cronie/cronie-1.4.6-selinux.patch
2010-12-16 14:02:06 +01:00

211 lines
6.9 KiB
Diff

diff -up cronie-1.4.6/src/cron.c.old cronie-1.4.6/src/cron.c
--- cronie-1.4.6/src/cron.c.old 2010-10-21 07:56:27.000000000 +0200
+++ cronie-1.4.6/src/cron.c 2010-12-16 13:44:44.000000000 +0100
@@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
exit(1);
}
+ if (cron_init_security() < 0) {
+ log_it("CRON", pid, "DEATH", "Critical security parameters not initialized", 0);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
/* Get the default locale character set for the mail
* "Content-Type: ...; charset=" header
*/
diff -up cronie-1.4.6/src/funcs.h.old cronie-1.4.6/src/funcs.h
--- cronie-1.4.6/src/funcs.h.old 2010-10-04 16:07:25.000000000 +0200
+++ cronie-1.4.6/src/funcs.h 2010-12-16 09:59:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ long get_gmtoff(time_t *, struct tm *);
/* Red Hat security stuff (security.c):
*/
+int cron_init_security( void );
+
void cron_restore_default_security_context( void );
int cron_set_job_security_context( entry *e, user *u, char ***jobenvp );
diff -up cronie-1.4.6/src/security.c.old cronie-1.4.6/src/security.c
--- cronie-1.4.6/src/security.c.old 2010-10-04 16:07:25.000000000 +0200
+++ cronie-1.4.6/src/security.c 2010-12-16 09:59:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -41,15 +41,14 @@ static int
cron_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msgm,
struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
{
- struct pam_message**m = msgm;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) {
- switch (m[i]->msg_style) {
+ switch (msgm[i]->msg_style) {
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
- if (m[i]->msg != NULL) {
- log_it("CRON", getpid(), "pam_message", m[i]->msg, 0);
+ if (msgm[i]->msg != NULL) {
+ log_it("CRON", getpid(), "pam_message", msgm[i]->msg, 0);
}
break;
default:
@@ -81,6 +80,11 @@ static char **build_env(char **cronenv);
static int cron_change_selinux_range(user * u, security_context_t ucontext);
static int cron_get_job_range(user * u, security_context_t * ucontextp,
char **jobenv);
+
+static security_class_t file_class;
+static security_class_t context_class;
+static access_vector_t entrypoint_bit;
+static access_vector_t contains_bit;
#endif
void cron_restore_default_security_context() {
@@ -89,6 +93,40 @@ void cron_restore_default_security_conte
#endif
}
+int cron_init_security() {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ if (is_selinux_enabled() <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (security_getenforce() <= 0)
+ rv = 0;
+
+ file_class = string_to_security_class("file");
+ if (!file_class) {
+ log_it("CRON", getpid(), "ERROR", "Failed to translate security class file", errno);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ context_class = string_to_security_class("context");
+ if (!context_class) {
+ log_it("CRON", getpid(), "ERROR", "Failed to translate security class context", errno);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ entrypoint_bit = string_to_av_perm(file_class, "entrypoint");
+ if (!entrypoint_bit) {
+ log_it("CRON", getpid(), "ERROR", "Failed to translate av perm entrypoint", errno);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ contains_bit = string_to_av_perm(context_class, "contains");
+ if (!contains_bit) {
+ log_it("CRON", getpid(), "ERROR", "Failed to translate av perm contains", errno);
+ return rv;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cron_set_job_security_context(entry * e, user * u, char ***jobenv) {
time_t minutely_time = 0;
#ifdef WITH_PAM
@@ -254,7 +292,7 @@ static int cron_authorize_context(securi
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
struct av_decision avd;
int retval;
- unsigned int bit = FILE__ENTRYPOINT;
+
/*
* Since crontab files are not directly executed,
* crond must ensure that the crontab file has
@@ -262,9 +300,11 @@ static int cron_authorize_context(securi
* the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
* permission check for this purpose.
*/
+ if (!file_class || !entrypoint_bit)
+ return 0;
retval = security_compute_av(scontext, file_context,
- SECCLASS_FILE, bit, &avd);
- if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
+ file_class, entrypoint_bit, &avd);
+ if (retval || ((entrypoint_bit & avd.allowed) != entrypoint_bit))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
@@ -275,16 +315,17 @@ static int cron_authorize_range(security
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
struct av_decision avd;
int retval;
- unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
/*
* Since crontab files are not directly executed,
* so crond must ensure that any user specified range
* falls within the seusers-specified range for that Linux user.
*/
+ if (!context_class || !contains_bit)
+ return 0;
retval = security_compute_av(scontext, ucontext,
- SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
+ context_class, contains_bit, &avd);
- if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
+ if (retval || ((contains_bit & avd.allowed) != contains_bit))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
@@ -479,15 +520,22 @@ get_security_context(const char *name, i
}
if (!cron_authorize_context(scontext, file_context)) {
+ char *msg=NULL;
+ if (asprintf(&msg,
+ "Unauthorized SELinux context=%s file_context=%s", (char *) scontext, file_context) >= 0) {
+ log_it(name, getpid(), msg, tabname, 0);
+ free(msg);
+ } else {
+ log_it(name, getpid(), "Unauthorized SELinux context", tabname, 0);
+ }
freecon(scontext);
freecon(file_context);
if (security_getenforce() > 0) {
- log_it(name, getpid(), "Unauthorized SELinux context", tabname, 0);
return -1;
}
else {
log_it(name, getpid(),
- "Unauthorized SELinux context, but SELinux in permissive mode, continuing",
+ "SELinux in permissive mode, continuing",
tabname, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -515,22 +563,30 @@ int crontab_security_access(void) {
security_context_t user_context;
if (getprevcon_raw(&user_context) == 0) {
security_class_t passwd_class;
+ access_vector_t crontab_bit;
struct av_decision avd;
- int retval;
+ int retval = 0;
passwd_class = string_to_security_class("passwd");
if (passwd_class == 0) {
- selinux_check_passwd_access = -1;
fprintf(stderr, "Security class \"passwd\" is not defined in the SELinux policy.\n");
+ retval = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ crontab_bit = string_to_av_perm(passwd_class, "crontab");
+ if (crontab_bit == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Security av permission \"crontab\" is not defined in the SELinux policy.\n");
+ retval = -1;
+ }
}
- retval = security_compute_av_raw(user_context,
- user_context,
- passwd_class,
- PASSWD__CRONTAB,
- &avd);
+ if (retval == 0)
+ retval = security_compute_av_raw(user_context,
+ user_context, passwd_class,
+ crontab_bit, &avd);
- if ((retval == 0) && ((PASSWD__CRONTAB & avd.allowed) == PASSWD__CRONTAB)) {
+ if ((retval == 0) && ((crontab_bit & avd.allowed) == crontab_bit)) {
selinux_check_passwd_access = 0;
}
freecon(user_context);