- resolves: RHEL-185759 - Fix CVE-2026-12505 Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paalcant@redhat.com>
252 lines
6.2 KiB
Diff
252 lines
6.2 KiB
Diff
From 972c5b5ff95e3e812bc8daa72d0383654ab0dba7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
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Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:25:22 -0300
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Subject: [PATCH] cifs.upcall: remove getpwuid() dependency
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This patch removes getpwuid() and resort to getting UID/GID from
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/proc/pid/status
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Changes:
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- add get_uidgid() helper
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- drop supplementary groups (i.e. move setgroups(0, NULL)) before even
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decoding spnego key -- those are never needed in any case
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Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
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Reported-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
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Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
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Acked-by: Pavel Shilovskiy <pshilovskiy@microsoft.com>
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Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
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Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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---
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cifs.upcall.c | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
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1 file changed, 145 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/cifs.upcall.c b/cifs.upcall.c
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index 52c03280dbe0..ae3294dd61f0 100644
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--- a/cifs.upcall.c
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+++ b/cifs.upcall.c
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@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@
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#include <netdb.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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-#include <pwd.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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@@ -1265,6 +1264,121 @@ static int ip_to_fqdn(const char *addrstr, char *host, size_t hostlen)
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return 0;
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}
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+/* cover worst case/impossible scenarios, + 1 for NUL */
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+#define PROC_PID_PATH_MAXLEN ((int)strlen("/proc/2147483647/status") + 1)
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+/* max valid UID/GID is (UINT_MAX - 1) */
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+#define INVALID_UIDGID UINT_MAX
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+
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+/*
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+ * get_uidgid - Get @pid's (real) UID and/or GID.
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+ * @pid: process to get UID/GID from
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+ * @uidp: pointer to store @pid's UID (can be NULL)
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+ * @gidp: pointer to store @pid's GID (can be NULL)
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+ *
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+ * Extract "Uid:" and "Gid:" fields from /proc/@pid/status.
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+ * Do so based on whether @uidp or @gidp are NULL.
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+ *
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+ * This function assumes we're on the same namespace as @pid.
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+ *
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+ * Return: 0 on success, -1 otherwise (errno set).
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+ *
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+ * On errors, *@uidp and *@gidp are set to INVALID_UIDGID.
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+ */
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+static int get_uidgid(pid_t pid, uid_t *uidp, gid_t *gidp)
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+{
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+ char path[PROC_PID_PATH_MAXLEN] = {}, buf[256];
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+ FILE *fp = NULL;
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+ int ret;
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+
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+ errno = 0;
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+ if (pid < 0 || (!uidp && !gidp)) {
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+ errno = EINVAL;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (uidp)
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+ *uidp = INVALID_UIDGID;
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+
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+ if (gidp)
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+ *gidp = INVALID_UIDGID;
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+
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+ ret = snprintf(path, PROC_PID_PATH_MAXLEN, "/proc/%d/status", pid);
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+ if (ret < 0 || ret >= PROC_PID_PATH_MAXLEN) {
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+ if (!errno)
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+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ fp = fopen(path, "r");
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+ if (!fp) {
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+ ret = -1;
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Parse /proc/pid/status fields */
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+ errno = 0;
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+ ret = -1;
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+ while (fgets(buf, 256, fp)) {
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+ unsigned long long val;
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+
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+ errno = ENODATA;
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+ if ((!uidp || strncmp(buf, "Uid:", 4)) && (!gidp || strncmp(buf, "Gid:", 4)))
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+ continue;
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+
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+ errno = 0;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Example line format (same for both Uid/Gid):
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+ * "Uid:\t%u\t%u\%u\%u"
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+ *
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+ * Where the numbers represents:
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+ * <real> <effective> <saved> <fsuid>
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+ *
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+ * We're only interested in the <real> value.
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+ *
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+ * (field names "Uid:"/"Gid:" parsed above, skip it)
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+ */
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+ ret = sscanf(&buf[0] + 4, "%llu", &val);
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+ if (ret != 1) {
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+ ret = -1;
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+ if (errno)
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+ break;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+
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+ ret = -1;
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+ if (val >= UINT_MAX) {
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+ errno = EINVAL;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (uidp && !strncmp(buf, "Uid:", 4))
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+ *uidp = (uid_t)val;
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+ else
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+ *gidp = (gid_t)val;
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+
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+ if ((!uidp || *uidp != INVALID_UIDGID) && (!gidp || *gidp != INVALID_UIDGID)) {
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+ errno = 0;
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+ ret = 0;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ }
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+out:
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+ if (fp)
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+ fclose(fp);
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+
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+ if (ret) {
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+ syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s(pid=%d): %s", __func__, pid, strerror(errno));
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+ if (uidp)
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+ *uidp = INVALID_UIDGID;
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+
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+ if (gidp)
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+ *gidp = INVALID_UIDGID;
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+ }
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+
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+ return ret;
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+}
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+
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/* walk a string and lowercase it in-place */
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static void
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lowercase_string(char *c)
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@@ -1306,10 +1420,10 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[])
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struct decoded_args *arg = NULL;
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const char *oid;
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uid_t uid;
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+ gid_t gid;
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char *keytab_name = NULL;
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char *env_cachename = NULL;
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krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
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- struct passwd *pw;
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unsigned expire_time = DNS_RESOLVER_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
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const char *key_descr = NULL;
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@@ -1396,6 +1510,17 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[])
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* Otherwise, it's a spnego key request
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*/
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+ /*
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+ * We don't need supplementary groups, ever.
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+ * Drop them ASAP.
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+ */
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+ rc = setgroups(0, NULL);
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+ if (rc == -1) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "setgroups: %s", strerror(errno));
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+ rc = 1;
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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rc = decode_key_description(buf, &arg);
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free(buf);
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if (rc) {
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@@ -1450,38 +1575,6 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[])
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if (trim_capabilities(env_probe))
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goto out;
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- /*
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- * The kernel doesn't pass down the gid, so we resort here to scraping
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- * one out of the passwd nss db. Note that this might not reflect the
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- * actual gid of the process that initiated the upcall. While we could
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- * scrape that out of /proc, relying on that is a bit more risky.
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- */
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- pw = getpwuid(uid);
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- if (!pw) {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "Unable to find pw entry for uid %d: %s\n",
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- uid, strerror(errno));
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- rc = 1;
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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- /*
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- * The kernel should send down a zero-length grouplist already, but
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- * just to be on the safe side...
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- */
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- rc = setgroups(0, NULL);
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- if (rc == -1) {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "setgroups: %s", strerror(errno));
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- rc = 1;
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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- rc = setgid(pw->pw_gid);
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- if (rc == -1) {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "setgid: %s", strerror(errno));
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- rc = 1;
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- goto out;
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- }
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-
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/*
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* We can't reasonably do this for root. When mounting a DFS share,
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* for instance we can end up with creds being overridden, but the env
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@@ -1490,6 +1583,24 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[])
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if (uid == 0)
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env_probe = false;
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+ /*
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+ * FIXME: this only works if we haven't switched PID namespaces.
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+ * If we did, /proc/arg->pid/ might not exist, or worse, point to something else.
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+ */
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+ rc = get_uidgid(arg->pid, &uid, &gid);
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+ if (rc) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "get_uidgid (NS): %s", strerror(errno));
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+ rc = 1;
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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+ rc = setgid(gid);
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+ if (rc) {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "setgid: %s", strerror(errno));
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+ rc = 1;
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+
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/*
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* Must do this before setuid, as we need elevated capabilities to
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* look at the environ file.
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