import CS c-ares-1.13.0-8.el8

This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2023-09-27 12:44:44 +00:00
parent 2bcc699504
commit 6ad6954deb
3 changed files with 157 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 9903253c347f9e0bffd285ae3829aef251cc852d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hopper-vul <118949689+hopper-vul@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 22:14:26 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Add str len check in config_sortlist to avoid stack overflow
(#497)
In ares_set_sortlist, it calls config_sortlist(..., sortstr) to parse
the input str and initialize a sortlist configuration.
However, ares_set_sortlist has not any checks about the validity of the input str.
It is very easy to create an arbitrary length stack overflow with the unchecked
`memcpy(ipbuf, str, q-str);` and `memcpy(ipbufpfx, str, q-str);`
statements in the config_sortlist call, which could potentially cause severe
security impact in practical programs.
This commit add necessary check for `ipbuf` and `ipbufpfx` which avoid the
potential stack overflows.
fixes #496
Fix By: @hopper-vul
---
ares_init.c | 4 ++++
test/ares-test-init.cc | 2 ++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ares_init.c b/ares_init.c
index f7b700b..5aad7c8 100644
--- a/ares_init.c
+++ b/ares_init.c
@@ -2065,6 +2065,8 @@ static int config_sortlist(struct apattern **sortlist, int *nsort,
q = str;
while (*q && *q != '/' && *q != ';' && !ISSPACE(*q))
q++;
+ if (q-str >= 16)
+ return ARES_EBADSTR;
memcpy(ipbuf, str, q-str);
ipbuf[q-str] = '\0';
/* Find the prefix */
@@ -2073,6 +2075,8 @@ static int config_sortlist(struct apattern **sortlist, int *nsort,
const char *str2 = q+1;
while (*q && *q != ';' && !ISSPACE(*q))
q++;
+ if (q-str >= 32)
+ return ARES_EBADSTR;
memcpy(ipbufpfx, str, q-str);
ipbufpfx[q-str] = '\0';
str = str2;
diff --git a/test/ares-test-init.cc b/test/ares-test-init.cc
index 63c6a22..ee84518 100644
--- a/test/ares-test-init.cc
+++ b/test/ares-test-init.cc
@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ TEST_F(DefaultChannelTest, SetAddresses) {
TEST_F(DefaultChannelTest, SetSortlistFailures) {
EXPECT_EQ(ARES_ENODATA, ares_set_sortlist(nullptr, "1.2.3.4"));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ARES_EBADSTR, ares_set_sortlist(channel_, "111.111.111.111*/16"));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ARES_EBADSTR, ares_set_sortlist(channel_, "111.111.111.111/255.255.255.240*"));
EXPECT_EQ(ARES_SUCCESS, ares_set_sortlist(channel_, "xyzzy ; lwk"));
EXPECT_EQ(ARES_SUCCESS, ares_set_sortlist(channel_, "xyzzy ; 0x123"));
}
--
2.37.3

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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From b9b8413cfdb70a3f99e1573333b23052d57ec1ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Brad House <brad@brad-house.com>
Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 06:51:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request from GHSA-9g78-jv2r-p7vc
---
ares_process.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ares_process.c b/ares_process.c
index bf0cde4..6cac0a9 100644
--- a/ares_process.c
+++ b/ares_process.c
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static void read_udp_packets(ares_channel channel, fd_set *read_fds,
{
struct server_state *server;
int i;
- ares_ssize_t count;
+ ares_ssize_t read_len;
unsigned char buf[MAXENDSSZ + 1];
#ifdef HAVE_RECVFROM
ares_socklen_t fromlen;
@@ -513,32 +513,41 @@ static void read_udp_packets(ares_channel channel, fd_set *read_fds,
/* To reduce event loop overhead, read and process as many
* packets as we can. */
do {
- if (server->udp_socket == ARES_SOCKET_BAD)
- count = 0;
-
- else {
- if (server->addr.family == AF_INET)
+ if (server->udp_socket == ARES_SOCKET_BAD) {
+ read_len = -1;
+ } else {
+ if (server->addr.family == AF_INET) {
fromlen = sizeof(from.sa4);
- else
+ } else {
fromlen = sizeof(from.sa6);
- count = socket_recvfrom(channel, server->udp_socket, (void *)buf,
- sizeof(buf), 0, &from.sa, &fromlen);
+ }
+ read_len = socket_recvfrom(channel, server->udp_socket, (void *)buf,
+ sizeof(buf), 0, &from.sa, &fromlen);
}
- if (count == -1 && try_again(SOCKERRNO))
+ if (read_len == 0) {
+ /* UDP is connectionless, so result code of 0 is a 0-length UDP
+ * packet, and not an indication the connection is closed like on
+ * tcp */
continue;
- else if (count <= 0)
+ } else if (read_len < 0) {
+ if (try_again(SOCKERRNO))
+ continue;
+
handle_error(channel, i, now);
+
#ifdef HAVE_RECVFROM
- else if (!same_address(&from.sa, &server->addr))
+ } else if (!same_address(&from.sa, &server->addr)) {
/* The address the response comes from does not match the address we
* sent the request to. Someone may be attempting to perform a cache
* poisoning attack. */
- break;
+ continue;
#endif
- else
- process_answer(channel, buf, (int)count, i, 0, now);
- } while (count > 0);
+
+ } else {
+ process_answer(channel, buf, (int)read_len, i, 0, now);
+ }
+ } while (read_len >= 0);
}
}
--
2.38.1

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Summary: A library that performs asynchronous DNS operations
Name: c-ares
Version: 1.13.0
Release: 6%{?dist}
Release: 8%{?dist}
License: MIT
Group: System Environment/Libraries
URL: http://c-ares.haxx.se/
@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ Source0: http://c-ares.haxx.se/download/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: LICENSE
Patch0: 0001-Use-RPM-compiler-options.patch
Patch1: 0002-fix-CVE-2021-3672.patch
Patch2: 0003-Add-str-len-check-in-config_sortlist-to-avoid-stack-.patch
Patch3: 0004-Merge-pull-request-from-GHSA-9g78-jv2r-p7vc.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
@ -36,6 +38,8 @@ compile applications or shared objects that use c-ares.
%setup -q
%patch0 -p1 -b .optflags
%patch1 -p1 -b .dns
%patch2 -p1 -b .sortlist
%patch3 -p1 -b .udp
cp %{SOURCE1} .
f=CHANGES ; iconv -f iso-8859-1 -t utf-8 $f -o $f.utf8 ; mv $f.utf8 $f
@ -74,6 +78,12 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%{_mandir}/man3/ares_*
%changelog
* Mon May 29 2023 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 1.13.0-8
- Resolves: rhbz#2209517 - CVE-2023-32067 c-ares: 0-byte UDP payload Denial of Service [rhel-8.9.0]
* Fri May 12 2023 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 1.13.0-7
- Resolves: rhbz#2170867 - c-ares: buffer overflow in config_sortlist() due to missing string length check [rhel-8]
* Fri Oct 15 2021 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 1.13.0-6
- Resolves: rhbz#1989425 - CVE-2021-3672 c-ares: missing input validation of host names may lead to Domain Hijacking [rhel-8]