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- Resolves: RHEL-163817

Browse Source 
- Resolves: RHEL-163838

- totemsrp: Return error if sanity check fails
  (fixes CVE-2026-35091)
- totemsrp: Fix integer overflow in memb_join_sanity
  (fixes CVE-2026-35092)

Signed-off-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jan Friesse 2026-04-09 09:54:50 +02:00
parent 24eeeb4c36
commit f7b7f4f0c9
3 changed files with 113 additions and 1 deletions
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46
RHEL-163817-totemsrp-Return-error-if-sanity-check-fails.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From a16614accfdb3481264d7281843fadf439d9ab1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:00:39 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] totemsrp: Return error if sanity check fails
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Previously, the check_memb_commit_token_sanity function correctly
checked the minimum message length. However, if the message was too
short, it incorrectly returned a success code (0) instead of the
expected failure code (-1).
This commit ensures the appropriate error code is returned when the
message length sanity check fails.
Fixes: CVE-2026-35091
Reported-by: Sebastián Alba Vives (@Sebasteuo / 0xS4bb1) <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
Also-proposed-by: nicholasyang <nicholas.yang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christine Caulfield <ccaulfie@redhat.com>
---
exec/totemsrp.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/exec/totemsrp.c b/exec/totemsrp.c
index a716ae9f..372a96d1 100644
--- a/exec/totemsrp.c
+++ b/exec/totemsrp.c
@@ -3811,10 +3811,10 @@ static int check_memb_commit_token_sanity(
log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
"Received memb_commit_token message is too short... ignoring.");
- return (0);
+ return (-1);
}
- addr_entries= mct_msg->addr_entries;
+ addr_entries = mct_msg->addr_entries;
if (endian_conversion_needed) {
addr_entries = swab32(addr_entries);
}
--
2.47.3

56
RHEL-163838-totemsrp-Fix-integer-overflow-in-memb_join_sanity.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From 4082294f5094a7591e4e00658c5a605f05d644f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:44:06 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] totemsrp: Fix integer overflow in memb_join_sanity
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This commit addresses an integer overflow (wraparound) vulnerability
in the check_memb_join_sanity function.
Previously, the 32-bit unsigned network values proc_list_entries and
failed_list_entries were added together before being promoted to
size_t. This allowed the addition to wrap around in 32-bit arithmetic
(e.g., 0x80000000 + 0x80000000 = 0), resulting in a required_len
calculation that was incorrectly small.
The solution is to cast the list entries to size_t and verify that
neither exceeds the maximum allowed value before the addition occurs.
Fixes: CVE-2026-35092
Reported-by: Sebastián Alba Vives (@Sebasteuo / 0xS4bb1) <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
Also-proposed-by: nicholasyang <nicholas.yang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christine Caulfield <ccaulfie@redhat.com>
---
exec/totemsrp.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/exec/totemsrp.c b/exec/totemsrp.c
index 372a96d1..67596911 100644
--- a/exec/totemsrp.c
+++ b/exec/totemsrp.c
@@ -3786,7 +3786,17 @@ static int check_memb_join_sanity(
failed_list_entries = swab32(failed_list_entries);
}
- required_len = sizeof(struct memb_join) + ((proc_list_entries + failed_list_entries) * sizeof(struct srp_addr));
+ if (proc_list_entries > PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX ||
+ failed_list_entries > PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX) {
+ log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
+ "Received memb_join message list_entries exceeds the maximum "
+ "allowed value... ignoring.");
+
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ required_len = sizeof(struct memb_join) +
+ (((size_t)proc_list_entries + (size_t)failed_list_entries) * sizeof(struct srp_addr));
if (msg_len < required_len) {
log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
"Received memb_join message is too short... ignoring.");
--
2.47.3

12
corosync.spec
View File

@ -15,11 +15,14 @@
Name: corosync
Summary: The Corosync Cluster Engine and Application Programming Interfaces
Version: 3.1.10
Release: 1%{?dist}
Release: 2%{?dist}
License: BSD-3-Clause
URL: http://corosync.github.io/corosync/
Source0: https://github.com/%{name}/%{name}/releases/download/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}%{?gittarver}.tar.gz
Patch0: RHEL-163817-totemsrp-Return-error-if-sanity-check-fails.patch
Patch1: RHEL-163838-totemsrp-Fix-integer-overflow-in-memb_join_sanity.patch
# Runtime bits
# The automatic dependency overridden in favor of explicit version lock
Requires: corosynclib%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
@ -289,6 +292,13 @@ network splits)
%endif
%changelog
* Thu Apr 09 2026 Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-2
- Resolves: RHEL-163817
- Resolves: RHEL-163838
- totemsrp: Return error if sanity check fails (fixes CVE-2026-35091)
- totemsrp: Fix integer overflow in memb_join_sanity (fixes CVE-2026-35092)
* Tue Nov 18 2025 Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-1
- Resolves: RHEL-122942