import CS bubblewrap-0.4.1-8.el9_5

SOURCES/0001-Accept-EROFS-for-access-check-of-proc-entries.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 4c35d7a5f92499d6ed646d4a5ffad9acc10cb432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=BCrg=20Billeter?= <j@bitron.ch>
+Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 17:33:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Accept EROFS for access() check of /proc entries
+
+This is required to work in a Docker container.
+---
+ bubblewrap.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bubblewrap.c b/bubblewrap.c
+index e1a4629..d65ffef 100644
+--- a/bubblewrap.c
++++ b/bubblewrap.c
+@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ setup_newroot (bool unshare_pid,
+               if (access (subdir, W_OK) < 0)
+                 {
+                   /* The file is already read-only or doesn't exist.  */
+-                  if (errno == EACCES || errno == ENOENT)
++                  if (errno == EACCES || errno == ENOENT || errno == EROFS)
+                     continue;
+ 
+                   die_with_error ("Can't access %s", subdir);
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

SOURCES/0001-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O_PATH-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+From 52d5f7c3ba5c8e10b3a992304fd28cd4d18caeeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 10:20:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Add --bind-fd and --ro-bind-fd to let you bind a O_PATH fd.
+
+This is useful for example if you for some reason don't have the real
+path. It is also a way to make bind-mounts race-free (i.e. to have the
+mount actually be the thing you wanted to be mounted, avoiding issues
+where some other process replaces the target in parallel with the bwrap
+launch.
+
+Unfortunately due to some technical details we can't actually directly
+mount the dirfd, as they come from different user namespace which is not
+permitted, but at least we can delay resolving the fd to a path as much as
+possible, and then validate after mount that we actually mounted the right
+thing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit a253257cd298892da43e15201d83f9a02c9b58b5)
+[kalev: Backport to 0.4.x]
+Signed-off-by: Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com>
+---
+ bubblewrap.c      | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/test-run.sh |  7 ++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/bubblewrap.c b/bubblewrap.c
+index b3d52bc..38b3646 100644
+--- a/bubblewrap.c
++++ b/bubblewrap.c
+@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ usage (int ecode, FILE *out)
+            "    --dev-bind-try SRC DEST      Equal to --dev-bind but ignores non-existent SRC\n"
+            "    --ro-bind SRC DEST           Bind mount the host path SRC readonly on DEST\n"
+            "    --ro-bind-try SRC DEST       Equal to --ro-bind but ignores non-existent SRC\n"
++           "    --bind-fd FD DEST            Bind open directory or path fd on DEST\n"
++           "    --ro-bind-fd FD DEST         Bind open directory or path fd read-only on DEST\n"
+            "    --remount-ro DEST            Remount DEST as readonly; does not recursively remount\n"
+            "    --exec-label LABEL           Exec label for the sandbox\n"
+            "    --file-label LABEL           File label for temporary sandbox content\n"
+@@ -1111,6 +1113,30 @@ setup_newroot (bool unshare_pid,
+                          (op->type == SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT ? BIND_READONLY : 0) |
+                          (op->type == SETUP_DEV_BIND_MOUNT ? BIND_DEVICES : 0),
+                          source, dest);
++
++          if (op->fd >= 0)
++            {
++              struct stat fd_st, mount_st;
++
++              /* When using bind-fd, there is a race condition between resolving the fd as a magic symlink
++               * and mounting it, where someone could replace what is at the symlink target. Ideally
++               * we would not even resolve the symlink and directly bind-mount from the fd, but unfortunately
++               * we can't do that, because its not permitted to bind mount a fd from another user namespace.
++               * So, we resolve, mount and then compare fstat+stat to detect the race. */
++
++              if (fstat(op->fd, &fd_st) != 0)
++                die_with_error("Can't stat fd %d", op->fd);
++              if (lstat(dest, &mount_st) != 0)
++                die_with_error("Can't stat mount at %s", dest);
++
++              if (fd_st.st_ino != mount_st.st_ino ||
++                  fd_st.st_dev != mount_st.st_dev)
++                die_with_error("Race condition binding dirfd");
++
++              close(op->fd);
++              op->fd = -1;
++            }
++
+           break;
+ 
+         case SETUP_REMOUNT_RO_NO_RECURSIVE:
+@@ -1648,6 +1674,30 @@ parse_args_recurse (int          *argcp,
+           if (strcmp(arg, "--dev-bind-try") == 0)
+             op->flags = ALLOW_NOTEXIST;
+ 
++          argv += 2;
++          argc -= 2;
++        }
++      else if (strcmp (arg, "--bind-fd") == 0 ||
++               strcmp (arg, "--ro-bind-fd") == 0)
++        {
++          int src_fd;
++          char *endptr;
++
++          if (argc < 3)
++            die ("--bind-fd takes two arguments");
++
++          src_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
++          if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || src_fd < 0)
++            die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
++
++          if (strcmp(arg, "--ro-bind-fd") == 0)
++            op = setup_op_new (SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT);
++          else
++            op = setup_op_new (SETUP_BIND_MOUNT);
++          op->source = xasprintf ("/proc/self/fd/%d", src_fd);
++          op->fd = src_fd;
++          op->dest = argv[2];
++
+           argv += 2;
+           argc -= 2;
+         }
+diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh
+index 702c480..ce1eaf6 100755
+--- a/tests/test-run.sh
++++ b/tests/test-run.sh
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ if ! $RUN true; then
+     skip Seems like bwrap is not working at all. Maybe setuid is not working
+ fi
+ 
+-echo "1..49"
++echo "1..50"
+ 
+ # Test help
+ ${BWRAP} --help > help.txt
+@@ -382,5 +382,10 @@ else
+     echo "ok - Test --pidns"
+ fi
+ 
++echo "foobar" > file-data
++$RUN --proc /proc --dev /dev --bind / / --bind-fd 100 /tmp cat /tmp/file-data 100< . > stdout
++assert_file_has_content stdout foobar
++
++echo "ok - bind-fd"
+ 
+ echo "ok - End of test"
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

SPECS/bubblewrap.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Name: bubblewrap
 Version: 0.4.1
-Release: 6%{?dist}
+Release: 8%{?dist}
 Summary: Core execution tool for unprivileged containers
 
 License: LGPLv2+
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ License: LGPLv2+
 URL: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap
 Source0: https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap/releases/download/v%{version}/bubblewrap-%{version}.tar.xz
 Patch0: 0001-Avoid-memory-leak-if-args-is-specified-multiple-time.patch
+Patch1: 0001-Accept-EROFS-for-access-check-of-proc-entries.patch
+Patch2: 0001-Add-bind-fd-and-ro-bind-fd-to-let-you-bind-a-O_PATH-.patch
 
 BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool
 BuildRequires: gcc
@@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ containers that works as a setuid binary on kernels without
 user namespaces.
 
 %prep
-%autosetup
+%autosetup -p1
 
 %build
 if ! test -x configure; then NOCONFIGURE=1 ./autogen.sh; fi
@@ -47,6 +49,12 @@ find %{buildroot} -name '*.la' -delete -print
 %{_mandir}/man1/*
 
 %changelog
+* Fri Aug 30 2024 Kalev Lember <klember@redhat.com> - 0.4.1-8
+- Backport upstream fix to help address CVE-2024-42472 in flatpak
+
+* Fri Mar 15 2024 Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com> - 0.4.1-7
+- Backport https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/commit/4c35d7a5f92499d6ed646d4a5ffad9acc10cb432
+
 * Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 0.4.1-6
 - Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
   Related: rhbz#1991688