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at/at-3.1.10-pam.patch
Marcela Mašláňová 489143c252 Add patch
2006-10-24 14:25:28 +00:00

482 lines
15 KiB
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--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.pam 2006-09-12 15:01:55.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c 2006-09-12 15:26:49.000000000 +0200
@@ -73,6 +73,42 @@
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <syslog.h>
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+/*
+ * We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ * credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+ setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+ setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+ setregid(gid,egid); \
+ setreuid(uid,euid); \
+ return(0); \
+ }
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+ setregid(gid,egid);
+ setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
/* Local headers */
@@ -83,6 +119,10 @@
#include "getloadavg.h"
#endif
+#ifndef LOG_ATD
+#define LOG_ATD LOG_DAEMON
+#endif
+
/* Macros */
#define BATCH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT 60
@@ -196,6 +236,19 @@
#define fork myfork
#endif
+#undef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
+#undef ATD_MAIL_NAME
+#if defined(SENDMAIL)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM SENDMAIL
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "sendmail"
+#elif defined(MAILC)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILC
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mail"
+#elif defined(MAILX)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILX
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mailx"
+#endif
+
static void
run_file(char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
@@ -420,6 +473,8 @@
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
PRIV_END
#endif
@@ -434,6 +489,14 @@
else if (pid == 0) {
char *nul = NULL;
char **nenvp = &nul;
+ char **pam_envp=0L;
+
+ PRIV_START
+ #ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_envp = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+ if ( ( pam_envp != 0L ) && (pam_envp[0] != 0L) )
+ nenvp = pam_envp;
+ #endif
/* Set up things for the child; we want standard input from the
* input file, and standard output and error sent to our output file.
@@ -455,8 +518,6 @@
if (chdir(ATJOB_DIR) < 0)
perr("Cannot chdir to " ATJOB_DIR);
- PRIV_START
-
nice((tolower((int) queue) - 'a' + 1) * 2);
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
@@ -472,10 +533,93 @@
perr("Cannot reset signal handler to default");
chdir("/");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ char *seuser=NULL;
+ char *level=NULL;
+
+ if (getseuserbyname(pentry->pw_name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
+ retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
+ free(seuser);
+ free(level);
+ if (retval) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+
+
if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", (char *) NULL, nenvp) != 0)
+
perr("Exec failed for /bin/sh");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ if ( ( nenvp != &nul ) && (pam_envp != 0L) && (*pam_envp != 0L))
+ {
+ for( nenvp = pam_envp; *nenvp != 0L; nenvp++)
+ free(*nenvp);
+ free( pam_envp );
+ nenvp = &nul;
+ pam_envp=0L;
+ }
+#endif
+
PRIV_END
}
/* We're the parent. Let's wait.
@@ -507,14 +651,43 @@
unlink(filename);
}
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
/* The job is now finished. We can delete its input file.
*/
chdir(ATJOB_DIR);
unlink(newname);
+#ifdef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
if (((send_mail != -1) && (buf.st_size != size)) || (send_mail == 1)) {
-
- PRIV_START
+ int mail_pid = -1;
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ /* PAM has now re-opened our log to auth.info ! */
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
+ mail_pid = fork();
+
+ if ( mail_pid == 0 )
+ {
+ PRIV_START
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
perr("Cannot delete saved userids");
@@ -527,16 +700,81 @@
chdir ("/");
-#if defined(SENDMAIL)
- execl(SENDMAIL, "sendmail", mailname, (char *) NULL);
-#else
-/*#error "No mail command specified."*/
- perr("No mail command specified.");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+
+ if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ execl(ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM, ATD_MAIL_NAME, mailname, (char *) NULL);
+ perr("Exec failed for mail command");
+ exit(-1);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
#endif
- perr("Exec failed for mail command");
- PRIV_END
+ PRIV_END
+ } else
+ if ( mail_pid == -1 ) {
+ perr("fork of mailer failed");
+ } else {
+ /* Parent */
+ waitpid(mail_pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+ }
}
+#endif
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
@@ -736,6 +974,10 @@
struct passwd *pwe;
struct group *ge;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
/* We don't need root privileges all the time; running under uid and gid
* daemon is fine.
*/
@@ -752,11 +994,7 @@
RELINQUISH_PRIVS_ROOT(daemon_uid, daemon_gid)
-#ifndef LOG_CRON
-#define LOG_CRON LOG_DAEMON
-#endif
-
- openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_CRON);
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
opterr = 0;
errno = 0;
--- at-3.1.10/perm.c.pam 2005-08-05 05:16:01.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/perm.c 2006-09-12 15:06:30.000000000 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@
#define PRIV_END while(0)
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+ NULL
+};
+#endif
+
/* Structures and unions */
@@ -109,18 +117,58 @@
int
check_permission()
{
- uid_t uid = geteuid();
+ uid_t euid = geteuid(), uid=getuid(), egid=getegid(), gid=getgid();
struct passwd *pentry;
int allow = 0, deny = 1;
- if (uid == 0)
+ int retcode=0;
+
+ if (euid == 0)
return 1;
- if ((pentry = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+ if ((pentry = getpwuid(euid)) == NULL) {
perror("Cannot access user database");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+/*
+ * We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ * credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+ setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+ setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+ setregid(gid,egid); \
+ setreuid(uid,euid); \
+ return(0); \
+ }
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+ setregid(gid,egid);
+ setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
+
+
allow = user_in_file(ETCDIR "/at.allow", pentry->pw_name);
if (allow==0 || allow==1)
return allow;
--- at-3.1.8/pam_atd.pam 2005-01-25 16:16:41.842416000 -0500
+++ at-3.1.8/pam_atd 2005-01-25 16:01:10.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the at daemon
+#
+#
+auth sufficient /lib/security/$ISA/pam_rootok.so
+auth required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+auth required pam_env.so
+account required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+# Sets up user limits, please uncomment and read /etc/security/limits.conf
+# to enable this functionality.
+# session required pam_limits.so
+#
--- at-3.1.10/config.h.in.__ 2006-09-07 18:47:06.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/config.h.in 2006-09-07 18:48:12.000000000 +0200
@@ -181,3 +181,9 @@
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN
#undef HAVE_PAM
+
+/* Define if you are building with_selinux */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* Define if you are building with_pam */
+#undef WITH_PAM
--- at-3.1.10/configure.in._ 2005-08-05 05:16:02.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/configure.in 2006-09-07 16:21:19.000000000 +0200
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@
if test "$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL" != "" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SENDMAIL,"$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL")
MAIL_CMD="$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL"
+#AC_PATH_PROG(GETOPT, getopt, , $PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin )
+#if test "$ac_cv_path_GETOPT" != "" ; then
+#AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GETOPT,"$ac_cv_path_GETOPT")
fi
AC_SUBST(MAIL_CMD)
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