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import OL bind-9.11.36-16.el8_10.2

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This commit is contained in:
Andrew Lukoshko 2024-08-19 21:01:33 +00:00
parent 6650d7fa32
commit 26550e8f2c
7 changed files with 806 additions and 1 deletions
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133
SOURCES/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1737-runtime-env.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
From 0a7909045f9e1bf74c1f0fd561a8ef5f55481e8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Mensik <pemensik@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 16:20:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Allow global runtime definition by DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES
Modify rbtdb to not set it only at runtime, but allow setting that also
in runtime via environment variable. It is still possible to modify
default during the build define. In addition to it allows runtime change
also. Can be positive number to set limit, 0 disabled the check.
Similarly add also DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS to set maximum number of
records for a single name. This must be positive number, 0 is no accepted.
These replaces max-records-per-type and max-types-per-name in later
versions. But can be configured only by environment and can be
configured only globally, not in each view or zone.
---
lib/dns/rbtdb.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
lib/dns/rdataslab.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
index a3cb8dc871..0104c3ee36 100644
--- a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
+++ b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
@@ -6320,15 +6320,29 @@ update_recordsandbytes(bool add, rbtdb_version_t *rbtversion,
#define DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES 100
#endif /* DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES */
+static uint32_t dns_g_rbtdb_max_rtypes = DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES;
+
+static void
+init_max_rtypes(void) {
+ /* Red Hat change, allow setting different max value by environment. */
+ const char *max = getenv("DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES");
+ if (max) {
+ char *endp = NULL;
+ long l = strtol(max, &endp, 10);
+ if (max != endp && endp && !*endp && l >= 0)
+ dns_g_rbtdb_max_rtypes = l;
+ }
+}
+
static bool
overmaxtype(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, uint32_t ntypes) {
UNUSED(rbtdb);
- if (DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES == 0) {
+ if (dns_g_rbtdb_max_rtypes == 0) {
return (false);
}
- return (ntypes >= DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES);
+ return (ntypes >= dns_g_rbtdb_max_rtypes);
}
static bool
@@ -8831,6 +8845,8 @@ static dns_dbmethods_t cache_methods = {
getservestalettl
};
+static isc_once_t once_db = ISC_ONCE_INIT;
+
isc_result_t
#ifdef DNS_RBTDB_VERSION64
dns_rbtdb64_create
@@ -8850,6 +8866,7 @@ dns_rbtdb_create
/* Keep the compiler happy. */
UNUSED(driverarg);
+ RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&once_db, init_max_rtypes) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
rbtdb = isc_mem_get(mctx, sizeof(*rbtdb));
if (rbtdb == NULL)
diff --git a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c
index 347b7d2ce8..9566f79671 100644
--- a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c
+++ b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <isc/mem.h>
+#include <isc/once.h>
#include <isc/region.h>
#include <isc/string.h> /* Required for HP/UX (and others?) */
#include <isc/util.h>
@@ -119,6 +120,23 @@ fillin_offsets(unsigned char *offsetbase, unsigned int *offsettable,
#define DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS 100
#endif /* DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS */
+static unsigned int dns_g_rdataset_max_records = DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS;
+static isc_once_t once = ISC_ONCE_INIT;
+
+static void
+init_max_records(void) {
+ /* Red Hat change, allow setting different max value by environment. */
+ const char *max = getenv("DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS");
+ if (max) {
+ char *endp = NULL;
+ long l = strtol(max, &endp, 10);
+ if (max != endp && endp && !*endp && l > 0)
+ dns_g_rdataset_max_records = l;
+ }
+}
+
+
+
isc_result_t
dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
isc_region_t *region, unsigned int reservelen)
@@ -165,7 +183,9 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
- if (nitems > DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS) {
+ RUNTIME_CHECK(isc_once_do(&once, init_max_records) == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+ if (nitems > dns_g_rdataset_max_records) {
return (DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
}
@@ -662,7 +682,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_merge(unsigned char *oslab, unsigned char *nslab,
#endif
INSIST(ocount > 0 && ncount > 0);
- if (ocount + ncount > DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS) {
+ if (ocount + ncount > dns_g_rdataset_max_records) {
return (DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
}
--
2.45.2

317
SOURCES/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1737.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
From 71df06e2bf3da31c5d542fb33dbda67b21537322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <ondrej@isc.org>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 08:26:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] [9.11][CVE-2024-1737] Add a limit to the number of RRs in
RRSets
Add a limit to the number of RRs in RRSets
Previously, the number of RRs in the RRSets were internally unlimited.
As the data structure that holds the RRs is just a linked list, and
there are places where we just walk through all of the RRs, adding an
RRSet with huge number of RRs inside would slow down processing of said
RRSets.
The fix for end-of-life branches make the limit compile-time only for
simplicity and the limit can be changed at the compile time by adding
following define to CFLAGS:
-DDNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS=<limit>
(cherry picked from commit c5c4d00c38530390c9e1ae4c98b65fbbadfe9e5e)
(cherry picked from commit 7f705778af729ada7fec36ac4b456c73329bd996)
(cherry picked from commit b9b5485b22c364fb88c27aa04bad4c8f616da3fa)
Add a limit to the number of RR types for single name
Previously, the number of RR types for a single owner name was limited
only by the maximum number of the types (64k). As the data structure
that holds the RR types for the database node is just a linked list, and
there are places where we just walk through the whole list (again and
again), adding a large number of RR types for a single owner named with
would slow down processing of such name (database node).
Add a hard-coded limit (100) to cap the number of the RR types for a single
owner. The limit can be changed at the compile time by adding following
define to CFLAGS:
-DDNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES=<limit>
(cherry picked from commit 538b843d84f49ba5125ff545e3d0cf1c8434a8f2)
(cherry picked from commit 3f10d6eff035702796ba82cd28b9f7cf9836e743)
Optimize the slabheader placement for certain RRTypes
Mark the infrastructure RRTypes as "priority" types and place them at
the beginning of the rdataslab header data graph. The non-priority
types either go right after the priority types (if any).
(cherry picked from commit 3ac482be7fd058d284e89873021339579fad0615)
(cherry picked from commit 23a4652346fb2877d6246b1eebaa967969dbde16)
[9.11][CVE-2024-1737 (part 2)] Be smarter about refusing to add many RR types to the database
Expand the list of the priority types
Add HTTPS, SVCB, SRV, PTR, NAPTR, DNSKEY and TXT records to the list of
the priority types that are put at the beginning of the slabheader list
for faster access and to avoid eviction when there are more types than
the max-types-per-name limit.
(cherry picked from commit b27c6bcce894786a8e082eafd59eccbf6f2731cb)
(cherry picked from commit 3e0a67e4bdb253dae3a03a45c1aa117239a3313d)
Be smarter about refusing to add many RR types to the database
Instead of outright refusing to add new RR types to the cache, be a bit
smarter:
1. If the new header type is in our priority list, we always add either
positive or negative entry at the beginning of the list.
2. If the new header type is negative entry, and we are over the limit,
we mark it as ancient immediately, so it gets evicted from the cache
as soon as possible.
3. Otherwise add the new header after the priority headers (or at the
head of the list).
4. If we are over the limit, evict the last entry on the normal header
list.
(cherry picked from commit 57cd34441a1b4ecc9874a4a106c2c95b8d7a3120)
(cherry picked from commit e4d7ce686bb38428eddc7e33b40057d68eca9a6e)
---
configure | 2 +-
configure.ac | 2 +-
lib/dns/rbtdb.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
lib/dns/rdataslab.c | 12 +++++
4 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index e060e9d..6421c9b 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -12189,7 +12189,7 @@ fi
XTARGETS=
case "$enable_developer" in
yes)
- STD_CDEFINES="$STD_CDEFINES -DISC_LIST_CHECKINIT=1"
+ STD_CDEFINES="$STD_CDEFINES -DISC_LIST_CHECKINIT=1 -DDNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS=5000 -DDNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES=5000"
test "${enable_fixed_rrset+set}" = set || enable_fixed_rrset=yes
test "${enable_querytrace+set}" = set || enable_querytrace=yes
test "${enable_filter_aaaa+set}" = set || enable_filter_aaaa=yes
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 83cad4a..1c35ce9 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(developer,
XTARGETS=
case "$enable_developer" in
yes)
- STD_CDEFINES="$STD_CDEFINES -DISC_LIST_CHECKINIT=1"
+ STD_CDEFINES="$STD_CDEFINES -DISC_LIST_CHECKINIT=1 -DDNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS=5000 -DDNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES=5000"
test "${enable_fixed_rrset+set}" = set || enable_fixed_rrset=yes
test "${enable_querytrace+set}" = set || enable_querytrace=yes
test "${enable_filter_aaaa+set}" = set || enable_filter_aaaa=yes
diff --git a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
index ee59c1b..a2b2df7 100644
--- a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
+++ b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
@@ -1183,6 +1183,44 @@ set_ttl(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *header, dns_ttl_t newttl) {
isc_heap_decreased(heap, header->heap_index);
}
+static bool
+prio_type(rbtdb_rdatatype_t type) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case dns_rdatatype_soa:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_soa):
+ case dns_rdatatype_a:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_a):
+ case dns_rdatatype_mx:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_mx):
+ case dns_rdatatype_aaaa:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_aaaa):
+ case dns_rdatatype_nsec:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_nsec):
+ case dns_rdatatype_nsec3:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_nsec3):
+ case dns_rdatatype_ns:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_ns):
+ case dns_rdatatype_ds:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_ds):
+ case dns_rdatatype_cname:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_cname):
+ case dns_rdatatype_dname:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_dname):
+ case dns_rdatatype_dnskey:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_dnskey):
+ case dns_rdatatype_srv:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_srv):
+ case dns_rdatatype_txt:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_txt):
+ case dns_rdatatype_ptr:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_ptr):
+ case dns_rdatatype_naptr:
+ case RBTDB_RDATATYPE_VALUE(dns_rdatatype_rrsig, dns_rdatatype_naptr):
+ return (true);
+ }
+ return (false);
+}
+
/*%
* These functions allow the heap code to rank the priority of each
* element. It returns true if v1 happens "sooner" than v2.
@@ -6278,6 +6316,30 @@ update_recordsandbytes(bool add, rbtdb_version_t *rbtversion,
RWUNLOCK(&rbtversion->rwlock, isc_rwlocktype_write);
}
+#ifndef DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES
+#define DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES 100
+#endif /* DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES */
+
+static bool
+overmaxtype(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, uint32_t ntypes) {
+ UNUSED(rbtdb);
+
+ if (DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES == 0) {
+ return (false);
+ }
+
+ return (ntypes >= DNS_RBTDB_MAX_RTYPES);
+}
+
+static bool
+prio_header(rdatasetheader_t *header) {
+ if (NEGATIVE(header) && prio_type(RBTDB_RDATATYPE_EXT(header->type))) {
+ return (true);
+ }
+
+ return (prio_type(header->type));
+}
+
/*
* write lock on rbtnode must be held.
*/
@@ -6288,6 +6350,7 @@ add32(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, dns_rbtnode_t *rbtnode, rbtdb_version_t *rbtversion,
{
rbtdb_changed_t *changed = NULL;
rdatasetheader_t *topheader, *topheader_prev, *header, *sigheader;
+ rdatasetheader_t *prioheader = NULL, *expireheader = NULL;
unsigned char *merged;
isc_result_t result;
bool header_nx;
@@ -6297,6 +6360,7 @@ add32(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, dns_rbtnode_t *rbtnode, rbtdb_version_t *rbtversion,
rbtdb_rdatatype_t negtype, sigtype;
dns_trust_t trust;
int idx;
+ uint32_t ntypes = 0;
/*
* Add an rdatasetheader_t to a node.
@@ -6429,6 +6493,15 @@ add32(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, dns_rbtnode_t *rbtnode, rbtdb_version_t *rbtversion,
for (topheader = rbtnode->data;
topheader != NULL;
topheader = topheader->next) {
+ if (IS_CACHE(rbtdb) && ACTIVE(topheader, now)) {
+ ++ntypes;
+ expireheader = topheader;
+ } else if (!IS_CACHE(rbtdb)) {
+ ++ntypes;
+ }
+ if (prio_header(topheader)) {
+ prioheader = topheader;
+ }
if (topheader->type == newheader->type ||
topheader->type == negtype)
break;
@@ -6792,9 +6865,46 @@ add32(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, dns_rbtnode_t *rbtnode, rbtdb_version_t *rbtversion,
/*
* No rdatasets of the given type exist at the node.
*/
- newheader->next = rbtnode->data;
+ if (!IS_CACHE(rbtdb) && overmaxtype(rbtdb, ntypes)) {
+ free_rdataset(rbtdb, rbtdb->common.mctx,
+ newheader);
+ return (ISC_R_QUOTA);
+ }
+
newheader->down = NULL;
- rbtnode->data = newheader;
+
+ if (prio_header(newheader)) {
+ /* This is a priority type, prepend it */
+ newheader->next = rbtnode->data;
+ rbtnode->data = newheader;
+ } else if (prioheader != NULL) {
+ /* Append after the priority headers */
+ newheader->next = prioheader->next;
+ prioheader->next = newheader;
+ } else {
+ /* There were no priority headers */
+ newheader->next = rbtnode->data;
+ rbtnode->data = newheader;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_CACHE(rbtdb) && overmaxtype(rbtdb, ntypes)) {
+ if (expireheader == NULL) {
+ expireheader = newheader;
+ }
+ if (NEGATIVE(newheader) &&
+ !prio_header(newheader))
+ {
+ /*
+ * Add the new non-priority negative
+ * header to the database only
+ * temporarily.
+ */
+ expireheader = newheader;
+ }
+
+ set_ttl(rbtdb, expireheader, 0);
+ mark_header_ancient(rbtdb, expireheader);
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c
index b0f77b1..347b7d2 100644
--- a/lib/dns/rdataslab.c
+++ b/lib/dns/rdataslab.c
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ fillin_offsets(unsigned char *offsetbase, unsigned int *offsettable,
}
#endif
+#ifndef DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS
+#define DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS 100
+#endif /* DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS */
+
isc_result_t
dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
isc_region_t *region, unsigned int reservelen)
@@ -161,6 +165,10 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx,
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
+ if (nitems > DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS) {
+ return (DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
+ }
+
if (nitems > 0xffff)
return (ISC_R_NOSPACE);
@@ -654,6 +662,10 @@ dns_rdataslab_merge(unsigned char *oslab, unsigned char *nslab,
#endif
INSIST(ocount > 0 && ncount > 0);
+ if (ocount + ncount > DNS_RDATASET_MAX_RECORDS) {
+ return (DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
+ }
+
#if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED
oncount = ncount;
#endif
--
2.45.2

322
SOURCES/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
From 5ff88892e43c049659a8a5aef8dfd56c3712daf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Mensik <pemensik@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:49:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve CVE-2024-1975
6404. [security] Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure
for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480]
Resolves: CVE-2024-1975
---
bin/named/client.c | 7 +++
bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl | 5 ++
bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh | 12 ++--
bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh | 21 ++++---
doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml | 22 +++----
lib/dns/message.c | 94 +++-------------------------
6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bin/named/client.c b/bin/named/client.c
index 368bc94..ea121b3 100644
--- a/bin/named/client.c
+++ b/bin/named/client.c
@@ -3013,6 +3013,13 @@ client_request(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
"request is signed by a nonauthoritative key");
+ } else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET &&
+ client->message->sig0 != NULL)
+ {
+ ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
+ NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+ "request has a SIG(0) signature but its support "
+ "was removed (CVE-2024-1975)");
} else {
char tsigrcode[64];
isc_buffer_t b;
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl
index ab3833d..0b231ee 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl
+++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) {
exit(1);
}
+# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM.
+select STDOUT;
+$| = 1;
+
unlink($path);
my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or
die "unable to create socket $path";
@@ -53,6 +57,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) {
}
while (my $client = $server->accept()) {
+ printf("accept()\n");
$client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0);
my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf);
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh
index 456ce61..d0db388 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh
+++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status+ret))
echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)"
ret=0
-$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 > /dev/null 2>&1 &
+$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 &
sleep 1
test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1
n=$((n+1))
@@ -130,17 +130,19 @@ n=$((n+1))
if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
status=$((status+ret))
-echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)"
+echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)"
ret=0
-$NSUPDATE -R $RANDFILE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END > /dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1
+$NSUPDATE -R $RANDFILE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true
+debug
server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT}
zone example.nil
update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar.
send
END
+# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported
output=`$DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.`
-[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1
-[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed"
+[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1
+grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1
n=$((n+1))
if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
status=$((status+ret))
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh
index ebc9ded..f5b89d4 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh
+++ b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh
@@ -181,19 +181,22 @@ n=`expr $n + 1`
if test -f keyname
then
- echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)"
+ echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)"
ret=0
keyname=`cat keyname`
- $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
- local 10.53.0.1
- server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT}
- zone example2
- update add unsigned.example2. 600 A 10.10.10.1
- update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo
- send
+ # SIG(0) is removed, update is expected to fail.
+ {
+ $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
+ local 10.53.0.1
+ server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT}
+ zone example2
+ update add unsigned.example2. 600 A 10.10.10.1
+ update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo
+ send
EOF
+ } >nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1
$DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 > dig.out.ns1.test$n
- grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n > /dev/null || ret=1
+ grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1
if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then echo_i "failed"; fi
status=`expr $status + $ret`
n=`expr $n + 1`
diff --git a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml
index acf772b..563dced 100644
--- a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml
+++ b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml
@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;};
The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending
a query of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server. The query must include
an appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and
- must be signed using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously
+ must be signed using TSIG with a previously
established key. The server's response, if successful,
contains a TKEY record in its answer section. After this transaction,
both participants have enough information to calculate a
@@ -2050,24 +2050,24 @@ allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;};
<section xml:id="sig0"><info><title>SIG(0)</title></info>
<para>
- <acronym>BIND</acronym> partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0)
+ <acronym>BIND</acronym> partially supported DNSSEC SIG(0)
transaction signatures as specified in RFC 2535 and RFC 2931.
SIG(0) uses public/private keys to authenticate messages. Access control
- is performed in the same manner as with TSIG keys; privileges can be
+ were performed in the same manner as with TSIG keys; privileges can be
granted or denied in ACL directives based on the key name.
</para>
<para>
- When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only
+ When a SIG(0) signed message were received, it were only
verified if the key is known and trusted by the server. The
- server does not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the
+ server did not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the
key.
</para>
<para>
- SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
+ SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams were not supported.
</para>
<para>
- The only tool shipped with <acronym>BIND</acronym> 9 that
- generates SIG(0) signed messages is <command>nsupdate</command>.
+ Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed
+ as part of the mitigation of CVE-2024-1975.
</para>
</section>
@@ -12655,7 +12655,7 @@ example.com. NS ns2.example.net.
either grants or denies permission for one or more
names in the zone to be updated by one or more
identities. Identity is determined by the key that
- signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0).
+ signed the update request, using TSIG.
In most cases, <command>update-policy</command> rules
only apply to key-based identities. There is no way
to specify update permissions based on client source
@@ -12742,7 +12742,7 @@ example.com. NS ns2.example.net.
<para>
The <command>identity</command> field must be set to
a fully qualified domain name. In most cases, this
- represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that must be
+ represents the name of the TSIG key that must be
used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a
wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the
rule may apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange
@@ -15952,7 +15952,7 @@ HOST-127.EXAMPLE. MX 0 .
</para>
<para>
ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics:
- 1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was
+ 1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was
used to sign the request, if any; and 3) an address prefix
encoded in an EDNS Client-Subnet option, if any.
</para>
diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c
index a44eb2d..9ea2b9e 100644
--- a/lib/dns/message.c
+++ b/lib/dns/message.c
@@ -3373,103 +3373,23 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) {
isc_result_t
dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) {
- isc_buffer_t b, msgb;
+ isc_buffer_t msgb;
REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
- if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL)
+ if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL)
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL);
isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length);
isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length);
- if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) {
#ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG
- dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
+ dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
#endif
- if (view != NULL)
- return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
- else
- return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
- } else {
- dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
- dns_rdata_sig_t sig;
- dns_rdataset_t keyset;
- isc_result_t result;
-
- result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0);
- INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
- dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata);
-
- /*
- * This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since
- * the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not
- * happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only
- * looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update
- * meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections.
- */
- if (rdata.length == 0)
- return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND);
-
- result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, msg->mctx);
- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
- return (result);
-
- dns_rdataset_init(&keyset);
- if (view == NULL)
- return (DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED);
- result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer,
- dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */,
- 0, 0, false, &keyset, NULL);
-
- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
- /* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */
- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
- goto freesig;
- } else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
- /* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */
- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
- goto freesig;
- }
- result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset);
- INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
- for (;
- result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
- result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset))
- {
- dst_key_t *key = NULL;
-
- dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
- dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata);
- isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length);
- isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length);
-
- result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass,
- &b, view->mctx, &key);
- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
- continue;
- if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm ||
- dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid ||
- !(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC ||
- dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY))
- {
- dst_key_free(&key);
- continue;
- }
- result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key);
- dst_key_free(&key);
- if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
- break;
- }
- if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-
- freesig:
- if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset))
- dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset);
- dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig);
- return (result);
- }
+ if (view != NULL)
+ return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
+ else
+ return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
}
#define INDENT(sp) \
--
2.45.2

0
SOURCES/generate-rndc-key.sh Executable file → Normal file
View File

0
SOURCES/setup-named-chroot.sh Executable file → Normal file
View File

0
SOURCES/setup-named-softhsm.sh Executable file → Normal file
View File

35
SPECS/bind.spec
View File

@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Summary: The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) DNS (Domain Name System) serv
Name: bind Name: bind
License: MPLv2.0 License: MPLv2.0
Version: 9.11.36 Version: 9.11.36
Release: 14%{?PATCHVER:.%{PATCHVER}}%{?PREVER:.%{PREVER}}%{?dist} Release: 16%{?PATCHVER:.%{PATCHVER}}%{?PREVER:.%{PREVER}}%{?dist}.2
Epoch: 32 Epoch: 32
Url: https://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/ Url: https://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/
# #
@ -187,6 +187,16 @@ Patch202: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-50387.patch
Patch203: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-2828-fixup.patch Patch203: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-2828-fixup.patch
# addition to patch 200 # addition to patch 200
Patch204: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-50387-fixup.patch Patch204: bind-9.11-CVE-2023-50387-fixup.patch
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/225f2861920b8f8d42a0ea6c34dd1faa93aa8726
Patch205: bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/3e0a67e4bdb253dae3a03a45c1aa117239a3313d
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/e4d7ce686bb38428eddc7e33b40057d68eca9a6e
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/b9b5485b22c364fb88c27aa04bad4c8f616da3fa
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/3f10d6eff035702796ba82cd28b9f7cf9836e743
# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/23a4652346fb2877d6246b1eebaa967969dbde16
Patch206: bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1737.patch
# RH downstream, allow changing by environment
Patch208: bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1737-runtime-env.patch
# SDB patches # SDB patches
Patch11: bind-9.3.2b2-sdbsrc.patch Patch11: bind-9.3.2b2-sdbsrc.patch
@ -212,6 +222,12 @@ Obsoletes: caching-nameserver < 31:9.4.1-7.fc8
Provides: caching-nameserver = 31:9.4.1-7.fc8 Provides: caching-nameserver = 31:9.4.1-7.fc8
Obsoletes: dnssec-conf < 1.27-2 Obsoletes: dnssec-conf < 1.27-2
Provides: dnssec-conf = 1.27-2 Provides: dnssec-conf = 1.27-2
# Fixes of CVE-2023-50387 and CVE-2023-50868 caused ABI change
# Enforce updated rebuild is accepted only
Conflicts: bind-dyndb-ldap < 11.6-5
Conflicts: dhcp-client < 12:4.3.6-50
Conflicts: dhcp-server < 12:4.3.6-50
Conflicts: dhcp-relay < 12:4.3.6-50
BuildRequires: gcc, make BuildRequires: gcc, make
BuildRequires: openssl-devel, libtool, autoconf, pkgconfig, libcap-devel BuildRequires: openssl-devel, libtool, autoconf, pkgconfig, libcap-devel
BuildRequires: libidn2-devel, libxml2-devel BuildRequires: libidn2-devel, libxml2-devel
@ -601,6 +617,9 @@ are used for building ISC DHCP.
%patch202 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50387+50868 %patch202 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50387+50868
%patch203 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-2828-fixup %patch203 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-2828-fixup
%patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50387-fixup %patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50387-fixup
%patch205 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-1975
%patch206 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-1737
%patch208 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-1737-env
mkdir lib/dns/tests/testdata/dstrandom mkdir lib/dns/tests/testdata/dstrandom
cp -a %{SOURCE50} lib/dns/tests/testdata/dstrandom/random.data cp -a %{SOURCE50} lib/dns/tests/testdata/dstrandom/random.data
@ -1653,6 +1672,20 @@ rm -rf ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}
%endif %endif
%changelog %changelog
* Tue Aug 06 2024 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.11.36-16.2
- Rebuild after CI change
* Thu Jul 18 2024 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.11.36-16.1
- Resolve CVE-2024-1975
- Resolve CVE-2024-1737
- Add ability to change runtime limits for max types and records per name
* Mon Apr 15 2024 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.11.36-16
- Ensure incompatible dhcp is not accepted
* Fri Apr 12 2024 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.11.36-15
- Ensure incompatible bind-dyndb-ldap is not accepted
* Mon Feb 26 2024 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.11.36-14 * Mon Feb 26 2024 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.11.36-14
- Speed up parsing of DNS messages with many different names (CVE-2023-4408) - Speed up parsing of DNS messages with many different names (CVE-2023-4408)
- Prevent increased CPU consumption in DNSSEC validator (CVE-2023-50387 CVE-2023-50868) - Prevent increased CPU consumption in DNSSEC validator (CVE-2023-50387 CVE-2023-50868)