compat-exiv2-026/SOURCES/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch

37 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff

From 6ede8aa1975177705450abb816163f0b8d33a597 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2017 23:09:08 +0200
Subject: Fix for CVE-2017-14860
A heap buffer overflow could occur in memcpy when icc.size_ is larger
than data.size_ - pad, as then memcpy would read out of bounds of data.
This commit adds a sanity check to iccLength (= icc.size_): if it is
larger than data.size_ - pad (i.e. an overflow would be caused) an
exception is thrown.
This fixes #71.
diff --git a/src/jp2image.cpp b/src/jp2image.cpp
index 1892fd43..09d023e2 100644
--- a/src/jp2image.cpp
+++ b/src/jp2image.cpp
@@ -269,10 +269,15 @@ namespace Exiv2
std::cout << "Exiv2::Jp2Image::readMetadata: "
<< "Color data found" << std::endl;
#endif
- long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
+ const long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
DataBuf data(subBox.length+8);
io_->read(data.pData_,data.size_);
- long iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
+ const long iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
+ // subtracting pad from data.size_ is safe:
+ // size_ is at least 8 and pad = 3
+ if (iccLength > data.size_ - pad) {
+ throw Error(58);
+ }
DataBuf icc(iccLength);
::memcpy(icc.pData_,data.pData_+pad,icc.size_);
#ifdef DEBUG