rpms/bluez
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity
c10s
bluez/static-analysis-issues-6.patch

354 lines
13 KiB
Diff
Raw Permalink Normal View History

Fix coverity issues Related: Jira:RHEL-34536
2024-08-05 15:15:39 +00:00
From bdf5fd2a0156e9070e1e55777b4a71033160fbf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 12:37:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] sdp: Ensure size doesn't overflow
Error: INTEGER_OVERFLOW (CWE-190): [#def1] [important]
bluez-5.77/lib/sdp.c:1685:2: tainted_data_argument: The check "sent < size" contains the tainted expression "sent" which causes "size" to be considered tainted.
bluez-5.77/lib/sdp.c:1686:3: overflow: The expression "size - sent" is deemed overflowed because at least one of its arguments has overflowed.
bluez-5.77/lib/sdp.c:1686:3: overflow_sink: "size - sent", which might have underflowed, is passed to "send(session->sock, buf + sent, size - sent, 0)".
1684|
1685| while (sent < size) {
1686|-> int n = send(session->sock, buf + sent, size - sent, 0);
1687| if (n < 0)
1688| return -1;
---
lib/sdp.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/sdp.c b/lib/sdp.c
index 411a95b8a7d3..8a15ad803db1 100644
--- a/lib/sdp.c
+++ b/lib/sdp.c
@@ -1678,13 +1678,13 @@ sdp_data_t *sdp_data_get(const sdp_record_t *rec, uint16_t attrId)
return NULL;
}
-static int sdp_send_req(sdp_session_t *session, uint8_t *buf, uint32_t size)
+static int sdp_send_req(sdp_session_t *session, uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
- uint32_t sent = 0;
+ size_t sent = 0;
while (sent < size) {
int n = send(session->sock, buf + sent, size - sent, 0);
- if (n < 0)
+ if (n < 0 || sent > SIZE_MAX - n)
return -1;
sent += n;
}
--
2.45.2
From 062c998fb5c407bc09d6124324b1bd393997bfee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 15:43:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/8] tools/isotest: Ensure ret doesn't overflow
Error: INTEGER_OVERFLOW (CWE-190): [#def20] [important]
bluez-5.77/tools/isotest.c:778:2: tainted_data_argument: The check "ret < count" contains the tainted expression "ret" which causes "count" to be considered tainted.
bluez-5.77/tools/isotest.c:779:3: overflow: The expression "count - ret" is deemed overflowed because at least one of its arguments has overflowed.
bluez-5.77/tools/isotest.c:779:3: overflow_sink: "count - ret", which might have underflowed, is passed to "read(fd, buf + ret, count - ret)". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
777|
778| while (ret < count) {
779|-> len = read(fd, buf + ret, count - ret);
780| if (len < 0)
781| return -errno;
---
tools/isotest.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/isotest.c b/tools/isotest.c
index 2cac0e49cc39..0805faa66e47 100644
--- a/tools/isotest.c
+++ b/tools/isotest.c
@@ -779,6 +779,8 @@ static int read_stream(int fd, ssize_t count)
len = read(fd, buf + ret, count - ret);
if (len < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (len > SSIZE_MAX - ret)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
ret += len;
usleep(1000);
--
2.45.2
From 122a888962765010162306f19fccf77333e1bc1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 15:45:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] health: mcap: Ensure sent doesn't overflow
Error: INTEGER_OVERFLOW (CWE-190): [#def13] [important]
bluez-5.77/profiles/health/mcap.c:390:2: tainted_data_argument: The check "sent < size" contains the tainted expression "sent" which causes "size" to be considered tainted.
bluez-5.77/profiles/health/mcap.c:391:3: overflow: The expression "size - sent" is deemed overflowed because at least one of its arguments has overflowed.
bluez-5.77/profiles/health/mcap.c:391:3: overflow_sink: "size - sent", which might have underflowed, is passed to "write(sock, buf_b + sent, size - sent)".
389|
390| while (sent < size) {
391|-> int n = write(sock, buf_b + sent, size - sent);
392| if (n < 0)
393| return -1;
---
profiles/health/mcap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/profiles/health/mcap.c b/profiles/health/mcap.c
index 2e4214a6984f..b3bf403e74d2 100644
--- a/profiles/health/mcap.c
+++ b/profiles/health/mcap.c
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int mcap_send_data(int sock, const void *buf, uint32_t size)
while (sent < size) {
int n = write(sock, buf_b + sent, size - sent);
- if (n < 0)
+ if (n < 0 || n > SSIZE_MAX - sent)
return -1;
sent += n;
}
--
2.45.2
From fce37c2100a043fce99fbe2e8c8171406b841fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 11:26:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] shared/tester: Add early failure check
Add a similar assertion to the other tests to avoid passing negative len
to tester_monitor() which might result in crashes.
Error: OVERRUN (CWE-119): [#def13] [important]
bluez-5.77/src/shared/tester.c:946:2: return_constant: Function call "io_send(io, iov, 1)" may return -107.
bluez-5.77/src/shared/tester.c:946:2: assignment: Assigning: "len" = "io_send(io, iov, 1)". The value of "len" is now -107.
bluez-5.77/src/shared/tester.c:948:2: overrun-buffer-arg: Calling "tester_monitor" with "iov->iov_base" and "len" is suspicious because of the very large index, 18446744073709551509. The index may be due to a negative parameter being interpreted as unsigned.
946| len = io_send(io, iov, 1);
947|
948|-> tester_monitor('<', 0x0004, 0x0000, iov->iov_base, len);
949|
950| g_assert_cmpint(len, ==, iov->iov_len);
---
src/shared/tester.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/shared/tester.c b/src/shared/tester.c
index 56c8cba6f578..3053025d7945 100644
--- a/src/shared/tester.c
+++ b/src/shared/tester.c
@@ -945,6 +945,8 @@ static bool test_io_send(struct io *io, void *user_data)
len = io_send(io, iov, 1);
+ g_assert(len > 0);
+
tester_monitor('<', 0x0004, 0x0000, iov->iov_base, len);
g_assert_cmpint(len, ==, iov->iov_len);
--
2.45.2
From 5078e205d5892048cb1243ce2977dcf8eb0c02fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 13:53:41 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] mesh: Fix possible integer overflow
Error: INTEGER_OVERFLOW (CWE-190): [#def1] [important]
bluez-5.77/mesh/net.c:3164:4: cast_overflow: Truncation due to cast operation on "msg->len - seg_off" from 32 to 8 bits.
bluez-5.77/mesh/net.c:3164:4: overflow_assign: "seg_len" is assigned from "msg->len - seg_off".
bluez-5.77/mesh/net.c:3178:2: overflow_sink: "seg_len", which might have overflowed, is passed to "mesh_crypto_packet_build(false, msg->ttl, seq_num, msg->src, msg->remote, 0, msg->segmented, msg->key_aid, msg->szmic, false, msg->seqZero, segO, segN, msg->buf + seg_off, seg_len, packet + 1, &packet_len)".
3176|
3177| /* TODO: Are we RXing on an LPN's behalf? Then set RLY bit */
3178|-> if (!mesh_crypto_packet_build(false, msg->ttl, seq_num, msg->src,
3179| msg->remote, 0, msg->segmented,
3180| msg->key_aid, msg->szmic, false,
X
---
mesh/net.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mesh/net.c b/mesh/net.c
index 05ca48326fc5..ef6a3133859a 100644
--- a/mesh/net.c
+++ b/mesh/net.c
@@ -3149,13 +3149,22 @@ static bool send_seg(struct mesh_net *net, uint8_t cnt, uint16_t interval,
uint32_t seq_num;
if (msg->segmented) {
+ if (msg->len < seg_off) {
+ l_error("Failed to build packet");
+ return false;
+ }
/* Send each segment on unique seq_num */
seq_num = mesh_net_next_seq_num(net);
- if (msg->len - seg_off > SEG_OFF(1))
+ if (msg->len - seg_off > SEG_OFF(1)) {
seg_len = SEG_OFF(1);
- else
+ } else {
+ if (msg->len - seg_off > UINT8_MAX) {
+ l_error("Failed to build packet");
+ return false;
+ }
seg_len = msg->len - seg_off;
+ }
} else {
/* Send on same seq_num used for Access Layer */
seq_num = msg->seqAuth;
--
2.45.2
From c37f2cdd4b8fa66fc97d423c4c980865b4793ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 14:27:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] shared/gatt-db: Fix possible buffer overrun
uuid_to_le() returns one of the possible values from bt_uuid_len().
bt_uuid_len() returns "type / 8".
type is a value between 0 and 128, but could be something else
depending on the validity of the UUID that's parsed. So an invalid
value of type between 128 and 256 would trigger an overrun.
Add a check to make sure that an invalid type isn't used to calculate
the length.
Error: OVERRUN (CWE-119): [#def6] [important]
bluez-5.77/src/shared/gatt-db.c:612:2: assignment: Assigning: "len" = "uuid_to_le(uuid, value)". The value of "len" is now between 0 and 31 (inclusive).
bluez-5.77/src/shared/gatt-db.c:614:2: overrun-buffer-arg: Overrunning array "value" of 16 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 30 using argument "len" (which evaluates to 31).
612| len = uuid_to_le(uuid, value);
613|
614|-> service->attributes[0] = new_attribute(service, handle, type, value,
615| len);
616| if (!service->attributes[0]) {
---
src/shared/gatt-db.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/shared/gatt-db.c b/src/shared/gatt-db.c
index b35763410d17..cd0eba6bf1d0 100644
--- a/src/shared/gatt-db.c
+++ b/src/shared/gatt-db.c
@@ -560,9 +560,14 @@ static int uuid_to_le(const bt_uuid_t *uuid, uint8_t *dst)
return bt_uuid_len(uuid);
}
- bt_uuid_to_uuid128(uuid, &uuid128);
- bswap_128(&uuid128.value.u128, dst);
- return bt_uuid_len(&uuid128);
+ if (uuid->type == BT_UUID32 ||
+ uuid->type == BT_UUID128) {
+ bt_uuid_to_uuid128(uuid, &uuid128);
+ bswap_128(&uuid128.value.u128, dst);
+ return bt_uuid_len(&uuid128);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
static bool le_to_uuid(const uint8_t *src, size_t len, bt_uuid_t *uuid)
--
2.45.2
From b7cb9a4bc9b94ded15be812d1d444d0ace4a886d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 11:29:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] shared/btsnoop: Avoid underflowing toread variable
Error: INTEGER_OVERFLOW (CWE-190): [#def8] [important]
bluez-5.77/src/shared/btsnoop.c:556:3: underflow: The decrement operator on the unsigned variable "toread" might result in an underflow.
bluez-5.77/src/shared/btsnoop.c:572:2: overflow_sink: "toread", which might have underflowed, is passed to "read(btsnoop->fd, data, toread)". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
570| }
571|
572|-> len = read(btsnoop->fd, data, toread);
573| if (len < 0) {
574| btsnoop->aborted = true;
---
src/shared/btsnoop.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/shared/btsnoop.c b/src/shared/btsnoop.c
index bc5f7fcbe84c..bb0bccf0dd01 100644
--- a/src/shared/btsnoop.c
+++ b/src/shared/btsnoop.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ bool btsnoop_read_hci(struct btsnoop *btsnoop, struct timeval *tv,
}
toread = be32toh(pkt.len);
- if (toread > BTSNOOP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
+ if (toread > BTSNOOP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE || toread < 1) {
btsnoop->aborted = true;
return false;
}
@@ -569,6 +569,11 @@ bool btsnoop_read_hci(struct btsnoop *btsnoop, struct timeval *tv,
return false;
}
+ if (toread == 0) {
+ btsnoop->aborted = true;
+ return false;
+ }
+
len = read(btsnoop->fd, data, toread);
if (len < 0) {
btsnoop->aborted = true;
--
2.45.2
From 354babc88eb98970a9f59056b41854b0f0f87859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2024 15:14:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] monitor: Check for possible integer underflow
Error: INTEGER_OVERFLOW (CWE-190): [#def4] [important]
bluez-5.77/monitor/control.c:1094:2: tainted_data_return: Called function "recv(data->fd, data->buf + data->offset, 1490UL - data->offset, MSG_DONTWAIT)", and a possible return value may be less than zero.
bluez-5.77/monitor/control.c:1094:2: assign: Assigning: "len" = "recv(data->fd, data->buf + data->offset, 1490UL - data->offset, MSG_DONTWAIT)".
bluez-5.77/monitor/control.c:1099:2: overflow: The expression "data->offset" is considered to have possibly overflowed.
bluez-5.77/monitor/control.c:1115:3: overflow: The expression "data->offset -= pktlen + 6" is deemed overflowed because at least one of its arguments has overflowed.
bluez-5.77/monitor/control.c:1118:4: overflow_sink: "data->offset", which might have underflowed, is passed to "memmove(data->buf, data->buf + 6 + pktlen, data->offset)". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
1116|
1117| if (data->offset > 0)
1118|-> memmove(data->buf, data->buf + MGMT_HDR_SIZE + pktlen,
1119| data->offset);
1120| }
---
monitor/control.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/monitor/control.c b/monitor/control.c
index 009cf15209f0..62857b4b84de 100644
--- a/monitor/control.c
+++ b/monitor/control.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -1091,9 +1092,14 @@ static void client_callback(int fd, uint32_t events, void *user_data)
return;
}
+ if (sizeof(data->buf) <= data->offset)
+ return;
+
len = recv(data->fd, data->buf + data->offset,
sizeof(data->buf) - data->offset, MSG_DONTWAIT);
- if (len < 0)
+ if (len < 0 ||
+ len > UINT16_MAX ||
+ UINT16_MAX - data->offset > len)
return;
data->offset += len;
--
2.45.2
Reference in New Issue Copy Permalink