bind/bind-9.11-CVE-2024-1975.patch

From 5ff88892e43c049659a8a5aef8dfd56c3712daf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Mensik <pemensik@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:49:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Resolve CVE-2024-1975

6404.	[security]	Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure
			for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480]

Resolves: CVE-2024-1975
---
 bin/named/client.c                   |  7 +++
 bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl |  5 ++
 bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh    | 12 ++--
 bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh    | 21 ++++---
 doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml              | 22 +++----
 lib/dns/message.c                    | 94 +++-------------------------
 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

diff --git a/bin/named/client.c b/bin/named/client.c
index 368bc94..ea121b3 100644
--- a/bin/named/client.c
+++ b/bin/named/client.c
@@ -3013,6 +3013,13 @@ client_request(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
 		ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
 			      NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
 			      "request is signed by a nonauthoritative key");
+	} else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET &&
+		   client->message->sig0 != NULL)
+	{
+		ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY,
+			      NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "request has a SIG(0) signature but its support "
+			      "was removed (CVE-2024-1975)");
 	} else {
 		char tsigrcode[64];
 		isc_buffer_t b;
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl
index ab3833d..0b231ee 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl
+++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ if (!defined($path)) {
 	exit(1);
 }
 
+# Enable output autoflush so that it's not lost when the parent sends TERM.
+select STDOUT;
+$| = 1;
+
 unlink($path);
 my $server = IO::Socket::UNIX->new(Local => $path, Type => SOCK_STREAM, Listen => 8) or
     die "unable to create socket $path";
@@ -53,6 +57,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) {
 }
 
 while (my $client = $server->accept()) {
+	printf("accept()\n");
 	$client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0);
 	my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf);
 
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh
index 456ce61..d0db388 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh
+++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ status=$((status+ret))
 
 echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)"
 ret=0
-$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 > /dev/null 2>&1 &
+$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 &
 sleep 1
 test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1
 n=$((n+1))
@@ -130,17 +130,19 @@ n=$((n+1))
 if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
 status=$((status+ret))
 
-echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)"
+echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)"
 ret=0
-$NSUPDATE -R $RANDFILE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END > /dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1
+$NSUPDATE -R $RANDFILE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <<END >nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true
+debug
 server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT}
 zone example.nil
 update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar.
 send
 END
+# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported
 output=`$DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.`
-[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1
-[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed"
+[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1
+grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1
 n=$((n+1))
 if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi
 status=$((status+ret))
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh
index ebc9ded..f5b89d4 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh
+++ b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh
@@ -181,19 +181,22 @@ n=`expr $n + 1`
 
 if test -f keyname
 then
-	echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)"
+	echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)"
 	ret=0
 	keyname=`cat keyname`
-	$NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
-	local 10.53.0.1
-	server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT}
-	zone example2
-	update add unsigned.example2. 600 A 10.10.10.1
-	update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo
-	send
+	# SIG(0) is removed, update is expected to fail.
+	{
+	  $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <<EOF
+	  local 10.53.0.1
+	  server 10.53.0.3 ${PORT}
+	  zone example2
+	  update add unsigned.example2. 600 A 10.10.10.1
+	  update add unsigned.example2. 600 TXT Foo
+	  send
 EOF
+	} >nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1
 	$DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 > dig.out.ns1.test$n
-	grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n > /dev/null || ret=1
+	grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1
 	if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then echo_i "failed"; fi
 	status=`expr $status + $ret`
 	n=`expr $n + 1`
diff --git a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml
index acf772b..563dced 100644
--- a/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml
+++ b/doc/arm/Bv9ARM-book.xml
@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;};
 	The TKEY process is initiated by a client or server by sending
 	a query of type TKEY to a TKEY-aware server.  The query must include
 	an appropriate KEY record in the additional section, and
-	must be signed using either TSIG or SIG(0) with a previously
+	must be signed using TSIG with a previously
 	established key.  The server's response, if successful,
 	contains a TKEY record in its answer section.  After this transaction,
 	both participants have enough information to calculate a
@@ -2050,24 +2050,24 @@ allow-update { !{ !localnets; any; }; key host1-host2. ;};
     <section xml:id="sig0"><info><title>SIG(0)</title></info>
 
       <para>
-	<acronym>BIND</acronym> partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0)
+	<acronym>BIND</acronym> partially supported DNSSEC SIG(0)
 	transaction signatures as specified in RFC 2535 and RFC 2931.
 	SIG(0) uses public/private keys to authenticate messages.  Access control
-	is performed in the same manner as with TSIG keys; privileges can be
+	were performed in the same manner as with TSIG keys; privileges can be
 	granted or denied in ACL directives based on the key name.
       </para>
       <para>
-	When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only
+	When a SIG(0) signed message were received, it were only
 	verified if the key is known and trusted by the server. The
-	server does not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the
+	server did not attempt to recursively fetch or validate the
 	key.
       </para>
       <para>
-	SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported.
+	SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams were not supported.
       </para>
       <para>
-	The only tool shipped with <acronym>BIND</acronym> 9 that
-	generates SIG(0) signed messages is <command>nsupdate</command>.
+	Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed
+	as part of the mitigation of CVE-2024-1975.
       </para>
     </section>
 
@@ -12655,7 +12655,7 @@ example.com. NS ns2.example.net.
 	      either grants or denies permission for one or more
 	      names in the zone to be updated by one or more
 	      identities. Identity is determined by the key that
-	      signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0).
+	      signed the update request, using TSIG.
 	      In most cases, <command>update-policy</command> rules
 	      only apply to key-based identities.  There is no way
 	      to specify update permissions based on client source
@@ -12742,7 +12742,7 @@ example.com. NS ns2.example.net.
 	    <para>
 	      The <command>identity</command> field must be set to
 	      a fully qualified domain name.  In most cases, this
-	      represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that must be
+	      represents the name of the TSIG key that must be
 	      used to sign the update request.  If the specified name is a
 	      wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the
 	      rule may apply to multiple identities.  When a TKEY exchange
@@ -15952,7 +15952,7 @@ HOST-127.EXAMPLE. MX 0 .
 	</para>
 	<para>
 	  ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics:
-	  1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was
+	  1) The client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was
 	  used to sign the request, if any; and 3) an address prefix
 	  encoded in an EDNS Client-Subnet option, if any.
 	</para>
diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c
index a44eb2d..9ea2b9e 100644
--- a/lib/dns/message.c
+++ b/lib/dns/message.c
@@ -3373,103 +3373,23 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) {
 
 isc_result_t
 dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) {
-	isc_buffer_t b, msgb;
+	isc_buffer_t msgb;
 
 	REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg));
 
-	if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL)
+	if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL)
 		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
 
 	INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL);
 	isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length);
 	isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length);
-	if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) {
 #ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG
-		dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
+	dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1");
 #endif
-		if (view != NULL)
-			return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
-		else
-			return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
-	} else {
-		dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
-		dns_rdata_sig_t sig;
-		dns_rdataset_t keyset;
-		isc_result_t result;
-
-		result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0);
-		INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-		dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata);
-
-		/*
-		 * This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since
-		 * the rdata length checking is relaxed.  This should not
-		 * happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only
-		 * looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update
-		 * meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections.
-		 */
-		if (rdata.length == 0)
-			return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND);
-
-		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, msg->mctx);
-		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
-			return (result);
-
-		dns_rdataset_init(&keyset);
-		if (view == NULL)
-			return (DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED);
-		result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer,
-					     dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */,
-					     0, 0, false, &keyset, NULL);
-
-		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
-			/* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */
-			result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-			goto freesig;
-		} else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
-			/* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */
-			result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-			goto freesig;
-		}
-		result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset);
-		INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
-		for (;
-		     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
-		     result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset))
-		{
-			dst_key_t *key = NULL;
-
-			dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
-			dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata);
-			isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length);
-			isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length);
-
-			result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass,
-						 &b, view->mctx, &key);
-			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
-				continue;
-			if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm ||
-			    dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid ||
-			    !(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC ||
-			      dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY))
-			{
-				dst_key_free(&key);
-				continue;
-			}
-			result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key);
-			dst_key_free(&key);
-			if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
-				break;
-		}
-		if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
-			result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED;
-
- freesig:
-		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset))
-			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset);
-		dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig);
-		return (result);
-	}
+	if (view != NULL)
+		return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg));
+	else
+		return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL));
 }
 
 #define INDENT(sp) \
-- 
2.45.2