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5 changed files with 84 additions and 138 deletions

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f62f7900c32a5fec4e53a929eae5a9fd16bb3536 SOURCES/bubblewrap-0.4.0.tar.xz 00e121950ea494fcd9cfbe23971c0938d6be6755 SOURCES/bubblewrap-0.4.1.tar.xz

2
.gitignore vendored
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SOURCES/bubblewrap-0.4.0.tar.xz SOURCES/bubblewrap-0.4.1.tar.xz

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From 52d5f7c3ba5c8e10b3a992304fd28cd4d18caeeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 10:20:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add --bind-fd and --ro-bind-fd to let you bind a O_PATH fd.
This is useful for example if you for some reason don't have the real
path. It is also a way to make bind-mounts race-free (i.e. to have the
mount actually be the thing you wanted to be mounted, avoiding issues
where some other process replaces the target in parallel with the bwrap
launch.
Unfortunately due to some technical details we can't actually directly
mount the dirfd, as they come from different user namespace which is not
permitted, but at least we can delay resolving the fd to a path as much as
possible, and then validate after mount that we actually mounted the right
thing.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a253257cd298892da43e15201d83f9a02c9b58b5)
[kalev: Backport to 0.4.x]
Signed-off-by: Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com>
---
bubblewrap.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/test-run.sh | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/bubblewrap.c b/bubblewrap.c
index b3d52bc..38b3646 100644
--- a/bubblewrap.c
+++ b/bubblewrap.c
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ usage (int ecode, FILE *out)
" --dev-bind-try SRC DEST Equal to --dev-bind but ignores non-existent SRC\n"
" --ro-bind SRC DEST Bind mount the host path SRC readonly on DEST\n"
" --ro-bind-try SRC DEST Equal to --ro-bind but ignores non-existent SRC\n"
+ " --bind-fd FD DEST Bind open directory or path fd on DEST\n"
+ " --ro-bind-fd FD DEST Bind open directory or path fd read-only on DEST\n"
" --remount-ro DEST Remount DEST as readonly; does not recursively remount\n"
" --exec-label LABEL Exec label for the sandbox\n"
" --file-label LABEL File label for temporary sandbox content\n"
@@ -1111,6 +1113,30 @@ setup_newroot (bool unshare_pid,
(op->type == SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT ? BIND_READONLY : 0) |
(op->type == SETUP_DEV_BIND_MOUNT ? BIND_DEVICES : 0),
source, dest);
+
+ if (op->fd >= 0)
+ {
+ struct stat fd_st, mount_st;
+
+ /* When using bind-fd, there is a race condition between resolving the fd as a magic symlink
+ * and mounting it, where someone could replace what is at the symlink target. Ideally
+ * we would not even resolve the symlink and directly bind-mount from the fd, but unfortunately
+ * we can't do that, because its not permitted to bind mount a fd from another user namespace.
+ * So, we resolve, mount and then compare fstat+stat to detect the race. */
+
+ if (fstat(op->fd, &fd_st) != 0)
+ die_with_error("Can't stat fd %d", op->fd);
+ if (lstat(dest, &mount_st) != 0)
+ die_with_error("Can't stat mount at %s", dest);
+
+ if (fd_st.st_ino != mount_st.st_ino ||
+ fd_st.st_dev != mount_st.st_dev)
+ die_with_error("Race condition binding dirfd");
+
+ close(op->fd);
+ op->fd = -1;
+ }
+
break;
case SETUP_REMOUNT_RO_NO_RECURSIVE:
@@ -1648,6 +1674,30 @@ parse_args_recurse (int *argcp,
if (strcmp(arg, "--dev-bind-try") == 0)
op->flags = ALLOW_NOTEXIST;
+ argv += 2;
+ argc -= 2;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp (arg, "--bind-fd") == 0 ||
+ strcmp (arg, "--ro-bind-fd") == 0)
+ {
+ int src_fd;
+ char *endptr;
+
+ if (argc < 3)
+ die ("--bind-fd takes two arguments");
+
+ src_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
+ if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || src_fd < 0)
+ die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
+
+ if (strcmp(arg, "--ro-bind-fd") == 0)
+ op = setup_op_new (SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT);
+ else
+ op = setup_op_new (SETUP_BIND_MOUNT);
+ op->source = xasprintf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd);
+ op->fd = src_fd;
+ op->dest = argv[2];
+
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh
index 702c480..ce1eaf6 100755
--- a/tests/test-run.sh
+++ b/tests/test-run.sh
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ if ! $RUN true; then
skip Seems like bwrap is not working at all. Maybe setuid is not working
fi
-echo "1..49"
+echo "1..50"
# Test help
${BWRAP} --help > help.txt
@@ -382,5 +382,10 @@ else
echo "ok - Test --pidns"
fi
+echo "foobar" > file-data
+$RUN --proc /proc --dev /dev --bind / / --bind-fd 100 /tmp cat /tmp/file-data 100< . > stdout
+assert_file_has_content stdout foobar
+
+echo "ok - bind-fd"
echo "ok - End of test"
--
2.46.0

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@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
From d70c640aecc30e9216dc1a614a207e85c8732036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 16:19:27 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid memory leak if --args is specified multiple times
Found by a static analyzer.
```
bubblewrap-0.4.1/bubblewrap.c:1500: overwrite_var: Overwriting "opt_args_data" in "opt_args_data = load_file_data(the_fd, &data_len)" leaks the storage that "opt_args_data" points to.
# 1498| * keep allocated until exit time, since its argv entries get used
# 1499| * by the other cases in parse_args_recurse() when we recurse. */
# 1500|-> opt_args_data = load_file_data (the_fd, &data_len);
# 1501| if (opt_args_data == NULL)
# 1502| die_with_error ("Can't read --args data");
```
---
bubblewrap.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/bubblewrap.c b/bubblewrap.c
index 771e1ea..56ac07c 100644
--- a/bubblewrap.c
+++ b/bubblewrap.c
@@ -1494,6 +1494,12 @@ parse_args_recurse (int *argcp,
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
+ /* Specifying --args multiple times doesn't work; this just pacifies
+ * a static analyzer which pointed out the memory leak
+ */
+ if (opt_args_data != NULL)
+ free (opt_args_data);
+
/* opt_args_data is essentially a recursive argv array, which we must
* keep allocated until exit time, since its argv entries get used
* by the other cases in parse_args_recurse() when we recurse. */
--
2.31.1

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@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
Name: bubblewrap Name: bubblewrap
Version: 0.4.0 Version: 0.4.1
Release: 2%{?dist} Release: 6%{?dist}
Summary: Core execution tool for unprivileged containers Summary: Core execution tool for unprivileged containers
License: LGPLv2+ License: LGPLv2+
#VCS: git:https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap #VCS: git:https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap
URL: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap URL: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap
Source0: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/releases/download/v%{version}/bubblewrap-%{version}.tar.xz Source0: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/releases/download/v%{version}/bubblewrap-%{version}.tar.xz
Patch0: 0001-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O_PATH-.patch Patch0: 0001-Avoid-memory-leak-if-args-is-specified-multiple-time.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool
BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: gcc
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ BuildRequires: libcap-devel
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libselinux) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libselinux)
BuildRequires: libxslt BuildRequires: libxslt
BuildRequires: docbook-style-xsl BuildRequires: docbook-style-xsl
BuildRequires: make
%description %description
Bubblewrap (/usr/bin/bwrap) is a core execution engine for unprivileged Bubblewrap (/usr/bin/bwrap) is a core execution engine for unprivileged
@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ containers that works as a setuid binary on kernels without
user namespaces. user namespaces.
%prep %prep
%autosetup -p1 %autosetup
%build %build
if ! test -x configure; then NOCONFIGURE=1 ./autogen.sh; fi if ! test -x configure; then NOCONFIGURE=1 ./autogen.sh; fi
@ -46,11 +47,45 @@ find %{buildroot} -name '*.la' -delete -print
%{_mandir}/man1/* %{_mandir}/man1/*
%changelog %changelog
* Fri Aug 30 2024 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 0.4.0-2 * Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 0.4.1-6
- Backport upstream fix to help address CVE-2024-42472 in flatpak - Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
Related: rhbz#1991688
* Thu Jan 09 2020 David King <dking@redhat.com> - 0.4.0-1 * Thu May 27 2021 Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> - 0.4.1-5
- Rebase to 0.4.0 (#1788067) - Backport https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/pull/426
* Thu Apr 15 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 0.4.1-4
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
* Tue Jan 26 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.4.1-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Jul 27 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.4.1-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Mar 30 2020 David King <amigadave@amigadave.com> - 0.4.1-1
- Update to 0.4.1
* Tue Jan 28 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.4.0-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed Nov 27 2019 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 0.4.0-1
- Update to 0.4.0
* Wed Jul 24 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.3.3-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed May 01 2019 Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com> - 0.3.3-2
- New upstream release
* Thu Jan 31 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.3.1-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Oct 01 2018 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 0.3.1-1
- Update to 0.3.1
* Thu Jul 12 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.3.0-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed Jul 11 2018 Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> - 0.3.0-1 * Wed Jul 11 2018 Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> - 0.3.0-1
- https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.3.0 - https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.3.0