diff --git a/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch b/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f455871 --- /dev/null +++ b/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +From 5ff88892e43c049659a8a5aef8dfd56c3712daf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Mensik +Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:49:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Resolve CVE-2024-1975 + +6404. [security] Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure + for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480] + +Resolves: CVE-2024-1975 +--- + bin/named/client.c | 7 +++ + bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl | 5 ++ + bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh | 12 ++-- + bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh | 21 ++++--- + doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml | 22 +++---- + lib/dns/message.c | 94 +++------------------------- + 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bin/named/client.c b/bin/named/client.c +index 368bc94..ea121b3 100644 +--- a/bin/named/client.c ++++ b/bin/named/client.c +@@ -3013,6 +3013,13 @@ client_request(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) { + ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, + NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), + "request is signed by a nonauthoritative key"); ++ } else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET && ++ client->message->sig0 != NULL) ++ { ++ ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, ++ NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), ++ "request has a SIG(0) signature but its support " ++ "was removed (CVE-2024-1975)"); + } else { + char tsigrcode[64]; + isc_buffer_t b; +diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +index ab3833d..0b231ee 100644 +--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl ++++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) { + exit(1); + } + ++# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM. ++select STDOUT; ++$| = 1; ++ + unlink($path); + my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or + die "unable to create socket $path"; +@@ -53,6 +57,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) { + } + + while (my $client = $server->accept()) { ++ printf("accept()\n"); + $client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0); + my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf); + +diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh +index 456ce61..d0db388 100644 +--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh ++++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh +@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status+ret)) + + echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)" + ret=0 +-$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 > /dev/null 2>&1 & ++$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 & + sleep 1 + test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1 + n=$((n+1)) +@@ -130,17 +130,19 @@ n=$((n+1)) + if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi + status=$((status+ret)) + +-echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)" ++echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)" + ret=0 +-$NSUPDATE -R $RANDFILE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private < /dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1 ++$NSUPDATE -R $RANDFILE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true ++debug + server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT} + zone example.nil + update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar. + send + END ++# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported + output=`$DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.` +-[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1 +-[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed" ++[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1 ++grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1 + n=$((n+1)) + if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi + status=$((status+ret)) +diff --git a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh +index ebc9ded..f5b89d4 100644 +--- a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh ++++ b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh +@@ -181,19 +181,22 @@ n=`expr $n + 1` + + if test -f keyname + then +- echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)" ++ echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)" + ret=0 + keyname=`cat keyname` +- $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1 + $DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 > dig.out.ns1.test$n +- grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n > /dev/null || ret=1 ++ grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1 + if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then echo_i "failed"; fi + status=`expr $status + $ret` + n=`expr $n + 1` +diff --git a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml +index acf772b..563dced 100644 +--- a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml ++++ b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml +@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;}; + The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending + a query of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server. The query must include + an appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and +- must be signed using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously ++ must be signed using TSIG with a previously + established key. The server's response, if successful, + contains a TKEY record in its answer section. After this transaction, + both participants have enough information to calculate a +@@ -2050,24 +2050,24 @@ allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;}; +
SIG(0) + + +- BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) ++ BIND partially supported DNSSEC SIG(0) + transaction signatures as specified in RFC 2535 and RFC 2931. + SIG(0) uses public/private keys to authenticate messages. Access control +- is performed in the same manner as with TSIG keys; privileges can be ++ were performed in the same manner as with TSIG keys; privileges can be + granted or denied in ACL directives based on the key name. + + +- When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only ++ When a SIG(0) signed message were received, it were only + verified if the key is known and trusted by the server. The +- server does not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the ++ server did not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the + key. + + +- SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported. ++ SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams were not supported. + + +- The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that +- generates SIG(0) signed messages is nsupdate. ++ Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed ++ as part of the mitigation of CVE-2024-1975. + +
+ +@@ -12655,7 +12655,7 @@ example.com. NS ns2.example.net. + either grants or denies permission for one or more + names in the zone to be updated by one or more + identities. Identity is determined by the key that +- signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). ++ signed the update request, using TSIG. + In most cases, update-policy rules + only apply to key-based identities. There is no way + to specify update permissions based on client source +@@ -12742,7 +12742,7 @@ example.com. NS ns2.example.net. + + The identity field must be set to + a fully qualified domain name. In most cases, this +- represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that must be ++ represents the name of the TSIG key that must be + used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a + wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the + rule may apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange +@@ -15952,7 +15952,7 @@ HOST-127.EXAMPLE. MX 0 . + + + ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: +- 1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was ++ 1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was + used to sign the request, if any; and 3) an address prefix + encoded in an EDNS Client-Subnet option, if any. + +diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c +index a44eb2d..9ea2b9e 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/message.c ++++ b/lib/dns/message.c +@@ -3373,103 +3373,23 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) { + + isc_result_t + dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) { +- isc_buffer_t b, msgb; ++ isc_buffer_t msgb; + + REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg)); + +- if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL) ++ if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL) + return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); + + INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL); + isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length); + isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length); +- if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) { + #ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG +- dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); ++ dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); + #endif +- if (view != NULL) +- return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); +- else +- return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); +- } else { +- dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT; +- dns_rdata_sig_t sig; +- dns_rdataset_t keyset; +- isc_result_t result; +- +- result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0); +- INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); +- dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata); +- +- /* +- * This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since +- * the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not +- * happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only +- * looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update +- * meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections. +- */ +- if (rdata.length == 0) +- return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND); +- +- result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, msg->mctx); +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) +- return (result); +- +- dns_rdataset_init(&keyset); +- if (view == NULL) +- return (DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED); +- result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer, +- dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */, +- 0, 0, false, &keyset, NULL); +- +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { +- /* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */ +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- goto freesig; +- } else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) { +- /* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */ +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- goto freesig; +- } +- result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset); +- INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); +- for (; +- result == ISC_R_SUCCESS; +- result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset)) +- { +- dst_key_t *key = NULL; +- +- dns_rdata_reset(&rdata); +- dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata); +- isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length); +- isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length); +- +- result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass, +- &b, view->mctx, &key); +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) +- continue; +- if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm || +- dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid || +- !(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC || +- dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY)) +- { +- dst_key_free(&key); +- continue; +- } +- result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key); +- dst_key_free(&key); +- if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) +- break; +- } +- if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- +- freesig: +- if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset)) +- dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset); +- dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig); +- return (result); +- } ++ if (view != NULL) ++ return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); ++ else ++ return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); + } + + #define INDENT(sp) \ +-- +2.45.2 + diff --git a/bind.spec b/bind.spec index 29897dd..56567c6 100644 --- a/bind.spec +++ b/bind.spec @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Summary: The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) DNS (Domain Name System) serv Name: bind License: MPLv2.0 Version: 9.11.36 -Release: 16%{?PATCHVER:.%{PATCHVER}}%{?PREVER:.%{PREVER}}%{?dist} +Release: 16%{?PATCHVER:.%{PATCHVER}}%{?PREVER:.%{PREVER}}%{?dist}.1 Epoch: 32 Url: https://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/ # @@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ Patch202: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-50387.patch Patch203: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-2828-fixup.patch # addition to patch 200 Patch204: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-50387-fixup.patch +# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/225f2861920b8f8d42a0ea6c34dd1faa93aa8726 +Patch205: bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch # SDB patches Patch11: bind-9.3.2b2-sdbsrc.patch @@ -607,6 +609,7 @@ are used for building ISC DHCP. %patch202 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50387+50868 %patch203 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-2828-fixup %patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50387-fixup +%patch205 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-1975 mkdir lib/dns/tests/testdata/dstrandom cp -a %{SOURCE50} lib/dns/tests/testdata/dstrandom/random.data @@ -1659,6 +1662,9 @@ rm -rf ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT} %endif %changelog +* Thu Jul 18 2024 Petr Menšík - 32:9.11.36-16.1 +- Resolve CVE-2024-1975 + * Mon Apr 15 2024 Petr Menšík - 32:9.11.36-16 - Ensure incompatible dhcp is not accepted