From d5947d12d56dcf53d0dc150f1eef2485a976a213 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: eabdullin Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2025 16:10:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] import UBI bind-9.16.23-33.el9_7 --- SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40778.patch | 784 ------------------- SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40780.patch | 303 ------- SOURCES/bind-9.18-dig-idn-input-always.patch | 102 +++ SOURCES/named.logrotate | 3 +- SPECS/bind.spec | 20 +- 5 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40778.patch delete mode 100644 SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40780.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/bind-9.18-dig-idn-input-always.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40778.patch b/SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40778.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 99b8c28..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40778.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,784 +0,0 @@ -From 39a43add7ad19fc2d83950a9af0c4f8cf580588b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Evan Hunt -Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 21:46:59 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] Tighten restrictions on caching NS RRsets in authority - section - -To prevent certain spoofing attacks, a new check has been added -to the existing rules for whether NS data can be cached: the owner -name of the NS RRset must be an ancestor of the name being queried. - -(cherry picked from commit fa153f791f9324bf84abf8d259e11c0531fe6e25) -(cherry picked from commit 2f0f44d493c382a7f0a3adfe7c4976b18a3d480b) - -Further restrict addresses that are cached when processing referrals - -Use the owner name of the NS record as the bailwick apex name -when determining which additional records to cache, rather than -the name of the delegating zone (or a parent thereof). - -Modified resolver.c - -(cherry picked from commit a41054e9e606a61f1b3c8bc0c54e2f1059347165) -(cherry picked from commit 50479358efdf432d690415131b74b5df158a9d69) - -Retry lookups with unsigned DNAME over TCP - -To prevent spoofed unsigned DNAME responses being accepted retry -response with unsigned DNAMEs over TCP if the response is not TSIG -signed or there isn't a good DNS CLIENT COOKIE. - -To prevent test failures, this required adding TCP support to the -ans3 and ans4 servers in the chain system test. - -(cherry picked from commit 2e40705c06831988106335ed77db3cf924d431f6) -(cherry picked from commit 33a7db1fe964e55b76b4ac003ecc56cc67028bd9) ---- - bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl | 129 ----------------- - bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py | 58 ++++++-- - lib/dns/include/dns/message.h | 10 ++ - lib/dns/message.c | 12 ++ - lib/dns/resolver.c | 114 ++++++++++++--- - 6 files changed, 380 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl - create mode 100644 bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py - -diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl -deleted file mode 100644 -index 31d22d807b..0000000000 ---- a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.pl -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ --#!/usr/bin/env perl --# --# Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") --# --# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public --# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this --# file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. --# --# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional --# information regarding copyright ownership. -- --use strict; --use warnings; -- --use IO::File; --use Getopt::Long; --use Net::DNS::Nameserver; -- --my $pidf = new IO::File "ans.pid", "w" or die "cannot open pid file: $!"; --print $pidf "$$\n" or die "cannot write pid file: $!"; --$pidf->close or die "cannot close pid file: $!"; --sub rmpid { unlink "ans.pid"; exit 1; }; -- --$SIG{INT} = \&rmpid; --$SIG{TERM} = \&rmpid; -- --my $localaddr = "10.53.0.3"; -- --my $localport = int($ENV{'PORT'}); --if (!$localport) { $localport = 5300; } -- --my $verbose = 0; --my $ttl = 60; --my $zone = "example.broken"; --my $nsname = "ns3.$zone"; --my $synth = "synth-then-dname.$zone"; --my $synth2 = "synth2-then-dname.$zone"; -- --sub reply_handler { -- my ($qname, $qclass, $qtype, $peerhost, $query, $conn) = @_; -- my ($rcode, @ans, @auth, @add); -- -- print ("request: $qname/$qtype\n"); -- STDOUT->flush(); -- -- if ($qname eq "example.broken") { -- if ($qtype eq "SOA") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass SOA . . 0 0 0 0 0"); -- push @ans, $rr; -- } elsif ($qtype eq "NS") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass NS $nsname"); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$nsname $ttl $qclass A $localaddr"); -- push @add, $rr; -- } -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } elsif ($qname eq "cname-to-$synth2") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME name.$synth2"); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("name.$synth2 $ttl $qclass CNAME name"); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$synth2 $ttl $qclass DNAME ."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } elsif ($qname eq "$synth" || $qname eq "$synth2") { -- if ($qtype eq "DNAME") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass DNAME ."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- } -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } elsif ($qname eq "name.$synth") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME name."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$synth $ttl $qclass DNAME ."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } elsif ($qname eq "name.$synth2") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME name."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$synth2 $ttl $qclass DNAME ."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- # The following three code branches referring to the "example.dname" -- # zone are necessary for the resolver variant of the CVE-2021-25215 -- # regression test to work. A named instance cannot be used for -- # serving the DNAME records below as a version of BIND vulnerable to -- # CVE-2021-25215 would crash while answering the queries asked by -- # the tested resolver. -- } elsif ($qname eq "ns3.example.dname") { -- if ($qtype eq "A") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass A 10.53.0.3"); -- push @ans, $rr; -- } -- if ($qtype eq "AAAA") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("example.dname. $ttl $qclass SOA . . 0 0 0 0 $ttl"); -- push @auth, $rr; -- } -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } elsif ($qname eq "self.example.self.example.dname") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("self.example.dname. $ttl $qclass DNAME dname."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass CNAME self.example.dname."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } elsif ($qname eq "self.example.dname") { -- if ($qtype eq "DNAME") { -- my $rr = new Net::DNS::RR("$qname $ttl $qclass DNAME dname."); -- push @ans, $rr; -- } -- $rcode = "NOERROR"; -- } else { -- $rcode = "REFUSED"; -- } -- return ($rcode, \@ans, \@auth, \@add, { aa => 1 }); --} -- --GetOptions( -- 'port=i' => \$localport, -- 'verbose!' => \$verbose, --); -- --my $ns = Net::DNS::Nameserver->new( -- LocalAddr => $localaddr, -- LocalPort => $localport, -- ReplyHandler => \&reply_handler, -- Verbose => $verbose, --); -- --$ns->main_loop; -diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000000..0a031c1145 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans3/ans.py -@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ -+# Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") -+# -+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 -+# -+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public -+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this -+# file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. -+# -+# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional -+# information regarding copyright ownership. -+ -+############################################################################ -+# ans.py: See README.anspy for details. -+############################################################################ -+ -+from __future__ import print_function -+import os -+import sys -+import signal -+import socket -+import select -+from datetime import datetime, timedelta -+import functools -+ -+import dns, dns.message, dns.query -+from dns.rdatatype import * -+from dns.rdataclass import * -+from dns.rcode import * -+from dns.name import * -+ -+ -+############################################################################ -+# Respond to a DNS query. -+############################################################################ -+def create_response(msg): -+ ttl = 60 -+ zone = "example.broken." -+ nsname = f"ns3.{zone}" -+ synth = f"synth-then-dname.{zone}" -+ synth2 = f"synth2-then-dname.{zone}" -+ -+ m = dns.message.from_wire(msg) -+ qname = m.question[0].name.to_text() -+ -+ # prepare the response and convert to wire format -+ r = dns.message.make_response(m) -+ -+ # get qtype -+ rrtype = m.question[0].rdtype -+ qtype = dns.rdatatype.to_text(rrtype) -+ print(f"request: {qname}/{qtype}") -+ -+ rcode = "NOERROR" -+ if qname == zone: -+ if qtype == "SOA": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, SOA, ". . 0 0 0 0 0")) -+ elif qtype == "NS": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, NS, nsname)) -+ r.additional.append(dns.rrset.from_text(nsname, ttl, IN, A, ip4)) -+ elif qname == f"cname-to-{synth2}": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, f"name.{synth2}")) -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(f"name.{synth2}", ttl, IN, CNAME, "name.")) -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(synth2, ttl, IN, DNAME, ".")) -+ elif qname == f"{synth}" or qname == f"{synth2}": -+ if qtype == "DNAME": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, DNAME, ".")) -+ elif qname == f"name.{synth}": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, "name.")) -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(synth, ttl, IN, DNAME, ".")) -+ elif qname == f"name.{synth2}": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, "name.")) -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(synth2, ttl, IN, DNAME, ".")) -+ elif qname == "ns3.example.dname.": -+ # This and the next two code branches referring to the "example.dname" -+ # zone are necessary for the resolver variant of the CVE-2021-25215 -+ # regression test to work. A named instance cannot be used for -+ # serving the DNAME records below as a version of BIND vulnerable to -+ # CVE-2021-25215 would crash while answering the queries asked by -+ # the tested resolver. -+ if qtype == "A": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, A, ip4)) -+ elif qtype == "AAAA": -+ r.authority.append( -+ dns.rrset.from_text("example.dname.", ttl, IN, SOA, ". . 0 0 0 0 0") -+ ) -+ elif qname == "self.example.self..example.dname.": -+ r.answer.append( -+ dns.rrset.from_text("self.example.dname.", ttl, IN, DNAME, "dname.") -+ ) -+ r.answer.append( -+ dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, CNAME, "self.example.dname.") -+ ) -+ elif qname == "self.example.dname.": -+ if qtype == "DNAME": -+ r.answer.append(dns.rrset.from_text(qname, ttl, IN, DNAME, "dname.")) -+ else: -+ rcode = "REFUSED" -+ -+ r.flags |= dns.flags.AA -+ r.use_edns() -+ return r.to_wire() -+ -+ -+def sigterm(signum, frame): -+ print("Shutting down now...") -+ os.remove("ans.pid") -+ running = False -+ sys.exit(0) -+ -+ -+############################################################################ -+# Main -+# -+# Set up responder and control channel, open the pid file, and start -+# the main loop, listening for queries on the query channel or commands -+# on the control channel and acting on them. -+############################################################################ -+ip4 = "10.53.0.3" -+ip6 = "fd92:7065:b8e:ffff::3" -+ -+try: -+ port = int(os.environ["PORT"]) -+except: -+ port = 5300 -+ -+query4_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) -+query4_udp.bind((ip4, port)) -+ -+query4_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) -+query4_tcp.bind((ip4, port)) -+query4_tcp.listen(1) -+query4_tcp.settimeout(1) -+ -+havev6 = True -+try: -+ query6_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) -+ try: -+ query6_udp.bind((ip6, port)) -+ except: -+ query6_udp.close() -+ havev6 = False -+ -+ query6_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) -+ try: -+ query6_tcp.bind((ip4, port)) -+ query6_tcp.listen(1) -+ query6_tcp.settimeout(1) -+ except: -+ query6_tcp.close() -+ havev6 = False -+except: -+ havev6 = False -+ -+signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, sigterm) -+ -+f = open("ans.pid", "w") -+pid = os.getpid() -+print(pid, file=f) -+f.close() -+ -+running = True -+ -+print("Listening on %s port %d" % (ip4, port)) -+if havev6: -+ print("Listening on %s port %d" % (ip6, port)) -+print("Ctrl-c to quit") -+ -+if havev6: -+ input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, query6_udp, query6_tcp] -+else: -+ input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp] -+ -+while running: -+ try: -+ inputready, outputready, exceptready = select.select(input, [], []) -+ except select.error as e: -+ break -+ except socket.error as e: -+ break -+ except KeyboardInterrupt: -+ break -+ -+ for s in inputready: -+ if s == query4_udp or s == query6_udp: -+ print("Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_udp else ip6)) -+ # Handle incoming queries -+ msg = s.recvfrom(65535) -+ rsp = create_response(msg[0]) -+ if rsp: -+ s.sendto(rsp, msg[1]) -+ elif s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp: -+ try: -+ conn, _ = s.accept() -+ if s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp: -+ print( -+ "TCP Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_tcp else ip6), -+ end=" ", -+ ) -+ # get TCP message length -+ msg = conn.recv(2) -+ if len(msg) != 2: -+ print("couldn't read TCP message length") -+ continue -+ length = struct.unpack(">H", msg[:2])[0] -+ msg = conn.recv(length) -+ if len(msg) != length: -+ print("couldn't read TCP message") -+ continue -+ rsp = create_response(msg) -+ if rsp: -+ conn.send(struct.pack(">H", len(rsp))) -+ conn.send(rsp) -+ conn.close() -+ except socket.error as e: -+ print("error: %s" % str(e)) -+ if not running: -+ break -diff --git a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py -index 45d650417f..e4fc15a280 100755 ---- a/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py -+++ b/bin/tests/system/chain/ans4/ans.py -@@ -276,16 +276,30 @@ except: port=5300 - try: ctrlport=int(os.environ['EXTRAPORT1']) - except: ctrlport=5300 - --query4_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) --query4_socket.bind((ip4, port)) -+query4_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) -+query4_udp.bind((ip4, port)) -+ -+query4_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) -+query4_tcp.bind((ip4, port)) -+query4_tcp.listen(1) -+query4_tcp.settimeout(1) - - havev6 = True - try: -- query6_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) -+ query6_udp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) -+ try: -+ query6_udp.bind((ip6, port)) -+ except: -+ query6_udp.close() -+ havev6 = False -+ -+ query6_tcp = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) - try: -- query6_socket.bind((ip6, port)) -+ query6_tcp.bind((ip4, port)) -+ query6_tcp.listen(1) -+ query6_tcp.settimeout(1) - except: -- query6_socket.close() -+ query6_tcp.close() - havev6 = False - except: - havev6 = False -@@ -310,9 +324,9 @@ print ("Control channel on %s port %d" % (ip4, ctrlport)) - print ("Ctrl-c to quit") - - if havev6: -- input = [query4_socket, query6_socket, ctrl_socket] -+ input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, query6_udp, query6_tcp, ctrl_socket] - else: -- input = [query4_socket, ctrl_socket] -+ input = [query4_udp, query4_tcp, ctrl_socket] - - while running: - try: -@@ -335,13 +349,37 @@ while running: - break - ctl_channel(msg) - conn.close() -- if s == query4_socket or s == query6_socket: -- print ("Query received on %s" % -- (ip4 if s == query4_socket else ip6)) -+ elif s == query4_udp or s == query6_udp: -+ print("Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_udp else ip6)) - # Handle incoming queries - msg = s.recvfrom(65535) - rsp = create_response(msg[0]) - if rsp: - s.sendto(rsp, msg[1]) -+ elif s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp: -+ try: -+ conn, _ = s.accept() -+ if s == query4_tcp or s == query6_tcp: -+ print( -+ "TCP Query received on %s" % (ip4 if s == query4_tcp else ip6), -+ end=" ", -+ ) -+ # get TCP message length -+ msg = conn.recv(2) -+ if len(msg) != 2: -+ print("couldn't read TCP message length") -+ continue -+ length = struct.unpack(">H", msg[:2])[0] -+ msg = conn.recv(length) -+ if len(msg) != length: -+ print("couldn't read TCP message") -+ continue -+ rsp = create_response(msg) -+ if rsp: -+ conn.send(struct.pack(">H", len(rsp))) -+ conn.send(rsp) -+ conn.close() -+ except socket.error as e: -+ print("error: %s" % str(e)) - if not running: - break -diff --git a/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h b/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h -index 68c13ee6c5..53c96a5827 100644 ---- a/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h -+++ b/lib/dns/include/dns/message.h -@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ - /* - * Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") - * -+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 -+ * - * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public - * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this - * file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. -@@ -233,6 +235,7 @@ struct dns_message { - unsigned int cc_bad : 1; - unsigned int tkey : 1; - unsigned int rdclass_set : 1; -+ unsigned int has_dname : 1; - - unsigned int opt_reserved; - unsigned int sig_reserved; -@@ -1449,4 +1452,11 @@ dns_message_clonebuffer(dns_message_t *msg); - * \li msg be a valid message. - */ - -+bool -+dns_message_hasdname(dns_message_t *msg); -+/*%< -+ * Return whether a DNAME was detected in the ANSWER section of a QUERY -+ * message when it was parsed. -+ */ -+ - ISC_LANG_ENDDECLS -diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c -index 04315bc6d0..aa434a75f1 100644 ---- a/lib/dns/message.c -+++ b/lib/dns/message.c -@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ msginit(dns_message_t *m) { - m->cc_bad = 0; - m->tkey = 0; - m->rdclass_set = 0; -+ m->has_dname = 0; - m->querytsig = NULL; - m->indent.string = "\t"; - m->indent.count = 0; -@@ -1717,6 +1718,11 @@ getsection(isc_buffer_t *source, dns_message_t *msg, dns_decompress_t *dctx, - */ - msg->tsigname->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_NOCOMPRESS; - free_name = false; -+ } else if (rdtype == dns_rdatatype_dname && -+ sectionid == DNS_SECTION_ANSWER && -+ msg->opcode == dns_opcode_query) -+ { -+ msg->has_dname = 1; - } - rdataset = NULL; - -@@ -4750,3 +4756,9 @@ dns_message_clonebuffer(dns_message_t *msg) { - msg->free_query = 1; - } - } -+ -+bool -+dns_message_hasdname(dns_message_t *msg) { -+ REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg)); -+ return msg->has_dname; -+} -diff --git a/lib/dns/resolver.c b/lib/dns/resolver.c -index ad0a1b8102..5973bc1d55 100644 ---- a/lib/dns/resolver.c -+++ b/lib/dns/resolver.c -@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ typedef struct respctx { - bool get_nameservers; /* get a new NS rrset at - * zone cut? */ - bool resend; /* resend this query? */ -+ bool secured; /* message was signed or had a valid cookie */ - bool nextitem; /* invalid response; keep - * listening for the correct one */ - bool truncated; /* response was truncated */ -@@ -7155,7 +7156,8 @@ mark_related(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, bool external, - * locally served zone. - */ - static inline bool --name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, fetchctx_t *fctx) { -+name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, respctx_t *rctx) { -+ fetchctx_t *fctx = rctx->fctx; - isc_result_t result; - dns_forwarders_t *forwarders = NULL; - dns_fixedname_t fixed, zfixed; -@@ -7167,7 +7169,9 @@ name_external(const dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type, fetchctx_t *fctx) { - unsigned int labels; - dns_namereln_t rel; - -- apex = ISFORWARDER(fctx->addrinfo) ? fctx->fwdname : &fctx->domain; -+ apex = (/*ISDUALSTACK(fctx->addrinfo) || */!ISFORWARDER(fctx->addrinfo)) -+ ? rctx->ns_name != NULL ? rctx->ns_name : &fctx->domain -+ : fctx->fwdname; - - /* - * The name is outside the queried namespace. -@@ -7275,7 +7279,7 @@ check_section(void *arg, const dns_name_t *addname, dns_rdatatype_t type, - result = dns_message_findname(rctx->query->rmessage, section, addname, - dns_rdatatype_any, 0, &name, NULL); - if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { -- external = name_external(name, type, fctx); -+ external = name_external(name, type, rctx); - if (type == dns_rdatatype_a) { - for (rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list); - rdataset != NULL; -@@ -7884,6 +7888,47 @@ betterreferral(respctx_t *rctx) { - return (false); - } - -+static bool -+rctx_need_tcpretry(respctx_t *rctx) { -+ resquery_t *query = rctx->query; -+ if ((rctx->retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) != 0) { -+ /* TCP is already in the retry flags */ -+ return false; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If the message was secured, no need to continue. -+ */ -+ if (rctx->secured) { -+ return false; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Currently the only extra reason why we might need to -+ * retry a UDP response over TCP is a DNAME in the message. -+ */ -+ if (dns_message_hasdname(query->rmessage)) { -+ return true; -+ } -+ -+ return false; -+} -+ -+static isc_result_t -+rctx_tcpretry(respctx_t *rctx) { -+ /* -+ * Do we need to retry a UDP response over TCP? -+ */ -+ if (rctx_need_tcpretry(rctx)) { -+ rctx->retryopts |= DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP; -+ rctx->resend = true; -+ rctx_done(rctx, ISC_R_SUCCESS); -+ return ISC_R_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ return ISC_R_SUCCESS; -+} -+ - /* - * resquery_response(): - * Handles responses received in response to iterative queries sent by -@@ -8042,6 +8087,11 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { - break; - } - -+ /* -+ * The dispatcher should ensure we only get responses with QR set. -+ */ -+ INSIST((query->rmessage->flags & DNS_MESSAGEFLAG_QR) != 0); -+ - /* - * If the message is signed, check the signature. If not, this - * returns success anyway. -@@ -8058,9 +8108,16 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { - } - - /* -- * The dispatcher should ensure we only get responses with QR set. -+ * Remember whether this message was signed or had a -+ * valid client cookie; if not, we may need to retry over -+ * TCP later. - */ -- INSIST((query->rmessage->flags & DNS_MESSAGEFLAG_QR) != 0); -+ if (query->rmessage->cc_ok || query->rmessage->tsig != NULL || -+ query->rmessage->sig0 != NULL) -+ { -+ rctx.secured = true; -+ } -+ - /* - * INSIST() that the message comes from the place we sent it to, - * since the dispatch code should ensure this. -@@ -8074,10 +8131,7 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { - * This may be a misconfigured anycast server or an attempt to send - * a spoofed response. Skip if we have a valid tsig. - */ -- if (dns_message_gettsig(query->rmessage, NULL) == NULL && -- !query->rmessage->cc_ok && !query->rmessage->cc_bad && -- (rctx.retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) -- { -+ if (!rctx.secured && (rctx.retryopts & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) { - unsigned char cookie[COOKIE_BUFFER_SIZE]; - if (dns_adb_getcookie(fctx->adb, query->addrinfo, cookie, - sizeof(cookie)) > CLIENT_COOKIE_SIZE) -@@ -8103,6 +8157,17 @@ resquery_response(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { - */ - } - -+ /* -+ * Check whether we need to retry over TCP for some other reason. -+ */ -+ result = rctx_tcpretry(&rctx); -+ if (result == ISC_R_COMPLETE) { -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Check for EDNS issues. -+ */ - rctx_edns(&rctx); - - /* -@@ -8830,8 +8895,8 @@ rctx_answer_positive(respctx_t *rctx) { - } - - /* -- * Cache records in the authority section, if -- * there are any suitable for caching. -+ * Cache records in the authority section, if there are -+ * any suitable for caching. - */ - rctx_authority_positive(rctx); - -@@ -8902,7 +8967,7 @@ rctx_answer_scan(respctx_t *rctx) { - /* - * Don't accept DNAME from parent namespace. - */ -- if (name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_dname, fctx)) { -+ if (name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_dname, rctx)) { - continue; - } - -@@ -9200,14 +9265,14 @@ rctx_answer_dname(respctx_t *rctx) { - - /* - * rctx_authority_positive(): -- * Examine the records in the authority section (if there are any) for a -- * positive answer. We expect the names for all rdatasets in this section -- * to be subdomains of the domain being queried; any that are not are -- * skipped. We expect to find only *one* owner name; any names -- * after the first one processed are ignored. We expect to find only -- * rdatasets of type NS, RRSIG, or SIG; all others are ignored. Whatever -- * remains can be cached at trust level authauthority or additional -- * (depending on whether the AA bit was set on the answer). -+ * If a positive answer was received over TCP or secured with a cookie -+ * or TSIG, examine the authority section. We expect names for all -+ * rdatasets in this section to be subdomains of the domain being queried; -+ * any that are not are skipped. We expect to find only *one* owner name; -+ * any names after the first one processed are ignored. We expect to find -+ * only rdatasets of type NS; all others are ignored. Whatever remains can -+ * be cached at trust level authauthority or additional (depending on -+ * whether the AA bit was set on the answer). - */ - static void - rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) { -@@ -9215,6 +9280,11 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) { - bool done = false; - isc_result_t result; - -+ /* If it's spoofable, don't cache it. */ -+ if (!rctx->secured && (rctx->query->options & DNS_FETCHOPT_TCP) == 0) { -+ return; -+ } -+ - result = dns_message_firstname(rctx->query->rmessage, - DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY); - while (!done && result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { -@@ -9223,7 +9293,9 @@ rctx_authority_positive(respctx_t *rctx) { - dns_message_currentname(rctx->query->rmessage, - DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, &name); - -- if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, fctx)) { -+ if (!name_external(name, dns_rdatatype_ns, rctx) && -+ dns_name_issubdomain(&fctx->name, name)) -+ { - dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = NULL; - - /* --- -2.51.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40780.patch b/SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40780.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5508810..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40780.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,303 +0,0 @@ -From 6254679e5250a9f0d6079ec082cffdad4315372d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= -Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2025 19:22:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Use cryptographically-secure pseudo-random generator - everywhere - -It was discovered in an upcoming academic paper that a xoshiro128** -internal state can be recovered by an external 3rd party allowing to -predict UDP ports and DNS IDs in the outgoing queries. This could lead -to an attacker spoofing the DNS answers with great efficiency and -poisoning the DNS cache. - -Change the internal random generator to system CSPRNG with buffering to -avoid excessive syscalls. - -Thanks Omer Ben Simhon and Amit Klein of Hebrew University of Jerusalem -for responsibly reporting this to us. Very cool research! - -(cherry picked from commit cffcab9d5f3e709002f331b72498fcc229786ae2) -(cherry picked from commit d9b5ef342916462bfd63391831d96afc80c12df3) ---- - lib/isc/include/isc/os.h | 5 + - lib/isc/include/isc/random.h | 2 +- - lib/isc/random.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++----------------- - lib/isc/tests/random_test.c | 4 +- - 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/isc/include/isc/os.h b/lib/isc/include/isc/os.h -index ce7615a0e3..5def473d2b 100644 ---- a/lib/isc/include/isc/os.h -+++ b/lib/isc/include/isc/os.h -@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ - - ISC_LANG_BEGINDECLS - -+/*%< -+ * Hardcode the L1 cacheline size of the CPU to 64. -+ */ -+#define ISC_OS_CACHELINE_SIZE 64 -+ - unsigned int - isc_os_ncpus(void); - /*%< -diff --git a/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h b/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h -index 556e74754a..2c16472a5d 100644 ---- a/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h -+++ b/lib/isc/include/isc/random.h -@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ - #include - - /*! \file isc/random.h -- * \brief Implements wrapper around a non-cryptographically secure -+ * \brief Implements wrapper around a cryptographically secure - * pseudo-random number generator. - * - */ -diff --git a/lib/isc/random.c b/lib/isc/random.c -index 753453ff3c..717e1f0dcd 100644 ---- a/lib/isc/random.c -+++ b/lib/isc/random.c -@@ -29,131 +29,136 @@ - */ - - #include --#include --#include --#include -+#include - --#include -+#include - #include - #include --#include - #include --#include - #include - - #include "entropy_private.h" - --/* -- * The specific implementation for PRNG is included as a C file -- * that has to provide a static variable named seed, and a function -- * uint32_t next(void) that provides next random number. -- * -- * The implementation must be thread-safe. -- */ -- --/* -- * Two contestants have been considered: the xoroshiro family of the -- * functions by Villa&Blackman, and PCG by O'Neill. After -- * consideration, the xoshiro128starstar function has been chosen as -- * the uint32_t random number provider because it is very fast and has -- * good enough properties for our usage pattern. -- */ --#include "xoshiro128starstar.c" -+#define ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE (ISC_OS_CACHELINE_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t)) - --ISC_THREAD_LOCAL isc_once_t isc_random_once = ISC_ONCE_INIT; -+ISC_THREAD_LOCAL uint32_t isc__random_pool[ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE]; -+ISC_THREAD_LOCAL size_t isc__random_pos = ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE; - --static void --isc_random_initialize(void) { -- int useed[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 1 }; -+static uint32_t -+random_u32(void) { - #if FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION - /* -- * Set a constant seed to help in problem reproduction should fuzzing -- * find a crash or a hang. The seed array must be non-zero else -- * xoshiro128starstar will generate an infinite series of zeroes. -+ * A fixed stream of numbers helps with problem reproduction when -+ * fuzzing. The first result needs to be non-zero as expected by -+ * random_test.c (it starts with ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE, see above). - */ --#else /* if FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */ -- isc_entropy_get(useed, sizeof(useed)); -+ return (uint32_t)(isc__random_pos++); - #endif /* if FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */ -- memmove(seed, useed, sizeof(seed)); -+ -+ if (isc__random_pos == ISC_RANDOM_BUFSIZE) { -+ isc_entropy_get(isc__random_pool, sizeof(isc__random_pool)); -+ isc__random_pos = 0; -+ } -+ -+ return isc__random_pool[isc__random_pos++]; - } - - uint8_t - isc_random8(void) { -- RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) == -- ISC_R_SUCCESS); -- return (next() & 0xff); -+ return (uint8_t)random_u32(); - } - - uint16_t - isc_random16(void) { -- RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) == -- ISC_R_SUCCESS); -- return (next() & 0xffff); -+ return (uint16_t)random_u32(); - } - - uint32_t - isc_random32(void) { -- RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) == -- ISC_R_SUCCESS); -- return (next()); -+ return random_u32(); - } - - void - isc_random_buf(void *buf, size_t buflen) { -- int i; -- uint32_t r; -+ REQUIRE(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); - -- REQUIRE(buf != NULL); -- REQUIRE(buflen > 0); -- -- RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) == -- ISC_R_SUCCESS); -- -- for (i = 0; i + sizeof(r) <= buflen; i += sizeof(r)) { -- r = next(); -- memmove((uint8_t *)buf + i, &r, sizeof(r)); -+ if (buf == NULL || buflen == 0) { -+ return; - } -- r = next(); -- memmove((uint8_t *)buf + i, &r, buflen % sizeof(r)); -- return; -+ -+ isc_entropy_get(buf, buflen); - } - - uint32_t --isc_random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound) { -- /* Copy of arc4random_uniform from OpenBSD */ -- uint32_t r, min; -- -- RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&isc_random_once, isc_random_initialize) == -- ISC_R_SUCCESS); -- -- if (upper_bound < 2) { -- return (0); -- } -- --#if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL) -- min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound; --#else /* if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL) */ -- /* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */ -- if (upper_bound > 0x80000000) { -- min = 1 + ~upper_bound; /* 2**32 - upper_bound */ -- } else { -- /* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */ -- min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound; -- } --#endif /* if (ULONG_MAX > 0xffffffffUL) */ -- -+isc_random_uniform(uint32_t limit) { - /* -- * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has -- * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a -- * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need -- * to re-roll. -+ * Daniel Lemire's nearly-divisionless unbiased bounded random numbers. -+ * -+ * https://lemire.me/blog/?p=17551 -+ * -+ * The raw random number generator `next()` returns a 32-bit value. -+ * We do a 64-bit multiply `next() * limit` and treat the product as a -+ * 32.32 fixed-point value less than the limit. Our result will be the -+ * integer part (upper 32 bits), and we will use the fraction part -+ * (lower 32 bits) to determine whether or not we need to resample. - */ -- for (;;) { -- r = next(); -- if (r >= min) { -- break; -+ uint64_t num = (uint64_t)random_u32() * (uint64_t)limit; -+ /* -+ * In the fast path, we avoid doing a division in most cases by -+ * comparing the fraction part of `num` with the limit, which is -+ * a slight over-estimate for the exact resample threshold. -+ */ -+ if ((uint32_t)(num) < limit) { -+ /* -+ * We are in the slow path where we re-do the approximate test -+ * more accurately. The exact threshold for the resample loop -+ * is the remainder after dividing the raw RNG limit `1 << 32` -+ * by the caller's limit. We use a trick to calculate it -+ * within 32 bits: -+ * -+ * (1 << 32) % limit -+ * == ((1 << 32) - limit) % limit -+ * == (uint32_t)(-limit) % limit -+ * -+ * This division is safe: we know that `limit` is strictly -+ * greater than zero because of the slow-path test above. -+ */ -+ uint32_t residue = (uint32_t)(-limit) % limit; -+ /* -+ * Unless we get one of `N = (1 << 32) - residue` valid -+ * values, we reject the sample. This `N` is a multiple of -+ * `limit`, so our results will be unbiased; and `N` is the -+ * largest multiple that fits in 32 bits, so rejections are as -+ * rare as possible. -+ * -+ * There are `limit` possible values for the integer part of -+ * our fixed-point number. Each one corresponds to `N/limit` -+ * or `N/limit + 1` possible fraction parts. For our result to -+ * be unbiased, every possible integer part must have the same -+ * number of possible valid fraction parts. So, when we get -+ * the superfluous value in the `N/limit + 1` cases, we need -+ * to reject and resample. -+ * -+ * Because of the multiplication, the possible values in the -+ * fraction part are equally spaced by `limit`, with varying -+ * gaps at each end of the fraction's 32-bit range. We will -+ * choose a range of size `N` (a multiple of `limit`) into -+ * which valid fraction values must fall, with the rest of the -+ * 32-bit range covered by the `residue`. Lemire's paper says -+ * that exactly `N/limit` possible values spaced apart by -+ * `limit` will fit into our size `N` valid range, regardless -+ * of the size of the end gaps, the phase alignment of the -+ * values, or the position of the range. -+ * -+ * So, when a fraction value falls in the `residue` outside -+ * our valid range, it is superfluous, and we resample. -+ */ -+ while ((uint32_t)(num) < residue) { -+ num = (uint64_t)random_u32() * (uint64_t)limit; - } - } -- -- return (r % upper_bound); -+ /* -+ * Return the integer part (upper 32 bits). -+ */ -+ return (uint32_t)(num >> 32); - } -diff --git a/lib/isc/tests/random_test.c b/lib/isc/tests/random_test.c -index 7161cd96a9..f47137d3ac 100644 ---- a/lib/isc/tests/random_test.c -+++ b/lib/isc/tests/random_test.c -@@ -345,7 +345,9 @@ random_test(pvalue_func_t *func, isc_random_func test_func) { - } - break; - case ISC_RANDOM_BYTES: -- isc_random_buf(values, sizeof(values)); -+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(values); i++) { -+ values[i] = isc_random32(); -+ } - break; - case ISC_RANDOM_UNIFORM: - uniform_values = (uint16_t *)values; --- -2.51.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/bind-9.18-dig-idn-input-always.patch b/SOURCES/bind-9.18-dig-idn-input-always.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72faf02 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/bind-9.18-dig-idn-input-always.patch @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +From d023241c7e2921926be8bd1784424eefba2a3c54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20Men=C5=A1=C3=ADk?= +Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 21:29:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Allow always IDN input in dig +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Even when stdout is non-interactive terminal, allow unicode characters +to be encoded into ACE form. Still disable IDN output, but unless ++noidnin or IDN_DISABLE=1 env is detected, consider input as locale +defined name. + +Provides more isolated change, which issue #3527 introduced similar +behavior into 9.19 with more changes. + +Ignore input IDN errors when stdout is not terminal + +Attempt to prevent visible regressions when enabling IDN on input +always. Instead of new hard failures preventing IDN decoding of input +name just use original input. + +Should make the change backward compatible. When on interactive terminal +behave the same way as before and emit hard errors. Become more +forgiving in scripts where stdout leads to script. Decoding output is +not enabled there and if input decoding fails, just use input as it was. + +Change dig manual +idnin + +Note in manual IDN input is always enabled. But it silently ignores +errors when stdout is not a terminal to prevent regressions. + +Signed-off-by: Petr Menšík +--- + bin/dig/dig.rst | 6 +++--- + bin/dig/dighost.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bin/dig/dig.rst b/bin/dig/dig.rst +index a1d7cfe..85acde1 100644 +--- a/bin/dig/dig.rst ++++ b/bin/dig/dig.rst +@@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ abbreviation is unambiguous; for example, ``+cd`` is equivalent to + This option processes [or does not process] IDN domain names on input. This requires + ``IDN SUPPORT`` to have been enabled at compile time. + +- The default is to process IDN input when standard output is a tty. +- The IDN processing on input is disabled when ``dig`` output is redirected +- to files, pipes, and other non-tty file descriptors. ++ The default is to process IDN input. The input IDN processing errors are ignored ++ when :program:`dig` output is redirected to files, pipes, and other non-tty file ++ descriptors. + + ``+[no]idnout`` + This option converts [or does not convert] puny code on output. This requires +diff --git a/bin/dig/dighost.c b/bin/dig/dighost.c +index 7e88b6b..fbd5ad9 100644 +--- a/bin/dig/dighost.c ++++ b/bin/dig/dighost.c +@@ -620,6 +620,9 @@ clone_server_list(dig_serverlist_t src, dig_serverlist_t *dest) { + dig_lookup_t * + make_empty_lookup(void) { + dig_lookup_t *looknew; ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBIDN2 ++ bool idn_allowed = (getenv("IDN_DISABLE") == NULL); ++#endif + + debug("make_empty_lookup()"); + +@@ -671,8 +674,8 @@ make_empty_lookup(void) { + looknew->qr = false; + looknew->accept_reply_unexpected_src = false; + #ifdef HAVE_LIBIDN2 +- looknew->idnin = isatty(1) ? (getenv("IDN_DISABLE") == NULL) : false; +- looknew->idnout = looknew->idnin; ++ looknew->idnin = idn_allowed; ++ looknew->idnout = isatty(1) && idn_allowed; + #else /* ifdef HAVE_LIBIDN2 */ + looknew->idnin = false; + looknew->idnout = false; +@@ -4493,8 +4496,16 @@ idn_locale_to_ace(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dstlen) { + */ + res = idn2_to_ascii_lz(src, &ascii_src, IDN2_NONTRANSITIONAL); + if (res != IDN2_OK) { +- fatal("'%s' is not a legal IDNA2008 name (%s), use +noidnin", +- src, idn2_strerror(res)); ++ if (isatty(1)) { ++ fatal("'%s' is not a legal IDNA2008 name (%s), use +noidnin", ++ src, idn2_strerror(res)); ++ } else { ++ /* In case of non-terminal output silently ignore errors ++ * in IDN input decoding. */ ++ (void)strlcpy(dst, src, dstlen); ++ resetlocale(LC_ALL); ++ return; ++ } + } + + /* +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/named.logrotate b/SOURCES/named.logrotate index 5df448f..74ceff8 100644 --- a/SOURCES/named.logrotate +++ b/SOURCES/named.logrotate @@ -2,11 +2,10 @@ missingok su named named create 0644 named named + notifempty postrotate /usr/bin/systemctl reload named.service > /dev/null 2>&1 || true /usr/bin/systemctl reload named-chroot.service > /dev/null 2>&1 || true - /usr/bin/systemctl reload named-sdb.service > /dev/null 2>&1 || true - /usr/bin/systemctl reload named-sdb-chroot.service > /dev/null 2>&1 || true /usr/bin/systemctl reload named-pkcs11.service > /dev/null 2>&1 || true endscript } diff --git a/SPECS/bind.spec b/SPECS/bind.spec index 7c68d94..3354283 100644 --- a/SPECS/bind.spec +++ b/SPECS/bind.spec @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Summary: The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) DNS (Domain Name System) serv Name: bind License: MPLv2.0 Version: 9.16.23 -Release: 31%{?dist}.2 +Release: 33%{?dist} Epoch: 32 Url: https://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/ # @@ -188,12 +188,9 @@ Patch218: bind-9.18-query-fname-relative.patch Patch219: bind-9.18-partial-additional-records.patch # downstream only, RHEL-84006 Patch220: bind-9.18-configurable-additional-records.patch -# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/d9b5ef342916462bfd63391831d96afc80c12df3 -Patch224: bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40780.patch -# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/2f0f44d493c382a7f0a3adfe7c4976b18a3d480b -# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/50479358efdf432d690415131b74b5df158a9d69 -# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/33a7db1fe964e55b76b4ac003ecc56cc67028bd9 -Patch225: bind-9.16-CVE-2025-40778.patch +# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/merge_requests/9723 +# downstream only +Patch221: bind-9.18-dig-idn-input-always.patch %{?systemd_ordering} Requires: coreutils @@ -1238,12 +1235,11 @@ fi; %endif %changelog -* Thu Oct 30 2025 Petr Menšík - 32:9.16.23-31.2 -- Replace downstream fixes with upstream changes +* Fri Sep 12 2025 Petr Menšík <> - 32:9.16.23-33 +- logrotate: skip if empty and remove old variants (RHEL-113942) -* Wed Oct 29 2025 Petr Menšík - 32:9.16.23-31.1 -- Prevent cache poisoning due to weak PRNG (CVE-2025-40780) -- Address various spoofing attacks (CVE-2025-40778) +* Wed Sep 03 2025 Petr Menšík - 32:9.16.23-31 +- Decode IDN names on input in all situations in utilities (RHEL-66172) * Wed Jul 09 2025 Petr Menšík - 32:9.16.23-31 - Add runtime tunable limit by environment NAMED_MAXADDITIONAL (RHEL-84006)