import audit-3.0-0.13.20190507gitf58ec40.el8
This commit is contained in:
parent
bf4d714ac6
commit
8b1f895570
@ -1 +1 @@
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6968c30d9bb05d3f44413d1cd944ca8cbf3cf8c4 SOURCES/audit-3.0-alpha5.tar.gz
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5205dd634a26512d69d75ca27171c70b70f102f0 SOURCES/audit-3.0-alpha8.tar.gz
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2
.gitignore
vendored
2
.gitignore
vendored
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SOURCES/audit-3.0-alpha5.tar.gz
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SOURCES/audit-3.0-alpha8.tar.gz
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140
SOURCES/30-ospp-v42.rules
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SOURCES/30-ospp-v42.rules
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## The purpose of these rules is to meet the requirements for Operating
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## System Protection Profile (OSPP)v4.2. These rules depends on having
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## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed.
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## Successful/Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT)
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-create
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## Successful/Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate)
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-modification
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## Successful/Unsuccessful file access (any other opens) This has to go last.
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-access
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# These next two are likely to result in a whole lot of events
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-access
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## Successful/Unsuccessful file delete
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-delete
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unlink,unlinkat,rename,renameat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-delete
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## Successful/Unsuccessful permission change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat,setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change
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## Successful/Unsuccessful ownership change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccessful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F success=1 -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=successful-perm-change
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## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could
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## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and
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## shadow for writes
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam.
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## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could
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## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and
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## gshadow for writes
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-a always,exit -F path=/etc/passwd -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F path=/etc/shadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
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-a always,exit -F path=/etc/group -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
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-a always,exit -F path=/etc/gshadow -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
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## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid
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## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because
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## requirements are only for ones that affect system configuration.
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/usernetctl -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/userhelper -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/sbin/seunshare -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/mount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgrp -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newuidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/gpasswd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/newgidmap -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/umount -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/passwd -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/crontab -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=special-config-changes
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## Privilege escalation via su or sudo. This is entirely handled by pam.
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## Audit log access
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-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/audit/ -F perm=r -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=access-audit-trail
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## Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information
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-a always,exit -F path=/var/run/utmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
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-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/btmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
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-a always,exit -F path=/var/log/wtmp -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=session
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## Attempts to modify MAC controls
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-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/selinux/ -F perm=wa -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=MAC-policy
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## Software updates. This is entirely handled by rpm.
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## System start and shutdown. This is entirely handled by systemd
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## Kernel Module loading. This is handled in 43-module-load.rules
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## Application invocation. The requirements list an optional requirement
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## FPT_SRP_EXT.1 Software Restriction Policies. This event is intended to
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## state results from that policy. This would be handled entirely by
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## that daemon.
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@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
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diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/audisp/audispd-builtins.c audit-3.0/audisp/audispd-builtins.c
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--- audit-3.0.orig/audisp/audispd-builtins.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
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+++ audit-3.0/audisp/audispd-builtins.c 2018-12-06 20:01:06.922443361 -0500
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@@ -35,12 +35,17 @@
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#include <sys/uio.h> // writev
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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+#include "ev.h"
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#include "audispd-pconfig.h"
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#include "audispd-builtins.h"
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+// Global data
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+extern struct ev_loop *loop;
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+
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// Local data
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static volatile int sock = -1, conn = -1;
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static char *path = NULL;
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+static struct ev_io af_unix_watcher;
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// Local prototypes
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static void init_af_unix(const plugin_conf_t *conf);
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@@ -63,21 +68,37 @@ void stop_builtin(plugin_conf_t *conf)
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syslog(LOG_ERR, "Unknown builtin %s", conf->path);
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}
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-static void af_unix_accept(int fd)
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+static int watching = 0;
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+static void stop_watching(void)
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+{
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+ if (watching) {
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+ ev_io_stop(loop, &af_unix_watcher);
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+ watching = 0;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+static void af_unix_accept(struct ev_loop *l, struct ev_io *_io, int revents)
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{
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int cmd;
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do {
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- conn = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
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+ conn = accept(_io->fd, NULL, NULL);
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} while (conn < 0 && errno == EINTR);
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// De-register since this is intended to be one listener
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if (conn >= 0)
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- remove_event(fd);
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+ stop_watching();
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cmd = fcntl(conn, F_GETFD);
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fcntl(conn, F_SETFD, cmd|FD_CLOEXEC);
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}
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+static void start_watching(void)
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+{
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+ ev_io_init(&af_unix_watcher, af_unix_accept, sock, EV_READ);
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+ ev_io_start(loop, &af_unix_watcher);
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+ watching = 1;
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+}
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+
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static int create_af_unix_socket(const char *path, int mode)
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{
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struct sockaddr_un addr;
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@@ -122,8 +143,8 @@ static int create_af_unix_socket(const c
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// Make socket listening...won't block
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(void)listen(sock, 5);
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- // Register socket with poll
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- add_event(sock, af_unix_accept);
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+ // Register socket with libev
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+ start_watching();
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -213,7 +234,8 @@ void send_af_unix_string(const char *s,
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if (rc < 0 && errno == EPIPE) {
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close(conn);
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conn = -1;
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- add_event(sock, af_unix_accept);
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+ stop_watching();
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+ start_watching();
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -237,7 +259,8 @@ void send_af_unix_binary(event_t *e)
|
||||
if (rc < 0 && errno == EPIPE) {
|
||||
close(conn);
|
||||
conn = -1;
|
||||
- add_event(sock, af_unix_accept);
|
||||
+ stop_watching();
|
||||
+ start_watching();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -250,10 +273,13 @@ void destroy_af_unix(void)
|
||||
conn = -1;
|
||||
did_something = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ stop_watching();
|
||||
if (sock >= 0) {
|
||||
+
|
||||
close(sock);
|
||||
sock = -1;
|
||||
did_something = 1;
|
||||
+
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (path) {
|
||||
unlink(path);
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/audisp/audispd-builtins.h audit-3.0/audisp/audispd-builtins.h
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/audisp/audispd-builtins.h 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/audisp/audispd-builtins.h 2018-12-06 20:01:06.922443361 -0500
|
||||
@@ -33,10 +33,5 @@ void send_af_unix_string(const char *s,
|
||||
void send_af_unix_binary(event_t *e);
|
||||
void destroy_af_unix(void);
|
||||
|
||||
-typedef void (*poll_callback_ptr)(int fd);
|
||||
-int add_event(int fd, poll_callback_ptr cb);
|
||||
-int remove_event(int fd);
|
||||
-
|
||||
-
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/audisp/audispd.c audit-3.0/audisp/audispd.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/audisp/audispd.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/audisp/audispd.c 2018-12-06 20:01:06.922443361 -0500
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
|
||||
#include <pthread.h>
|
||||
#include <dirent.h>
|
||||
#include <fcntl.h>
|
||||
-#include <sys/poll.h>
|
||||
#include <netdb.h>
|
||||
#include <arpa/inet.h>
|
||||
#include <limits.h>
|
||||
@@ -578,43 +577,6 @@ static int event_loop(void)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-static struct pollfd pfd[4];
|
||||
-static poll_callback_ptr pfd_cb[4];
|
||||
-static volatile int pfd_cnt=0;
|
||||
-int add_event(int fd, poll_callback_ptr cb)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- if (pfd_cnt > 3)
|
||||
- return -1;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- pfd[pfd_cnt].fd = fd;
|
||||
- pfd[pfd_cnt].events = POLLIN;
|
||||
- pfd[pfd_cnt].revents = 0;
|
||||
- pfd_cb[pfd_cnt] = cb;
|
||||
- pfd_cnt++;
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
-int remove_event(int fd)
|
||||
-{
|
||||
- int start, i;
|
||||
- if (pfd_cnt == 0)
|
||||
- return -1;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- for (start=0; start < pfd_cnt; start++) {
|
||||
- if (pfd[start].fd == fd)
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- for (i=start; i<(pfd_cnt-1); i++) {
|
||||
- pfd[i].events = pfd[i+1].events;
|
||||
- pfd[i].revents = pfd[i+1].revents;
|
||||
- pfd[i].fd = pfd[i+1].fd;
|
||||
- pfd_cb[i] = pfd_cb[i+1];
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
- pfd_cnt--;
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
-}
|
||||
-
|
||||
/* returns > 0 if plugins and 0 if none */
|
||||
int libdisp_active(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/audisp/Makefile.am audit-3.0/audisp/Makefile.am
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/audisp/Makefile.am 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/audisp/Makefile.am 2018-12-06 20:01:06.922443361 -0500
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
SUBDIRS = plugins
|
||||
CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = *.rej *.orig
|
||||
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -fPIC -DPIC -I${top_srcdir} -I${top_srcdir}/lib -I${top_srcdir}/src
|
||||
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -fPIC -DPIC -I${top_srcdir} -I${top_srcdir}/lib -I${top_srcdir}/src -I${top_srcdir}/src/libev
|
||||
LIBS = -L${top_builddir}/lib -laudit
|
||||
LDADD = -lpthread
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,5 +30,6 @@ noinst_HEADERS = audispd-pconfig.h audis
|
||||
queue.h audispd-builtins.h libdisp.h
|
||||
libdisp_a_SOURCES = audispd.c audispd-pconfig.c queue.c \
|
||||
audispd-llist.c audispd-builtins.c
|
||||
+libdisp_a_CFLAGS = -fno-strict-aliasing
|
||||
noinst_LIBRARIES = libdisp.a
|
||||
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd.c audit-3.0/src/auditd.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd.c 2018-12-06 19:41:21.076570614 -0500
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/auditd.c 2018-12-06 20:01:06.923443360 -0500
|
||||
@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ static void close_pipes(void)
|
||||
close(pipefds[1]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+struct ev_loop *loop;
|
||||
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct sigaction sa;
|
||||
@@ -597,7 +598,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
enum startup_state opt_startup = startup_enable;
|
||||
extern char *optarg;
|
||||
extern int optind;
|
||||
- struct ev_loop *loop;
|
||||
struct ev_io netlink_watcher;
|
||||
struct ev_io pipe_watcher;
|
||||
struct ev_signal sigterm_watcher;
|
||||
@@ -748,14 +748,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (init_dispatcher(&config)) {
|
||||
- if (pidfile)
|
||||
- unlink(pidfile);
|
||||
- tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
- free_config(&config);
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
/* Get machine name ready for use */
|
||||
if (resolve_node(&config)) {
|
||||
if (pidfile)
|
||||
@@ -891,6 +883,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
/* Depending on value of opt_startup (-s) set initial audit state */
|
||||
loop = ev_default_loop (EVFLAG_NOENV);
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (init_dispatcher(&config)) {
|
||||
+ if (pidfile)
|
||||
+ unlink(pidfile);
|
||||
+ tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
+ free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!opt_aggregate_only) {
|
||||
ev_io_init (&netlink_watcher, netlink_handler, fd, EV_READ);
|
||||
ev_io_start (loop, &netlink_watcher);
|
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -ur audit-3.0.orig/init.d/auditd.stop audit-3.0/init.d/auditd.stop
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/init.d/auditd.stop 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/init.d/auditd.stop 2018-12-08 17:15:59.916950477 -0500
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
|
||||
. /etc/init.d/functions
|
||||
|
||||
printf "Stopping logging: "
|
||||
-killproc $prog -TERM
|
||||
+killproc -d 1 $prog -TERM
|
||||
RETVAL=$?
|
||||
echo
|
||||
exit $RETVAL
|
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/ausearch-lol.c audit-3.0/src/ausearch-lol.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/ausearch-lol.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/ausearch-lol.c 2018-12-06 19:38:21.208589916 -0500
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int lol_add_record(lol *lo, char *buff)
|
||||
if (n.tlen > MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH)
|
||||
n.tlen = MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
- n.tlen = MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
|
||||
+ n.tlen = n.mlen;
|
||||
fmt = LF_ENRICHED;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ptr = strrchr(n.message, 0x0a);
|
||||
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ int lol_add_record(lol *lo, char *buff)
|
||||
if (n.mlen > MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH)
|
||||
n.mlen = MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
- n.mlen = MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
|
||||
+ n.mlen = strlen(n.message);
|
||||
n.interp = NULL;
|
||||
n.tlen = n.mlen;
|
||||
fmt = LF_RAW;
|
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd.c audit-3.0/src/auditd.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/auditd.c 2018-12-06 19:41:21.076570614 -0500
|
||||
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
#ifndef DEBUG
|
||||
/* Make sure we can do our job. Containers may not give you
|
||||
* capabilities, so we revert to a uid check for that case. */
|
||||
- if (!audit_can_control() || !audit_can_read()) {
|
||||
+ if (!audit_can_control()) {
|
||||
if (!config.local_events && geteuid() == 0)
|
||||
;
|
||||
else {
|
71
SOURCES/audit-3.0-chkconfig.patch
Normal file
71
SOURCES/audit-3.0-chkconfig.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
commit d1c80e0217a049441cdad42428254270904f8694
|
||||
Author: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri Jul 5 12:58:03 2019 -0400
|
||||
|
||||
Remove dependency on chkconfig
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/init.d/auditd.reload b/init.d/auditd.reload
|
||||
index b9c9c6c..9c30295 100644
|
||||
--- a/init.d/auditd.reload
|
||||
+++ b/init.d/auditd.reload
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ test $(id -u) = 0 || exit 4
|
||||
|
||||
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
|
||||
prog="auditd"
|
||||
-. /etc/init.d/functions
|
||||
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
|
||||
|
||||
printf "Reconfiguring: "
|
||||
/sbin/augenrules --load
|
||||
diff --git a/init.d/auditd.resume b/init.d/auditd.resume
|
||||
index 8185cd1..f1d2157 100644
|
||||
--- a/init.d/auditd.resume
|
||||
+++ b/init.d/auditd.resume
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ test $(id -u) = 0 || exit 4
|
||||
|
||||
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
|
||||
prog="auditd"
|
||||
-. /etc/init.d/functions
|
||||
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
|
||||
|
||||
printf "Resuming logging: "
|
||||
killproc $prog -USR2
|
||||
diff --git a/init.d/auditd.rotate b/init.d/auditd.rotate
|
||||
index a627a43..2b13cf7 100644
|
||||
--- a/init.d/auditd.rotate
|
||||
+++ b/init.d/auditd.rotate
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ test $(id -u) = 0 || exit 4
|
||||
|
||||
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
|
||||
prog="auditd"
|
||||
-. /etc/init.d/functions
|
||||
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
|
||||
|
||||
printf "Rotating logs: "
|
||||
killproc $prog -USR1
|
||||
diff --git a/init.d/auditd.state b/init.d/auditd.state
|
||||
index 6e9e69e..c7e291e 100644
|
||||
--- a/init.d/auditd.state
|
||||
+++ b/init.d/auditd.state
|
||||
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ test $(id -u) = 0 || exit 4
|
||||
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
|
||||
prog="auditd"
|
||||
state_file="/var/run/auditd.state"
|
||||
-. /etc/init.d/functions
|
||||
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
|
||||
|
||||
printf "Getting auditd internal state: "
|
||||
killproc $prog -CONT
|
||||
diff --git a/init.d/auditd.stop b/init.d/auditd.stop
|
||||
index 6550fae..70aaeef 100644
|
||||
--- a/init.d/auditd.stop
|
||||
+++ b/init.d/auditd.stop
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ test $(id -u) = 0 || exit 4
|
||||
|
||||
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin
|
||||
prog="auditd"
|
||||
-. /etc/init.d/functions
|
||||
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
|
||||
pid="$(__pids_pidof "$prog")"
|
||||
|
||||
printf "Stopping logging: "
|
@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -ur audit-3.0.orig/docs/auparse_normalize.3 audit-3.0/docs/auparse_normalize.3
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/docs/auparse_normalize.3 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/docs/auparse_normalize.3 2018-12-06 19:27:33.636659407 -0500
|
||||
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
.SH "SEE ALSO"
|
||||
|
||||
-.BR
|
||||
+.BR auparse_normalize_subject_primary (3) ,
|
||||
+.BR auparse_normalize_object_primary (3).
|
||||
|
||||
.SH AUTHOR
|
||||
Steve Grubb
|
||||
diff -ur audit-3.0.orig/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules audit-3.0/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/rules/30-ospp-v42.rules 2018-12-06 19:27:33.656659405 -0500
|
||||
@@ -3,20 +3,28 @@
|
||||
## 10-base-config.rules, 11-loginuid.rules, and 43-module-load.rules installed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Unsuccessful file creation (open with O_CREAT)
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&0100 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-create
|
||||
|
||||
## Unsuccessful file modifications (open for write or truncate)
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&01003 -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EACCES -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S truncate,ftruncate -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-modification
|
||||
@@ -47,16 +55,30 @@
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown,fchown,chown,fchownat -F exit=-EPERM -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=unsuccesful-perm-change
|
||||
|
||||
## User add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could
|
||||
-## open a file and directly create a user, so we'll watch passwd for writes
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch passwd and
|
||||
+## shadow for writes
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/passwd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/shadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=user-modify
|
||||
|
||||
## User enable and disable. This is entirely handled by pam.
|
||||
|
||||
## Group add delete modify. This is covered by pam. However, someone could
|
||||
-## open a file and directly create a user, so we'll watch group for writes
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open,openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+## open a file and directly create or modify a user, so we'll watch group and
|
||||
+## gshadow for writes
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/group -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,open_by_handle_at -F a2&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -F a1&03 -F path=/etc/gshadow -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=group-modify
|
||||
|
||||
## Use of special rights for config changes. This would be use of setuid
|
||||
## programs that relate to user accts. This is not all setuid apps because
|
||||
diff -ur audit-3.0.orig/rules/30-pci-dss-v31.rules audit-3.0/rules/30-pci-dss-v31.rules
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/rules/30-pci-dss-v31.rules 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/rules/30-pci-dss-v31.rules 2018-12-06 19:27:33.656659405 -0500
|
||||
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@
|
||||
## ausearch --start today -m user_auth,user_chauthtok -i
|
||||
|
||||
## 10.2.5.b All elevation of privileges is logged
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setuid -Fa0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/su -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
|
||||
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setuid -Fa0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/su -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/su -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
|
||||
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/su -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/sudo -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F exe=/usr/bin/sudo -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-session
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -C uid!=euid -F euid=0 -F key=10.2.5.b-elevated-privs-setuid
|
63
SOURCES/audit-3.0-krb-remote-fixup.patch
Normal file
63
SOURCES/audit-3.0-krb-remote-fixup.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c audit-3.0/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c 2019-06-07 17:08:36.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/audisp/plugins/remote/audisp-remote.c 2019-07-13 11:37:45.000000000 -0400
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* audisp-remote.c --
|
||||
- * Copyright 2008-2012,2016,2018 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
|
||||
+ * Copyright 2008-2012,2016,2018,2019 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
|
||||
* All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int ar_write (int, const void *,
|
||||
credentials. These are the ones we talk to the server with. */
|
||||
gss_ctx_id_t my_context;
|
||||
|
||||
-#define KEYTAB_NAME "/etc/audisp/audisp-remote.key"
|
||||
+#define KEYTAB_NAME "/etc/audit/audisp-remote.key"
|
||||
#define CCACHE_NAME "MEMORY:audisp-remote"
|
||||
|
||||
#define REQ_FLAGS GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG
|
||||
@@ -978,7 +989,14 @@ static int negotiate_credentials (void)
|
||||
|
||||
static int stop_sock(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (sock >= 0) {
|
||||
+ if (USE_GSS) {
|
||||
+ OM_uint32 minor_status;
|
||||
+ gss_delete_sec_context(&minor_status, &my_context,
|
||||
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
|
||||
+ my_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
|
||||
close(sock);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -995,11 +1013,8 @@ static int stop_transport(void)
|
||||
switch (config.transport)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case T_TCP:
|
||||
- rc = stop_sock();
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
case T_KRB5:
|
||||
- // FIXME: shutdown kerberos
|
||||
- rc = -1;
|
||||
+ rc = stop_sock();
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
rc = -1;
|
||||
@@ -1142,6 +1157,7 @@ static int init_transport(void)
|
||||
switch (config.transport)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case T_TCP:
|
||||
+ case T_KRB5:
|
||||
rc = init_sock();
|
||||
// We set this so that it will retry the connection
|
||||
if (rc == ET_TEMPORARY)
|
||||
@@ -1589,6 +1605,7 @@ static int relay_event(const char *s, si
|
||||
switch (config.transport)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case T_TCP:
|
||||
+ case T_KRB5:
|
||||
rc = relay_sock(s, len);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/libev/ev.c audit-3.0/src/libev/ev.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/libev/ev.c 2019-01-03 12:25:16.000000000 -0500
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/libev/ev.c 2019-01-09 10:58:20.437560972 -0500
|
||||
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ typedef int ecb_bool;
|
||||
#if ECB_GCC_VERSION(4,3)
|
||||
#define ecb_artificial ecb_attribute ((__artificial__))
|
||||
#define ecb_hot ecb_attribute ((__hot__))
|
||||
- #define ecb_cold ecb_attribute ((__cold__))
|
||||
+ #define ecb_cold
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define ecb_artificial
|
||||
#define ecb_hot
|
@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd.c audit-3.0/src/auditd.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd.c 2018-12-06 20:01:06.923443360 -0500
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/auditd.c 2018-12-06 20:17:19.030339043 -0500
|
||||
@@ -214,24 +214,35 @@ static void cont_handler(struct ev_loop
|
||||
|
||||
static int extract_type(const char *str)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- const char *tptr, *ptr2, *ptr = str;
|
||||
+ char tmp, *ptr2, *ptr = str;
|
||||
+ int type;
|
||||
if (*str == 'n') {
|
||||
ptr = strchr(str+1, ' ');
|
||||
if (ptr == NULL)
|
||||
return -1; // Malformed - bomb out
|
||||
ptr++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
// ptr should be at 't'
|
||||
ptr2 = strchr(ptr, ' ');
|
||||
- // get type=xxx in a buffer
|
||||
- tptr = strndupa(ptr, ptr2 - ptr);
|
||||
+
|
||||
// find =
|
||||
- str = strchr(tptr, '=');
|
||||
- if (str == NULL)
|
||||
+ str = strchr(ptr, '=');
|
||||
+ if (str == NULL || str >= ptr2)
|
||||
return -1; // Malformed - bomb out
|
||||
+
|
||||
// name is 1 past
|
||||
str++;
|
||||
- return audit_name_to_msg_type(str);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // Save character & terminate string
|
||||
+ tmp = *ptr2;
|
||||
+ *ptr2 = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ type = audit_name_to_msg_type(str);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ *ptr2 = tmp; // Restore character
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return type;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void distribute_event(struct auditd_event *e)
|
||||
@@ -250,18 +261,22 @@ void distribute_event(struct auditd_even
|
||||
route = 0;
|
||||
else { // We only need the original type if its being routed
|
||||
e->reply.type = extract_type(e->reply.message);
|
||||
- char *p = strchr(e->reply.message,
|
||||
- AUDIT_INTERP_SEPARATOR);
|
||||
- if (p)
|
||||
- proto = AUDISP_PROTOCOL_VER2;
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- proto = AUDISP_PROTOCOL_VER;
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Treat everything from the network as VER2
|
||||
+ // because they are already formatted. This is
|
||||
+ // important when it gets to the dispatcher which
|
||||
+ // can strip node= when its VER1.
|
||||
+ proto = AUDISP_PROTOCOL_VER2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- } else if (e->reply.type != AUDIT_DAEMON_RECONFIG)
|
||||
- // All other events need formatting
|
||||
+ } else if (e->reply.type != AUDIT_DAEMON_RECONFIG) {
|
||||
+ // All other local events need formatting
|
||||
format_event(e);
|
||||
- else
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // If the event has been formatted with node, upgrade
|
||||
+ // to VER2 so that the dispatcher honors the formatting
|
||||
+ if (config.node_name_format != N_NONE)
|
||||
+ proto = AUDISP_PROTOCOL_VER2;
|
||||
+ } else
|
||||
route = 0; // Don't DAEMON_RECONFIG events until after enqueue
|
||||
|
||||
/* End of Event is for realtime interface - skip local logging of it */
|
||||
@@ -748,6 +763,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Startup libev and dispatcher */
|
||||
+ loop = ev_default_loop(EVFLAG_NOENV);
|
||||
+ if (init_dispatcher(&config)) {
|
||||
+ if (pidfile)
|
||||
+ unlink(pidfile);
|
||||
+ tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
+ free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Get machine name ready for use */
|
||||
if (resolve_node(&config)) {
|
||||
if (pidfile)
|
||||
@@ -755,6 +781,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
shutdown_dispatcher();
|
||||
tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -766,6 +793,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
shutdown_dispatcher();
|
||||
tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
fcntl(pipefds[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
|
||||
@@ -785,6 +813,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
close_pipes();
|
||||
free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (getsubj(subj))
|
||||
@@ -811,6 +840,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
close_pipes();
|
||||
free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -821,6 +851,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
/* let config manager init */
|
||||
init_config_manager();
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Depending on value of opt_startup (-s) set initial audit state */
|
||||
if (opt_startup != startup_nochange && !opt_aggregate_only &&
|
||||
(audit_is_enabled(fd) < 2) &&
|
||||
audit_set_enabled(fd, (int)opt_startup) < 0) {
|
||||
@@ -849,6 +880,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
close_pipes();
|
||||
free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -877,20 +909,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
close_pipes();
|
||||
free_config(&config);
|
||||
+ ev_default_destroy();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- /* Depending on value of opt_startup (-s) set initial audit state */
|
||||
- loop = ev_default_loop (EVFLAG_NOENV);
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (init_dispatcher(&config)) {
|
||||
- if (pidfile)
|
||||
- unlink(pidfile);
|
||||
- tell_parent(FAILURE);
|
||||
- free_config(&config);
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ /* Start up all the handlers */
|
||||
if (!opt_aggregate_only) {
|
||||
ev_io_init (&netlink_watcher, netlink_handler, fd, EV_READ);
|
||||
ev_io_start (loop, &netlink_watcher);
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd-dispatch.c audit-3.0/src/auditd-dispatch.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd-dispatch.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/auditd-dispatch.c 2018-12-06 20:17:09.769340037 -0500
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ int dispatch_event(const struct audit_re
|
||||
if (!libdisp_active())
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Translate event into dispatcher format
|
||||
e = malloc(sizeof(event_t));
|
||||
if (e == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ int dispatch_event(const struct audit_re
|
||||
e->hdr.hlen = sizeof(struct audit_dispatcher_header);
|
||||
e->hdr.type = rep->type;
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Network originating events have data at rep->message
|
||||
if (protocol_ver == AUDISP_PROTOCOL_VER) {
|
||||
e->hdr.size = rep->msg.nlh.nlmsg_len;
|
||||
memcpy(e->data, (void*)rep->msg.data, e->hdr.size);
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd-event.c audit-3.0/src/auditd-event.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd-event.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/auditd-event.c 2018-12-06 20:17:09.769340037 -0500
|
||||
@@ -225,8 +225,10 @@ static void replace_event_msg(struct aud
|
||||
e->reply.message = strndup(buf, MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH-1);
|
||||
len = MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- e->reply.msg.nlh.nlmsg_len = e->reply.len;
|
||||
- e->reply.len = len;
|
||||
+ // For network originating events, len should be used
|
||||
+ if (!from_network(e)) // V1 protocol msg size
|
||||
+ e->reply.msg.nlh.nlmsg_len = e->reply.len;
|
||||
+ e->reply.len = len; // V2 protocol msg size
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -500,7 +502,7 @@ struct auditd_event *create_event(char *
|
||||
e->sequence_id = sequence_id;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Network originating events need things adjusted to mimic netlink. */
|
||||
- if (e->ack_func)
|
||||
+ if (from_network(e))
|
||||
replace_event_msg(e, msg);
|
||||
|
||||
return e;
|
||||
@@ -570,7 +572,7 @@ void handle_event(struct auditd_event *e
|
||||
static void send_ack(const struct auditd_event *e, int ack_type,
|
||||
const char *msg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (e->ack_func) {
|
||||
+ if (from_network(e)) {
|
||||
unsigned char header[AUDIT_RMW_HEADER_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
AUDIT_RMW_PACK_HEADER(header, 0, ack_type, strlen(msg),
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd-event.h audit-3.0/src/auditd-event.h
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/auditd-event.h 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/auditd-event.h 2018-12-06 20:17:09.769340037 -0500
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ struct auditd_event {
|
||||
unsigned long sequence_id;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+static inline int from_network(const struct auditd_event *e)
|
||||
+{ if (e && e->ack_func) return 1; return 0; };
|
||||
+
|
||||
#include "auditd-config.h"
|
||||
|
||||
int dispatch_network_events(void);
|
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/audisp/queue.c audit-3.0/audisp/queue.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/audisp/queue.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/audisp/queue.c 2018-12-06 20:21:22.184312950 -0500
|
||||
@@ -231,11 +231,12 @@ void increase_queue_depth(unsigned int s
|
||||
|
||||
void write_queue_state(FILE *f)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- fprintf(f, "current queue depth = %u\n", currently_used);
|
||||
- fprintf(f, "max queue depth used = %u\n", max_used);
|
||||
- fprintf(f, "queue size = %u\n", q_depth);
|
||||
- fprintf(f, "queue overflow detected = %s\n",overflowed ? "yes" : "no");
|
||||
- fprintf(f, "queueing suspended = %s\n",
|
||||
+ fprintf(f, "current plugin queue depth = %u\n", currently_used);
|
||||
+ fprintf(f, "max plugin queue depth used = %u\n", max_used);
|
||||
+ fprintf(f, "plugin queue size = %u\n", q_depth);
|
||||
+ fprintf(f, "plugin queue overflow detected = %s\n",
|
||||
+ overflowed ? "yes" : "no");
|
||||
+ fprintf(f, "plugin queueing suspended = %s\n",
|
||||
processing_suspended ? "yes" : "no");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
14
SOURCES/audit-3.0-saddr_fam-doc.patch
Normal file
14
SOURCES/audit-3.0-saddr_fam-doc.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/docs/auditctl.8 b/docs/auditctl.8
|
||||
index 2c970cf..043a9d6 100644
|
||||
--- a/docs/auditctl.8
|
||||
+++ b/docs/auditctl.8
|
||||
@@ -210,6 +210,9 @@ Process ID
|
||||
.B ppid
|
||||
Parent's Process ID
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
+.B saddr_fam
|
||||
+Address family number as found in /usr/include/bits/socket.h. For example, IPv4 would be 2 and IPv6 would be 10.
|
||||
+.TP
|
||||
.B sessionid
|
||||
User's login session ID
|
||||
.TP
|
@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff -ur audit-3.0.orig/src/aureport-options.c audit-3.0/src/aureport-options.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/aureport-options.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/aureport-options.c 2018-12-06 19:31:26.945634371 -0500
|
||||
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@
|
||||
R_AVCS, R_SYSCALLS, R_PIDS, R_EVENTS, R_ACCT_MODS,
|
||||
R_INTERPRET, R_HELP, R_ANOMALY, R_RESPONSE, R_SUMMARY_DET, R_CRYPTO,
|
||||
R_MAC, R_FAILED, R_SUCCESS, R_ADD, R_DEL, R_AUTH, R_NODE, R_IN_LOGS,
|
||||
- R_KEYS, R_TTY, R_NO_CONFIG, R_COMM, R_VIRT, R_INTEG, R_ESCAPE };
|
||||
+ R_KEYS, R_TTY, R_NO_CONFIG, R_COMM, R_VIRT, R_INTEG, R_ESCAPE,
|
||||
+ R_DEBUG };
|
||||
|
||||
static struct nv_pair optiontab[] = {
|
||||
{ R_AUTH, "-au" },
|
||||
@@ -98,6 +99,7 @@
|
||||
{ R_CONFIGS, "--config" },
|
||||
{ R_CRYPTO, "-cr" },
|
||||
{ R_CRYPTO, "--crypto" },
|
||||
+ { R_DEBUG, "--debug" },
|
||||
{ R_DEL, "--delete" },
|
||||
{ R_EVENTS, "-e" },
|
||||
{ R_EVENTS, "--event" },
|
||||
@@ -731,6 +733,9 @@
|
||||
case R_DEL:
|
||||
event_conf_act = C_DEL;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ case R_DEBUG:
|
||||
+ event_debug = 1;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
case R_IN_LOGS:
|
||||
force_logs = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
diff -ur audit-3.0.orig/src/ausearch-parse.c audit-3.0/src/ausearch-parse.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/ausearch-parse.c 2018-08-31 17:05:48.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/ausearch-parse.c 2018-12-06 19:31:26.945634371 -0500
|
||||
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@
|
||||
ret = parse_path(n, s);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUDIT_USER:
|
||||
- case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
|
||||
+ case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_USER_END:
|
||||
+ case AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
|
||||
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
|
||||
ret = parse_user(n, s);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@
|
||||
avc_parse_path(n, s);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUDIT_AVC:
|
||||
+ case AUDIT_USER_AVC:
|
||||
ret = parse_avc(n, s);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT:
|
||||
@@ -1867,6 +1869,20 @@
|
||||
*term = ' ';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ // User AVC's are not formatted like a kernel AVC
|
||||
+ if (n->type == AUDIT_USER_AVC) {
|
||||
+ rc = parse_user(n, s);
|
||||
+ if (rc > 20)
|
||||
+ rc = 0;
|
||||
+ if (audit_avc_init(s) == 0) {
|
||||
+ alist_append(s->avc, &an);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ rc = 10;
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
// get pid
|
||||
if (event_pid != -1) {
|
||||
str = strstr(term, "pid=");
|
||||
diff -urp audit-3.0.orig/src/ausearch-parse.c audit-3.0/src/ausearch-parse.c
|
||||
--- audit-3.0.orig/src/ausearch-parse.c 2018-10-03 19:46:52.000000000 -0400
|
||||
+++ audit-3.0/src/ausearch-parse.c 2018-12-08 15:48:54.350009208 -0500
|
||||
@@ -1839,8 +1839,10 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, sea
|
||||
if (str) {
|
||||
str += 5;
|
||||
term = strchr(str, '{');
|
||||
- if (term == NULL)
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
+ if (term == NULL) {
|
||||
+ term = n->message;
|
||||
+ goto other_avc;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (event_success != S_UNSET) {
|
||||
*term = 0;
|
||||
// FIXME. Do not override syscall success if already
|
||||
@@ -1869,6 +1871,7 @@ static int parse_avc(const lnode *n, sea
|
||||
*term = ' ';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+other_avc:
|
||||
// User AVC's are not formatted like a kernel AVC
|
||||
if (n->type == AUDIT_USER_AVC) {
|
||||
rc = parse_user(n, s);
|
@ -3,31 +3,15 @@
|
||||
Summary: User space tools for 2.6 kernel auditing
|
||||
Name: audit
|
||||
Version: 3.0
|
||||
Release: 0.10.20180831git0047a6c%{?dist}
|
||||
Release: 0.13.20190507gitf58ec40%{?dist}
|
||||
License: GPLv2+
|
||||
URL: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/
|
||||
Source0: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/%{name}-%{version}-alpha5.tar.gz
|
||||
Source0: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/%{name}-%{version}-alpha8.tar.gz
|
||||
Source1: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-2.1.txt
|
||||
# Update documentation and rules
|
||||
Patch1: audit-3.0-docs.patch
|
||||
# 1628626 - lightly parse USER_AVC events
|
||||
Patch2: audit-3.0-user_avc.patch
|
||||
# Fix a buffer length calculation in ausearch
|
||||
Patch3: audit-3.0-ausearch-buffer-fix.patch
|
||||
# Remove CAP_AUDIT_READ from daemon permission checks
|
||||
Patch4: audit-3.0-cap_audit_read.patch
|
||||
# Port af_unix plugin to libev
|
||||
Patch5: audit-3.0-af_unix-plugin.patch
|
||||
# Make all network originating events VER2 dispatcher protocol
|
||||
Patch6: audit-3.0-network-orig-events.patch
|
||||
# Adjust state report for plugin queue
|
||||
Patch7: audit-3.0-queue-report.patch
|
||||
# 1643567 - auditd wasn't quite stopped when it was supposed to be
|
||||
Patch8: audit-3.0-auditd-stop.patch
|
||||
# In libev, cold functions cause annocheck failures. Remove them.
|
||||
Patch9: audit-3.0-libev-remove-cold.patch
|
||||
# Next BuildRequires is only needed for the patching - remove in the future
|
||||
BuildRequires: autoconf automake
|
||||
Source2: 30-ospp-v42.rules
|
||||
Patch1: audit-3.0-saddr_fam-doc.patch
|
||||
Patch2: audit-3.0-chkconfig.patch
|
||||
Patch3: audit-3.0-krb-remote-fixup.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc swig
|
||||
BuildRequires: openldap-devel
|
||||
@ -36,8 +20,8 @@ BuildRequires: kernel-headers >= 2.6.29
|
||||
Requires: %{name}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
|
||||
BuildRequires: systemd
|
||||
Requires(post): systemd coreutils
|
||||
Requires(preun): systemd
|
||||
Requires(postun): systemd coreutils
|
||||
Requires(preun): systemd initscripts
|
||||
Requires(postun): systemd coreutils initscripts
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
The audit package contains the user space utilities for
|
||||
@ -99,21 +83,14 @@ incoming audit events, as they happen, to a configured z/OS SMF (Service
|
||||
Management Facility) database, through an IBM Tivoli Directory Server
|
||||
(ITDS) set for Remote Audit service.
|
||||
|
||||
%enable_gotoolset7
|
||||
|
||||
%prep
|
||||
%setup -q
|
||||
%patch1 -p1
|
||||
%patch2 -p1
|
||||
%patch3 -p1
|
||||
%patch4 -p1
|
||||
%patch5 -p1
|
||||
%patch6 -p1
|
||||
%patch7 -p1
|
||||
%patch8 -p1
|
||||
%patch9 -p1
|
||||
cp %{SOURCE1} .
|
||||
autoreconf
|
||||
## overwrite 30-ospp-v42.rules
|
||||
cp -f %{SOURCE2} rules/
|
||||
|
||||
%build
|
||||
%configure --sbindir=/sbin --libdir=/%{_lib} --with-python=no \
|
||||
@ -177,6 +154,9 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
%preun
|
||||
%systemd_preun auditd.service
|
||||
if [ $1 -eq 0 ]; then
|
||||
/sbin/service auditd stop > /dev/null 2>&1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
%postun
|
||||
if [ $1 -ge 1 ]; then
|
||||
@ -244,7 +224,7 @@ fi
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/initscripts/legacy-actions/auditd/state
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/initscripts/legacy-actions/auditd/stop
|
||||
%ghost %{_localstatedir}/run/auditd.state
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) %dir %{_var}/log/audit
|
||||
%attr(-,root,-) %dir %{_var}/log/audit
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) %dir /etc/audit
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) %dir /etc/audit/rules.d
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) %dir /etc/audit/plugins.d
|
||||
@ -273,6 +253,21 @@ fi
|
||||
%attr(750,root,root) /sbin/audispd-zos-remote
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Thu Jul 25 2019 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 3.0-0.13.20190607gitf58ec40
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1695638 - Rebase audit package to pick up latest bugfixes
|
||||
|
||||
* Sat Jul 13 2019 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 3.0-0.12.20190607gitf58ec40
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1695638 - Rebase audit package to pick up latest bugfixes
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Jun 10 2019 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 3.0-0.11.20190607gitf58ec40
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1643567 - service auditd stop exits prematurely
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1693470 - libauparse memory leak
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1694071 - ausearch doesn't record device/inode details checkpointing a single file
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1695638 - Rebase audit package to pick up latest bugfixes
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1705894 - aureport aborts when using a specific input
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1706045 - RFE: Backport support for new audit record types
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1715852 - RFE: provide a way to filter on network address family
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Jan 09 2019 Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> 3.0-0.10.20180831git0047a6c
|
||||
resolves: rhbz#1655270] Message "audit: backlog limit exceeded" reported
|
||||
- Fix annobin failure
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user