curl/SOURCES/0010-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2019-3822.patch
2021-10-08 10:21:02 +00:00

42 lines
1.3 KiB
Diff

From ab22e3a00f04b458039c21111cfa448051e5777d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
CVE-2019-3822
Upstream-commit: 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc
Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
---
lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
index b614cda..a3a55d9 100644
--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
@@ -777,11 +777,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
});
#ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
- if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
- DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
- memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
- size += ntresplen;
+ /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
+ if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
+ failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
+ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
+ DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
+ memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
+ size += ntresplen;
DEBUG_OUT({
fprintf(stderr, "\n ntresp=");
--
2.17.2