23 changed files with 6005 additions and 3 deletions
--- a/SOURCES/0039-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-27782.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0039-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-27782.patch
@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+From d4247fa7baf0859729fff2fe5cf0bfab8322d1a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 23:13:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] tls: check more TLS details for connection reuse
+
+CVE-2022-27782
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27782.html
+Closes #8825
+
+Upstream-commit: f18af4f874cecab82a9797e8c7541e0990c7a64c
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/setopt.c       | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ lib/url.c          | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ lib/urldata.h      | 14 +++++++-------
+ lib/vtls/openssl.c | 10 +++++-----
+ lib/vtls/vtls.c    | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index b07ccfe..319a010 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
+++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS:
+     arg = va_arg(param, long);
+    data->set.ssl.primary.ssl_options = (unsigned char)(arg & 0xff);
+     data->set.ssl.enable_beast = arg&CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST?TRUE:FALSE;
+     data->set.ssl.no_revoke = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE);
+     data->set.ssl.no_partialchain = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_PARTIALCHAIN);
+@@ -2051,6 +2052,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS:
+     arg = va_arg(param, long);
+    data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.ssl_options = (unsigned char)(arg & 0xff);
+     data->set.proxy_ssl.enable_beast = arg&CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST?TRUE:FALSE;
+     data->set.proxy_ssl.no_revoke = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE);
+     break;
+@@ -2451,44 +2453,47 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
+   case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_USERNAME:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+-    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] && !data->set.ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] &&
+       !data->set.ssl.primary.authtype)
+      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_USERNAME:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+     if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY] &&
+-       !data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+       !data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype)
+      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to
+                                                                  SRP */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+-    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] && !data->set.ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+    if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] &&
+       !data->set.ssl.primary.authtype)
+      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD:
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+     if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY] &&
+-       !data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype)
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */
+       !data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype)
+      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default */
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_TYPE:
+     argptr = va_arg(param, char *);
+     if(!argptr ||
+        strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP")))
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
+      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
+     else
+-      data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+      data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+     break;
+   case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE:
+     argptr = va_arg(param, char *);
+     if(!argptr ||
+        strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP")))
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
+      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP;
+     else
+-      data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+      data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+     break;
+ #endif
+   case CURLOPT_DNS_SERVERS:
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 7dd5267..30fc5ad 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   set->ssl.primary.verifypeer = TRUE;
+   set->ssl.primary.verifyhost = TRUE;
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  set->ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+  set->ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE;
+ #endif
+   set->ssh_auth_types = CURLSSH_AUTH_DEFAULT; /* defaults to any auth
+                                                       type */
+@@ -1881,10 +1881,12 @@ static struct connectdata *allocate_conn(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   conn->ssl_config.verifystatus = data->set.ssl.primary.verifystatus;
+   conn->ssl_config.verifypeer = data->set.ssl.primary.verifypeer;
+   conn->ssl_config.verifyhost = data->set.ssl.primary.verifyhost;
+  conn->ssl_config.ssl_options = data->set.ssl.primary.ssl_options;
+   conn->proxy_ssl_config.verifystatus =
+     data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.verifystatus;
+   conn->proxy_ssl_config.verifypeer = data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.verifypeer;
+   conn->proxy_ssl_config.verifyhost = data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.verifyhost;
+  conn->proxy_ssl_config.ssl_options = data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.ssl_options;
+ 
+   conn->ip_version = data->set.ipver;
+ 
+@@ -4362,8 +4364,9 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.cipher_list13 =
+     data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER13_LIST_PROXY];
+ 
+-  data->set.ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
+  data->set.ssl.primary.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE];
+  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CRLfile =
+    data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.cert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+   data->set.ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE];
+@@ -4377,10 +4380,12 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   data->set.ssl.primary.clientcert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT];
+   data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.clientcert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY];
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  data->set.ssl.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY];
+-  data->set.ssl.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD];
+-  data->set.proxy_ssl.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY];
+  data->set.ssl.primary.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME];
+  data->set.ssl.primary.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD];
+  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.username =
+    data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY];
+  data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.password =
+    data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY];
+ #endif
+ 
+   if(!Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(&data->set.ssl.primary,
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 026684b..0e48841 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
+++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -229,6 +229,13 @@ struct ssl_primary_config {
+   char *egdsocket;       /* path to file containing the EGD daemon socket */
+   char *cipher_list;     /* list of ciphers to use */
+   char *cipher_list13;   /* list of TLS 1.3 cipher suites to use */
+  char *CRLfile;         /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+  char *username; /* TLS username (for, e.g., SRP) */
+  char *password; /* TLS password (for, e.g., SRP) */
+  enum CURL_TLSAUTH authtype; /* TLS authentication type (default SRP) */
+#endif
+  unsigned char ssl_options;  /* the CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS bitmask */
+ };
+ 
+ struct ssl_config_data {
+@@ -238,7 +245,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data {
+   bool no_revoke;    /* disable SSL certificate revocation checks */
+   bool no_partialchain;  /* don't accept partial certificate chains */
+   long certverifyresult; /* result from the certificate verification */
+-  char *CRLfile;   /* CRL to check certificate revocation */
+   curl_ssl_ctx_callback fsslctx; /* function to initialize ssl ctx */
+   void *fsslctxp;        /* parameter for call back */
+   bool certinfo;         /* gather lots of certificate info */
+@@ -249,12 +255,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data {
+   char *key; /* private key file name */
+   char *key_type; /* format for private key (default: PEM) */
+   char *key_passwd; /* plain text private key password */
+-
+-#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  char *username; /* TLS username (for, e.g., SRP) */
+-  char *password; /* TLS password (for, e.g., SRP) */
+-  enum CURL_TLSAUTH authtype; /* TLS authentication type (default SRP) */
+-#endif
+ };
+ 
+ struct ssl_general_config {
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+index 6c8faa2..75ff8d8 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c
+@@ -2232,14 +2232,14 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+     &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult;
+   const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+-  const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype);
+  const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype);
+ #endif
+   char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert);
+   const char * const ssl_cert_type = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type);
+   const char * const ssl_cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile);
+   const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
+   const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer);
+-  const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile);
+  const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile);
+   char error_buffer[256];
+ 
+   DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
+@@ -2501,15 +2501,15 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+ #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+   if((ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) &&
+      Curl_allow_auth_to_host(conn)) {
+-    char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username);
+-
+    char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username);
+    char * const ssl_password = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.password);
+     infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", ssl_username);
+ 
+     if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_username)) {
+       failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
+       return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+     }
+-    if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(BACKEND->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) {
+    if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_password)) {
+       failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
+       return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+     }
+diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+index bdff93f..2b14fa6 100644
+--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+ {
+   if((data->version == needle->version) &&
+      (data->version_max == needle->version_max) &&
+     (data->ssl_options == needle->ssl_options) &&
+      (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) &&
+      (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) &&
+      (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) &&
+@@ -96,6 +97,12 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config* data,
+      Curl_safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) &&
+      Curl_safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) &&
+      Curl_safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) &&
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+     Curl_safecmp(data->username, needle->username) &&
+     Curl_safecmp(data->password, needle->password) &&
+     (data->authtype == needle->authtype) &&
+#endif
+     Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CRLfile, needle->CRLfile) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) &&
+      Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13))
+     return TRUE;
+@@ -113,6 +120,10 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+   dest->verifyhost = source->verifyhost;
+   dest->verifystatus = source->verifystatus;
+   dest->sessionid = source->sessionid;
+  dest->ssl_options = source->ssl_options;
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+  dest->authtype = source->authtype;
+#endif
+ 
+   CLONE_STRING(CApath);
+   CLONE_STRING(CAfile);
+@@ -122,6 +133,11 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source,
+   CLONE_STRING(egdsocket);
+   CLONE_STRING(cipher_list);
+   CLONE_STRING(cipher_list13);
+  CLONE_STRING(CRLfile);
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+  CLONE_STRING(username);
+  CLONE_STRING(password);
+#endif
+ 
+   return TRUE;
+ }
+@@ -136,6 +152,11 @@ void Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config* sslc)
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->egdsocket);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->cipher_list);
+   Curl_safefree(sslc->cipher_list13);
+  Curl_safefree(sslc->CRLfile);
+#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
+  Curl_safefree(sslc->username);
+  Curl_safefree(sslc->password);
+#endif
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_SSL
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
+
+From a9cf46e6c6c9a4261f3ea8500dfef87c1436908b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 23:13:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] url: check SSH config match on connection reuse
+
+CVE-2022-27782
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27782.html
+Closes #8825
+
+Upstream-commit: 1645e9b44505abd5cbaf65da5282c3f33b5924a5
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/ssh.h |  4 ++--
+ lib/url.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ssh.h b/lib/ssh.h
+index 0620aac..1114f8a 100644
+--- a/lib/ssh.h
+++ b/lib/ssh.h
+@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ struct ssh_conn {
+ 
+   /* common */
+   const char *passphrase;     /* pass-phrase to use */
+-  char *rsa_pub;              /* path name */
+-  char *rsa;                  /* path name */
+  char *rsa_pub;              /* strdup'ed public key file */
+  char *rsa;                  /* strdup'ed private key file */
+   bool authed;                /* the connection has been authenticated fine */
+   sshstate state;             /* always use ssh.c:state() to change state! */
+   sshstate nextstate;         /* the state to goto after stopping */
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 30fc5ad..8653ebb 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1030,6 +1030,12 @@ static size_t max_pipeline_length(struct Curl_multi *multi)
+ }
+ 
+ 
+static bool ssh_config_matches(struct connectdata *one,
+                               struct connectdata *two)
+{
+  return (Curl_safecmp(one->proto.sshc.rsa, two->proto.sshc.rsa) &&
+          Curl_safecmp(one->proto.sshc.rsa_pub, two->proto.sshc.rsa_pub));
+}
+ /*
+  * Given one filled in connection struct (named needle), this function should
+  * detect if there already is one that has all the significant details
+@@ -1299,6 +1305,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         }
+       }
+ 
+      if(needle->handler->protocol & (CURLPROTO_SCP|CURLPROTO_SFTP)) {
+        if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
+          continue;
+      }
+
+       if(!needle->bits.httpproxy || (needle->handler->flags&PROTOPT_SSL) ||
+          needle->bits.tunnel_proxy) {
+         /* The requested connection does not use a HTTP proxy or it uses SSL or
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0040-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-32208.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0040-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-32208.patch
@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From d36661703e16bd740a3a928041b1e697a6617b98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 09:27:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] krb5: return error properly on decode errors
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32208.html
+CVE-2022-32208
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #9051
+
+Upstream-commit: 6ecdf5136b52af747e7bda08db9a748256b1cd09
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/krb5.c     |  5 +----
+ lib/security.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/krb5.c b/lib/krb5.c
+index 787137c..6f9e1f7 100644
+--- a/lib/krb5.c
+++ b/lib/krb5.c
+@@ -86,11 +86,8 @@ krb5_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len,
+   enc.value = buf;
+   enc.length = len;
+   maj = gss_unwrap(&min, *context, &enc, &dec, NULL, NULL);
+-  if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+-    if(len >= 4)
+-      strcpy(buf, "599 ");
+  if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+     return -1;
+-  }
+ 
+   memcpy(buf, dec.value, dec.length);
+   len = curlx_uztosi(dec.length);
+diff --git a/lib/security.c b/lib/security.c
+index 52cce97..c95f290 100644
+--- a/lib/security.c
+++ b/lib/security.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,10 @@
+ /* The last #include file should be: */
+ #include "memdebug.h"
+ 
+/* Max string input length is a precaution against abuse and to detect junk
+   input easier and better. */
+#define CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH 8000000
+
+ static const struct {
+   enum protection_level level;
+   const char *name;
+@@ -192,6 +196,7 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   int len;
+   CURLcode result;
+  int nread;
+ 
+   result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));
+   if(result)
+@@ -200,7 +205,10 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+   if(len) {
+     /* only realloc if there was a length */
+     len = ntohl(len);
+-    buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len);
+    if(len > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH)
+      len = 0;
+    else
+      buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len);
+   }
+   if(!len || !buf->data)
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+@@ -208,8 +216,11 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+   result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len);
+   if(result)
+     return result;
+-  buf->size = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len,
+-                                 conn->data_prot, conn);
+  nread = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len,
+                             conn->data_prot, conn);
+  if(nread < 0)
+    return CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+  buf->size = (size_t)nread;
+   buf->index = 0;
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+-- 
+2.35.3
+
--- a/SOURCES/0041-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-32206.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0041-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-32206.patch
@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+From 24dedf9b260eebb7feae6fc273208b551fe54a79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 16:28:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] content_encoding: return error on too many compression
+ steps
+
+The max allowed steps is arbitrarily set to 5.
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32206.html
+CVE-2022-32206
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #9049
+
+Upstream-commit: 3a09fbb7f264c67c438d01a30669ce325aa508e2
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/content_encoding.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/content_encoding.c b/lib/content_encoding.c
+index c03637a..6f994b3 100644
+--- a/lib/content_encoding.c
+++ b/lib/content_encoding.c
+@@ -934,6 +934,9 @@ static const content_encoding *find_encoding(const char *name, size_t len)
+   return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+/* allow no more than 5 "chained" compression steps */
+#define MAX_ENCODE_STACK 5
+
+ /* Set-up the unencoding stack from the Content-Encoding header value.
+  * See RFC 7231 section 3.1.2.2. */
+ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+@@ -941,6 +944,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req;
+  int counter = 0;
+ 
+   do {
+     const char *name;
+@@ -975,6 +979,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!encoding)
+         encoding = &error_encoding;  /* Defer error at stack use. */
+ 
+      if(++counter >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
+        failf(data, "Reject response due to %u content encodings",
+              counter);
+        return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
+      }
+       /* Stack the unencoding stage. */
+       writer = new_unencoding_writer(conn, encoding, k->writer_stack);
+       if(!writer)
+-- 
+2.35.3
+
+
+From b3cd74f01871281f0989860e04c546d896f0e72f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 16:29:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] test387: verify rejection of compression chain attack
+
+Upstream-commit: 7230b19a2e17a164f61f82e4e409a9777ea2421a
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |  1 +
+ tests/data/test387      | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test387
+
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index 98d5516..9b5f4fb 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ test325 test326 test330 \
+ test340 \
+ \
+ test350 test351 test352 test353 test354 \
+test387 \
+ test393 test394 test395 \
+ \
+ test400 test401 test402 test403 test404 test405 test406 test407 test408 \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test387 b/tests/data/test387
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..015ec25
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data/test387
+@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+<testcase>
+<info>
+<keywords>
+HTTP
+gzip
+</keywords>
+</info>
+
+#
+# Server-side
+<reply>
+<data nocheck="yes">
+HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip,gzip
+
+-foo-
+</data>
+</reply>
+
+#
+# Client-side
+<client>
+<server>
+http
+</server>
+ <name>
+Response with overly long compression chain
+ </name>
+ <command>
+http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -sS
+</command>
+</client>
+
+#
+# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
+<verify>
+<protocol>
+GET /%TESTNUMBER HTTP/1.1
+Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
+User-Agent: curl/7.61.1
+Accept: */*
+
+</protocol>
+
+# CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING is 61
+<errorcode>
+61
+</errorcode>
+<stderr mode="text">
+curl: (61) Reject response due to 5 content encodings
+</stderr>
+</verify>
+</testcase>
+-- 
+2.35.3
+
--- a/SOURCES/0042-curl-7.61.1-ssh-known-hosts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0042-curl-7.61.1-ssh-known-hosts.patch
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 9ea407a0476d22cde575826c18b5aa56b57ac9b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Felix=20H=C3=A4dicke?= <felixhaedicke@web.de>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 23:10:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] setopt: enable CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS and
+ CURLOPT_SSH_KEYFUNCTION for libssh
+
+CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS and CURLOPT_SSH_KEYFUNCTION are supported for
+libssh as well. So accepting these options only when compiling with
+libssh2 is wrong here.
+
+Fixes #3493
+Closes #3494
+
+Upstream-commit: 3cbf731d9ec7146f9f1a6ac0fbd9af7fe358f5bb
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/setopt.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index b07ccfe..88a05ff 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
+++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -2208,7 +2208,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
+     result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5],
+                             va_arg(param, char *));
+     break;
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_API
+
+   case CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS:
+     /*
+      * Store the file name to read known hosts from.
+@@ -2229,7 +2229,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
+      */
+     data->set.ssh_keyfunc_userp = va_arg(param, void *);
+     break;
+-#endif /* HAVE_LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_API */
+ #endif /* USE_LIBSSH2 */
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_HTTP_TRANSFER_DECODING:
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0043-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-35252.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0043-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-35252.patch
@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+From 005d3f387bc5c3b2ee94d0597b5e202644c825f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 11:08:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] runtests: use the local curl for verifying
+
+... revert the mistaken change brought in commit 8440616f53.
+
+Reported-by: Alessandro Ghedini
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2018-10/0118.html
+
+Closes #3198
+
+Upstream-commit: 8effa8c2b09906a2f00a3f08322dc5da35245b0a
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/runtests.pl | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/runtests.pl b/tests/runtests.pl
+index 8d8ed81..d62fa40 100755
+--- a/tests/runtests.pl
+++ b/tests/runtests.pl
+@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ my $NEGTELNETPORT;       # TELNET server port with negotiation
+ 
+ my $srcdir = $ENV{'srcdir'} || '.';
+ my $CURL="../src/curl".exe_ext(); # what curl executable to run on the tests
+-my $VCURL="curl";   # what curl binary to use to verify the servers with
+my $VCURL=$CURL;   # what curl binary to use to verify the servers with
+                    # VCURL is handy to set to the system one when the one you
+                    # just built hangs or crashes and thus prevent verification
+ my $DBGCURL=$CURL; #"../src/.libs/curl";  # alternative for debugging
+-- 
+2.37.3
+
+
+From fbc2ac6f06ec13cc872ce7adb870f4d7c7d5dded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 00:09:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] cookie: reject cookies with "control bytes"
+
+Rejects 0x01 - 0x1f (except 0x09) plus 0x7f
+
+Reported-by: Axel Chong
+
+Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-35252.html
+
+CVE-2022-35252
+
+Closes #9381
+
+Upstream-commit: 8dfc93e573ca740544a2d79ebb0ed786592c65c3
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index cb0c03b..e0470a1 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -371,6 +371,30 @@ static void strstore(char **str, const char *newstr)
+   *str = strdup(newstr);
+ }
+ 
+/*
+  RFC 6265 section 4.1.1 says a server should accept this range:
+
+  cookie-octet    = %x21 / %x23-2B / %x2D-3A / %x3C-5B / %x5D-7E
+
+  But Firefox and Chrome as of June 2022 accept space, comma and double-quotes
+  fine. The prime reason for filtering out control bytes is that some HTTP
+  servers return 400 for requests that contain such.
+*/
+static int invalid_octets(const char *p)
+{
+  /* Reject all bytes \x01 - \x1f (*except* \x09, TAB) + \x7f */
+  static const char badoctets[] = {
+    "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x0a"
+    "\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14"
+    "\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x7f"
+  };
+  size_t vlen, len;
+  /* scan for all the octets that are *not* in cookie-octet */
+  len = strcspn(p, badoctets);
+  vlen = strlen(p);
+  return (len != vlen);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * remove_expired() removes expired cookies.
+  */
+@@ -541,6 +565,11 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+             badcookie = TRUE;
+             break;
+           }
+          if(invalid_octets(whatptr) || invalid_octets(name)) {
+            infof(data, "invalid octets in name/value, cookie dropped");
+            badcookie = TRUE;
+            break;
+          }
+         }
+         else if(!len) {
+           /* this was a "<name>=" with no content, and we must allow
+-- 
+2.37.1
+
+
+From 1a3e2bd48572761236934651091c899a4d460ef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 00:09:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] test8: verify that "ctrl-byte cookies" are ignored
+
+Upstream-commit: 2fc031d834d488854ffc58bf7dbcef7fa7c1fc28
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/data/test8 | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/data/test8 b/tests/data/test8
+index a8548e6..8587611 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test8
+++ b/tests/data/test8
+@@ -46,6 +46,36 @@ Set-Cookie: trailingspace    = removed; path=/we/want;
+ Set-Cookie: nocookie=yes; path=/WE;
+ Set-Cookie: blexp=yesyes; domain=%HOSTIP; domain=%HOSTIP; expiry=totally bad;
+ Set-Cookie: partialip=nono; domain=.0.0.1;
+Set-Cookie: cookie1=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie2=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie3=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie4=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie5=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie6=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie7=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie8=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie9=junk-	-
+Set-Cookie: cookie11=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie12=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie14=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie15=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie16=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie17=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie18=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie19=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie20=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie21=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie22=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie23=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie24=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie25=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie26=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie27=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie28=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie29=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie30=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie31=-junk
+Set-Cookie: cookie31=-junk
+ 
+ </file>
+ <precheck>
+@@ -62,7 +92,7 @@ perl -e 'if ("%HOSTIP" !~ /\.0\.0\.1$/) {print "Test only works for HOSTIPs endi
+ GET /we/want/8 HTTP/1.1
+ Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
+ Accept: */*
+-Cookie: name with space=is weird but; trailingspace=removed; cookie=perhaps; cookie=yes; foobar=name; blexp=yesyes
+Cookie: name with space=is weird but; trailingspace=removed; cookie=perhaps; cookie=yes; foobar=name; blexp=yesyes; cookie9=junk-	-
+ 
+ </protocol>
+ </verify>
+-- 
+2.37.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0044-curl-7.61.1-retry-http11.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0044-curl-7.61.1-retry-http11.patch
@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From 78b62ef1206621e8f4f1628ad4eb0a7be877c96f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 17:04:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Upon HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED, retry the request with HTTP/1.1
+
+This is a companion patch to cbea2fd2c (NTLM: force the connection to
+HTTP/1.1, 2018-12-06): with NTLM, we can switch to HTTP/1.1
+preemptively. However, with other (Negotiate) authentication it is not
+clear to this developer whether there is a way to make it work with
+HTTP/2, so let's try HTTP/2 first and fall back in case we encounter the
+error HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED.
+
+Note: we will still keep the NTLM workaround, as it avoids an extra
+round trip.
+
+Daniel Stenberg helped a lot with this patch, in particular by
+suggesting to introduce the Curl_h2_http_1_1_error() function.
+
+Closes #3349
+
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
+
+Upstream-commit: d997aa0e963c5be5de100dccdc5208d39bd3d62b
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/http2.c |  8 ++++++++
+ lib/http2.h |  4 ++++
+ lib/multi.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
+index d769193..3071097 100644
+--- a/lib/http2.c
+++ b/lib/http2.c
+@@ -2300,6 +2300,14 @@ void Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(struct Curl_easy *data)
+     Curl_http2_remove_child(data->set.stream_depends_on, data);
+ }
+ 
+/* Only call this function for a transfer that already got a HTTP/2
+   CURLE_HTTP2_STREAM error! */
+bool Curl_h2_http_1_1_error(struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+  struct http_conn *httpc = &conn->proto.httpc;
+  return (httpc->error_code == NGHTTP2_HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED);
+}
+
+ #else /* !USE_NGHTTP2 */
+ 
+ /* Satisfy external references even if http2 is not compiled in. */
+diff --git a/lib/http2.h b/lib/http2.h
+index 21cd9b8..91e504c 100644
+--- a/lib/http2.h
+++ b/lib/http2.h
+@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_add_child(struct Curl_easy *parent,
+ void Curl_http2_remove_child(struct Curl_easy *parent,
+                              struct Curl_easy *child);
+ void Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(struct Curl_easy *data);
+
+/* returns true if the HTTP/2 stream error was HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED */
+bool Curl_h2_http_1_1_error(struct connectdata *conn);
+ #else /* USE_NGHTTP2 */
+ #define Curl_http2_init(x) CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
+ #define Curl_http2_send_request(x) CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
+@@ -74,6 +77,7 @@ void Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(struct Curl_easy *data);
+ #define Curl_http2_add_child(x, y, z)
+ #define Curl_http2_remove_child(x, y)
+ #define Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(x)
+#define Curl_h2_http_1_1_error(x) 0
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_HTTP2_H */
+diff --git a/lib/multi.c b/lib/multi.c
+index 0f57fd5..d64ba94 100644
+--- a/lib/multi.c
+++ b/lib/multi.c
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+ #include "vtls/vtls.h"
+ #include "connect.h"
+ #include "http_proxy.h"
+#include "http2.h"
+ /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
+ #include "curl_printf.h"
+ #include "curl_memory.h"
+@@ -1943,6 +1944,25 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi,
+           done = TRUE;
+         }
+       }
+      else if((CURLE_HTTP2_STREAM == result) &&
+                Curl_h2_http_1_1_error(data->easy_conn)) {
+        CURLcode ret = Curl_retry_request(data->easy_conn, &newurl);
+
+        infof(data, "Forcing HTTP/1.1 for NTLM");
+        data->set.httpversion = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
+
+        if(!ret)
+          retry = (newurl)?TRUE:FALSE;
+        else
+          result = ret;
+
+        if(retry) {
+          /* if we are to retry, set the result to OK and consider the
+             request as done */
+          result = CURLE_OK;
+          done = TRUE;
+        }
+      }
+ 
+       if(result) {
+         /*
+-- 
+2.37.3
+
--- a/SOURCES/0045-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-43552.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0045-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-43552.patch
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+From 5cdcf1dbd39c64e18a81fc912a36942a3ec87565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2022 08:38:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] smb/telnet: do not free the protocol struct in *_done()
+
+It is managed by the generic layer.
+
+Reported-by: Trail of Bits
+
+Closes #10112
+
+Upstream-commit: 4f20188ac644afe174be6005ef4f6ffba232b8b2
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/smb.c    | 14 ++------------
+ lib/telnet.c |  3 ---
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/smb.c b/lib/smb.c
+index 039d680..f682c1f 100644
+--- a/lib/smb.c
+++ b/lib/smb.c
+@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_connection_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_do(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done);
+-static CURLcode smb_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
+-                         bool premature);
+ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead);
+ static int smb_getsock(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks,
+                        int numsocks);
+@@ -75,7 +73,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smb = {
+   "SMB",                                /* scheme */
+   smb_setup_connection,                 /* setup_connection */
+   smb_do,                               /* do_it */
+-  smb_done,                             /* done */
+  ZERO_NULL,                            /* done */
+   ZERO_NULL,                            /* do_more */
+   smb_connect,                          /* connect_it */
+   smb_connection_state,                 /* connecting */
+@@ -100,7 +98,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smbs = {
+   "SMBS",                               /* scheme */
+   smb_setup_connection,                 /* setup_connection */
+   smb_do,                               /* do_it */
+-  smb_done,                             /* done */
+  ZERO_NULL,                            /* done */
+   ZERO_NULL,                            /* do_more */
+   smb_connect,                          /* connect_it */
+   smb_connection_state,                 /* connecting */
+@@ -915,14 +913,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+-static CURLcode smb_done(struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode status,
+-                         bool premature)
+-{
+-  (void) premature;
+-  Curl_safefree(conn->data->req.protop);
+-  return status;
+-}
+-
+ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead)
+ {
+   struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc;
+diff --git a/lib/telnet.c b/lib/telnet.c
+index 923c7f8..48cd0d7 100644
+--- a/lib/telnet.c
+++ b/lib/telnet.c
+@@ -1294,9 +1294,6 @@ static CURLcode telnet_done(struct connectdata *conn,
+ 
+   curl_slist_free_all(tn->telnet_vars);
+   tn->telnet_vars = NULL;
+-
+-  Curl_safefree(conn->data->req.protop);
+-
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.38.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0046-curl-7.61.1-h2-window-size.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0046-curl-7.61.1-h2-window-size.patch
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 4bbd1947aeb26d5dbcddbb058652e0e64771b71d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 17:46:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] h2: lower initial window size to 32 MiB
+
+Cherry-picked from upstream commit
+15f51474c837679c0b79825c23356ac681ffabde which was focused on paused
+transfers but required an update of nghttp2 to work properly.
+
+Bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2166254
+---
+ lib/http2.c         | 2 +-
+ tests/data/test1800 | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
+index 3071097..1fd2233 100644
+--- a/lib/http2.c
+++ b/lib/http2.c
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
+ #define NGHTTP2_HAS_SET_LOCAL_WINDOW_SIZE 1
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define HTTP2_HUGE_WINDOW_SIZE (1 << 30)
+#define HTTP2_HUGE_WINDOW_SIZE (32 * 1024 * 1024) /* 32 MB */
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_HTTP2
+ #define H2BUGF(x) x
+diff --git a/tests/data/test1800 b/tests/data/test1800
+index 0110184..c308c99 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test1800
+++ b/tests/data/test1800
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
+ Accept: */*
+ Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings
+ Upgrade: %H2CVER
+-HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAARAAAAAAAIAAAAA
+HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQCAAAAAAIAAAAA
+ 
+ </protocol>
+ </verify>
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0047-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-23916.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0047-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-23916.patch
@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+From 95f873ff983a1ae57415b3c16a881e74432cf8b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Fabian Keil <fk@fabiankeil.de>
+Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 14:04:32 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] runtests.pl: support the nonewline attribute for the data
+ part
+
+Closes #8239
+
+Upstream-commit: 736847611a40c01e7c290407e22e2f0f5f8efd6a
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ tests/runtests.pl      |  7 +++++++
+ tests/server/getpart.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/runtests.pl b/tests/runtests.pl
+index 40315aa..2e1500d 100755
+--- a/tests/runtests.pl
+++ b/tests/runtests.pl
+@@ -3817,6 +3817,13 @@ sub singletest {
+     else {
+         # check against the data section
+         @reply = getpart("reply", "data");
+        if(@reply) {
+            my %hash = getpartattr("reply", "data");
+            if($hash{'nonewline'}) {
+                # cut off the final newline from the final line of the data
+                chomp($reply[$#reply]);
+            }
+        }
+         # get the mode attribute
+         my $filemode=$replyattr{'mode'};
+         if($filemode && ($filemode eq "text") && $has_textaware) {
+diff --git a/tests/server/getpart.c b/tests/server/getpart.c
+index 32b55bc..f8fe3f6 100644
+--- a/tests/server/getpart.c
+++ b/tests/server/getpart.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+  *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+  *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+  *
+- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+  *
+  * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+  * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ int getpart(char **outbuf, size_t *outlen,
+   size_t outalloc = 256;
+   int in_wanted_part = 0;
+   int base64 = 0;
+  int nonewline = 0;
+   int error;
+ 
+   enum {
+@@ -360,6 +361,8 @@ int getpart(char **outbuf, size_t *outlen,
+             if(error)
+               return error;
+           }
+          if(nonewline)
+            (*outlen)--;
+           break;
+         }
+       }
+@@ -377,6 +380,8 @@ int getpart(char **outbuf, size_t *outlen,
+             if(error)
+               return error;
+           }
+          if(nonewline)
+            (*outlen)--;
+           break;
+         }
+       }
+@@ -451,6 +456,10 @@ int getpart(char **outbuf, size_t *outlen,
+               /* bit rough test, but "mostly" functional, */
+               /* treat wanted part data as base64 encoded */
+               base64 = 1;
+          if(strstr(patt, "nonewline=")) {
+            show(("* setting nonewline\n"));
+            nonewline = 1;
+          }
+         }
+         continue;
+       }
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+
+From bc5fc958b017895728962c9d44c469418cbec1a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Monnerat <patrick@monnerat.net>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 08:33:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] content_encoding: do not reset stage counter for each
+ header
+
+Test 418 verifies
+
+Closes #10492
+
+Upstream-commit: 119fb187192a9ea13dc90d9d20c215fc82799ab9
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/content_encoding.c  |   7 +-
+ lib/urldata.h           |   1 +
+ tests/data/Makefile.inc |   1 +
+ tests/data/test387      |   2 +-
+ tests/data/test418      | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 5 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/data/test418
+
+diff --git a/lib/content_encoding.c b/lib/content_encoding.c
+index bfc13e2..94344d6 100644
+--- a/lib/content_encoding.c
+++ b/lib/content_encoding.c
+@@ -944,7 +944,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+ {
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req;
+-  int counter = 0;
+ 
+   do {
+     const char *name;
+@@ -979,9 +978,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct connectdata *conn,
+       if(!encoding)
+         encoding = &error_encoding;  /* Defer error at stack use. */
+ 
+-      if(++counter >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
+-        failf(data, "Reject response due to %u content encodings",
+-              counter);
+      if(k->writer_stack_depth++ >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) {
+        failf(data, "Reject response due to more than %u content encodings",
+              MAX_ENCODE_STACK);
+         return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
+       }
+       /* Stack the unencoding stage. */
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 5b4b34f..8c8c20b 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
+++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -539,6 +539,7 @@ struct SingleRequest {
+ 
+   struct curltime start;         /* transfer started at this time */
+   struct curltime now;           /* current time */
+  unsigned char writer_stack_depth; /* Unencoding stack depth. */
+   bool header;                  /* incoming data has HTTP header */
+   enum {
+     HEADER_NORMAL,              /* no bad header at all */
+diff --git a/tests/data/Makefile.inc b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+index fb51cd6..86b6f85 100644
+--- a/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+++ b/tests/data/Makefile.inc
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ test393 test394 test395 \
+ \
+ test400 test401 test402 test403 test404 test405 test406 test407 test408 \
+ test409 \
+test418 \
+ \
+ test500 test501 test502 test503 test504 test505 test506 test507 test508 \
+ test509 test510 test511 test512 test513 test514 test515 test516 test517 \
+diff --git a/tests/data/test387 b/tests/data/test387
+index 015ec25..644fc7f 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test387
+++ b/tests/data/test387
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Accept: */*
+ 61
+ </errorcode>
+ <stderr mode="text">
+-curl: (61) Reject response due to 5 content encodings
+curl: (61) Reject response due to more than 5 content encodings
+ </stderr>
+ </verify>
+ </testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test418 b/tests/data/test418
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..50e974e
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/data/test418
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+<testcase>
+<info>
+<keywords>
+HTTP
+gzip
+</keywords>
+</info>
+
+#
+# Server-side
+<reply>
+<data nocheck="yes">
+HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+Transfer-Encoding: gzip
+
+-foo-
+</data>
+</reply>
+
+#
+# Client-side
+<client>
+<server>
+http
+</server>
+ <name>
+Response with multiple Transfer-Encoding headers
+ </name>
+ <command>
+http://%HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT/%TESTNUMBER -sS
+</command>
+</client>
+
+#
+# Verify data after the test has been "shot"
+<verify>
+<protocol>
+GET /%TESTNUMBER HTTP/1.1
+Host: %HOSTIP:%HTTPPORT
+User-Agent: curl/7.61.1
+Accept: */*
+
+</protocol>
+
+# CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING is 61
+<errorcode>
+61
+</errorcode>
+<stderr mode="text">
+curl: (61) Reject response due to more than 5 content encodings
+</stderr>
+</verify>
+</testcase>
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
--- a/SOURCES/0048-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-27535.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0048-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-27535.patch
@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+From e8705acd69383c13191c9dd4867d5118e58c54ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 00:49:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] strcase: add Curl_timestrcmp
+
+This is a strcmp() alternative function for comparing "secrets",
+designed to take the same time no matter the content to not leak
+match/non-match info to observers based on how fast it is.
+
+The time this function takes is only a function of the shortest input
+string.
+
+Reported-by: Trail of Bits
+
+Closes #9658
+
+Upstream-commit: ed5095ed94281989e103c72e032200b83be37878
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/strcase.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/strcase.h |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.c b/lib/strcase.c
+index f932485..c73907d 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.c
+++ b/lib/strcase.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,28 @@ bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b)
+   return !a && !b;
+ }
+ 
+/*
+ * Curl_timestrcmp() returns 0 if the two strings are identical. The time this
+ * function spends is a function of the shortest string, not of the contents.
+ */
+int Curl_timestrcmp(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+  int match = 0;
+  int i = 0;
+
+  if(a && b) {
+    while(1) {
+      match |= a[i]^b[i];
+      if(!a[i] || !b[i])
+        break;
+      i++;
+    }
+  }
+  else
+    return a || b;
+  return match;
+}
+
+ /* --- public functions --- */
+ 
+ int curl_strequal(const char *first, const char *second)
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.h b/lib/strcase.h
+index d245929..11a67a1 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.h
+++ b/lib/strcase.h
+@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@ char Curl_raw_toupper(char in);
+ void Curl_strntoupper(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+ 
+ bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b);
+int Curl_timestrcmp(const char *first, const char *second);
+ 
+ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_STRCASE_H */
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
+
+From 9cfaea212ff347937a38f6b5d6b885ed8ba1b931 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2023 17:47:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ftp: add more conditions for connection reuse
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #10730
+
+Upstream-commit: 8f4608468b890dce2dad9f91d5607ee7e9c1aba1
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/ftp.c     | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ lib/ftp.h     |  5 +++++
+ lib/setopt.c  |  2 +-
+ lib/url.c     | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ lib/urldata.h |  4 ++--
+ 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index 9442832..df15bc0 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
+++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -4080,6 +4080,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_disconnect(struct connectdata *conn, bool dead_connection)
+   }
+ 
+   freedirs(ftpc);
+  Curl_safefree(ftpc->account);
+  Curl_safefree(ftpc->alternative_to_user);
+   free(ftpc->prevpath);
+   ftpc->prevpath = NULL;
+   free(ftpc->server_os);
+@@ -4391,11 +4393,31 @@ static CURLcode ftp_setup_connection(struct connectdata *conn)
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   char *type;
+   struct FTP *ftp;
+  struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc;
+ 
+-  conn->data->req.protop = ftp = malloc(sizeof(struct FTP));
+  ftp = calloc(sizeof(struct FTP), 1);
+   if(NULL == ftp)
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 
+  /* clone connection related data that is FTP specific */
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ACCOUNT]) {
+    ftpc->account = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ACCOUNT]);
+    if(!ftpc->account) {
+      free(ftp);
+      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    }
+  }
+  if(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER]) {
+    ftpc->alternative_to_user =
+      strdup(data->set.str[STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER]);
+    if(!ftpc->alternative_to_user) {
+      Curl_safefree(ftpc->account);
+      free(ftp);
+      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    }
+  }
+  data->req.protop = ftp;
+
+   data->state.path++;   /* don't include the initial slash */
+   data->state.slash_removed = TRUE; /* we've skipped the slash */
+ 
+@@ -4445,7 +4467,9 @@ static CURLcode ftp_setup_connection(struct connectdata *conn)
+   if(isBadFtpString(ftp->passwd))
+     return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
+ 
+-  conn->proto.ftpc.known_filesize = -1; /* unknown size for now */
+  ftpc->known_filesize = -1; /* unknown size for now */
+  ftpc->use_ssl = data->set.use_ssl;
+  ftpc->ccc = data->set.ftp_ccc;
+ 
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.h b/lib/ftp.h
+index 7f6f432..3f33e27 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.h
+++ b/lib/ftp.h
+@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ struct FTP {
+    struct */
+ struct ftp_conn {
+   struct pingpong pp;
+  char *account;
+  char *alternative_to_user;
+   char *entrypath; /* the PWD reply when we logged on */
+   char **dirs;   /* realloc()ed array for path components */
+   int dirdepth;  /* number of entries used in the 'dirs' array */
+@@ -144,6 +146,9 @@ struct ftp_conn {
+   ftpstate state; /* always use ftp.c:state() to change state! */
+   ftpstate state_saved; /* transfer type saved to be reloaded after
+                            data connection is established */
+  unsigned char use_ssl;   /* if AUTH TLS is to be attempted etc, for FTP or
+                              IMAP or POP3 or others! (type: curl_usessl)*/
+  unsigned char ccc;       /* ccc level for this connection */
+   curl_off_t retr_size_saved; /* Size of retrieved file saved */
+   char *server_os;     /* The target server operating system. */
+   curl_off_t known_filesize; /* file size is different from -1, if wildcard
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index 3339a67..6fc111d 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
+++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option,
+     arg = va_arg(param, long);
+     if((arg < CURLUSESSL_NONE) || (arg > CURLUSESSL_ALL))
+       return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
+-    data->set.use_ssl = (curl_usessl)arg;
+    data->set.use_ssl = (unsigned char)arg;
+     break;
+ 
+   case CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS:
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 61ba832..4e21838 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1309,7 +1309,18 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
+           continue;
+       }
+-
+#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP
+      if(needle->handler->protocol & (CURLPROTO_FTP|CURLPROTO_FTPS)) {
+        /* Also match ACCOUNT, ALTERNATIVE-TO-USER, USE_SSL and CCC options */
+        if(Curl_timestrcmp(needle->proto.ftpc.account,
+                           check->proto.ftpc.account) ||
+           Curl_timestrcmp(needle->proto.ftpc.alternative_to_user,
+                           check->proto.ftpc.alternative_to_user) ||
+           (needle->proto.ftpc.use_ssl != check->proto.ftpc.use_ssl) ||
+           (needle->proto.ftpc.ccc != check->proto.ftpc.ccc))
+          continue;
+      }
+#endif
+       if(!needle->bits.httpproxy || (needle->handler->flags&PROTOPT_SSL) ||
+          needle->bits.tunnel_proxy) {
+         /* The requested connection does not use a HTTP proxy or it uses SSL or
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index 9d9ca92..4e2f5b9 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
+++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1498,6 +1498,8 @@ struct UserDefined {
+   curl_write_callback fwrite_header; /* function that stores headers */
+   curl_write_callback fwrite_rtp;    /* function that stores interleaved RTP */
+   curl_read_callback fread_func_set; /* function that reads the input */
+  unsigned char use_ssl;   /* if AUTH TLS is to be attempted etc, for FTP or
+                              IMAP or POP3 or others! (type: curl_usessl)*/
+   int is_fread_set; /* boolean, has read callback been set to non-NULL? */
+   int is_fwrite_set; /* boolean, has write callback been set to non-NULL? */
+   curl_progress_callback fprogress; /* OLD and deprecated progress callback  */
+@@ -1622,8 +1624,6 @@ struct UserDefined {
+   bool ftp_use_eprt;     /* if EPRT is to be attempted or not */
+   bool ftp_use_pret;     /* if PRET is to be used before PASV or not */
+ 
+-  curl_usessl use_ssl;   /* if AUTH TLS is to be attempted etc, for FTP or
+-                            IMAP or POP3 or others! */
+   curl_ftpauth ftpsslauth; /* what AUTH XXX to be attempted */
+   curl_ftpccc ftp_ccc;   /* FTP CCC options */
+   bool no_signal;        /* do not use any signal/alarm handler */
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
--- a/SOURCES/0049-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-27536.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0049-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-27536.patch
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 9d6dd7bc1dea42ae8e710aeae714e2a2c290de61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 09:22:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] url: only reuse connections with same GSS delegation
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Closes #10731
+
+Upstream-commit: cb49e67303dbafbab1cebf4086e3ec15b7d56ee5
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/url.c     | 6 ++++++
+ lib/urldata.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c
+index 3b11b7e..cbbc7f3 100644
+--- a/lib/url.c
+++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         }
+       }
+ 
+      /* GSS delegation differences do not actually affect every connection
+         and auth method, but this check takes precaution before efficiency */
+      if(needle->gssapi_delegation != check->gssapi_delegation)
+        continue;
+
+       if(needle->handler->protocol & (CURLPROTO_SCP|CURLPROTO_SFTP)) {
+         if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check))
+           continue;
+@@ -1949,6 +1954,7 @@ static struct connectdata *allocate_conn(struct Curl_easy *data)
+      it may live on without (this specific) Curl_easy */
+   conn->fclosesocket = data->set.fclosesocket;
+   conn->closesocket_client = data->set.closesocket_client;
+  conn->gssapi_delegation = data->set.gssapi_delegation;
+ 
+   return conn;
+   error:
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index ce90304..9e16f26 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
+++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -856,6 +856,8 @@ struct connectdata {
+   int httpversion;        /* the HTTP version*10 reported by the server */
+   int rtspversion;        /* the RTSP version*10 reported by the server */
+ 
+  unsigned char gssapi_delegation; /* inherited from set.gssapi_delegation */
+
+   struct curltime now;     /* "current" time */
+   struct curltime created; /* creation time */
+   curl_socket_t sock[2]; /* two sockets, the second is used for the data
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
--- a/SOURCES/0050-curl-7.61.1-sftp-upload-flags.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0050-curl-7.61.1-sftp-upload-flags.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From cc52b2d89397ff26b01d791cd1c605cba741aaa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Felix=20H=C3=A4dicke?= <felixhaedicke@web.de>
+Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 11:47:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ssh-libssh: do not specify O_APPEND when not in append mode
+
+Specifying O_APPEND in conjunction with O_TRUNC and O_CREAT does not
+make much sense. And this combination of flags is not accepted by all
+SFTP servers (at least not Apache SSHD).
+
+Fixes #4147
+Closes #4148
+
+Upstream-commit: 62617495102c60124db8a909f592f063e38a89aa
+Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/ssh-libssh.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ssh-libssh.c b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+index 4110be2..2414173 100644
+--- a/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+++ b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn, bool *block)
+         flags = O_WRONLY|O_APPEND;
+       else
+         /* Clear file before writing (normal behaviour) */
+-        flags = O_WRONLY|O_APPEND|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC;
+        flags = O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC;
+ 
+       if(sshc->sftp_file)
+         sftp_close(sshc->sftp_file);
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
--- a/SOURCES/0051-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-28321.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0051-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-28321.patch
@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+From 199f2d440d8659b42670c1b796220792b01a97bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 21:07:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] hostcheck: fix host name wildcard checking
+
+The leftmost "label" of the host name can now only match against single
+'*'. Like the browsers have worked for a long time.
+
+- extended unit test 1397 for this
+- move some SOURCE variables from unit/Makefile.am to unit/Makefile.inc
+
+Reported-by: Hiroki Kurosawa
+Closes #11018
+---
+ lib/hostcheck.c         |  50 +++++++--------
+ tests/data/test1397     |  10 ++-
+ tests/unit/Makefile.am  |  94 ----------------------------
+ tests/unit/Makefile.inc |  94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/unit/unit1397.c   | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 5 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 180 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/hostcheck.c b/lib/hostcheck.c
+index e827dc58f378c..d061c6356f97f 100644
+--- a/lib/hostcheck.c
+++ b/lib/hostcheck.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@
+ /* The last #include file should be: */
+ #include "memdebug.h"
+ 
+/* check the two input strings with given length, but do not
+   assume they end in nul-bytes */
+static int pmatch(const char *hostname, size_t hostlen,
+                  const char *pattern, size_t patternlen)
+{
+  if(hostlen != patternlen)
+    return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+  return strncasecompare(hostname, pattern, hostlen) ?
+    CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
+  * E.g.
+@@ -65,26 +76,27 @@
+ 
+ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern)
+ {
+-  const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
+-  int wildcard_enabled;
+-  size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
+  size_t hostlen, patternlen;
+  const char *pattern_label_end;
+   struct in_addr ignored;
+ #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+   struct sockaddr_in6 si6;
+ #endif
+ 
+  DEBUGASSERT(pattern);
+  DEBUGASSERT(hostname);
+
+  hostlen = strlen(hostname);
+  patternlen = strlen(pattern);
+
+   /* normalize pattern and hostname by stripping off trailing dots */
+-  size_t len = strlen(hostname);
+-  if(hostname[len-1]=='.')
+-    hostname[len-1] = 0;
+-  len = strlen(pattern);
+-  if(pattern[len-1]=='.')
+-    pattern[len-1] = 0;
+-
+-  pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
+-  if(pattern_wildcard == NULL)
+-    return strcasecompare(pattern, hostname) ?
+-      CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+  if(hostname[hostlen-1]=='.')
+    hostname[hostlen-1] = 0;
+  if(pattern[patternlen-1]=='.')
+    pattern[patternlen-1] = 0;
+
+  if(strncmp(pattern, "*.", 2))
+    return pmatch(hostname, hostlen, pattern, patternlen);
+ 
+   /* detect IP address as hostname and fail the match if so */
+   if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0)
+@@ -96,34 +108,20 @@ static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern)
+ 
+   /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
+      match. */
+-  wildcard_enabled = 1;
+   pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
+-  if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end + 1, '.') == NULL ||
+-     pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
+-     strncasecompare(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
+-    wildcard_enabled = 0;
+  if(pattern_label_end == NULL ||
+    (strrchr(pattern, '.') == pattern_label_end))
+      return pmatch(pattern, patternlen, hostname, hostlen);
+
+  const char *hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
+  if(hostname_label_end != NULL) {
+    size_t skiphost = hostname_label_end - hostname;
+    size_t skiplen = pattern_label_end - pattern;
+    return pmatch(hostname_label_end, hostlen - skiphost,
+                  pattern_label_end, patternlen - skiplen);
+   }
+-  if(!wildcard_enabled)
+-    return strcasecompare(pattern, hostname) ?
+-      CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+-
+-  hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
+-  if(hostname_label_end == NULL ||
+-     !strcasecompare(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end))
+-    return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ 
+-  /* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
+-     label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
+-     of the pattern. */
+-  if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern)
+-    return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+-
+-  prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
+-  suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard + 1);
+-  return strncasecompare(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
+-    strncasecompare(pattern_wildcard + 1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
+-                    suffixlen) ?
+-    CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+  return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH;
+ }
+ 
+ int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
+diff --git a/tests/data/test1397 b/tests/data/test1397
+index 84f962abebee3..f31b2c2a3f330 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test1397
+++ b/tests/data/test1397
+@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
+ <info>
+ <keywords>
+ unittest
+-ssl
+-wildcard
+Curl_cert_hostcheck
+ </keywords>
+ </info>
+ 
+@@ -15,10 +14,10 @@ none
+ <features>
+ unittest
+ </features>
+- <name>
+-Check wildcard certificate matching function Curl_cert_hostcheck
+- </name>
+<name>
+Curl_cert_hostcheck unit tests
+</name>
+ <tool>
+ unit1397
+ </tool>
+ </client>
+diff --git a/tests/unit/unit1397.c b/tests/unit/unit1397.c
+index 2f3d3aa4d09e1..3ae75618d5d10 100644
+--- a/tests/unit/unit1397.c
+++ b/tests/unit/unit1397.c
+@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
+  ***************************************************************************/
+ #include "curlcheck.h"
+ 
+-#include "hostcheck.h" /* from the lib dir */
+-
+ static CURLcode unit_setup(void)
+ {
+   return CURLE_OK;
+@@ -30,50 +28,93 @@ static CURLcode unit_setup(void)
+ 
+ static void unit_stop(void)
+ {
+-  /* done before shutting down and exiting */
+ }
+ 
+-UNITTEST_START
+-
+ /* only these backends define the tested functions */
+-#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_AXTLS) || defined(USE_GSKIT)
+-
+-  /* here you start doing things and checking that the results are good */
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GSKIT) || defined(USE_SCHANNEL)
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+struct testcase {
+  const char *host;
+  const char *pattern;
+  bool match;
+};
+ 
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("www.example.com", "www.example.com"),
+-            "good 1");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.com", "www.example.com"),
+-            "good 2");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("xxx*.example.com", "xxxwww.example.com"),
+-            "good 3");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("f*.example.com", "foo.example.com"),
+-            "good 4");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("192.168.0.0", "192.168.0.0"),
+-            "good 5");
+-
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("xxx.example.com", "www.example.com"), "bad 1");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*", "www.example.com"), "bad 2");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.*.com", "www.example.com"), "bad 3");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.com", "baa.foo.example.com"), "bad 4");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("f*.example.com", "baa.example.com"), "bad 5");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.com", "example.com"), "bad 6");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*fail.com", "example.com"), "bad 7");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.", "www.example."), "bad 8");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.example.", "www.example"), "bad 9");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("", "www"), "bad 10");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*", "www"), "bad 11");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*.168.0.0", "192.168.0.0"), "bad 12");
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("www.example.com", "192.168.0.0"), "bad 13");
+-
+-#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
+-fail_if(Curl_cert_hostcheck("*::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619",
+-                            "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619"), "bad 14");
+-fail_unless(Curl_cert_hostcheck("fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619",
+-                                "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619"), "good 6");
+-#endif
+static struct testcase tests[] = {
+  {"", "", FALSE},
+  {"a", "", FALSE},
+  {"", "b", FALSE},
+  {"a", "b", FALSE},
+  {"aa", "bb", FALSE},
+  {"\xff", "\xff", TRUE},
+  {"aa.aa.aa", "aa.aa.bb", FALSE},
+  {"aa.aa.aa", "aa.aa.aa", TRUE},
+  {"aa.aa.aa", "*.aa.bb", FALSE},
+  {"aa.aa.aa", "*.aa.aa", TRUE},
+  {"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", TRUE},
+  {"192.168.0.1", "*.168.0.1", FALSE},
+  {"192.168.0.1", "*.0.1", FALSE},
+  {"h.ello", "*.ello", FALSE},
+  {"h.ello.", "*.ello", FALSE},
+  {"h.ello", "*.ello.", FALSE},
+  {"h.e.llo", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"h.e.llo", " *.e.llo", FALSE},
+  {" h.e.llo", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"h.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"*.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"************.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+   "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
+   "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"
+   "DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD"
+   "EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE"
+   ".e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"\xfe\xfe.e.llo.", "*.e.llo", TRUE},
+  {"h.e.llo.", "*.e.llo.", TRUE},
+  {"h.e.llo", "*.e.llo.", TRUE},
+  {".h.e.llo", "*.e.llo.", FALSE},
+  {"h.e.llo", "*.*.llo.", FALSE},
+  {"h.e.llo", "h.*.llo", FALSE},
+  {"h.e.llo", "h.e.*", FALSE},
+  {"hello", "*.ello", FALSE},
+  {"hello", "**llo", FALSE},
+  {"bar.foo.example.com", "*.example.com", FALSE},
+  {"foo.example.com", "*.example.com", TRUE},
+  {"baz.example.net", "b*z.example.net", FALSE},
+  {"foobaz.example.net", "*baz.example.net", FALSE},
+  {"xn--l8j.example.local", "x*.example.local", FALSE},
+  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "*.example.net", TRUE},
+  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "*j.example.net", FALSE},
+  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "xn--l8j.example.net", TRUE},
+  {"xn--l8j.example.net", "xn--l8j.*.net", FALSE},
+  {"xl8j.example.net", "*.example.net", TRUE},
+  {"fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", "*::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", FALSE},
+  {"fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", "fe80::3285:a9ff:fe46:b619", TRUE},
+  {NULL, NULL, FALSE}
+};
+ 
+-#endif
+UNITTEST_START
+{
+  int i;
+  for(i = 0; tests[i].host; i++) {
+    if(tests[i].match != Curl_cert_hostcheck(tests[i].pattern,
+                                             strlen(tests[i].pattern),
+                                             tests[i].host,
+                                             strlen(tests[i].host))) {
+      fprintf(stderr,
+              "HOST: %s\n"
+              "PTRN: %s\n"
+              "did %sMATCH\n",
+              tests[i].host,
+              tests[i].pattern,
+              tests[i].match ? "NOT ": "");
+      unitfail++;
+    }
+  }
+}
+UNITTEST_STOP
+#else
+ 
+-  /* you end the test code like this: */
+UNITTEST_START
+ 
+ UNITTEST_STOP
+#endif
--- a/SOURCES/0052-curl-7.61.1-certs.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0052-curl-7.61.1-certs.patch
--- a/SOURCES/0053-curl-7.61.1-password-when-keyboard-interactive-fails.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0053-curl-7.61.1-password-when-keyboard-interactive-fails.patch
@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+From be17dc9d31e805c03372b690dde67838b3bfc12d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 16:34:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] libssh: when keyboard-interactive auth fails, try password
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The state machine had a mistake in that it would not carry on to that
+next step.
+
+This also adds a verbose output what methods that are available from the
+server and renames the macros that change to the next auth methods to
+try.
+
+Reported-by: 左潇峰
+Fixes #11196
+Closes #11197
+---
+ lib/ssh-libssh.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ssh-libssh.c b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+index 7ebe61321419f..1cecb649cb623 100644
+--- a/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+++ b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int myssh_is_known(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   break; \
+ }
+ 
+-#define MOVE_TO_LAST_AUTH \
+#define MOVE_TO_PASSWD_AUTH \
+   if(sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD) { \
+     rc = SSH_OK; \
+     state(conn, SSH_AUTH_PASS_INIT); \
+@@ -452,25 +452,25 @@ static int myssh_is_known(struct Curl_easy *data)
+     MOVE_TO_ERROR_STATE(CURLE_LOGIN_DENIED); \
+   }
+ 
+-#define MOVE_TO_TERTIARY_AUTH \
+#define MOVE_TO_KEY_AUTH \
+   if(sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_INTERACTIVE) { \
+     rc = SSH_OK; \
+     state(conn, SSH_AUTH_KEY_INIT); \
+     break; \
+   } \
+   else { \
+-    MOVE_TO_LAST_AUTH; \
+    MOVE_TO_PASSWD_AUTH; \
+   }
+ 
+-#define MOVE_TO_SECONDARY_AUTH \
+#define MOVE_TO_GSSAPI_AUTH \
+   if(sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_MIC) { \
+     rc = SSH_OK; \
+     state(conn, SSH_AUTH_GSSAPI); \
+     break; \
+   } \
+   else { \
+-    MOVE_TO_TERTIARY_AUTH; \
+    MOVE_TO_KEY_AUTH; \
+   }
+ 
+ static
+ int myssh_auth_interactive(struct connectdata *conn)
+@@ -617,6 +617,16 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+         }
+ 
+         sshc->auth_methods = ssh_userauth_list(sshc->ssh_session, NULL);
+        if(sshc->auth_methods)
+          infof(data, "SSH authentication methods available: %s%s%s%s",
+                sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PUBLICKEY ?
+                "public key, ": "",
+                sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_GSSAPI_MIC ?
+                "GSSAPI, " : "",
+                sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_INTERACTIVE ?
+                "keyboard-interactive, " : "",
+                sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD ?
+                "password": "");
+         if(sshc->auth_methods & SSH_AUTH_METHOD_PUBLICKEY) {
+           state(conn, SSH_AUTH_PKEY_INIT);
+           infof(data, "Authentication using SSH public key file\n");
+@@ -761,8 +761,8 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+       }
+     case SSH_AUTH_PKEY_INIT:
+       if(!(data->set.ssh_auth_types & CURLSSH_AUTH_PUBLICKEY)) {
+-        MOVE_TO_SECONDARY_AUTH;
+        MOVE_TO_GSSAPI_AUTH;
+       }
+ 
+       /* Two choices, (1) private key was given on CMD,
+        * (2) use the "default" keys. */
+@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+           }
+ 
+           if(rc != SSH_OK) {
+-            MOVE_TO_SECONDARY_AUTH;
+            MOVE_TO_GSSAPI_AUTH;
+           }
+         }
+ 
+@@ -826,7 +836,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+           break;
+         }
+ 
+-        MOVE_TO_SECONDARY_AUTH;
+        MOVE_TO_GSSAPI_AUTH;
+       }
+       break;
+     case SSH_AUTH_PKEY:
+@@ -828,13 +828,13 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+       }
+       else {
+         infof(data, "Failed public key authentication (rc: %d)\n", rc);
+-        MOVE_TO_SECONDARY_AUTH;
+        MOVE_TO_GSSAPI_AUTH;
+       }
+       break;
+ 
+     case SSH_AUTH_GSSAPI:
+       if(!(data->set.ssh_auth_types & CURLSSH_AUTH_GSSAPI)) {
+-        MOVE_TO_TERTIARY_AUTH;
+        MOVE_TO_KEY_AUTH;
+       }
+ 
+       rc = ssh_userauth_gssapi(sshc->ssh_session);
+@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+         break;
+       }
+ 
+-      MOVE_TO_TERTIARY_AUTH;
+      MOVE_TO_KEY_AUTH;
+       break;
+ 
+     case SSH_AUTH_KEY_INIT:
+@@ -736,13 +736,12 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+         state(conn, SSH_AUTH_KEY);
+       }
+       else {
+-        MOVE_TO_LAST_AUTH;
+        MOVE_TO_PASSWD_AUTH;
+       }
+       break;
+ 
+     case SSH_AUTH_KEY:
+-
+-      /* Authentication failed. Continue with keyboard-interactive now. */
+      /* keyboard-interactive authentication */
+       rc = myssh_auth_interactive(conn);
+       if(rc == SSH_AGAIN) {
+         break;
+@@ -759,13 +759,15 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+       if(rc == SSH_OK) {
+         sshc->authed = TRUE;
+         infof(data, "completed keyboard interactive authentication\n");
+        state(data, SSH_AUTH_DONE);
+      }
+      else {
+        MOVE_TO_PASSWD_AUTH;
+       }
+-      state(conn, SSH_AUTH_DONE);
+       break;
+ 
+     case SSH_AUTH_PASS_INIT:
+       if(!(data->set.ssh_auth_types & CURLSSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) {
+-        /* Host key authentication is intentionally not implemented */
+         MOVE_TO_ERROR_STATE(CURLE_LOGIN_DENIED);
+       }
+       state(conn, SSH_AUTH_PASS);
--- a/SOURCES/0054-curl-7.61.1-64K-sftp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0054-curl-7.61.1-64K-sftp.patch
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 35eb2614d86316ba9f5a6806ce64f56680fa1e97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2023 17:33:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] libssh: cap SFTP packet size sent
+
+Due to libssh limitations
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+
+Closes #11804
+---
+ lib/ssh-libssh.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ssh-libssh.c b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+index dea0084575859..7c6a2e53f338f 100644
+--- a/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+++ b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+@@ -2412,6 +2412,12 @@ static ssize_t sftp_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex,
+   ssize_t nwrite;
+   (void)sockindex;
+ 
+  /* limit the writes to the maximum specified in Section 3 of
+   * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02
+   */
+  if(len > 32768)
+    len = 32768;
+
+   nwrite = sftp_write(conn->proto.sshc.sftp_file, mem, len);
+ 
+   myssh_block2waitfor(conn, FALSE);
--- a/SOURCES/0055-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-28322.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0055-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-28322.patch
@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+From 47f0d37bfc008c088416f3dcca802c9e087d9bf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 08:28:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: unify the upload/method handling
+
+By making sure we set state.upload based on the set.method value and not
+independently as set.upload, we reduce confusion and mixup risks, both
+internally and externally.
+---
+ lib/curl_rtmp.c    | 4 ++--
+ lib/file.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/ftp.c          | 8 ++++----
+ lib/http.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/imap.c         | 6 +++---
+ lib/rtsp.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/setopt.c       | 6 ++----
+ lib/smb.c          | 6 +++---
+ lib/smtp.c         | 4 ++--
+ lib/tftp.c         | 8 ++++----
+ lib/transfer.c     | 4 ++--
+ lib/urldata.h      | 2 +-
+ lib/ssh-libssh.c   | 6 +++---
+ lib/ssh.c          | 6 +++---
+ 14 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/curl_rtmp.c b/lib/curl_rtmp.c
+index 2679a2cdc1afe..406fb42ac0f44 100644
+--- a/lib/curl_rtmp.c
+++ b/lib/curl_rtmp.c
+@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static CURLcode rtmp_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+   /* We have to know if it's a write before we send the
+    * connect request packet
+    */
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload)
+  if(conn->data->state.upload)
+     r->Link.protocol |= RTMP_FEATURE_WRITE;
+ 
+   /* For plain streams, use the buffer toggle trick to keep data flowing */
+@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static CURLcode rtmp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+   if(!RTMP_ConnectStream(r, 0))
+     return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+ 
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload) {
+  if(conn->data->state.upload) {
+     Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(conn->data, conn->data->state.infilesize);
+     Curl_setup_transfer(conn, -1, -1, FALSE, NULL, FIRSTSOCKET, NULL);
+   }
+diff --git a/lib/file.c b/lib/file.c
+index 51c5d07ce40ab..c751e8861a99b 100644
+--- a/lib/file.c
+++ b/lib/file.c
+@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static CURLcode file_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+   file->freepath = real_path; /* free this when done */
+ 
+   file->fd = fd;
+-  if(!data->set.upload && (fd == -1)) {
+  if(!data->state.upload && (fd == -1)) {
+     failf(data, "Couldn't open file %s", data->state.path);
+     file_done(conn, CURLE_FILE_COULDNT_READ_FILE, FALSE);
+     return CURLE_FILE_COULDNT_READ_FILE;
+@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static CURLcode file_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+ 
+   Curl_pgrsStartNow(data);
+ 
+-  if(data->set.upload)
+  if(data->state.upload)
+     return file_upload(conn);
+ 
+   file = conn->data->req.protop;
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index f50d7baf622f8..4ff68cc454cbc 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
+++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_prepare_transfer(struct Curl_easy *data)
+                 data->set.str[STRING_CUSTOMREQUEST]:
+                 (data->set.ftp_list_only?"NLST":"LIST"));
+       }
+-      else if(data->set.upload) {
+      else if(data->state.upload) {
+         PPSENDF(&conn->proto.ftpc.pp, "PRET STOR %s", conn->proto.ftpc.file);
+       }
+       else {
+@@ -3368,7 +3368,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status,
+     /* the response code from the transfer showed an error already so no
+        use checking further */
+     ;
+-  else if(data->set.upload) {
+  else if(data->state.upload) {
+     if((-1 != data->state.infilesize) &&
+        (data->state.infilesize != *ftp->bytecountp) &&
+        !data->set.crlf &&
+@@ -3640,7 +3640,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_do_more(struct Curl_easy *data, int *completep)
+                            connected back to us */
+       }
+     }
+-    else if(data->set.upload) {
+    else if(data->state.upload) {
+       result = ftp_nb_type(conn, data->set.prefer_ascii, FTP_STOR_TYPE);
+       if(result)
+         return result;
+@@ -4217,7 +4217,7 @@ CURLcode ftp_parse_url_path(struct Curl_easy *data)
+     ftpc->file = NULL; /* instead of point to a zero byte, we make it a NULL
+                           pointer */
+ 
+-  if(data->set.upload && !ftpc->file && (ftp->transfer == FTPTRANSFER_BODY)) {
+  if(data->state.upload && !ftpc->file && (ftp->transfer == FTPTRANSFER_BODY)) {
+     /* We need a file name when uploading. Return error! */
+     failf(data, "Uploading to a URL without a file name!");
+     return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
+diff --git a/lib/http.c b/lib/http.c
+index 80e43f6f361e8..bffdd3468536d 100644
+--- a/lib/http.c
+++ b/lib/http.c
+@@ -2112,7 +2112,7 @@ void Curl_http_method(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+   http->writebytecount = http->readbytecount = 0;
+ 
+   if((conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_FTP)) &&
+-     data->set.upload) {
+     data->state.upload) {
+     httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT;
+   }
+ 
+@@ -2423,7 +2423,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_body(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
+     if((conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) &&
+        (((httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_MIME || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_FORM) &&
+        http->postsize < 0) ||
+-       (data->set.upload && data->state.infilesize == -1))) {
+       (data->state.upload && data->state.infilesize == -1))) {
+       if(conn->bits.authneg)
+         /* don't enable chunked during auth neg */
+         ;
+diff --git a/lib/imap.c b/lib/imap.c
+index c2f675d4b2618..1952e66a1efcd 100644
+--- a/lib/imap.c
+++ b/lib/imap.c
+@@ -1511,10 +1511,10 @@ static CURLcode imap_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status,
+     result = status;         /* use the already set error code */
+   }
+   else if(!data->set.connect_only && !imap->custom &&
+-          (imap->uid || data->set.upload ||
+          (imap->uid || data->state.upload ||
+           data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)) {
+     /* Handle responses after FETCH or APPEND transfer has finished */
+-    if(!data->set.upload && data->set.mimepost.kind == MIMEKIND_NONE)
+    if(!data->state.upload && data->set.mimepost.kind == MIMEKIND_NONE)
+       state(conn, IMAP_FETCH_FINAL);
+     else {
+       /* End the APPEND command first by sending an empty line */
+@@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *connected,
+     selected = TRUE;
+ 
+   /* Start the first command in the DO phase */
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)
+  if(conn->data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)
+     /* APPEND can be executed directly */
+     result = imap_perform_append(conn);
+   else if(imap->custom && (selected || !imap->mailbox))
+index ea99d720ec4eb..ccd7264b00e74 100644
+--- a/lib/rtsp.c
+++ b/lib/rtsp.c
+@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+      rtspreq == RTSPREQ_SET_PARAMETER ||
+      rtspreq == RTSPREQ_GET_PARAMETER) {
+ 
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
+    if(data->state.upload) {
+       putsize = data->state.infilesize;
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT;
+ 
+@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+       if(!Curl_checkheaders(conn, "Content-Length")) {
+         result = Curl_add_bufferf(req_buffer,
+             "Content-Length: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T"\r\n",
+-            (data->set.upload ? putsize : postsize));
+            (data->state.upload ? putsize : postsize));
+         if(result)
+           return result;
+       }
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index 38f5711e44191..0c3b9634d1192 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
+++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+      * We want to sent data to the remote host. If this is HTTP, that equals
+      * using the PUT request.
+      */
+-    data->set.upload = (0 != va_arg(param, long)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
+    arg = va_arg(param, long);
+    if(arg) {
+       /* If this is HTTP, PUT is what's needed to "upload" */
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT;
+       data->set.opt_no_body = FALSE; /* this is implied */
+@@ -888,7 +887,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+      */
+     if(va_arg(param, long)) {
+       data->set.httpreq = HTTPREQ_GET;
+-      data->set.upload = FALSE; /* switch off upload */
+       data->set.opt_no_body = FALSE; /* this is implied */
+     }
+     break;
+diff --git a/lib/smb.c b/lib/smb.c
+index a1e444ee6b97e..d6822213529bc 100644
+--- a/lib/smb.c
+++ b/lib/smb.c
+@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_send_open(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   byte_count = strlen(req->path);
+   msg.name_length = smb_swap16((unsigned short)byte_count);
+   msg.share_access = smb_swap32(SMB_FILE_SHARE_ALL);
+-  if(conn->data->set.upload) {
+  if(conn->data->state.upload) {
+     msg.access = smb_swap32(SMB_GENERIC_READ | SMB_GENERIC_WRITE);
+     msg.create_disposition = smb_swap32(SMB_FILE_OVERWRITE_IF);
+   }
+@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_request_state(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done)
+     smb_m = (const struct smb_nt_create_response*) msg;
+     req->fid = smb_swap16(smb_m->fid);
+     conn->data->req.offset = 0;
+-    if(conn->data->set.upload) {
+    if(conn->data->state.upload) {
+       conn->data->req.size = conn->data->state.infilesize;
+       Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(conn->data, conn->data->req.size);
+       next_state = SMB_UPLOAD;
+diff --git a/lib/smtp.c b/lib/smtp.c
+index 7a030308d4689..c182cace742d7 100644
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
+++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status,
+     result = status;         /* use the already set error code */
+   }
+   else if(!data->set.connect_only && data->set.mail_rcpt &&
+-          (data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind)) {
+          (data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind)) {
+     /* Calculate the EOB taking into account any terminating CRLF from the
+        previous line of the email or the CRLF of the DATA command when there
+        is "no mail data". RFC-5321, sect. 4.1.1.4.
+@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *connected,
+   smtp->eob = 2;
+ 
+   /* Start the first command in the DO phase */
+-  if((data->set.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind) && data->set.mail_rcpt)
+  if((data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind) && data->set.mail_rcpt)
+     /* MAIL transfer */
+     result = smtp_perform_mail(conn);
+   else
+diff --git a/lib/tftp.c b/lib/tftp.c
+index 164d3c723c5b9..8ed1b887b4d21 100644
+--- a/lib/tftp.c
+++ b/lib/tftp.c
+@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_parse_option_ack(struct tftp_state_data *state,
+ 
+       /* tsize should be ignored on upload: Who cares about the size of the
+          remote file? */
+-      if(!data->set.upload) {
+      if(!data->state.upload) {
+         if(!tsize) {
+           failf(data, "invalid tsize -:%s:- value in OACK packet", value);
+           return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
+@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(struct tftp_state_data *state,
+       return result;
+     }
+ 
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
+    if(data->state.upload) {
+       /* If we are uploading, send an WRQ */
+       setpacketevent(&state->spacket, TFTP_EVENT_WRQ);
+       state->conn->data->req.upload_fromhere =
+@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(struct tftp_state_data *state,
+     if(!data->set.tftp_no_options) {
+       char buf[64];
+       /* add tsize option */
+-      if(data->set.upload && (data->state.infilesize != -1))
+      if(data->state.upload && (data->state.infilesize != -1))
+         snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T,
+                  data->state.infilesize);
+       else
+@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(struct tftp_state_data *state,
+     break;
+ 
+   case TFTP_EVENT_OACK:
+-    if(data->set.upload) {
+    if(data->state.upload) {
+       result = tftp_connect_for_tx(state, event);
+     }
+     else {
+diff --git a/lib/transfer.c b/lib/transfer.c
+index e9ab8fbf09510..cb69f3365855a 100644
+--- a/lib/transfer.c
+++ b/lib/transfer.c
+@@ -1293,6 +1293,7 @@ void Curl_init_CONNECT(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ {
+   data->state.fread_func = data->set.fread_func_set;
+   data->state.in = data->set.in_set;
+  data->state.upload = (data->set.httpreq == HTTPREQ_PUT);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1770,7 +1770,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_retry_request(struct Curl_easy *data, char **url)
+ 
+   /* if we're talking upload, we can't do the checks below, unless the protocol
+      is HTTP as when uploading over HTTP we will still get a response */
+-  if(data->set.upload &&
+  if(data->state.upload &&
+      !(conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_RTSP)))
+     return CURLE_OK;
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h
+index cca992a0295aa..a8580bdb66fe8 100644
+--- a/lib/urldata.h
+++ b/lib/urldata.h
+@@ -1494,6 +1494,7 @@ struct UrlState {
+ #ifdef CURLDEBUG
+   bool conncache_lock;
+ #endif
+  bool upload;         /* upload request */
+ };
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1838,7 +1839,6 @@ struct UserDefined {
+   bool http_set_referer; /* is a custom referer used */
+   bool http_auto_referer; /* set "correct" referer when following location: */
+   bool opt_no_body;      /* as set with CURLOPT_NOBODY */
+-  bool upload;           /* upload request */
+   enum CURL_NETRC_OPTION
+        use_netrc;        /* defined in include/curl.h */
+   bool verbose;          /* output verbosity */
+diff --git a/lib/ssh-libssh.c b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+index b31f741ba9492..d60edaa303642 100644
+--- a/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+++ b/lib/ssh-libssh.c
+@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+     }
+ 
+     case SSH_SFTP_TRANS_INIT:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
+      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SFTP_UPLOAD_INIT);
+       else {
+         if(protop->path[strlen(protop->path)-1] == '/')
+@@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+       /* Functions from the SCP subsystem cannot handle/return SSH_AGAIN */
+       ssh_set_blocking(sshc->ssh_session, 1);
+ 
+-      if(data->set.upload) {
+      if(data->state.upload) {
+         if(data->state.infilesize < 0) {
+           failf(data, "SCP requires a known file size for upload");
+           sshc->actualcode = CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED;
+@@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+         break;
+       }
+     case SSH_SCP_DONE:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
+      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_SEND_EOF);
+       else
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_CHANNEL_FREE);
+diff --git a/lib/ssh.c b/lib/ssh.c
+index f1154dc47a74e..f2e5352d1fd3a 100644
+--- a/lib/ssh.c
+++ b/lib/ssh.c
+@@ -2019,7 +2019,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+     }
+ 
+     case SSH_SFTP_TRANS_INIT:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
+      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SFTP_UPLOAD_INIT);
+       else {
+         if(sftp_scp->path[strlen(sftp_scp->path)-1] == '/')
+@@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+         break;
+       }
+ 
+-      if(data->set.upload) {
+      if(data->state.upload) {
+         if(data->state.infilesize < 0) {
+           failf(data, "SCP requires a known file size for upload");
+           sshc->actualcode = CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED;
+@@ -2831,7 +2831,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block)
+     break;
+ 
+     case SSH_SCP_DONE:
+-      if(data->set.upload)
+      if(data->state.upload)
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_SEND_EOF);
+       else
+         state(conn, SSH_SCP_CHANNEL_FREE);
--- a/SOURCES/0056-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-38546.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0056-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-38546.patch
@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 61275672b46d9abb3285740467b882e22ed75da8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 23:28:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: remove unnecessary struct fields
+
+Plus: reduce the hash table size from 256 to 63. It seems unlikely to
+make much of a speed difference for most use cases but saves 1.5KB of
+data per instance.
+
+Closes #11862
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 13 +------------
+ lib/cookie.h | 13 ++++---------
+ lib/easy.c   |  4 +---
+ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index 4345a84c6fd9d..e39c89a94a960 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co)
+   free(co->name);
+   free(co->value);
+   free(co->maxage);
+-  free(co->version);
+   free(co);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -717,11 +716,7 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+           }
+         }
+         else if(strcasecompare("version", name)) {
+-          strstore(&co->version, whatptr);
+-          if(!co->version) {
+-            badcookie = TRUE;
+-            break;
+-          }
+          /* just ignore */
+         }
+         else if(strcasecompare("max-age", name)) {
+           /* Defined in RFC2109:
+@@ -1159,7 +1154,6 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+         free(clist->path);
+         free(clist->spath);
+         free(clist->expirestr);
+-        free(clist->version);
+         free(clist->maxage);
+ 
+         *clist = *co;  /* then store all the new data */
+@@ -1223,9 +1217,6 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data,
+     c = calloc(1, sizeof(struct CookieInfo));
+     if(!c)
+       return NULL; /* failed to get memory */
+-    c->filename = strdup(file?file:"none"); /* copy the name just in case */
+-    if(!c->filename)
+-      goto fail; /* failed to get memory */
+   }
+   else {
+     /* we got an already existing one, use that */
+@@ -1378,7 +1369,6 @@ static struct Cookie *dup_cookie(struct Cookie *src)
+     CLONE(name);
+     CLONE(value);
+     CLONE(maxage);
+-    CLONE(version);
+     d->expires = src->expires;
+     d->tailmatch = src->tailmatch;
+     d->secure = src->secure;
+@@ -1595,7 +1585,6 @@ void Curl_cookie_cleanup(struct CookieInfo *c)
+ {
+   if(c) {
+     unsigned int i;
+-    free(c->filename);
+     for(i = 0; i < COOKIE_HASH_SIZE; i++)
+       Curl_cookie_freelist(c->cookies[i]);
+     free(c); /* free the base struct as well */
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.h b/lib/cookie.h
+index b3c0063b2cfb2..41e9e7a6914e0 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.h
+++ b/lib/cookie.h
+@@ -36,11 +36,7 @@ struct Cookie {
+   curl_off_t expires;  /* expires = <this> */
+   char *expirestr;   /* the plain text version */
+   bool tailmatch;    /* whether we do tail-matching of the domain name */
+-
+-  /* RFC 2109 keywords. Version=1 means 2109-compliant cookie sending */
+-  char *version;     /* Version = <value> */
+   char *maxage;      /* Max-Age = <value> */
+-
+   bool secure;       /* whether the 'secure' keyword was used */
+   bool livecookie;   /* updated from a server, not a stored file */
+   bool httponly;     /* true if the httponly directive is present */
+@@ -56,15 +52,14 @@ struct Cookie {
+   int creationtime;  /* time when the cookie was written */
+ };
+ 
+-#define COOKIE_HASH_SIZE 256
+#define COOKIE_HASH_SIZE 63
+ 
+ struct CookieInfo {
+   /* linked list of cookies we know of */
+   struct Cookie *cookies[COOKIE_HASH_SIZE];
+ 
+-  char *filename;  /* file we read from/write to */
+   bool running;    /* state info, for cookie adding information */
+-  long numcookies; /* number of cookies in the "jar" */
+  int numcookies; /* number of cookies in the "jar" */
+   bool newsession; /* new session, discard session cookies on load */
+   int lastct;      /* last creation-time used in the jar */
+ };
+diff --git a/lib/easy.c b/lib/easy.c
+index 16bbd35251d40..03195481f9780 100644
+--- a/lib/easy.c
+++ b/lib/easy.c
+@@ -925,9 +925,7 @@ struct Curl_easy *curl_easy_duphandle(struct Curl_easy *data)
+   if(data->cookies) {
+     /* If cookies are enabled in the parent handle, we enable them
+        in the clone as well! */
+-    outcurl->cookies = Curl_cookie_init(data,
+-                                        data->cookies->filename,
+-                                        outcurl->cookies,
+    outcurl->cookies = Curl_cookie_init(data, NULL, outcurl->cookies,
+                                         data->set.cookiesession);
+     if(!outcurl->cookies)
+       goto fail;
--- a/SOURCES/0057-curl-7.61.1-consolidate-nghttp2-session-mem-recv.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0057-curl-7.61.1-consolidate-nghttp2-session-mem-recv.patch
@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+diff -up curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c.25a25f45 curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c
+--- curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c.25a25f45	2023-08-07 14:03:42.043463284 +0200
+++ curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c	2023-08-07 14:10:24.769489855 +0200
+@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_request_upgrade(Curl
+   binlen = nghttp2_pack_settings_payload(binsettings, H2_BINSETTINGS_LEN,
+                                          httpc->local_settings,
+                                          httpc->local_settings_num);
+-  if(!binlen) {
+  if(binlen <= 0) {
+     failf(conn->data, "nghttp2 unexpectedly failed on pack_settings_payload");
+     Curl_add_buffer_free(req);
+     return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
+@@ -1285,6 +1285,14 @@ static int h2_process_pending_input(stru
+     return -1;
+   }
+ 
+  if(nghttp2_session_check_request_allowed(httpc->h2) == 0) {
+    /* No more requests are allowed in the current session, so
+       the connection may not be reused. This is set when a
+       GOAWAY frame has been received or when the limit of stream
+       identifiers has been reached. */
+    connclose(conn, "http/2: No new requests allowed");
+  }
+
+   if(should_close_session(httpc)) {
+     H2BUGF(infof(data,
+                  "h2_process_pending_input: nothing to do in this session\n"));
+@@ -1297,7 +1305,6 @@ static int h2_process_pending_input(stru
+     }
+     return -1;
+   }
+-
+   return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1455,8 +1462,6 @@ static int h2_session_send(struct Curl_e
+ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex,
+                           char *mem, size_t len, CURLcode *err)
+ {
+-  CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+-  ssize_t rv;
+   ssize_t nread;
+   struct http_conn *httpc = &conn->proto.httpc;
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+@@ -1519,8 +1524,7 @@ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connect
+       /* We have paused nghttp2, but we have no pause data (see
+          on_data_chunk_recv). */
+       httpc->pause_stream_id = 0;
+-      if(h2_process_pending_input(conn, httpc, &result) != 0) {
+-        *err = result;
+      if(h2_process_pending_input(conn, httpc, err) != 0) {
+         return -1;
+       }
+     }
+@@ -1549,8 +1553,7 @@ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connect
+          frames, then we have to call it again with 0-length data.
+          Without this, on_stream_close callback will not be called,
+          and stream could be hanged. */
+-      if(h2_process_pending_input(conn, httpc, &result) != 0) {
+-        *err = result;
+      if(h2_process_pending_input(conn, httpc, err) != 0) {
+         return -1;
+       }
+     }
+@@ -1573,7 +1576,6 @@ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connect
+     return -1;
+   }
+   else {
+-    char *inbuf;
+     /* remember where to store incoming data for this stream and how big the
+        buffer is */
+     stream->mem = mem;
+@@ -1582,16 +1584,15 @@ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connect
+ 
+     if(httpc->inbuflen == 0) {
+       nread = ((Curl_recv *)httpc->recv_underlying)(
+-          conn, FIRSTSOCKET, httpc->inbuf, H2_BUFSIZE, &result);
+          conn, FIRSTSOCKET, httpc->inbuf, H2_BUFSIZE, err);
+ 
+       if(nread == -1) {
+-        if(result != CURLE_AGAIN)
+        if(*err != CURLE_AGAIN)
+           failf(data, "Failed receiving HTTP2 data");
+         else if(stream->closed)
+           /* received when the stream was already closed! */
+           return http2_handle_stream_close(conn, data, stream, err);
+ 
+-        *err = result;
+         return -1;
+       }
+ 
+@@ -1604,47 +1605,17 @@ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connect
+       H2BUGF(infof(data, "nread=%zd\n", nread));
+ 
+       httpc->inbuflen = nread;
+-      inbuf = httpc->inbuf;
+
+      DEBUGASSERT(httpc->nread_inbuf == 0);
+     }
+     else {
+       nread = httpc->inbuflen - httpc->nread_inbuf;
+-      inbuf = httpc->inbuf + httpc->nread_inbuf;
+-
+      (void)nread;  /* silence warning, used in debug */
+       H2BUGF(infof(data, "Use data left in connection buffer, nread=%zd\n",
+                    nread));
+     }
+-    rv = nghttp2_session_mem_recv(httpc->h2, (const uint8_t *)inbuf, nread);
+-
+-    if(nghttp2_is_fatal((int)rv)) {
+-      failf(data, "nghttp2_session_mem_recv() returned %zd:%s\n",
+-            rv, nghttp2_strerror((int)rv));
+-      *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
+-      return -1;
+-    }
+-    H2BUGF(infof(data, "nghttp2_session_mem_recv() returns %zd\n", rv));
+-    if(nread == rv) {
+-      H2BUGF(infof(data, "All data in connection buffer processed\n"));
+-      httpc->inbuflen = 0;
+-      httpc->nread_inbuf = 0;
+-    }
+-    else {
+-      httpc->nread_inbuf += rv;
+-      H2BUGF(infof(data, "%zu bytes left in connection buffer\n",
+-                   httpc->inbuflen - httpc->nread_inbuf));
+-    }
+-    /* Always send pending frames in nghttp2 session, because
+-       nghttp2_session_mem_recv() may queue new frame */
+-    rv = h2_session_send(data, httpc->h2);
+-    if(rv != 0) {
+-      *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
+-      return -1;
+-    }
+-
+-    if(should_close_session(httpc)) {
+-      H2BUGF(infof(data, "http2_recv: nothing to do in this session\n"));
+-      *err = CURLE_HTTP2;
+    if(h2_process_pending_input(conn, httpc, err) != 0)
+       return -1;
+-    }
+   }
+   if(stream->memlen) {
+     ssize_t retlen = stream->memlen;
+@@ -2108,7 +2079,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_switched(struct conn
+   CURLcode result;
+   struct http_conn *httpc = &conn->proto.httpc;
+   int rv;
+-  ssize_t nproc;
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   struct HTTP *stream = conn->data->req.protop;
+ 
+@@ -2186,39 +2156,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_switched(struct conn
+     memcpy(httpc->inbuf, mem, nread);
+   httpc->inbuflen = nread;
+ 
+-  nproc = nghttp2_session_mem_recv(httpc->h2, (const uint8_t *)httpc->inbuf,
+-                                   httpc->inbuflen);
+  DEBUGASSERT(httpc->nread_inbuf == 0);
+ 
+-  if(nghttp2_is_fatal((int)nproc)) {
+-    failf(data, "nghttp2_session_mem_recv() failed: %s(%d)",
+-          nghttp2_strerror((int)nproc), (int)nproc);
+  if(-1 == h2_process_pending_input(conn, httpc, &result))
+     return CURLE_HTTP2;
+-  }
+-
+-  H2BUGF(infof(data, "nghttp2_session_mem_recv() returns %zd\n", nproc));
+-
+-  if((ssize_t)nread == nproc) {
+-    httpc->inbuflen = 0;
+-    httpc->nread_inbuf = 0;
+-  }
+-  else {
+-    httpc->nread_inbuf += nproc;
+-  }
+-
+-  /* Try to send some frames since we may read SETTINGS already. */
+-  rv = h2_session_send(data, httpc->h2);
+-
+-  if(rv != 0) {
+-    failf(data, "nghttp2_session_send() failed: %s(%d)",
+-          nghttp2_strerror(rv), rv);
+-    return CURLE_HTTP2;
+-  }
+-
+-  if(should_close_session(httpc)) {
+-    H2BUGF(infof(data,
+-                 "nghttp2_session_send(): nothing to do in this session\n"));
+-    return CURLE_HTTP2;
+-  }
+ 
+   return CURLE_OK;
+ }
--- a/SOURCES/0058-curl-7.61.1-error-in-the-HTTP2-framing-layer.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0058-curl-7.61.1-error-in-the-HTTP2-framing-layer.patch
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff -up curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c.c1b6a384 curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c
+--- curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c.c1b6a384	2023-08-07 13:59:18.482137005 +0200
+++ curl-7.61.1/lib/http2.c	2023-08-07 14:03:42.043463284 +0200
+@@ -1467,6 +1467,11 @@ static ssize_t http2_recv(struct connect
+   if(should_close_session(httpc)) {
+     H2BUGF(infof(data,
+                  "http2_recv: nothing to do in this session\n"));
+    if(conn->bits.close) {
+      /* already marked for closure, return OK and we're done */
+      *err = CURLE_OK;
+      return 0;
+    }
+     *err = CURLE_HTTP2;
+     return -1;
+   }
--- a/SOURCES/0059-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-46218.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0059-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-46218.patch
@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 2b0994c29a721c91c572cff7808c572a24d251eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 08:15:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] cookie: lowercase the domain names before PSL checks
+
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+
+Closes #12387
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index 568cf537ad1b1f..9095cea3e97f22 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -1027,15 +1027,23 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ #ifdef USE_LIBPSL
+   /* Check if the domain is a Public Suffix and if yes, ignore the cookie. */
+   if(domain && co->domain && !isip(co->domain)) {
+-    const psl_ctx_t *psl = Curl_psl_use(data);
+-    int acceptable;
+-
+-    if(psl) {
+-      acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable(psl, domain, co->domain);
+-      Curl_psl_release(data);
+    bool acceptable = FALSE;
+    char lcase[256];
+    char lcookie[256];
+    size_t dlen = strlen(domain);
+    size_t clen = strlen(co->domain);
+    if((dlen < sizeof(lcase)) && (clen < sizeof(lcookie))) {
+      const psl_ctx_t *psl = Curl_psl_use(data);
+      if(psl) {
+        /* the PSL check requires lowercase domain name and pattern */
+        Curl_strntolower(lcase, domain, dlen + 1);
+        Curl_strntolower(lcookie, co->domain, clen + 1);
+        acceptable = psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable(psl, lcase, lcookie);
+        Curl_psl_release(data);
+      }
+      else
+        acceptable = !bad_domain(domain);
+     }
+-    else
+-      acceptable = !bad_domain(domain);
+ 
+     if(!acceptable) {
+       infof(data, "cookie '%s' dropped, domain '%s' must not "
--- a/SOURCES/0060-curl-7.61.1-lowercase-headernames.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/0060-curl-7.61.1-lowercase-headernames.patch
@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+From 0023fce38d3bd6ee0e9b6ff8708fee1195057846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Barry Pollard <barry_pollard@hotmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 22 Sep 2019 21:17:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] http: lowercase headernames for HTTP/2 and HTTP/3
+
+Closes #4401
+Fixes #4400
+---
+ lib/strcase.c      | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/strcase.h      |  2 ++
+ 5 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.c b/lib/strcase.c
+index 24bcca932..098cec7a8 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.c
+++ b/lib/strcase.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,75 @@ char Curl_raw_toupper(char in)
+   return in;
+ }
+ 
+
+/* Portable, consistent tolower (remember EBCDIC). Do not use tolower() because
+   its behavior is altered by the current locale. */
+char Curl_raw_tolower(char in)
+{
+#if !defined(CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS)
+  if(in >= 'A' && in <= 'Z')
+    return (char)('a' + in - 'A');
+#else
+  switch(in) {
+  case 'A':
+    return 'a';
+  case 'B':
+    return 'b';
+  case 'C':
+    return 'c';
+  case 'D':
+    return 'd';
+  case 'E':
+    return 'e';
+  case 'F':
+    return 'f';
+  case 'G':
+    return 'g';
+  case 'H':
+    return 'h';
+  case 'I':
+    return 'i';
+  case 'J':
+    return 'j';
+  case 'K':
+    return 'k';
+  case 'L':
+    return 'l';
+  case 'M':
+    return 'm';
+  case 'N':
+    return 'n';
+  case 'O':
+    return 'o';
+  case 'P':
+    return 'p';
+  case 'Q':
+    return 'q';
+  case 'R':
+    return 'r';
+  case 'S':
+    return 's';
+  case 'T':
+    return 't';
+  case 'U':
+    return 'u';
+  case 'V':
+    return 'v';
+  case 'W':
+    return 'w';
+  case 'X':
+    return 'X';
+  case 'Y':
+    return 'y';
+  case 'Z':
+    return 'z';
+  }
+#endif
+
+  return in;
+}
+
+
+ /*
+  * Curl_strcasecompare() is for doing "raw" case insensitive strings. This is
+  * meant to be locale independent and only compare strings we know are safe
+@@ -234,6 +303,21 @@ void Curl_strntoupper(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n)
+   } while(*src++ && --n);
+ }
+ 
+/* Copy a lower case version of the string from src to dest.  The
+ * strings may overlap.  No more than n characters of the string are copied
+ * (including any NUL) and the destination string will NOT be
+ * NUL-terminated if that limit is reached.
+ */
+void Curl_strntolower(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n)
+{
+  if(n < 1)
+    return;
+
+  do {
+    *dest++ = Curl_raw_tolower(*src);
+  } while(*src++ && --n);
+}
+
+ /* Compare case-sensitive NUL-terminated strings, taking care of possible
+  * null pointers. Return true if arguments match.
+  */
+diff --git a/lib/strcase.h b/lib/strcase.h
+index 6fee3840e..2f07a74c9 100644
+--- a/lib/strcase.h
+++ b/lib/strcase.h
+@@ -40,12 +40,14 @@ int Curl_safe_strcasecompare(const char *first, const char *second);
+ int Curl_strncasecompare(const char *first, const char *second, size_t max);
+ 
+ char Curl_raw_toupper(char in);
+char Curl_raw_tolower(char in);
+ 
+ /* checkprefix() is a shorter version of the above, used when the first
+    argument is zero-byte terminated */
+ #define checkprefix(a,b)    curl_strnequal(a,b,strlen(a))
+ 
+ void Curl_strntoupper(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+void Curl_strntolower(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n);
+ 
+ bool Curl_safecmp(char *a, char *b);
+ int Curl_timestrcmp(const char *first, const char *second);
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
--- a/SPECS/curl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/curl.spec
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Summary: A utility for getting files from remote servers (FTP, HTTP, and others)
 Name: curl
 Version: 7.61.1
-Release: 22%{?dist}.2
+Release: 34%{?dist}
 License: MIT
 Source: https://curl.haxx.se/download/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz

@ -109,6 +109,72 @@ Patch37:  0037-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-27776.patch
 # fix credential leak on redirect (CVE-2022-27774)
 Patch38:  0038-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-27774.patch

+# fix too eager reuse of TLS and SSH connections (CVE-2022-27782)
+Patch39:  0039-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-27782.patch
+
+# fix FTP-KRB bad message verification (CVE-2022-32208)
+Patch40:  0040-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-32208.patch
+
+# fix HTTP compression denial of service (CVE-2022-32206)
+Patch41:  0041-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-32206.patch
+
+# setopt: enable CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS and CURLOPT_SSH_KEYFUNCTION (#2063703)
+Patch42:  0042-curl-7.61.1-ssh-known-hosts.patch
+
+# control code in cookie denial of service (CVE-2022-35252)
+Patch43:  0043-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-35252.patch
+
+# upon HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED, retry the request with HTTP/1.1 (#2139337)
+Patch44:  0044-curl-7.61.1-retry-http11.patch
+
+# smb/telnet: fix use-after-free when HTTP proxy denies tunnel (CVE-2022-43552)
+Patch45:  0045-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2022-43552.patch
+
+# h2: lower initial window size to 32 MiB (#2166254)
+Patch46:  0046-curl-7.61.1-h2-window-size.patch
+
+# fix HTTP multi-header compression denial of service (CVE-2023-23916)
+Patch47:  0047-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-23916.patch
+
+# fix FTP too eager connection reuse (CVE-2023-27535)
+Patch48:  0048-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-27535.patch
+
+# fix GSS delegation too eager connection re-use (CVE-2023-27536)
+Patch49:  0049-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-27536.patch
+
+# sftp: do not specify O_APPEND when not in append mode (#2187717)
+Patch50:  0050-curl-7.61.1-sftp-upload-flags.patch
+
+# fix host name wildcard checking (CVE-2023-28321)
+Patch51:  0051-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-28321.patch
+
+# rebuild certs with 2048-bit RSA keys
+Patch52:  0052-curl-7.61.1-certs.patch
+
+# when keyboard-interactive auth fails, try password
+Patch53:  0053-curl-7.61.1-password-when-keyboard-interactive-fails.patch
+
+# cap SFTP packet size sent
+Patch54:  0054-curl-7.61.1-64K-sftp.patch
+
+# unify the upload/method handling (CVE-2023-28322)
+Patch55:  0055-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-28322.patch
+
+# fix cookie injection with none file (CVE-2023-38546)
+Patch56:  0056-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-38546.patch
+
+# consolidate nghttp2_session_mem_recv() call paths
+Patch57:  0057-curl-7.61.1-consolidate-nghttp2-session-mem-recv.patch
+
+# when marked for closure and wanted to close == OK
+Patch58:  0058-curl-7.61.1-error-in-the-HTTP2-framing-layer.patch
+
+# lowercase the domain names before PSL checks (CVE-2023-46218)
+Patch59:  0059-curl-7.61.1-CVE-2023-46218.patch
+
+# lowercase headernames
+Patch60:  0060-curl-7.61.1-lowercase-headernames.patch
+
 # patch making libcurl multilib ready
 Patch101: 0101-curl-7.32.0-multilib.patch

@ -320,6 +386,29 @@ sed -e 's|%%HTTPPORT|%{?__isa_bits}90|g' -i tests/data/test1448
 %patch38 -p1
 sed -e 's|:8992/|:%{?__isa_bits}92/|g' -i tests/data/test97{3..6}

+%patch39 -p1
+%patch40 -p1
+%patch41 -p1
+%patch42 -p1
+%patch43 -p1
+%patch44 -p1
+%patch45 -p1
+%patch46 -p1
+%patch47 -p1
+%patch48 -p1
+%patch49 -p1
+%patch50 -p1
+%patch51 -p1
+git apply %{PATCH52}
+%patch53 -p1
+%patch54 -p1
+%patch55 -p1
+%patch56 -p1
+%patch57 -p1
+%patch58 -p1
+%patch59 -p1
+%patch60 -p1
+
 # make tests/*.py use Python 3
 sed -e '1 s|^#!/.*python|#!%{__python3}|' -i tests/*.py

@ -481,10 +570,50 @@ rm -f ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_libdir}/libcurl.la
 %{_libdir}/libcurl.so.4.[0-9].[0-9].minimal

 %changelog
-* Tue May 04 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-22.el8_6.2
+* Tue Sep 19 2023 Jacek Migacz <jmigacz@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-34
+- when keyboard-interactive auth fails, try password (#2229800)
+- cap SFTP packet size sent (RHEL-5311)
+- unify the upload/method handling (CVE-2023-28322)
+- fix cookie injection with none file (CVE-2023-38546)
+- fix HTTP2 connection failure with HTTP2 framing layer (RHEL-5657)
+- lowercase the domain names before PSL checks (CVE-2023-46218)
+
+* Tue Jun 27 2023 Jacek Migacz <jmigacz@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-33
+- fix host name wildcard checking (CVE-2023-28321)
+- rebuild certs with 2048-bit RSA keys
+
+* Thu Apr 20 2023 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-32
+- sftp: do not specify O_APPEND when not in append mode (#2187717)
+
+* Fri Mar 24 2023 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-31
+- fix GSS delegation too eager connection re-use (CVE-2023-27536)
+- fix FTP too eager connection reuse (CVE-2023-27535)
+
+* Wed Feb 15 2023 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-30
+- fix HTTP multi-header compression denial of service (CVE-2023-23916)
+
+* Tue Feb 07 2023 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-29
+- h2: lower initial window size to 32 MiB (#2166254)
+
+* Wed Dec 21 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-28
+- smb/telnet: fix use-after-free when HTTP proxy denies tunnel (CVE-2022-43552)
+
+* Fri Nov 18 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-27
+- upon HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED, retry the request with HTTP/1.1 (#2139337)
+
+* Fri Sep 02 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-26
+- control code in cookie denial of service (CVE-2022-35252)
+
+* Wed Jun 29 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-25
+- setopt: enable CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS and CURLOPT_SSH_KEYFUNCTION (#2063703)
+- fix HTTP compression denial of service (CVE-2022-32206)
+- fix FTP-KRB bad message verification (CVE-2022-32208)
+
+* Wed May 11 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-24
+- fix too eager reuse of TLS and SSH connections (CVE-2022-27782)
 - fix invalid type in printf() argument detected by Coverity

-* Thu Apr 28 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-22.el8_6.1
+* Thu Apr 28 2022 Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com> - 7.61.1-23
 - fix credential leak on redirect (CVE-2022-27774)
 - fix auth/cookie leak on redirect (CVE-2022-27776)
 - fix OAUTH2 bearer bypass in connection re-use (CVE-2022-22576)