.dbus.metadata

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+8e50e46796e8297eaa633da3a61cdc79a500e34a SOURCES/dbus-1.12.8.tar.gz

.gitignore

@@ -1,68 +1 @@
-/*.log
-/dbus-*/
-/*.src.rpm
-/noarch/
-/x86_64/
-/dbus-1.3.2.885483.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.4.0.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.4.10.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.4.20.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.6.0.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.6.6.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.6.8.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.6.12.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.6.18.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.8.4.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.8.6.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.8.12.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.8.14.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.8.16.tar.gz
-/dubs-1.9.14.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.9.16.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.9.18.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.9.20.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.10.0.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.10.2.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.10.4.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.10.6.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.0.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.2.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.4.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.6.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.8.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.10.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.12.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.14.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.16.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.18.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.20.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.11.22.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.0.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.8.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.10.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.12.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.14.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.16.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.16.tar.gz.asc
-/dbus-1.12.18.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.18.tar.gz.asc
-/dbus-1.12.20.tar.gz
-/dbus-1.12.20.tar.gz.asc
-/dbus-1.13.18.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.13.18.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.13.20.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.13.20.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.13.22.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.13.22.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.14.0.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.14.0.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.14.2.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.14.2.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.14.4.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.14.4.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.14.6.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.14.6.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.14.8.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.14.8.tar.xz.asc
-/dbus-1.14.10.tar.xz
-/dbus-1.14.10.tar.xz.asc
+SOURCES/dbus-1.12.8.tar.gz

SOURCES/dbus-1.12.8-fix-CVE-2019-12749.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+From 47b1a4c41004bf494b87370987b222c934b19016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 12:53:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] auth: Reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 for users other than the server
+ owner
+
+The DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication mechanism aims to prove ownership
+of a shared home directory by having the server write a secret "cookie"
+into a .dbus-keyrings subdirectory of the desired identity's home
+directory with 0700 permissions, and having the client prove that it can
+read the cookie. This never actually worked for non-malicious clients in
+the case where server uid != client uid (unless the server and client
+both have privileges, such as Linux CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or traditional
+Unix uid 0) because an unprivileged server would fail to write out the
+cookie, and an unprivileged client would be unable to read the resulting
+file owned by the server.
+
+Additionally, since dbus 1.7.10 we have checked that ~/.dbus-keyrings
+is owned by the uid of the server (a side-effect of a check added to
+harden our use of XDG_RUNTIME_DIR), further ruling out successful use
+by a non-malicious client with a uid differing from the server's.
+
+Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security discovered that the
+implementation of DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 was susceptible to a symbolic link
+attack: a malicious client with write access to its own home directory
+could manipulate a ~/.dbus-keyrings symlink to cause the DBusServer to
+read and write in unintended locations. In the worst case this could
+result in the DBusServer reusing a cookie that is known to the
+malicious client, and treating that cookie as evidence that a subsequent
+client connection came from an attacker-chosen uid, allowing
+authentication bypass.
+
+This is mitigated by the fact that by default, the well-known system
+dbus-daemon (since 2003) and the well-known session dbus-daemon (in
+stable releases since dbus 1.10.0 in 2015) only accept the EXTERNAL
+authentication mechanism, and as a result will reject DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
+at an early stage, before manipulating cookies. As a result, this
+vulnerability only applies to:
+
+* system or session dbus-daemons with non-standard configuration
+* third-party dbus-daemon invocations such as at-spi2-core (although
+  in practice at-spi2-core also only accepts EXTERNAL by default)
+* third-party uses of DBusServer such as the one in Upstart
+
+Avoiding symlink attacks in a portable way is difficult, because APIs
+like openat() and Linux /proc/self/fd are not universally available.
+However, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 already doesn't work in practice for
+a non-matching uid, we can solve this vulnerability in an easier way
+without regressions, by rejecting it early (before looking at
+~/.dbus-keyrings) whenever the requested identity doesn't match the
+identity of the process hosting the DBusServer.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/issues/269
+Closes: CVE-2019-12749
+---
+ dbus/dbus-auth.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-auth.c b/dbus/dbus-auth.c
+index 37d8d4c9..7390a9d5 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-auth.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-auth.c
+@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ sha1_handle_first_client_response (DBusAuth         *auth,
+   DBusString tmp2;
+   dbus_bool_t retval = FALSE;
+   DBusError error = DBUS_ERROR_INIT;
++  DBusCredentials *myself = NULL;
+ 
+   _dbus_string_set_length (&auth->challenge, 0);
+   
+@@ -565,6 +566,34 @@ sha1_handle_first_client_response (DBusAuth         *auth,
+       return FALSE;
+     }
+ 
++  myself = _dbus_credentials_new_from_current_process ();
++
++  if (myself == NULL)
++    goto out;
++
++  if (!_dbus_credentials_same_user (myself, auth->desired_identity))
++    {
++      /*
++       * DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 is not suitable for authenticating that the
++       * client is anyone other than the user owning the process
++       * containing the DBusServer: we probably aren't allowed to write
++       * to other users' home directories. Even if we can (for example
++       * uid 0 on traditional Unix or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE on Linux), we
++       * must not, because the other user controls their home directory,
++       * and could carry out symlink attacks to make us read from or
++       * write to unintended locations. It's difficult to avoid symlink
++       * attacks in a portable way, so we just don't try. This isn't a
++       * regression, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 never worked for other
++       * users anyway.
++       */
++      _dbus_verbose ("%s: client tried to authenticate as \"%s\", "
++                     "but that doesn't match this process",
++                     DBUS_AUTH_NAME (auth),
++                     _dbus_string_get_const_data (data));
++      retval = send_rejected (auth);
++      goto out;
++    }
++
+   /* we cache the keyring for speed, so here we drop it if it's the
+    * wrong one. FIXME caching the keyring here is useless since we use
+    * a different DBusAuth for every connection.
+@@ -679,6 +708,9 @@ sha1_handle_first_client_response (DBusAuth         *auth,
+   _dbus_string_zero (&tmp2);
+   _dbus_string_free (&tmp2);
+ 
++  if (myself != NULL)
++    _dbus_credentials_unref (myself);
++
+   return retval;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.21.0
+

SOURCES/dbus-1.12.8-fix-CVE-2020-12049.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 872b085f12f56da25a2dbd9bd0b2dff31d5aea63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:45:11 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] sysdeps-unix: On MSG_CTRUNC, close the fds we did receive
+
+MSG_CTRUNC indicates that we have received fewer fds that we should
+have done because the buffer was too small, but we were treating it
+as though it indicated that we received *no* fds. If we received any,
+we still have to make sure we close them, otherwise they will be leaked.
+
+On the system bus, if an attacker can induce us to leak fds in this
+way, that's a local denial of service via resource exhaustion.
+
+Reported-by: Kevin Backhouse, GitHub Security Lab
+Fixes: dbus#294
+Fixes: CVE-2020-12049
+Fixes: GHSL-2020-057
+---
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
+index b5fc24663..b176dae1a 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
+@@ -435,18 +435,6 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket        fd,
+       struct cmsghdr *cm;
+       dbus_bool_t found = FALSE;
+ 
+-      if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
+-        {
+-          /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad
+-             thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds
+-             without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a
+-             serious error. */
+-
+-          errno = ENOSPC;
+-          _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
+-          return -1;
+-        }
+-
+       for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&m); cm; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&m, cm))
+         if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cm->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS)
+           {
+@@ -501,6 +489,26 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket        fd,
+       if (!found)
+         *n_fds = 0;
+ 
++      if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
++        {
++          unsigned int i;
++
++          /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad
++             thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds
++             without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a
++             serious error. */
++
++          /* We still need to close whatever fds we *did* receive,
++           * otherwise they'll never get closed. (CVE-2020-12049) */
++          for (i = 0; i < *n_fds; i++)
++            close (fds[i]);
++
++          *n_fds = 0;
++          errno = ENOSPC;
++          _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
++          return -1;
++        }
++
+       /* put length back (doesn't actually realloc) */
+       _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start + bytes_read);
+ 
+-- 
+GitLab
+

SOURCES/dbus-1.12.8-fix-CVE-2023-34969.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+From 3a1b1e9a4010e581e2e940e61d37c4f617eb5eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 17:56:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] monitor test: Log the messages that we monitored
+
+This is helpful while debugging test failures.
+
+Helps: dbus/dbus#457
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 8ee5d3e04420975107c27073b50f8758871a998b)
+---
+ test/monitor.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/monitor.c b/test/monitor.c
+index df5a7180..182110f8 100644
+--- a/test/monitor.c
++++ b/test/monitor.c
+@@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ _log_message (DBusMessage *m,
+       not_null (dbus_message_get_signature (m)));
+   g_test_message ("\terror name: %s",
+       not_null (dbus_message_get_error_name (m)));
++  g_test_message ("\tserial number: %u",
++      dbus_message_get_serial (m));
++  g_test_message ("\tin reply to: %u",
++      dbus_message_get_reply_serial (m));
+ 
+   if (strcmp ("s", dbus_message_get_signature (m)) == 0)
+     {
+@@ -339,6 +343,9 @@ monitor_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
+ {
+   Fixture *f = user_data;
+ 
++  g_test_message ("Monitor received message:");
++  log_message (message);
++
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_get_interface (message), !=,
+       "com.example.Tedious");
+ 
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+
+From 37a4dc5835731a1f7a81f1b67c45b8dfb556dd1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: hongjinghao <q1204531485@163.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 18:17:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] bus: Assign a serial number for messages from the driver
+
+Normally, it's enough to rely on a message being given a serial number
+by the DBusConnection just before it is actually sent. However, in the
+rare case where the policy blocks the driver from sending a message
+(due to a deny rule or the outgoing message quota being full), we need
+to get a valid serial number sooner, so that we can copy it into the
+DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_REPLY_SERIAL field (which is mandatory) in the error
+message sent to monitors. Otherwise, the dbus-daemon will crash with
+an assertion failure if at least one Monitoring client is attached,
+because zero is not a valid serial number to copy.
+
+This fixes a denial-of-service vulnerability: if a privileged user is
+monitoring the well-known system bus using a Monitoring client like
+dbus-monitor or `busctl monitor`, then an unprivileged user can cause
+denial-of-service by triggering this crash. A mitigation for this
+vulnerability is to avoid attaching Monitoring clients to the system
+bus when they are not needed. If there are no Monitoring clients, then
+the vulnerable code is not reached.
+
+Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Resolves: dbus/dbus#457
+(cherry picked from commit b159849e031000d1dbc1ab876b5fc78a3ce9b534)
+---
+ bus/connection.c                | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h |  2 ++
+ dbus/dbus-connection.c          | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/connection.c b/bus/connection.c
+index b3583433..215f0230 100644
+--- a/bus/connection.c
++++ b/bus/connection.c
+@@ -2350,6 +2350,21 @@ bus_transaction_send_from_driver (BusTransaction *transaction,
+   if (!dbus_message_set_sender (message, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS))
+     return FALSE;
+ 
++  /* Make sure the message has a non-zero serial number, otherwise
++   * bus_transaction_capture_error_reply() will not be able to mock up
++   * a corresponding reply for it. Normally this would be delayed until
++   * the first time we actually send the message out from a
++   * connection, when the transaction is committed, but that's too late
++   * in this case.
++   */
++  if (dbus_message_get_serial (message) == 0)
++    {
++      dbus_uint32_t next_serial;
++
++      next_serial = _dbus_connection_get_next_client_serial (connection);
++      dbus_message_set_serial (message, next_serial);
++    }
++
+   if (bus_connection_is_active (connection))
+     {
+       if (!dbus_message_set_destination (message,
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h b/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h
+index 48357321..ba79b192 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h
++++ b/dbus/dbus-connection-internal.h
+@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
+ DBusConnection *  _dbus_connection_ref_unlocked                (DBusConnection     *connection);
+ DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
+ void              _dbus_connection_unref_unlocked              (DBusConnection     *connection);
++DBUS_PRIVATE_EXPORT
++dbus_uint32_t     _dbus_connection_get_next_client_serial      (DBusConnection *connection);
+ void              _dbus_connection_queue_received_message_link (DBusConnection     *connection,
+                                                                 DBusList           *link);
+ dbus_bool_t       _dbus_connection_has_messages_to_send_unlocked (DBusConnection     *connection);
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-connection.c b/dbus/dbus-connection.c
+index c525b6dc..09cef278 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-connection.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-connection.c
+@@ -1456,7 +1456,16 @@ _dbus_connection_unref_unlocked (DBusConnection *connection)
+     _dbus_connection_last_unref (connection);
+ }
+ 
+-static dbus_uint32_t
++/**
++ * Allocate and return the next non-zero serial number for outgoing messages.
++ *
++ * This method is only valid to call from single-threaded code, such as
++ * the dbus-daemon, or with the connection lock held.
++ *
++ * @param connection the connection
++ * @returns A suitable serial number for the next message to be sent on the connection.
++ */
++dbus_uint32_t
+ _dbus_connection_get_next_client_serial (DBusConnection *connection)
+ {
+   dbus_uint32_t serial;
+-- 
+2.41.0
+
+
+From 2c699f6ba9c162878c69d0728298c1ab7308db72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2023 18:51:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] monitor test: Reproduce dbus/dbus#457
+
+The exact failure mode reported in dbus/dbus#457 is quite difficult
+to achieve in a reliable way in a unit test, because we'd have to send
+enough messages to a client to fill up its queue, then stop that client
+from draining its queue, while still triggering a message that gets a
+reply from the bus driver. However, we can trigger the same crash in a
+slightly different way by not allowing the client to receive a
+particular message. I chose NameAcquired.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 986611ad0f7f67a3693e5672cd66bc608c00b228)
+---
+ .../valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in     |  3 +
+ test/monitor.c                                | 77 ++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in b/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in
+index d145613c..58b3cc6a 100644
+--- a/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in
++++ b/test/data/valid-config-files/forbidding.conf.in
+@@ -24,5 +24,8 @@
+     <allow send_interface="com.example.CannotUnicast2" send_broadcast="true"/>
+ 
+     <deny receive_interface="com.example.CannotReceive"/>
++
++    <!-- Used to reproduce dbus#457 -->
++    <deny receive_interface="org.freedesktop.DBus" receive_member="NameAcquired"/>
+   </policy>
+ </busconfig>
+diff --git a/test/monitor.c b/test/monitor.c
+index 182110f8..42e0734d 100644
+--- a/test/monitor.c
++++ b/test/monitor.c
+@@ -155,6 +155,21 @@ static Config side_effects_config = {
+     TRUE
+ };
+ 
++static dbus_bool_t
++config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (const Config *config)
++{
++  if (config == NULL)
++    return FALSE;
++
++  if (config->config_file == NULL)
++    return FALSE;
++
++  if (strcmp (config->config_file, forbidding_config.config_file) == 0)
++    return TRUE;
++
++  return FALSE;
++}
++
+ static inline const char *
+ not_null2 (const char *x,
+     const char *fallback)
+@@ -253,9 +268,6 @@ do { \
+ 
+ #define assert_name_acquired(m) \
+ do { \
+-  DBusError _e = DBUS_ERROR_INIT; \
+-  const char *_s; \
+-    \
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_type_to_string (dbus_message_get_type (m)), \
+       ==, dbus_message_type_to_string (DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)); \
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_get_sender (m), ==, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS); \
+@@ -265,7 +277,14 @@ do { \
+   g_assert_cmpstr (dbus_message_get_signature (m), ==, "s"); \
+   g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_serial (m), !=, 0); \
+   g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_reply_serial (m), ==, 0); \
++} while (0)
++
++#define assert_unique_name_acquired(m) \
++do { \
++  DBusError _e = DBUS_ERROR_INIT; \
++  const char *_s; \
+     \
++  assert_name_acquired (m); \
+   dbus_message_get_args (m, &_e, \
+         DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &_s, \
+         DBUS_TYPE_INVALID); \
+@@ -333,6 +352,21 @@ do { \
+   g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_reply_serial (m), !=, 0); \
+ } while (0)
+ 
++/* forbidding.conf does not allow receiving NameAcquired, so if we are in
++ * that configuration, then dbus-daemon synthesizes an error reply to itself
++ * and sends that to monitors */
++#define expect_name_acquired_error(queue, in_reply_to) \
++do { \
++  DBusMessage *message; \
++  \
++  message = g_queue_pop_head (queue); \
++  assert_error_reply (message, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS, \
++                      DBUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED); \
++  g_assert_cmpint (dbus_message_get_reply_serial (message), ==, \
++                   dbus_message_get_serial (in_reply_to)); \
++  dbus_message_unref (message); \
++} while (0)
++
+ /* This is called after processing pending replies to our own method
+  * calls, but before anything else.
+  */
+@@ -797,6 +831,11 @@ test_become_monitor (Fixture *f,
+   test_assert_no_error (&f->e);
+   g_assert_cmpint (ret, ==, DBUS_REQUEST_NAME_REPLY_PRIMARY_OWNER);
+ 
++  /* If the policy forbids receiving NameAcquired, then we'll never
++   * receive it, so behave as though we had */
++  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
++    got_unique = got_a = got_b = got_c = TRUE;
++
+   while (!got_unique || !got_a || !got_b || !got_c)
+     {
+       if (g_queue_is_empty (&f->monitored))
+@@ -1448,6 +1487,7 @@ test_dbus_daemon (Fixture *f,
+ {
+   DBusMessage *m;
+   int res;
++  size_t n_expected;
+ 
+   if (f->address == NULL)
+     return;
+@@ -1463,7 +1503,12 @@ test_dbus_daemon (Fixture *f,
+   test_assert_no_error (&f->e);
+   g_assert_cmpint (res, ==, DBUS_RELEASE_NAME_REPLY_RELEASED);
+ 
+-  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < 8)
++  n_expected = 8;
++
++  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (context))
++    n_expected += 1;
++
++  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < n_expected)
+     test_main_context_iterate (f->ctx, TRUE);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+@@ -1476,10 +1521,12 @@ test_dbus_daemon (Fixture *f,
+       "NameOwnerChanged", "sss", NULL);
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ 
+-  /* FIXME: should we get this? */
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+-  assert_signal (m, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS, DBUS_PATH_DBUS, DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
+-      "NameAcquired", "s", f->sender_name);
++  assert_name_acquired (m);
++
++  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
++    expect_name_acquired_error (&f->monitored, m);
++
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+@@ -1701,8 +1748,14 @@ static void
+ expect_new_connection (Fixture *f)
+ {
+   DBusMessage *m;
++  size_t n_expected;
+ 
+-  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < 4)
++  n_expected = 4;
++
++  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
++    n_expected += 1;
++
++  while (g_queue_get_length (&f->monitored) < n_expected)
+     test_main_context_iterate (f->ctx, TRUE);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+@@ -1719,7 +1772,11 @@ expect_new_connection (Fixture *f)
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ 
+   m = g_queue_pop_head (&f->monitored);
+-  assert_name_acquired (m);
++  assert_unique_name_acquired (m);
++
++  if (config_forbids_name_acquired_signal (f->config))
++    expect_name_acquired_error (&f->monitored, m);
++
+   dbus_message_unref (m);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2044,6 +2101,8 @@ main (int argc,
+       setup, test_method_call, teardown);
+   g_test_add ("/monitor/forbidden-method", Fixture, &forbidding_config,
+       setup, test_forbidden_method_call, teardown);
++  g_test_add ("/monitor/forbidden-reply", Fixture, &forbidding_config,
++      setup, test_dbus_daemon, teardown);
+   g_test_add ("/monitor/dbus-daemon", Fixture, NULL,
+       setup, test_dbus_daemon, teardown);
+   g_test_add ("/monitor/selective", Fixture, &selective_config,
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/dbus-1.12.8-fix-fd-limit-change.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+From 94bacc6955e563a7e698e53151a75323279a9f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 09:03:39 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] bus: Try to raise soft fd limit to match hard limit
+
+Linux systems have traditionally set the soft limit to 1024 and the hard
+limit to 4096. Recent versions of systemd keep the soft fd limit at
+1024 to avoid breaking programs that still use select(), but raise the
+hard limit to 512*1024, while in recent Debian versions a complicated
+interaction between components gives a soft limit of 1024 and a hard
+limit of 1024*1024. If we can, we might as well elevate our soft limit
+to match the hard limit, minimizing the chance that we will run out of
+file descriptor slots.
+
+Unlike the previous code to raise the hard and soft limits to at least
+65536, we do this even if we don't have privileges: privileges are
+unnecessary to raise the soft limit up to the hard limit.
+
+If we *do* have privileges, we also continue to raise the hard and soft
+limits to at least 65536 if they weren't already that high, making
+it harder to carry out a denial of service attack on the system bus on
+systems that use the traditional limit (CVE-2014-7824).
+
+As was previously the case on the system bus, we'll drop the limits back
+to our initial limits before we execute a subprocess for traditional
+(non-systemd) activation, if enabled.
+
+systemd activation doesn't involve us starting subprocesses at all,
+so in both cases activated services will still inherit the same limits
+they did previously.
+
+This change also fixes a bug when the hard limit is very large but
+the soft limit is not, for example seen as a regression when upgrading
+to systemd >= 240 (Debian #928877). In such environments, dbus-daemon
+would previously have changed its fd limit to 64K soft/64K hard. Because
+this hard limit is less than its original hard limit, it was unable to
+restore its original hard limit as intended when carrying out traditional
+activation, leaving activated subprocesses with unintended limits (while
+logging a warning).
+
+Reviewed-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+[smcv: Correct a comment based on Lennart's review, reword commit message]
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 7eacbfece70f16bb54d0f3ac51f87ae398759ef5)
+[smcv: Mention that this also fixes Debian #928877]
+---
+ bus/bus.c                     |  8 ++---
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c  |  3 +-
+ dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h           |  3 +-
+ 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/bus/bus.c b/bus/bus.c
+index 30ce4e10..2ad8e789 100644
+--- a/bus/bus.c
++++ b/bus/bus.c
+@@ -693,11 +693,11 @@ raise_file_descriptor_limit (BusContext      *context)
+   /* We used to compute a suitable rlimit based on the configured number
+    * of connections, but that breaks down as soon as we allow fd-passing,
+    * because each connection is allowed to pass 64 fds to us, and if
+-   * they all did, we'd hit kernel limits. We now hard-code 64k as a
+-   * good limit, like systemd does: that's enough to avoid DoS from
+-   * anything short of multiple uids conspiring against us.
++   * they all did, we'd hit kernel limits. We now hard-code a good
++   * limit that is enough to avoid DoS from anything short of multiple
++   * uids conspiring against us, much like systemd does.
+    */
+-  if (!_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit_if_privileged (65536, &error))
++  if (!_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit (&error))
+     {
+       bus_context_log (context, DBUS_SYSTEM_LOG_WARNING,
+                        "%s: %s", error.name, error.message);
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c
+index 2be5b779..7c4c3604 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-unix.c
+@@ -406,23 +406,15 @@ _dbus_rlimit_save_fd_limit (DBusError *error)
+   return self;
+ }
+ 
++/* Enough fds that we shouldn't run out, even if several uids work
++ * together to carry out a denial-of-service attack. This happens to be
++ * the same number that systemd < 234 would normally use. */
++#define ENOUGH_FDS 65536
++
+ dbus_bool_t
+-_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit_if_privileged (unsigned int  desired,
+-                                           DBusError    *error)
++_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit (DBusError *error)
+ {
+-  struct rlimit lim;
+-
+-  /* No point to doing this practically speaking
+-   * if we're not uid 0.  We expect the system
+-   * bus to use this before we change UID, and
+-   * the session bus takes the Linux default,
+-   * currently 1024 for cur and 4096 for max.
+-   */
+-  if (getuid () != 0)
+-    {
+-      /* not an error, we're probably the session bus */
+-      return TRUE;
+-    }
++  struct rlimit old, lim;
+ 
+   if (getrlimit (RLIMIT_NOFILE, &lim) < 0)
+     {
+@@ -431,22 +423,43 @@ _dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit_if_privileged (unsigned int  desired,
+       return FALSE;
+     }
+ 
+-  if (lim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY || lim.rlim_cur >= desired)
++  old = lim;
++
++  if (getuid () == 0)
+     {
+-      /* not an error, everything is fine */
+-      return TRUE;
++      /* We are privileged, so raise the soft limit to at least
++       * ENOUGH_FDS, and the hard limit to at least the desired soft
++       * limit. This assumes we can exercise CAP_SYS_RESOURCE on Linux,
++       * or other OSs' equivalents. */
++      if (lim.rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
++          lim.rlim_cur < ENOUGH_FDS)
++        lim.rlim_cur = ENOUGH_FDS;
++
++      if (lim.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY &&
++          lim.rlim_max < lim.rlim_cur)
++        lim.rlim_max = lim.rlim_cur;
+     }
+ 
+-  /* Ignore "maximum limit", assume we have the "superuser"
+-   * privileges.  On Linux this is CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
+-   */
+-  lim.rlim_cur = lim.rlim_max = desired;
++  /* Raise the soft limit to match the hard limit, which we can do even
++   * if we are unprivileged. In particular, systemd >= 240 will normally
++   * set rlim_cur to 1024 and rlim_max to 512*1024, recent Debian
++   * versions end up setting rlim_cur to 1024 and rlim_max to 1024*1024,
++   * and older and non-systemd Linux systems would typically set rlim_cur
++   * to 1024 and rlim_max to 4096. */
++  if (lim.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY || lim.rlim_cur < lim.rlim_max)
++    lim.rlim_cur = lim.rlim_max;
++
++  /* Early-return if there is nothing to do. */
++  if (lim.rlim_max == old.rlim_max &&
++      lim.rlim_cur == old.rlim_cur)
++    return TRUE;
+ 
+   if (setrlimit (RLIMIT_NOFILE, &lim) < 0)
+     {
+       dbus_set_error (error, _dbus_error_from_errno (errno),
+-                      "Failed to set fd limit to %u: %s",
+-                      desired, _dbus_strerror (errno));
++                      "Failed to set fd limit to %lu: %s",
++                      (unsigned long) lim.rlim_cur,
++                      _dbus_strerror (errno));
+       return FALSE;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -485,8 +498,7 @@ _dbus_rlimit_save_fd_limit (DBusError *error)
+ }
+ 
+ dbus_bool_t
+-_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit_if_privileged (unsigned int  desired,
+-                                           DBusError    *error)
++_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit (DBusError *error)
+ {
+   fd_limit_not_supported (error);
+   return FALSE;
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c
+index 1ef4ae6c..1c1d9f7d 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-util-win.c
+@@ -273,8 +273,7 @@ _dbus_rlimit_save_fd_limit (DBusError *error)
+ }
+ 
+ dbus_bool_t
+-_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit_if_privileged (unsigned int  desired,
+-                                           DBusError    *error)
++_dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit (DBusError *error)
+ {
+   fd_limit_not_supported (error);
+   return FALSE;
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h
+index ef786ecc..0b9d7696 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h
++++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps.h
+@@ -698,8 +698,7 @@ dbus_bool_t _dbus_replace_install_prefix (DBusString *path);
+ typedef struct DBusRLimit DBusRLimit;
+ 
+ DBusRLimit     *_dbus_rlimit_save_fd_limit                 (DBusError    *error);
+-dbus_bool_t     _dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit_if_privileged  (unsigned int  desired,
+-                                                            DBusError    *error);
++dbus_bool_t     _dbus_rlimit_raise_fd_limit                (DBusError    *error);
+ dbus_bool_t     _dbus_rlimit_restore_fd_limit              (DBusRLimit   *saved,
+                                                             DBusError    *error);
+ void            _dbus_rlimit_free                          (DBusRLimit   *lim);
+-- 
+GitLab
+

SOURCES/dbus-1.20.8-CVE-2022-42010.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From 8f382ee405ec68850866298ba0574f12e261a6fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2022 15:10:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dbus-marshal-validate: Check brackets in signature nest
+ correctly
+
+In debug builds with assertions enabled, a signature with incorrectly
+nested `()` and `{}`, for example `a{i(u}` or `(a{ii)}`, could result
+in an assertion failure.
+
+In production builds without assertions enabled, a signature with
+incorrectly nested `()` and `{}` could potentially result in a crash
+or incorrect message parsing, although we do not have a concrete example
+of either of these failure modes.
+
+Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/418
+Resolves: CVE-2022-42010
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 9d07424e9011e3bbe535e83043d335f3093d2916)
+(cherry picked from commit 3e53a785dee8d1432156188a2c4260e4cbc78c4d)
+---
+ dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+index 4d492f3f3..ae68414dd 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+ 
+   int element_count;
+   DBusList *element_count_stack;
++  char opened_brackets[DBUS_MAXIMUM_TYPE_RECURSION_DEPTH * 2 + 1] = { '\0' };
++  char last_bracket;
+ 
+   result = DBUS_VALID;
+   element_count_stack = NULL;
+@@ -93,6 +95,10 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+ 
+   while (p != end)
+     {
++      _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 0);
++      _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
++      _dbus_assert (opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth] == '\0');
++
+       switch (*p)
+         {
+         case DBUS_TYPE_BYTE:
+@@ -136,6 +142,10 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               goto out;
+             }
+ 
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
++          _dbus_assert (opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] == '\0');
++          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] = DBUS_STRUCT_BEGIN_CHAR;
+           break;
+ 
+         case DBUS_STRUCT_END_CHAR:
+@@ -151,9 +161,20 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               goto out;
+             }
+ 
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
++          last_bracket = opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1];
++
++          if (last_bracket != DBUS_STRUCT_BEGIN_CHAR)
++            {
++              result = DBUS_INVALID_STRUCT_ENDED_BUT_NOT_STARTED;
++              goto out;
++            }
++
+           _dbus_list_pop_last (&element_count_stack);
+ 
+           struct_depth -= 1;
++          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth] = '\0';
+           break;
+ 
+         case DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_BEGIN_CHAR:
+@@ -178,6 +199,10 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               goto out;
+             }
+ 
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
++          _dbus_assert (opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] == '\0');
++          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1] = DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_BEGIN_CHAR;
+           break;
+ 
+         case DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_END_CHAR:
+@@ -186,8 +211,19 @@ _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (const DBusString *type_str,
+               result = DBUS_INVALID_DICT_ENTRY_ENDED_BUT_NOT_STARTED;
+               goto out;
+             }
+-            
++
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth >= 1);
++          _dbus_assert (struct_depth + dict_entry_depth < _DBUS_N_ELEMENTS (opened_brackets));
++          last_bracket = opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth - 1];
++
++          if (last_bracket != DBUS_DICT_ENTRY_BEGIN_CHAR)
++            {
++              result = DBUS_INVALID_DICT_ENTRY_ENDED_BUT_NOT_STARTED;
++              goto out;
++            }
++
+           dict_entry_depth -= 1;
++          opened_brackets[struct_depth + dict_entry_depth] = '\0';
+ 
+           element_count = 
+             _DBUS_POINTER_TO_INT (_dbus_list_pop_last (&element_count_stack));
+-- 
+GitLab
+

SOURCES/dbus-1.20.8-CVE-2022-42011.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 3b8a7aff228770f4f7b478db606b10cceacea875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2022 13:14:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dbus-marshal-validate: Validate length of arrays of
+ fixed-length items
+
+This fast-path previously did not check that the array was made up
+of an integer number of items. This could lead to assertion failures
+and out-of-bounds accesses during subsequent message processing (which
+assumes that the message has already been validated), particularly after
+the addition of _dbus_header_remove_unknown_fields(), which makes it
+more likely that dbus-daemon will apply non-trivial edits to messages.
+
+Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
+Fixes: e61f13cf "Bug 18064 - more efficient validation for fixed-size type arrays"
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/413
+Resolves: CVE-2022-42011
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 079bbf16186e87fb0157adf8951f19864bc2ed69)
+(cherry picked from commit b9e6a7523085a2cfceaffca7ba1ab4251f12a984)
+---
+ dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+index ae68414dd..7d0d6cf72 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-marshal-validate.c
+@@ -503,13 +503,24 @@ validate_body_helper (DBusTypeReader       *reader,
+                  */ 
+                 if (dbus_type_is_fixed (array_elem_type))
+                   {
++                    /* Note that fixed-size types all have sizes equal to
++                     * their alignments, so this is really the item size. */
++                    alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
++                    _dbus_assert (alignment == 1 || alignment == 2 ||
++                                  alignment == 4 || alignment == 8);
++
++                    /* Because the alignment is a power of 2, this is
++                     * equivalent to: (claimed_len % alignment) != 0,
++                     * but avoids slower integer division */
++                    if ((claimed_len & (alignment - 1)) != 0)
++                      return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_INCORRECT;
++
+                     /* bools need to be handled differently, because they can
+                      * have an invalid value
+                      */
+                     if (array_elem_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
+                       {
+                         dbus_uint32_t v;
+-                        alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
+ 
+                         while (p < array_end)
+                           {
+-- 
+GitLab
+

SOURCES/dbus-1.20.8-CVE-2022-42012.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 51a5bbf9074855b0f4a353ed309938b196c13525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 13:46:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] dbus-marshal-byteswap: Byte-swap Unix fd indexes if needed
+
+When a D-Bus message includes attached file descriptors, the body of the
+message contains unsigned 32-bit indexes pointing into an out-of-band
+array of file descriptors. Some D-Bus APIs like GLib's GDBus refer to
+these indexes as "handles" for the associated fds (not to be confused
+with a Windows HANDLE, which is a kernel object).
+
+The assertion message removed by this commit is arguably correct up to
+a point: fd-passing is only reasonable on a local machine, and no known
+operating system allows processes of differing endianness even on a
+multi-endian ARM or PowerPC CPU, so it makes little sense for the sender
+to specify a byte-order that differs from the byte-order of the recipient.
+
+However, this doesn't account for the fact that a malicious sender
+doesn't have to restrict itself to only doing things that make sense.
+On a system with untrusted local users, a message sender could crash
+the system dbus-daemon (a denial of service) by sending a message in
+the opposite endianness that contains handles to file descriptors.
+
+Before this commit, if assertions are enabled, attempting to byteswap
+a fd index would cleanly crash the message recipient with an assertion
+failure. If assertions are disabled, attempting to byteswap a fd index
+would silently do nothing without advancing the pointer p, causing the
+message's type and the pointer into its contents to go out of sync, which
+can result in a subsequent crash (the crash demonstrated by fuzzing was
+a use-after-free, but other failure modes might be possible).
+
+In principle we could resolve this by rejecting wrong-endianness messages
+from a local sender, but it's actually simpler and less code to treat
+wrong-endianness messages as valid and byteswap them.
+
+Thanks: Evgeny Vereshchagin
+Fixes: ba7daa60 "unix-fd: add basic marshalling code for unix fds"
+Resolves: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/issues/417
+Resolves: CVE-2022-42012
+Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 236f16e444e88a984cf12b09225e0f8efa6c5b44)
+(cherry picked from commit 3fb065b0752db1e298e4ada52cf4adc414f5e946)
+---
+ dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c | 6 +-----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c b/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c
+index 27695aafb..7104e9c63 100644
+--- a/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-marshal-byteswap.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ byteswap_body_helper (DBusTypeReader       *reader,
+         case DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+         case DBUS_TYPE_INT32:
+         case DBUS_TYPE_UINT32:
++        case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
+           {
+             p = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, 4);
+             *((dbus_uint32_t*)p) = DBUS_UINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (*((dbus_uint32_t*)p));
+@@ -188,11 +189,6 @@ byteswap_body_helper (DBusTypeReader       *reader,
+           }
+           break;
+ 
+-        case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
+-          /* fds can only be passed on a local machine, so byte order must always match */
+-          _dbus_assert_not_reached("attempted to byteswap unix fds which makes no sense");
+-          break;
+-
+         default:
+           _dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid typecode in supposedly-validated signature");
+           break;
+-- 
+GitLab
+

SOURCES/dbus-kill-process-with-session

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# This script ensures the dbus-daemon is killed when the session closes.
+# It's used by SSH sessions that have X forwarding (since the X display
+# may outlive the session in those cases)
+[ $# != 1 ] && exit 1
+
+exec >& /dev/null
+
+MONITOR_READY_FILE=$(mktemp dbus-session-monitor.XXXXXX --tmpdir)
+DBUS_SESSIONS="${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}/dbus-1/sessions"
+DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE="${DBUS_SESSIONS}/${XDG_SESSION_ID}"
+
+trap 'rm -f "${MONITOR_READY_FILE}"; rm -f "${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE}"; kill -TERM $1; kill -HUP $(jobs -p)' EXIT
+
+export GVFS_DISABLE_FUSE=1
+coproc SESSION_MONITOR (gio monitor -f "/run/systemd/sessions/${XDG_SESSION_ID}" "${MONITOR_READY_FILE}")
+
+# Poll until the gio monitor command is actively monitoring
+until
+    touch "${MONITOR_READY_FILE}"
+    read -t 0.5 -u ${SESSION_MONITOR[0]}
+do
+    continue
+done
+
+# Block until the session is closed
+while grep -q ^State=active <(loginctl show-session $XDG_SESSION_ID)
+do
+    read -u ${SESSION_MONITOR[0]}
+done

SOURCES/ssh-x-forwarding.csh

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# DBus session bus over SSH with X11 forwarding
+if ( $?SSH_CONNECTION == 0 ) exit
+if ( $?XDG_SESSION_ID == 0) exit
+if ( $?DISPLAY == 0 ) exit
+if ( $SHLVL > 1 ) exit
+
+set DBUS_SESSIONS = "${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}/dbus-1/sessions"
+set DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE = "${DBUS_SESSIONS}/${XDG_SESSION_ID}"
+
+if ( -e "${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE}" ) then
+    setenv DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS "`cat ${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE}`"
+    exit
+endif
+
+setenv GDK_BACKEND x11
+
+eval `dbus-launch --csh-syntax`
+
+if ( $?DBUS_SESSION_BUS_PID == 0 ) exit
+
+mkdir -p "${DBUS_SESSIONS}"
+echo "${DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS}" > "${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE}"
+
+setsid -f /usr/libexec/dbus-1/dbus-kill-process-with-session $DBUS_SESSION_BUS_PID

SOURCES/ssh-x-forwarding.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# DBus session bus over SSH with X11 forwarding
+[ -z "$SSH_CONNECTION" ] && return
+[ -z "$XDG_SESSION_ID" ] && return
+[ -z "$DISPLAY" ] && return
+[ "${DISPLAY:0:1}" = ":" ] && return
+[ "$SHLVL" -ne 1 ] && return
+
+DBUS_SESSIONS="${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR}/dbus-1/sessions"
+DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE="${DBUS_SESSIONS}/${XDG_SESSION_ID}"
+
+if [ -e "${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE}" ]; then
+    export DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS="$(cat ${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE})"
+    return
+fi
+
+export GDK_BACKEND=x11
+
+eval `dbus-launch --sh-syntax`
+
+[ -z "$DBUS_SESSION_BUS_PID" ] && return
+
+mkdir -p "${DBUS_SESSIONS}"
+echo "${DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS}" > "${DBUS_SESSION_ADDRESS_FILE}"
+
+setsid -f /usr/libexec/dbus-1/dbus-kill-process-with-session "$DBUS_SESSION_BUS_PID"

SPECS/dbus.spec

@@ -5,11 +5,9 @@
 
 %global libselinux_version      2.0.86
 
-# fedora-release-30-0.2 and generic-release-0.1 added required presets to enable systemd-unit symlinks
-%global fedora_release_version  30-0.2
-%global generic_release_version 30-0.1
+%global dbus_user_uid           81
 
-%global dbus_common_config_opts --enable-libaudit --enable-selinux=yes --with-system-socket=/run/dbus/system_bus_socket --with-dbus-user=dbus --libexecdir=/%{_libexecdir}/dbus-1 --runstatedir=/run --enable-user-session --docdir=%{_pkgdocdir} --enable-installed-tests
+%global dbus_common_config_opts --enable-libaudit --enable-selinux=yes --with-system-socket=/run/dbus/system_bus_socket --with-dbus-user=dbus --libexecdir=/%{_libexecdir}/dbus-1 --enable-user-session --docdir=%{_pkgdocdir} --enable-installed-tests
 
 # Allow extra dependencies required for some tests to be disabled.
 %bcond_without tests
@@ -20,31 +18,41 @@
 
 Name:    dbus
 Epoch:   1
-Version: 1.14.10
-Release: 5%{?dist}
+Version: 1.12.8
+Release: 26%{?dist}
 Summary: D-BUS message bus
 
+Group:   System Environment/Libraries
 # The effective license of the majority of the package, including the shared
 # library, is "GPL-2+ or AFL-2.1". Certain utilities are "GPL-2+" only.
-License: (AFL-2.1 OR GPL-2.0-or-later) AND GPL-2.0-or-later
-URL:     https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/dbus/
-Source0: https://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/%{name}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz
-Source1: https://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/%{name}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
-# gpg --keyserver keyring.debian.org --recv-keys 36EC5A6448A4F5EF79BEFE98E05AE1478F814C4F
-# gpg --export --export-options export-minimal > gpgkey-36EC5A6448A4F5EF79BEFE98E05AE1478F814C4F.gpg
-Source2: gpgkey-36EC5A6448A4F5EF79BEFE98E05AE1478F814C4F.gpg
-Source3: 00-start-message-bus.sh
-Source4: dbus.socket
-Source5: dbus-daemon.service
-Source6: dbus.user.socket
-Source7: dbus-daemon.user.service
-Source8: dbus-systemd-sysusers.conf
+License: (GPLv2+ or AFL) and GPLv2+
+URL:     http://www.freedesktop.org/Software/dbus/
+#VCS:    git:git://git.freedesktop.org/git/dbus/dbus
+Source0: https://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/%{name}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1: 00-start-message-bus.sh
+Source2: ssh-x-forwarding.csh
+Source3: ssh-x-forwarding.sh
+Source4: dbus-kill-process-with-session
+Source5: dbus-systemd-sysusers.conf
 Patch0: 0001-tools-Use-Python3-for-GetAllMatchRules.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1725570
+Patch1: dbus-1.12.8-fix-CVE-2019-12749.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1851997
+Patch2: dbus-1.12.8-fix-CVE-2020-12049.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1839753
+Patch3: dbus-1.12.8-fix-fd-limit-change.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2133645
+Patch4: dbus-1.20.8-CVE-2022-42010.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2133639
+Patch5: dbus-1.20.8-CVE-2022-42011.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2133633
+Patch6: dbus-1.20.8-CVE-2022-42012.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2213400
+Patch7: dbus-1.12.8-fix-CVE-2023-34969.patch
 
 BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
 BuildRequires: libtool
 BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 0.9
-BuildRequires: gnupg2
 BuildRequires: libX11-devel
 BuildRequires: libcap-ng-devel
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(expat)
@@ -64,6 +72,7 @@ BuildRequires: cmake
 %endif
 
 #For macroized scriptlets.
+%{?systemd_requires}
 BuildRequires:    systemd
 
 # Note: These is only required for --with-tests; when bootstrapping, you can
@@ -76,10 +85,8 @@ BuildRequires: python3-gobject
 %if %{with check}
 BuildRequires: /usr/bin/Xvfb
 %endif
-BuildRequires: make
 
-# Since F30 the default implementation is dbus-broker over dbus-daemon
-Requires: dbus-broker >= 16-4
+Requires: %{name}-daemon = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 
 %description
 D-BUS is a system for sending messages between applications. It is
@@ -88,9 +95,9 @@ per-user-login-session messaging facility.
 
 %package common
 Summary:        D-BUS message bus configuration
+Group:          System Environment/Libraries
 BuildArch:      noarch
-Conflicts:      fedora-release < %{fedora_release_version}
-Conflicts:      generic-release < %{generic_release_version}
+Requires:       /usr/bin/systemctl
 
 %description common
 The %{name}-common package provides the configuration and setup files for D-Bus
@@ -98,13 +105,12 @@ implementations to provide a System and User Message Bus.
 
 %package daemon
 Summary:        D-BUS message bus
-Conflicts:      fedora-release < %{fedora_release_version}
-Conflicts:      generic-release < %{generic_release_version}
+Group:          System Environment/Libraries
+Requires(pre):  /usr/sbin/useradd
 Requires:       libselinux%{?_isa} >= %{libselinux_version}
 Requires:       dbus-common = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 Requires:       dbus-libs%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 Requires:       dbus-tools = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
-%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
 
 %description daemon
 D-BUS is a system for sending messages between applications. It is
@@ -113,6 +119,7 @@ per-user-login-session messaging facility.
 
 %package tools
 Summary:        D-BUS Tools and Utilities
+Group:          Development/Libraries
 Requires:       dbus-libs%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 
 %description tools
@@ -121,22 +128,16 @@ the reference implementation.
 
 %package libs
 Summary: Libraries for accessing D-BUS
+Group: Development/Libraries
 
 %description libs
 This package contains lowlevel libraries for accessing D-BUS.
 
-%package doc
-Summary: Developer documentation for D-BUS
-Requires: %{name}-daemon = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
-BuildArch: noarch
-
-%description doc
-This package contains developer documentation for D-Bus along with
-other supporting documentation such as the introspect dtd file.
-
 %package devel
 Summary: Development files for D-BUS
-Requires: dbus-libs%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
+Group: Development/Libraries
+# The server package can be a different architecture.
+Requires: %{name}-daemon = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 # For xml directory ownership.
 Requires: xml-common
 
@@ -146,6 +147,7 @@ developing software that uses D-BUS.
 
 %package tests
 Summary: Tests for the %{name}-daemon package
+Group: Development/Libraries
 Requires: %{name}-daemon%{?_isa} = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 
 %description tests
@@ -154,8 +156,11 @@ the functionality of the installed %{name}-daemon package.
 
 %package x11
 Summary: X11-requiring add-ons for D-BUS
+Group: Development/Libraries
 # The server package can be a different architecture.
 Requires: %{name}-daemon = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
+# Used by SSH daemon helper script.
+Requires: /usr/bin/gio
 
 %description x11
 D-BUS contains some tools that require Xlib to be installed, those are
@@ -163,7 +168,6 @@ in this separate package so server systems need not install X.
 
 
 %prep
-%{gpgverify} --keyring='%{SOURCE2}' --signature='%{SOURCE1}' --data='%{SOURCE0}'
 %autosetup -p1
 
 
@@ -174,34 +178,38 @@ if test -f autogen.sh; then env NOCONFIGURE=1 ./autogen.sh; else autoreconf --ve
 # Call configure here (before the extra directories for the multiple builds
 # have been created) to ensure that the hardening flag hack is applied to
 # ltmain.sh
-%configure %{dbus_common_config_opts} --enable-doxygen-docs --enable-ducktype-docs --enable-xml-docs --disable-asserts
+%configure %{dbus_common_config_opts} --disable-doxygen-docs %--enable-ducktype-docs --enable-xml-docs --disable-asserts
 make distclean
 
 mkdir build
 pushd build
 # See /usr/lib/rpm/macros
 %global _configure ../configure
-%configure %{dbus_common_config_opts} --enable-doxygen-docs --enable-ducktype-docs --enable-xml-docs --disable-asserts
-%make_build
+%configure %{dbus_common_config_opts} --disable-doxygen-docs --enable-ducktype-docs --enable-xml-docs --disable-asserts
+make V=1 %{?_smp_mflags}
 popd
 
 %if %{with check}
 mkdir build-check
 pushd build-check
 %configure %{dbus_common_config_opts} --enable-asserts --enable-verbose-mode --enable-tests
-%make_build
+make V=1 %{?_smp_mflags}
 popd
 %endif
 
 
 %install
 pushd build
-%make_install
+make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} INSTALL="install -p"
 popd
 
 # Delete python2 code
 rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}/examples/GetAllMatchRules.py
 
+# Delete docs
+rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}/examples/*.conf
+rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/gtk-doc
+
 find %{buildroot} -name '*.a' -type f -delete
 find %{buildroot} -name '*.la' -type f -delete
 
@@ -209,21 +217,13 @@ find %{buildroot} -name '*.la' -type f -delete
 rm -rf %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/cmake
 %endif
 
-# Delete upstream units
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/dbus.{socket,service}
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sockets.target.wants/dbus.socket
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/multi-user.target.wants/dbus.service
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_userunitdir}/dbus.{socket,service}
-rm -f %{buildroot}%{_userunitdir}/sockets.target.wants/dbus.socket
 rm -f %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/dbus.conf
 
-# Install downstream units
-install -Dp -m755 %{SOURCE3} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/X11/xinit/xinitrc.d/00-start-message-bus.sh
-install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/dbus.socket
-install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/dbus-daemon.service
-install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE6} %{buildroot}%{_userunitdir}/dbus.socket
-install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_userunitdir}/dbus-daemon.service
-install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/dbus.conf
+install -Dp -m755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/X11/xinit/xinitrc.d/00-start-message-bus.sh
+install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ssh-x-forwarding.csh
+install -p -m644 %{SOURCE3} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -Dp -m755 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/dbus-1/dbus-kill-process-with-session
+install -Dp -m644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/dbus.conf
 
 # Obsolete, but still widely used, for drop-in configuration snippets.
 install --directory %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/session.d
@@ -231,6 +231,11 @@ install --directory %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d
 
 install --directory %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/dbus-1/interfaces
 
+# Make sure that when somebody asks for D-Bus under the name of the
+# old SysV script, that he ends up with the standard dbus.service name
+# now.
+ln -s dbus.service %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/messagebus.service
+
 ## %find_lang %{gettext_package}
 
 install --directory %{buildroot}/var/lib/dbus
@@ -239,10 +244,6 @@ install --directory %{buildroot}/run/dbus
 install -pm 644 -t %{buildroot}%{_pkgdocdir} \
     doc/introspect.dtd doc/introspect.xsl doc/system-activation.txt
 
-# Make sure that the documentation shows up in Devhelp.
-install --directory %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/gtk-doc/html
-ln -s %{_pkgdocdir} %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/gtk-doc/html/dbus
-
 # Shell wrapper for installed tests, modified from Debian package.
 cat > dbus-run-installed-tests <<EOF
 #!/bin/sh
@@ -303,43 +304,26 @@ popd
 
 %pre daemon
 # Add the "dbus" user and group
-%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE8}
-
-%post common
-%systemd_post dbus.socket
-%systemd_user_post dbus.socket
+/usr/sbin/groupadd -r -g %{dbus_user_uid} dbus 2>/dev/null || :
+/usr/sbin/useradd -c 'System message bus' -u %{dbus_user_uid} -g %{dbus_user_uid} \
+    -s /sbin/nologin -r -d '/' dbus 2> /dev/null || :
 
 %post daemon
-%systemd_post dbus-daemon.service
-%systemd_user_post dbus-daemon.service
+%systemd_post dbus.service dbus.socket
+%systemd_user_post dbus.service dbus.socket
 
-%preun common
-%systemd_preun dbus.socket
-%systemd_user_preun dbus.socket
+%post libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %preun daemon
-%systemd_preun dbus-daemon.service
-%systemd_user_preun dbus-daemon.service
-
-%postun common
-%systemd_postun dbus.socket
-%systemd_user_postun dbus.socket
+%systemd_preun dbus.service dbus.socket
+%systemd_user_preun dbus.service dbus.socket
 
 %postun daemon
-%systemd_postun dbus-daemon.service
-%systemd_user_postun dbus-daemon.service
+%systemd_postun dbus.service dbus.socket
+%systemd_user_postun dbus.service dbus.socket
 
-%triggerpostun common -- dbus-common < 1:1.12.10-4
-if [ -x /usr/bin/systemctl ]; then
-    systemctl --no-reload preset dbus.socket &>/dev/null || :
-    systemctl --no-reload --global preset dbus.socket &>/dev/null || :
-fi
+%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
-%triggerpostun daemon -- dbus-daemon < 1:1.12.10-7
-if [ -x /usr/bin/systemctl ]; then
-    systemctl --no-reload preset dbus-daemon.service &>/dev/null || :
-    systemctl --no-reload --global preset dbus-daemon.service &>/dev/null || :
-fi
 
 %files
 # The 'dbus' package is only retained for compatibility purposes. It will
@@ -356,24 +340,19 @@ fi
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/session.conf
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.conf
 %dir %{_datadir}/dbus-1
-%dir %{_datadir}/dbus-1/session.d
-%dir %{_datadir}/dbus-1/system.d
 %{_datadir}/dbus-1/session.conf
 %{_datadir}/dbus-1/system.conf
 %{_datadir}/dbus-1/services
 %{_datadir}/dbus-1/system-services
 %{_datadir}/dbus-1/interfaces
 %{_sysusersdir}/dbus.conf
-%{_unitdir}/dbus.socket
-%{_userunitdir}/dbus.socket
 
 %files daemon
 # Strictly speaking, we could remove the COPYING from this subpackage and 
 # just have it be in libs, because dbus Requires dbus-libs.
 %{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
 %license COPYING
-%doc AUTHORS CONTRIBUTING.md NEWS README
-%exclude %{_pkgdocdir}/api
+%doc AUTHORS ChangeLog HACKING NEWS README
 %exclude %{_pkgdocdir}/diagram.*
 %exclude %{_pkgdocdir}/introspect.*
 %exclude %{_pkgdocdir}/system-activation.txt
@@ -394,8 +373,14 @@ fi
 %attr(4750,root,dbus) %{_libexecdir}/dbus-1/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
 %exclude %{_libexecdir}/dbus-1/dbus-run-installed-tests
 %{_tmpfilesdir}/dbus.conf
-%{_unitdir}/dbus-daemon.service
-%{_userunitdir}/dbus-daemon.service
+%{_unitdir}/dbus.service
+%{_unitdir}/dbus.socket
+%{_unitdir}/messagebus.service
+%{_unitdir}/multi-user.target.wants/dbus.service
+%{_unitdir}/sockets.target.wants/dbus.socket
+%{_userunitdir}/dbus.service
+%{_userunitdir}/dbus.socket
+%{_userunitdir}/sockets.target.wants/dbus.socket
 
 %files tools
 %{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
@@ -421,13 +406,11 @@ fi
 
 %files x11
 %{_bindir}/dbus-launch
+%{_libexecdir}/dbus-1/dbus-kill-process-with-session
 %{_mandir}/man1/dbus-launch.1*
+%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ssh-x-forwarding.*
 %{_sysconfdir}/X11/xinit/xinitrc.d/00-start-message-bus.sh
 
-%files doc
-%{_pkgdocdir}/*
-%{_datadir}/gtk-doc
-
 %files devel
 %{_datadir}/xml/dbus-1
 %{_libdir}/lib*.so
@@ -439,173 +422,84 @@ fi
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/dbus-1.pc
 %{_includedir}/*
 
-
 %changelog
-* Tue Oct 29 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 1:1.14.10-5
-- Bump release for October 2024 mass rebuild:
-  Resolves: RHEL-64018
+* Mon Jun 19 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1.12.8-26
+- Fix CVE-2023-34969 (#2213400)
 
-* Mon Jun 24 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 1:1.14.10-4
-- Bump release for June 2024 mass rebuild
+* Mon Apr 24 2023 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 1.12.8-25
+- Ensure only one dbus-daemon is spawned for all shells sharing
+  a single connection.
+  Resolves: #2189201
 
-* Wed Jan 24 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.14.10-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+* Wed Oct 19 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-24
+- Fix CVE-2022-42010 (#2133645)
+- Fix CVE-2022-42011 (#2133639)
+- Fix CVE-2022-42011 (#2133633)
 
-* Fri Jan 19 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.14.10-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+* Tue Sep 06 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-23
+- Address race for very short running sessions in SSH
+  session monitoring script.
+  Related: #2089362
 
-* Fri Sep 01 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.10-1
-- Update to 1.14.10
+* Tue Aug 09 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-22
+- Use hangup signal instead of termination signal to
+  kill sesssion monitoring script to appeach tcsh.
+  Related: #2089362
 
-* Wed Jul 19 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.14.8-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_39_Mass_Rebuild
+* Mon Aug 08 2022 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-20
+- Override sysusers configuration (#2090397)
 
-* Tue Jun 06 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.8-1
-- Update to 1.14.8
+* Thu Jun 16 2022 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-19
+- Ensure SSH session monitoring script is cleaned up when the
+  session exits.
+  Resolves: #2089362
 
-* Wed Feb 08 2023 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.6-1
-- Update to 1.14.6
+* Mon Dec 06 2021 Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com> - 1.12.8-18
+- Ensure session bus started for SSH sessions gets used by those
+  sessions.
+  Related: #1940067
 
-* Thu Jan 19 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.14.4-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild
+* Mon Nov 08 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-17
+- Improve SSH session bus starting (#1940067)
 
-* Thu Oct 06 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.4-1
-- Update to 1.14.4
+* Thu Jun 10 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-16
+- Add Conflicts on older redhat-release versions (#1941642)
 
-* Tue Sep 27 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.2-1
-- Update to 1.14.2
+* Wed May 26 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-15
+- Packaging updates from Fedora (#1941642)
 
-* Mon Aug 22 2022 Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.14.0-5
-- Restore Requires(pre) through %%sysusers_requires_compat
+* Tue Apr 27 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-14
+- Fix dbus-launch call in sh snippet (#1940348)
 
-* Wed Aug 03 2022 Luca BRUNO <lucab@lucabruno.net> - 1:1.14.0-4
-- Align sysusers.d configuration to Fedora user/group allocation (rhbz#2105177)
+* Tue Mar 23 2021 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-13
+- Fix raising hard fd limit (#1839753)
 
-* Thu Jul 21 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.14.0-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+* Mon Nov 23 2020 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-12
+- Install X11 SSH forwarding snippets (#1874282)
 
-* Tue Jul 12 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.0-2
-- Use sysusers.d snippet for user configuration (#2105177)
+* Tue Jun 30 2020 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-11
+- Fix CVE-2020-12049 (#1851997)
 
-* Thu Mar 10 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.14.0-1
-- Update to 1.14.0
+* Mon Apr 06 2020 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-10
+- Improve permissions on ghosted /run/dbus (#1797833)
 
-* Thu Feb 24 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.13.22-1
-- Update to 1.13.22
+* Thu Aug 01 2019 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-9
+- Ensure that patches are applied (#1725570)
 
-* Thu Jan 20 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.13.20-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
+* Tue Jul 09 2019 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-8
+- Fix CVE-2019-12749 (#1725570)
 
-* Tue Jan 04 2022 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.13.20-2
-- Explicitly specify runstatedir (#2036943)
+* Wed Oct 24 2018 Martin Pitt <mpitt@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.8-7
+- Fix useradd dependency of dbus-daemon rhbz#1634496
 
-* Fri Dec 17 2021 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.13.20-1
-- Update to 1.13.20
+* Thu Oct 18 2018 Martin Pitt <mpitt@redhat.com>
+- Drop unpublished -doc package to fix FTBFS rhbz#1640736
+- Add dist-git smoketest rhbz#1625683
+- Move dbus system user creation to correct package rhbz#1634496
 
-* Fri Oct 01 2021 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.20-5
-- Avoid systemd_requires as per updated packaging guidelines
-
-* Wed Jul 21 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.12.20-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.12.20-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Mon Jul 27 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.12.20-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Thu Jul 02 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.20-1
-- Update to 1.12.20
-
-* Tue Jun 02 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.18-1
-- Update to 1.12.18
-
-* Wed Feb 19 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.16-5
-- Verify GPG signature of sources
-- Improve permissions on ghosted /run/dbus
-
-* Fri Jan 31 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.16-4
-- Update python2- to python3-gobject
-
-* Tue Jan 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.12.16-4
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Thu Aug 01 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.16-3
-- Ensure that patches are applied
-
-* Wed Jul 24 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.12.16-2
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Tue Jun 11 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.16-1
-- Update to 1.12.16
-
-* Fri May 17 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.14-1
-- Update to 1.12.14
-
-* Tue Apr 09 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.12-7
-- Improve user and group creation (#1698001)
-
-* Thu Apr 04 2019 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.12-6
-- Own system.d and session.d directories (#1696385)
-
-* Sun Mar 03 2019 Leigh Scott <leigh123linux@googlemail.com> - 1:1.12.12-5
-- Fix f30 FTBFS
-
-* Mon Feb 04 2019 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.12-4
-- Update requires for pygobject3 -> python2-gobject rename
-
-* Thu Jan 31 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1:1.12.12-3
-- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
-
-* Fri Dec 14 2018 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.12-2
-- Change -devel subpackage to depend on -libs
-
-* Tue Dec 04 2018 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.12-1
-- Update to 1.12.12
-
-* Thu Nov 22 2018 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> - 1:1.12.10-9
-- Switch to dbus-broker as the default implementation
-
-* Wed Nov 07 2018 Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com> - 1:1.12.10-8
-- Fix requirement on system-release
-
-* Tue Nov 06 2018 Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> - 1:1.12.10-7
-- Fix the messagebus.service alias
-
-* Mon Nov 05 2018 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.10-6
-- Add further Requires to subpackages
-
-* Tue Oct 23 2018 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> - 1:1.12.10-5
-- Move useradd dependency to daemon subpackage
-
-* Fri Oct 19 2018 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.10-4
-- Move user and group creation to daemon subpackage
-- Move systemd to Requires of common subpackage (#1638910)
-- Remove unnecessary ldconfig calls
-
-* Fri Aug 31 2018 Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> - 1:1.12.10-3
-- Make sure presets are applied when upgrading from packages before the presets
-  existed
-
-* Thu Aug 30 2018 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> - 1:1.12.10-2
-- Change 'system-release' dependency to 'fedora-release', since otherwise hard
-  version dependencies are ignored.
-
-* Fri Aug 10 2018 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> - 1:1.12.10-2
-- Move generic units into 'dbus-common', so other dbus implementations can use
-  them as well.
-
-* Fri Aug 10 2018 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> - 1:1.12.10-1
-- Add [Install] sections to unit files, rather than creating the symlinks
-  manually during the installation. This will pick up the systemd-presets
-  global to Fedora from the 'fedora-release' package.
-
-* Fri Aug 10 2018 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> - 1:1.12.10-1
-- Provide custom systemd unit files to replace the upstream units. Also rename
-  the service to 'dbus-daemon.service', but provide an alias to 'dbus.service'.
-
-* Fri Aug 03 2018 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 1:1.12.10-1
-- Update to 1.12.10
+* Sat Aug 11 2018 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com>
+- BuildRequire python3-gobject instead of pygobject3
+- Related: bug#1614611
 
 * Tue Jul 31 2018 Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> - 1:1.12.8-5
 - More python3

dbus-daemon.service

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=D-Bus System Message Bus
-Documentation=man:dbus-daemon(1)
-Requires=dbus.socket
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
-ExecReload=/usr/bin/dbus-send --print-reply --system --type=method_call --dest=org.freedesktop.DBus / org.freedesktop.DBus.ReloadConfig
-OOMScoreAdjust=-900
-
-[Install]
-# Make sure that services can still refer to this under the name of the
-# old SysV script (messagebus).
-Alias=dbus.service messagebus.service
-WantedBy=multi-user.target

dbus-daemon.user.service

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=D-Bus User Message Bus
-Documentation=man:dbus-daemon(1)
-Requires=dbus.socket
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/dbus-daemon --session --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
-ExecReload=/usr/bin/dbus-send --print-reply --session --type=method_call --dest=org.freedesktop.DBus / org.freedesktop.DBus.ReloadConfig
-
-[Install]
-Alias=dbus.service

dbus.socket

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=D-Bus System Message Bus Socket
-
-[Socket]
-ListenStream=/run/dbus/system_bus_socket
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=sockets.target

dbus.user.socket

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=D-Bus User Message Bus Socket
-
-[Socket]
-ListenStream=%t/bus
-ExecStartPost=-/usr/bin/systemctl --user set-environment DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=%t/bus
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=sockets.target

gating.yaml

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---- !Policy
-product_versions:
-  - rhel-10
-decision_context: osci_compose_gate
-rules:
-  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: desktop-qe.desktop-ci.tier1-gating.functional}

sources

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-SHA512 (dbus-1.14.10.tar.xz) = 775b708326059692937acb69d4ce1a89e69878501166655b5d1b1628ac31b50dd53d979d93c84e57f95e90b15e25aa33893e51a7421d3537e9c2f02b1b91bfae
-SHA512 (dbus-1.14.10.tar.xz.asc) = 2a646884150f31e50b1bf2238fe21377929ceb536691fb9ef06aee25737c1a5be5ca18d8bdd8a02fdf3b00681fd26509a3e6e62a49541ef5685d09499ba9d30b