.criu.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-91eb1ccac61a7d538db14884091883c6dab5481a SOURCES/criu-3.15.tar.bz2
+b2ceaf9705aa8239915010136a59664d31044fe3 SOURCES/criu-3.12.tar.bz2

.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/criu-3.15.tar.bz2
+SOURCES/criu-3.12.tar.bz2

SOURCES/1e84cb90b63bce841376140a7a80107e5ec1e1a8.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 1e84cb90b63bce841376140a7a80107e5ec1e1a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 06:27:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] lsm: fix compiler error 'unused-result'
+
+Reading out the xattr 'security.selinux' of checkpointed sockets with
+fscanf() works (at least in theory) without checking the result of
+fscanf(). There are, however, multiple CI failures when ignoring the
+return value of fscanf().
+
+This adds ferror() to check if the stream has an actual error or if '-1'
+just mean EOF.
+
+Handle all errors of fscanf() // Andrei
+
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
+---
+ criu/lsm.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/criu/lsm.c b/criu/lsm.c
+index ef6ba112b3..9c9ac7f80e 100644
+--- a/criu/lsm.c
++++ b/criu/lsm.c
+@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ static int apparmor_get_label(pid_t pid, char **profile_name)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+ 	if (fscanf(f, "%ms", profile_name) != 1) {
+-		fclose(f);
+ 		pr_perror("err scanfing");
++		fclose(f);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -111,19 +111,23 @@ static int selinux_get_label(pid_t pid, char **output)
+ static int selinux_get_sockcreate_label(pid_t pid, char **output)
+ {
+ 	FILE *f;
++	int ret;
+ 
+ 	f = fopen_proc(pid, "attr/sockcreate");
+ 	if (!f)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	fscanf(f, "%ms", output);
+-	/*
+-	 * No need to check the result of fscanf(). If there is something
+-	 * in /proc/PID/attr/sockcreate it will be copied to *output. If
+-	 * there is nothing it will stay NULL. So whatever fscanf() does
+-	 * it should be correct.
+-	 */
+-
++	ret = fscanf(f, "%ms", output);
++	if (ret == -1 && errno != 0) {
++		pr_perror("Unable to parse /proc/%d/attr/sockcreate", pid);
++		/*
++		 * Only if the error indicator is set it is a real error.
++		 * -1 could also be EOF, which would mean that sockcreate
++		 * was just empty, which is the most common case.
++		 */
++		fclose(f);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 	return 0;
+ }

SOURCES/685.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,834 @@
+From 3313343ba7803bff077af5d87df2260cdcd2d678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 13:41:46 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] lsm: also dump and restore sockcreate
+
+The file /proc/PID/attr/sockcreate is used by SELinux to label newly
+created sockets with the label available at sockcreate.
+
+If it is NULL, the default label of the process will be used.
+
+This reads out that file during checkpoint and restores the value during
+restore.
+
+This value is irrelevant for existing sockets as they might have been
+created with another context. This is only to make sure that newly
+created sockets have the correct context.
+
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+---
+ criu/cr-restore.c       | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ criu/include/restorer.h |  2 ++
+ criu/lsm.c              | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ criu/pie/restorer.c     | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ images/creds.proto      |  1 +
+ 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/criu/cr-restore.c b/criu/cr-restore.c
+index 5fd22e9246..f254cbc0eb 100644
+--- a/criu/cr-restore.c
++++ b/criu/cr-restore.c
+@@ -2997,6 +2997,8 @@ static void rst_reloc_creds(struct thread_restore_args *thread_args,
+ 
+ 	if (args->lsm_profile)
+ 		args->lsm_profile = rst_mem_remap_ptr(args->mem_lsm_profile_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
++	if (args->lsm_sockcreate)
++		args->lsm_sockcreate = rst_mem_remap_ptr(args->mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
+ 	if (args->groups)
+ 		args->groups = rst_mem_remap_ptr(args->mem_groups_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
+ 
+@@ -3062,6 +3064,40 @@ rst_prep_creds_args(CredsEntry *ce, unsigned long *prev_pos)
+ 		args->mem_lsm_profile_pos = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (ce->lsm_sockcreate) {
++		char *rendered = NULL;
++		char *profile;
++
++		profile = ce->lsm_sockcreate;
++
++		if (validate_lsm(profile) < 0)
++			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++		if (profile && render_lsm_profile(profile, &rendered)) {
++			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++		}
++		if (rendered) {
++			size_t lsm_sockcreate_len;
++			char *lsm_sockcreate;
++
++			args->mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos = rst_mem_align_cpos(RM_PRIVATE);
++			lsm_sockcreate_len = strlen(rendered);
++			lsm_sockcreate = rst_mem_alloc(lsm_sockcreate_len + 1, RM_PRIVATE);
++			if (!lsm_sockcreate) {
++				xfree(rendered);
++				return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++			}
++
++			args = rst_mem_remap_ptr(this_pos, RM_PRIVATE);
++			args->lsm_sockcreate = lsm_sockcreate;
++			strncpy(args->lsm_sockcreate, rendered, lsm_sockcreate_len);
++			xfree(rendered);
++		}
++	} else {
++		args->lsm_sockcreate = NULL;
++		args->mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Zap fields which we can't use.
+ 	 */
+diff --git a/criu/include/restorer.h b/criu/include/restorer.h
+index 2884ce9e6d..b83e9130c5 100644
+--- a/criu/include/restorer.h
++++ b/criu/include/restorer.h
+@@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ struct thread_creds_args {
+ 	unsigned int			secbits;
+ 	char				*lsm_profile;
+ 	unsigned int			*groups;
++	char				*lsm_sockcreate;
+ 
+ 	unsigned long			mem_lsm_profile_pos;
++	unsigned long			mem_lsm_sockcreate_pos;
+ 	unsigned long			mem_groups_pos;
+ 
+ 	unsigned long			mem_pos_next;
+diff --git a/criu/lsm.c b/criu/lsm.c
+index 849ec37cde..b0ef0c396c 100644
+--- a/criu/lsm.c
++++ b/criu/lsm.c
+@@ -98,6 +98,32 @@ static int selinux_get_label(pid_t pid, char **output)
+ 	freecon(ctx);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++
++/*
++ * selinux_get_sockcreate_label reads /proc/PID/attr/sockcreate
++ * to see if the PID has a special label specified for sockets.
++ * Most of the time this will be empty and the process will use
++ * the process context also for sockets.
++ */
++static int selinux_get_sockcreate_label(pid_t pid, char **output)
++{
++	FILE *f;
++
++	f = fopen_proc(pid, "attr/sockcreate");
++	if (!f)
++		return -1;
++
++	fscanf(f, "%ms", output);
++	/*
++	 * No need to check the result of fscanf(). If there is something
++	 * in /proc/PID/attr/sockcreate it will be copied to *output. If
++	 * there is nothing it will stay NULL. So whatever fscanf() does
++	 * it should be correct.
++	 */
++
++	fclose(f);
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif
+ 
+ void kerndat_lsm(void)
+@@ -132,6 +158,7 @@ int collect_lsm_profile(pid_t pid, CredsEntry *ce)
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	ce->lsm_profile = NULL;
++	ce->lsm_sockcreate = NULL;
+ 
+ 	switch (kdat.lsm) {
+ 	case LSMTYPE__NO_LSM:
+@@ -143,6 +170,9 @@ int collect_lsm_profile(pid_t pid, CredsEntry *ce)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_SELINUX
+ 	case LSMTYPE__SELINUX:
+ 		ret = selinux_get_label(pid, &ce->lsm_profile);
++		if (ret)
++			break;
++		ret = selinux_get_sockcreate_label(pid, &ce->lsm_sockcreate);
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	default:
+@@ -153,6 +183,8 @@ int collect_lsm_profile(pid_t pid, CredsEntry *ce)
+ 
+ 	if (ce->lsm_profile)
+ 		pr_info("%d has lsm profile %s\n", pid, ce->lsm_profile);
++	if (ce->lsm_sockcreate)
++		pr_info("%d has lsm sockcreate label %s\n", pid, ce->lsm_sockcreate);
+ 
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+diff --git a/criu/pie/restorer.c b/criu/pie/restorer.c
+index 6e18cc2606..4f42605a09 100644
+--- a/criu/pie/restorer.c
++++ b/criu/pie/restorer.c
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static void sigchld_handler(int signal, siginfo_t *siginfo, void *data)
+ 	sys_exit_group(1);
+ }
+ 
+-static int lsm_set_label(char *label, int procfd)
++static int lsm_set_label(char *label, char *type, int procfd)
+ {
+ 	int ret = -1, len, lsmfd;
+ 	char path[STD_LOG_SIMPLE_CHUNK];
+@@ -157,9 +157,9 @@ static int lsm_set_label(char *label, int procfd)
+ 	if (!label)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	pr_info("restoring lsm profile %s\n", label);
++	pr_info("restoring lsm profile (%s) %s\n", type, label);
+ 
+-	std_sprintf(path, "self/task/%ld/attr/current", sys_gettid());
++	std_sprintf(path, "self/task/%ld/attr/%s", sys_gettid(), type);
+ 
+ 	lsmfd = sys_openat(procfd, path, O_WRONLY, 0);
+ 	if (lsmfd < 0) {
+@@ -305,9 +305,14 @@ static int restore_creds(struct thread_creds_args *args, int procfd,
+ 		 * SELinux and instead the process context is set before the
+ 		 * threads are created.
+ 		 */
+-		if (lsm_set_label(args->lsm_profile, procfd) < 0)
++		if (lsm_set_label(args->lsm_profile, "current", procfd) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
++
++	/* Also set the sockcreate label for all threads */
++	if (lsm_set_label(args->lsm_sockcreate, "sockcreate", procfd) < 0)
++		return -1;
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1571,7 +1576,7 @@ long __export_restore_task(struct task_restore_args *args)
+ 	if (args->lsm_type == LSMTYPE__SELINUX) {
+ 		/* Only for SELinux */
+ 		if (lsm_set_label(args->t->creds_args->lsm_profile,
+-				  args->proc_fd) < 0)
++				  "current", args->proc_fd) < 0)
+ 			goto core_restore_end;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff --git a/images/creds.proto b/images/creds.proto
+index 29fb8652eb..23b84c7e50 100644
+--- a/images/creds.proto
++++ b/images/creds.proto
+@@ -20,4 +20,5 @@ message creds_entry {
+ 	repeated uint32	groups	= 14;
+ 
+ 	optional string lsm_profile = 15;
++	optional string lsm_sockcreate = 16;
+ }
+
+From 495e6aa7ac51fcb36e6bc5f6c97f44cab7649b9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 13:47:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] test: Verify that sockcreate does not change during
+ restore
+
+This makes sure that sockcreate stays empty for selinux00 before and
+after checkpoint/restore.
+
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+---
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux00.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux00.c b/test/zdtm/static/selinux00.c
+index dd9096a6fc..db8420eacb 100644
+--- a/test/zdtm/static/selinux00.c
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux00.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,31 @@ int checkprofile()
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++int check_sockcreate()
++{
++	char *output = NULL;
++	FILE *f = fopen("/proc/self/attr/sockcreate", "r");
++	int ret = fscanf(f, "%ms", &output);
++	fclose(f);
++
++	if (ret >= 1) {
++		free(output);
++		/* sockcreate should be empty, if fscanf found something
++		 * it is wrong.*/
++		fail("sockcreate should be empty\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (output) {
++		free(output);
++		/* Same here, output should still be NULL. */
++		fail("sockcreate should be empty\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ 	test_init(argc, argv);
+@@ -95,12 +120,21 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (check_sockcreate())
++		return -1;
++
+ 	if (setprofile())
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	if (check_sockcreate())
++		return -1;
++
+ 	test_daemon();
+ 	test_waitsig();
+ 
++	if (check_sockcreate())
++		return -1;
++
+ 	if (checkprofile() == 0)
+ 		pass();
+ 
+
+From fe52cf66b38a261846ff40fc425085724b2acc15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 15:21:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] sockets: dump and restore xattr security labels
+
+Restoring a SELinux process also requires to correctly label sockets.
+
+During checkpointing fgetxattr() is used to retrieve the
+"security.selinux" xattr and during restore setsockcreatecon() is used
+before a socket is created.
+
+Previous commits are already restoring the sockcreate SELinux setting if
+set by the process.
+
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+---
+ criu/include/lsm.h  | 18 +++++++++++++++
+ criu/lsm.c          | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ criu/sk-inet.c      | 12 ++++++++++
+ criu/sockets.c      |  4 ++++
+ images/fdinfo.proto |  1 +
+ 5 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/criu/include/lsm.h b/criu/include/lsm.h
+index b4fce13039..3b82712829 100644
+--- a/criu/include/lsm.h
++++ b/criu/include/lsm.h
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "images/inventory.pb-c.h"
+ #include "images/creds.pb-c.h"
++#include "images/fdinfo.pb-c.h"
+ 
+ #define AA_SECURITYFS_PATH "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor"
+ 
+@@ -34,4 +35,21 @@ int validate_lsm(char *profile);
+ int render_lsm_profile(char *profile, char **val);
+ 
+ extern int lsm_check_opts(void);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_SELINUX
++int dump_xattr_security_selinux(int fd, FdinfoEntry *e);
++int run_setsockcreatecon(FdinfoEntry *e);
++int reset_setsockcreatecon();
++#else
++static inline int dump_xattr_security_selinux(int fd, FdinfoEntry *e) {
++	return 0;
++}
++static inline int run_setsockcreatecon(FdinfoEntry *e) {
++	return 0;
++}
++static inline int reset_setsockcreatecon() {
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __CR_LSM_H__ */
+diff --git a/criu/lsm.c b/criu/lsm.c
+index b0ef0c396c..ef6ba112b3 100644
+--- a/criu/lsm.c
++++ b/criu/lsm.c
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/xattr.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include "common/config.h"
+@@ -11,10 +12,12 @@
+ #include "util.h"
+ #include "cr_options.h"
+ #include "lsm.h"
++#include "fdstore.h"
+ 
+ #include "protobuf.h"
+ #include "images/inventory.pb-c.h"
+ #include "images/creds.pb-c.h"
++#include "images/fdinfo.pb-c.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_SELINUX
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+@@ -124,6 +127,59 @@ static int selinux_get_sockcreate_label(pid_t pid, char **output)
+ 	fclose(f);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++
++int reset_setsockcreatecon()
++{
++	return setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL);
++}
++
++int run_setsockcreatecon(FdinfoEntry *e)
++{
++	char *ctx = NULL;
++
++	/* Currently this only works for SELinux. */
++	if (kdat.lsm != LSMTYPE__SELINUX)
++		return 0;
++
++	ctx = e->xattr_security_selinux;
++	/* Writing to the FD using fsetxattr() did not work for some reason. */
++	return setsockcreatecon_raw(ctx);
++}
++
++int dump_xattr_security_selinux(int fd, FdinfoEntry *e)
++{
++	char *ctx = NULL;
++	int len;
++	int ret;
++
++	/* Currently this only works for SELinux. */
++	if (kdat.lsm != LSMTYPE__SELINUX)
++		return 0;
++
++	/* Get the size of the xattr. */
++	len = fgetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", ctx, 0);
++	if (len == -1) {
++		pr_err("Reading xattr %s to FD %d failed\n", ctx, fd);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	ctx = xmalloc(len);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		pr_err("xmalloc to read xattr for FD %d failed\n", fd);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	ret = fgetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", ctx, len);
++	if (len != ret) {
++		pr_err("Reading xattr %s to FD %d failed\n", ctx, fd);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	e->xattr_security_selinux = ctx;
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif
+ 
+ void kerndat_lsm(void)
+diff --git a/criu/sk-inet.c b/criu/sk-inet.c
+index 60ee4c3155..ca5c9bf2cd 100644
+--- a/criu/sk-inet.c
++++ b/criu/sk-inet.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
+ #include "files.h"
+ #include "image.h"
+ #include "log.h"
++#include "lsm.h"
++#include "kerndat.h"
++#include "pstree.h"
+ #include "rst-malloc.h"
+ #include "sockets.h"
+ #include "sk-inet.h"
+@@ -30,6 +33,8 @@
+ #include "util.h"
+ #include "namespaces.h"
+ 
++#include "images/inventory.pb-c.h"
++
+ #undef  LOG_PREFIX
+ #define LOG_PREFIX "inet: "
+ 
+@@ -804,12 +809,18 @@ static int open_inet_sk(struct file_desc *d, int *new_fd)
+ 	if (set_netns(ie->ns_id))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
++	if (run_setsockcreatecon(fle->fe))
++		return -1;
++
+ 	sk = socket(ie->family, ie->type, ie->proto);
+ 	if (sk < 0) {
+ 		pr_perror("Can't create inet socket");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (reset_setsockcreatecon())
++		return -1;
++
+ 	if (ie->v6only) {
+ 		if (restore_opt(sk, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &yes) == -1)
+ 			goto err;
+@@ -895,6 +906,7 @@ static int open_inet_sk(struct file_desc *d, int *new_fd)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	*new_fd = sk;
++
+ 	return 1;
+ err:
+ 	close(sk);
+diff --git a/criu/sockets.c b/criu/sockets.c
+index 30072ac737..7f7453ca1d 100644
+--- a/criu/sockets.c
++++ b/criu/sockets.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include "util-pie.h"
+ #include "sk-packet.h"
+ #include "namespaces.h"
++#include "lsm.h"
+ #include "net.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "fs-magic.h"
+@@ -663,6 +664,9 @@ int dump_socket(struct fd_parms *p, int lfd, FdinfoEntry *e)
+ 	int family;
+ 	const struct fdtype_ops *ops;
+ 
++	if (dump_xattr_security_selinux(lfd, e))
++		return -1;
++
+ 	if (dump_opt(lfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DOMAIN, &family))
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+diff --git a/images/fdinfo.proto b/images/fdinfo.proto
+index ed82ceffe7..77e375aa94 100644
+--- a/images/fdinfo.proto
++++ b/images/fdinfo.proto
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ message fdinfo_entry {
+ 	required uint32		flags	= 2;
+ 	required fd_types	type	= 3;
+ 	required uint32		fd	= 4;
++	optional string		xattr_security_selinux = 5;
+ }
+ 
+ message file_entry {
+
+From ba42d30fad82f17a66617a33f03d3da05cc73bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 09:47:32 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] selinux: add socket label test
+
+This adds two more SELinux test to verfy that checkpointing and
+restoring SELinux socket labels works correctly, if the process uses
+setsockcreatecon() or if the process leaves the default context for
+newly created sockets.
+
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+---
+ test/zdtm/static/Makefile            |   3 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux01.c         | 200 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux01.checkskip |   1 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux01.desc      |   1 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux01.hook      |   1 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux02.c         |   1 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux02.checkskip |   1 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux02.desc      |   1 +
+ test/zdtm/static/selinux02.hook      |   1 +
+ 9 files changed, 210 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 test/zdtm/static/selinux01.c
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux01.checkskip
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux01.desc
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux01.hook
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux02.c
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux02.checkskip
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux02.desc
+ create mode 120000 test/zdtm/static/selinux02.hook
+
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/Makefile b/test/zdtm/static/Makefile
+index 8e3f39276a..1ffaa90394 100644
+--- a/test/zdtm/static/Makefile
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/Makefile
+@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ TST_NOFILE	:=				\
+ 		thp_disable			\
+ 		pid_file			\
+ 		selinux00			\
++		selinux01			\
++		selinux02			\
+ #		jobctl00			\
+ 
+ ifneq ($(SRCARCH),arm)
+@@ -513,6 +515,7 @@ unlink_fstat041:		CFLAGS += -DUNLINK_FSTAT041 -DUNLINK_FSTAT04
+ ghost_holes01:		CFLAGS += -DTAIL_HOLE
+ ghost_holes02:		CFLAGS += -DHEAD_HOLE
+ sk-freebind-false:	CFLAGS += -DZDTM_FREEBIND_FALSE
++selinux02:		CFLAGS += -DUSING_SOCKCREATE
+ stopped01:		CFLAGS += -DZDTM_STOPPED_KILL
+ stopped02:		CFLAGS += -DZDTM_STOPPED_TKILL
+ stopped12:		CFLAGS += -DZDTM_STOPPED_KILL -DZDTM_STOPPED_TKILL
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.c b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..9966455c47
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/mount.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <sys/xattr.h>
++#include <linux/limits.h>
++#include <signal.h>
++#include "zdtmtst.h"
++
++/* Enabling the right policy happens in selinux00.hook and selinx00.checkskip */
++
++const char *test_doc	= "Check that a SELinux socket context is restored";
++const char *test_author	= "Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>";
++
++/* This is all based on Tycho's apparmor code */
++
++#define CONTEXT "unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_dbusd_t:s0"
++
++/*
++ * This is used to store the state of SELinux. For this test
++ * SELinux is switched to permissive mode and later the previous
++ * SELinux state is restored.
++ */
++char state;
++
++int check_for_selinux()
++{
++	if (access("/sys/fs/selinux", F_OK) == 0)
++		return 0;
++	return 1;
++}
++
++int setprofile()
++{
++	int fd, len;
++
++	fd = open("/proc/self/attr/current", O_WRONLY);
++	if (fd < 0) {
++		fail("Could not open /proc/self/attr/current\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	len = write(fd, CONTEXT, strlen(CONTEXT));
++	close(fd);
++
++	if (len < 0) {
++		fail("Could not write context\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int set_sockcreate()
++{
++	int fd, len;
++
++	fd = open("/proc/self/attr/sockcreate", O_WRONLY);
++	if (fd < 0) {
++		fail("Could not open /proc/self/attr/sockcreate\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	len = write(fd, CONTEXT, strlen(CONTEXT));
++	close(fd);
++
++	if (len < 0) {
++		fail("Could not write context\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int check_sockcreate()
++{
++	int fd;
++	char context[1024];
++	int len;
++
++
++	fd = open("/proc/self/attr/sockcreate", O_RDONLY);
++	if (fd < 0) {
++		fail("Could not open /proc/self/attr/sockcreate\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	len = read(fd, context, strlen(CONTEXT));
++	close(fd);
++	if (len != strlen(CONTEXT)) {
++		fail("SELinux context has unexpected length %d, expected %zd\n",
++			len, strlen(CONTEXT));
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (strncmp(context, CONTEXT, strlen(CONTEXT)) != 0) {
++		fail("Wrong SELinux context %s expected %s\n", context, CONTEXT);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int check_sockcreate_empty()
++{
++	char *output = NULL;
++	FILE *f = fopen("/proc/self/attr/sockcreate", "r");
++	int ret = fscanf(f, "%ms", &output);
++	fclose(f);
++
++	if (ret >= 1) {
++		free(output);
++		/* sockcreate should be empty, if fscanf found something
++		 * it is wrong.*/
++		fail("sockcreate should be empty\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (output) {
++		free(output);
++		/* Same here, output should still be NULL. */
++		fail("sockcreate should be empty\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++int main(int argc, char **argv)
++{
++	char ctx[1024];
++	test_init(argc, argv);
++
++	if (check_for_selinux()) {
++		skip("SELinux not found on this system.");
++		test_daemon();
++		test_waitsig();
++		pass();
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++#ifdef USING_SOCKCREATE
++	if (set_sockcreate())
++		return -1;
++#else
++	if (check_sockcreate_empty())
++		return -1;
++
++	if (setprofile())
++		return -1;
++
++	if (check_sockcreate_empty())
++		return -1;
++#endif
++
++	/* Open our test socket */
++	int sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++	memset(ctx, 0, 1024);
++	/* Read out the socket label */
++	if (fgetxattr(sk, "security.selinux", ctx, 1024) == -1) {
++		fail("Reading xattr 'security.selinux' failed.\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (strncmp(ctx, CONTEXT, strlen(CONTEXT)) != 0) {
++		fail("Wrong SELinux context %s expected %s\n", ctx, CONTEXT);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	memset(ctx, 0, 1024);
++
++	test_daemon();
++	test_waitsig();
++
++	/* Read out the socket label again */
++
++	if (fgetxattr(sk, "security.selinux", ctx, 1024) == -1) {
++		fail("Reading xattr 'security.selinux' failed.\n");
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (strncmp(ctx, CONTEXT, strlen(CONTEXT)) != 0) {
++		fail("Wrong SELinux context %s expected %s\n", ctx, CONTEXT);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++#ifdef USING_SOCKCREATE
++	if (check_sockcreate())
++		return -1;
++#else
++	if (check_sockcreate_empty())
++		return -1;
++#endif
++
++	pass();
++
++	return 0;
++}
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.checkskip b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.checkskip
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..e8a172479e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.checkskip
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux00.checkskip
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.desc b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.desc
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..2d2961a764
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.desc
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux00.desc
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.hook b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.hook
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..dd7ed6bb33
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux01.hook
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux00.hook
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.c b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.c
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..5702677858
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.c
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux01.c
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.checkskip b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.checkskip
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..2696e6e3de
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.checkskip
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux01.checkskip
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.desc b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.desc
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..9c6802c4da
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.desc
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux01.desc
+\ No newline at end of file
+diff --git a/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.hook b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.hook
+new file mode 120000
+index 0000000000..e3ea0a6c80
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/zdtm/static/selinux02.hook
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++selinux01.hook
+\ No newline at end of file

SOURCES/80d90c5c59e9477d8a0c9eb727a0fc1bec2b01ea.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 80d90c5c59e9477d8a0c9eb727a0fc1bec2b01ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 20:01:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] lsm: don't reset socket contex if SELinux is disabled
+
+Fixes #693
+---
+ criu/lsm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/criu/lsm.c b/criu/lsm.c
+index 9c9ac7f80e..5921138392 100644
+--- a/criu/lsm.c
++++ b/criu/lsm.c
+@@ -134,7 +134,15 @@ static int selinux_get_sockcreate_label(pid_t pid, char **output)
+ 
+ int reset_setsockcreatecon()
+ {
+-	return setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL);
++	/* Currently this only works for SELinux. */
++	if (kdat.lsm != LSMTYPE__SELINUX)
++		return 0;
++
++	if (setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL)) {
++		pr_perror("Unable to reset socket SELinux context");
++		return -1;
++	}
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int run_setsockcreatecon(FdinfoEntry *e)
+@@ -147,7 +155,11 @@ int run_setsockcreatecon(FdinfoEntry *e)
+ 
+ 	ctx = e->xattr_security_selinux;
+ 	/* Writing to the FD using fsetxattr() did not work for some reason. */
+-	return setsockcreatecon_raw(ctx);
++	if (setsockcreatecon_raw(ctx)) {
++		pr_perror("Unable to set the %s socket SELinux context", ctx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ int dump_xattr_security_selinux(int fd, FdinfoEntry *e)

SOURCES/b9e9e3903c78ba5d243b4176e82bf4b82342cb6a.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From b9e9e3903c78ba5d243b4176e82bf4b82342cb6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat, 4 May 2019 15:27:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lsm: fix compiler error on Fedora 30
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This fixes following compiler error:
+
+criu/lsm.c: In function ‘dump_xattr_security_selinux’:
+criu/include/log.h:51:2: error: ‘%s’ directive argument is null [-Werror=format-overflow=]
+   51 |  print_on_level(LOG_ERROR,     \
+      |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+   52 |          "Error (%s:%d): " LOG_PREFIX fmt,  \
+      |          ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+   53 |          __FILE__, __LINE__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+      |          ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+criu/lsm.c:166:3: note: in expansion of macro ‘pr_err’
+  166 |   pr_err("Reading xattr %s to FD %d failed\n", ctx, fd);
+      |   ^~~~~~
+
+Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
+---
+ criu/lsm.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/criu/lsm.c b/criu/lsm.c
+index 5921138392..420585ba4f 100644
+--- a/criu/lsm.c
++++ b/criu/lsm.c
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int dump_xattr_security_selinux(int fd, FdinfoEntry *e)
+ 	/* Get the size of the xattr. */
+ 	len = fgetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", ctx, 0);
+ 	if (len == -1) {
+-		pr_err("Reading xattr %s to FD %d failed\n", ctx, fd);
++		pr_err("Reading xattr security.selinux from FD %d failed\n", fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 

SPECS/criu.spec

@@ -1,32 +1,57 @@
+%if 0%{?fedora} >= 27 || 0%{?rhel} > 7
 %global py_prefix python3
 %global py_binary %{py_prefix}
+%else
+%global py_prefix python
+%global py_binary python2
+%endif
 
 # With annobin enabled, CRIU does not work anymore. It seems CRIU's
 # parasite code breaks if annobin is enabled.
 %undefine _annotated_build
 
 Name: criu
-Version: 3.15
+Version: 3.12
-Release: 3%{?dist}
+Release: 9%{?dist}
 Provides: crtools = %{version}-%{release}
 Obsoletes: crtools <= 1.0-2
 Summary: Tool for Checkpoint/Restore in User-space
 License: GPLv2
 URL: http://criu.org/
 Source0: http://download.openvz.org/criu/criu-%{version}.tar.bz2
-Source1: criu-tmpfiles.conf
+
+Patch0: https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/685.patch
+Patch1: https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/commit/1e84cb90b63bce841376140a7a80107e5ec1e1a8.patch
+Patch2: https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/commit/80d90c5c59e9477d8a0c9eb727a0fc1bec2b01ea.patch
+Patch3: https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/commit/b9e9e3903c78ba5d243b4176e82bf4b82342cb6a.patch
+
+%if 0%{?rhel} && 0%{?rhel} <= 7
+BuildRequires: perl
+# RHEL has no asciidoc; take man-page from Fedora 26
+# zcat /usr/share/man/man8/criu.8.gz > criu.8
+Source1: criu.8
+Source2: crit.1
+# The patch aio-fix.patch is needed as RHEL7
+# doesn't do "nr_events *= 2" in ioctx_alloc().
+Patch100: aio-fix.patch
+%endif
+
+Source3: criu-tmpfiles.conf
+
 BuildRequires: gcc
 BuildRequires: systemd
 BuildRequires: libnet-devel
 BuildRequires: protobuf-devel protobuf-c-devel %{py_prefix}-devel libnl3-devel libcap-devel
+%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} > 7
 BuildRequires: asciidoc xmlto
 BuildRequires: perl-interpreter
 BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
-BuildRequires: gnutls-devel
-BuildRequires: nftables-devel
-BuildRequires: make
 # Checkpointing containers with a tmpfs requires tar
 Recommends: tar
+%if 0%{?fedora}
+BuildRequires: libbsd-devel
+%endif
+%endif
 
 # user-space and kernel changes are only available for x86_64, arm,
 # ppc64le, aarch64 and s390x
@@ -38,10 +63,10 @@ criu is the user-space part of Checkpoint/Restore in User-space
 (CRIU), a project to implement checkpoint/restore functionality for
 Linux in user-space.
 
+%if 0%{?fedora}
 %package devel
 Summary: Header files and libraries for %{name}
 Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
-Requires: criu-libs = %{version}-%{release}
 
 %description devel
 This package contains header files and libraries for %{name}.
@@ -52,12 +77,18 @@ Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 
 %description libs
 This package contains the libraries for %{name}
+%endif
 
 %package -n %{py_prefix}-%{name}
 %{?python_provide:%python_provide %{py_prefix}-%{name}}
 Summary: Python bindings for %{name}
+%if 0%{?rhel} && 0%{?rhel} <= 7
+Requires: protobuf-python
+Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release} %{py_prefix}-ipaddr
+%else
 Requires: %{py_prefix}-protobuf
 Obsoletes: python2-criu < 3.10-1
+%endif
 
 %description -n %{py_prefix}-%{name}
 %{py_prefix}-%{name} contains Python bindings for %{name}.
@@ -70,35 +101,62 @@ Requires: %{py_prefix}-%{name} = %{version}-%{release}
 crit is a tool designed to decode CRIU binary dump files and show
 their content in human-readable form.
 
+
 %prep
 %setup -q
+%patch0 -p1
+%patch1 -p1
+%patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
+
+%if 0%{?rhel} && 0%{?rhel} <= 7
+%patch100 -p1
+%endif
 
 %build
 # %{?_smp_mflags} does not work
 # -fstack-protector breaks build
 CFLAGS+=`echo %{optflags} | sed -e 's,-fstack-protector\S*,,g'` make V=1 WERROR=0 PREFIX=%{_prefix} RUNDIR=/run/criu PYTHON=%{py_binary}
+%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} > 7
 make docs V=1
+%endif
+
 
 %install
 make install-criu DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT PREFIX=%{_prefix} LIBDIR=%{_libdir}
 make install-lib DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT PREFIX=%{_prefix} LIBDIR=%{_libdir} PYTHON=%{py_binary}
+%if 0%{?fedora} || 0%{?rhel} > 7
+# only install documentation on Fedora as it requires asciidoc,
+# which is not available on RHEL7
 make install-man DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT PREFIX=%{_prefix} LIBDIR=%{_libdir}
+%else
+install -p -m 644  -D %{SOURCE1} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/%{name}.8
+install -p -m 644  -D %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/crit.1
+%endif
+
 mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_tmpfilesdir}
-install -m 0644 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
+install -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} %{buildroot}%{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
 install -d -m 0755 %{buildroot}/run/%{name}/
 
-# remove static libs
+%if 0%{?rhel}
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.a
+# remove devel and libs packages
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_includedir}/criu
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/*.so*
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/pkgconfig
 rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/%{name}
+%endif
 
 %files
 %{_sbindir}/%{name}
-%{_mandir}/man8/criu.8*
+%doc %{_mandir}/man8/criu.8*
-%{_mandir}/man1/compel.1*
+%if 0%{?fedora}
+%{_libexecdir}/%{name}
+%endif
 %dir /run/%{name}
 %{_tmpfilesdir}/%{name}.conf
 %doc README.md COPYING
 
+%if 0%{?fedora}
 %files devel
 %{_includedir}/criu
 %{_libdir}/*.so
@@ -106,37 +164,23 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/%{name}
 
 %files libs
 %{_libdir}/*.so.*
+%endif
 
 %files -n %{py_prefix}-%{name}
+%if 0%{?rhel} && 0%{?rhel} <= 7
+%{python2_sitelib}/pycriu/*
+%{python2_sitelib}/*egg-info
+%else
 %{python3_sitelib}/pycriu/*
 %{python3_sitelib}/*egg-info
+%endif
 
 %files -n crit
 %{_bindir}/crit
 %doc %{_mandir}/man1/crit.1*
 
+
 %changelog
-* Fri Aug 06 2021 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 3.15-3
-- add Requires: criu-libs = %%{version}-%%{release} in criu-devel
-- add gating tests
-- Related: #1934415
-
-* Tue Jul 20 2021 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 3.15-2
-- add -devel and -libs subpackages
-- Resolves: #1971718
-
-* Wed Nov 04 2020 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 3.15-1
-- update to https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/releases/tag/v3.15
-- Related: #1883490
-
-* Mon May 25 2020 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 3.14-2
-- fix "Need to fix bugs found by coverity."
-- Related: #1821193
-
-* Tue May 12 2020 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 3.14-1
-- synchronize containter-tools 8.3.0 with 8.2.1
-- Related: #1821193
-
 * Mon May 13 2019 Adrian Reber <adrian@lisas.de> - 3.12-9
 - Added additional fixup patches for the socket labelling