rpms/at
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

Add patch

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Marcela Mašláňová 2006-10-24 14:25:28 +00:00
parent bedbd13062
commit 489143c252
15 changed files with 1127 additions and 42 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
.cvsignore
View File

@ -1,2 +1 @@
at_3.1.8-11.tar.gz
at-3.1.10.tar.gz at-3.1.10.tar.gz

59
at-3.1.10-dont_fork.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
--- at-3.1.10/daemon.c.dontfork 2005-08-05 05:16:01.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/daemon.c 2006-09-12 13:53:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
static const char *svnid = "$Id$";
-int daemon_debug;
+int daemon_debug = 0;
+int daemon_nofork = 0;
static int
lock_fd(int fd)
@@ -119,15 +120,18 @@
(open("/dev/null", O_RDWR) != 2)) {
perr("Error redirecting I/O");
}
+ }
+ if (daemon_nofork) pid = getpid();
+ else {
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
perr("Cannot fork");
} else if (pid != 0) {
exit(0);
}
+ (void) setsid();
}
old_umask = umask(S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH);
- (void) setsid();
PRIV_START
--- at-3.1.10/atd.8.in.dontfork 2005-08-29 10:08:51.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.8.in 2006-09-12 13:53:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
.IR batch_interval ]
.RB [ -d ]
.RB [ -s ]
+.RB [ -n ]
.SH DESCRIPTION
.B atd
runs jobs queued by
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@
is installed as
.B @prefix@/sbin/atrun
for backward compatibility.
+.TP 8
+.B -n
+Don't fork option.
.SH WARNING
.B atd
won't work if its spool directory is mounted via NFS even if
--- at-3.1.10/daemon.h.dontfork 2005-08-05 05:16:01.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/daemon.h 2006-09-12 13:54:43.000000000 +0200
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@
perr (const char *fmt, ...);
extern int daemon_debug;
+extern int daemon_nofork;

84
at-3.1.10-fix_no_export.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
--- at-3.1.10/at.c.fix 2006-09-12 13:21:16.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.c 2006-09-12 13:20:08.000000000 +0200
@@ -396,8 +396,9 @@
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(no_export) / sizeof(no_export[0]); i++) {
export = export
- && (strncmp(*atenv, no_export[i],
- (size_t) (eqp - *atenv)) != 0);
+ && ( (((size_t) (eqp - *atenv)) != strlen(no_export[i]))
+ ||(strncmp(*atenv, no_export[i],(size_t) (eqp - *atenv)) != 0)
+ );
}
eqp++;
}
--- at-3.1.10/at.1.in.fix 2006-09-12 13:21:16.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.1.in 2006-09-12 13:10:28.000000000 +0200
@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@
and
.B batch
read commands from standard input or a specified file which are to
-be executed at a later time, using
-.BR /bin/sh .
+be executed at a later time.
.TP 8
.BR at
executes commands at a specified time.
@@ -244,8 +243,56 @@
option argument, which must have the same format as specified for the
.BR touch(1)
utility's
-.B -t
+.B \-t
time option argument ([[CC]YY]MMDDhhmm).
+.SH ENVIRONMENT
+.P
+.TP 8
+.B SHELL
+The value of the SHELL environment variable at the time of
+.B at
+invocation will determine which shell is used to execute the
+.B at
+job commands. If SHELL is unset when
+.B at
+is invoked, the user's login shell will be used; otherwise,
+if SHELL is set when
+.B at
+is invoked, it must contain the path of a shell interpreter
+executable that will be used to run the commands at the specified time.
+.P
+.B at
+will record the values of
+environment variables present at time of
+.B at
+invocation. When the commands are run at the specified time,
+.B at
+will restore these variables to their recorded values .
+These variables are excluded from this processing and are never
+set by
+.B at
+when the commands are run :
+.br
+.BI TERM,
+.BI DISPLAY,
+.BI SHELLOPTS,
+.BI _,
+.BI PPID,
+.BI BASH_VERSINFO,
+.BI EUID,
+.BI UID,
+.BI GROUPS.
+.br
+If the user submitting the
+.B at
+job is not the super-user, variables that alter the behaviour of the
+loader
+.BR ld.so(8),
+such as
+.B LD_LIBRARY_PATH
+, cannot be recorded and restored by
+.B at .
+.P
.SH FILES
.I @ATJBD@
.br

245
at-3.1.10-instinet.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.instinet 2006-09-12 11:01:10.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c 2006-09-12 11:24:49.000000000 +0200
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
static const char *svnid = "$Id$";
static double load_avg = LOADAVG_MX;
static time_t now;
-static time_t last_chg;
+//static time_t last_chg;
static int nothing_to_do;
unsigned int batch_interval;
static int run_as_daemon = 0;
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@
#endif
static void
-run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+run_file(char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
/* Run a file by by spawning off a process which redirects I/O,
* spawns a subshell, then waits for it to complete and sends
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@
char jobbuf[9];
char *mailname = NULL;
int mailsize = 128;
- char *newname;
+ char newname[256];
FILE *stream;
int send_mail = 0;
struct stat buf, lbuf;
@@ -242,11 +242,17 @@
sprintf(jobbuf, "%8lu", jobno);
- if ((newname = malloc(strlen(filename) + 1)) == NULL)
- pabort("Job %8lu : out of virtual memory", jobno);
+ if( strlen( filename ) >= sizeof( newname ) - 1 )
+ pabort("File name too long: %s", filename );
strcpy(newname, filename);
+ newname[0] = '!';
+
+ if( rename( filename, newname ) < 0 )
+ perr( "Error renaming job file." );
+
+ filename[0] = '!';
newname[0] = '=';
/* We try to make a hard link to lock the file. If we fail, then
@@ -264,14 +270,15 @@
}
}
/* If something goes wrong between here and the unlink() call,
- * the job gets restarted as soon as the "=" entry is cleared
- * by the main atd loop.
- */
+ * the job will remain in the "!" queue.
+ * no point in retrying, and need glaring proof that something went wrong
+ */
pid = fork();
- if (pid == -1)
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ unlink(newname);
perr("Cannot fork");
-
+ }
else if (pid != 0) {
free(mailname);
free(newname);
@@ -284,6 +291,7 @@
pentry = getpwuid(uid);
if (pentry == NULL) {
+ unlink(newname);
pabort("Userid %lu not found - aborting job %8lu (%.500s)",
(unsigned long) uid, jobno, filename);
}
@@ -293,35 +301,43 @@
PRIV_END
- if (stream == NULL)
+ if (stream == NULL) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Cannot open input file");
-
- if ((fd_in = dup(fileno(stream))) < 0)
+ }
+ if ((fd_in = dup(fileno(stream))) < 0) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Error duplicating input file descriptor");
-
- if (fstat(fd_in, &buf) == -1)
+ }
+ if (fstat(fd_in, &buf) == -1) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Error in fstat of input file descriptor");
-
- if (lstat(filename, &lbuf) == -1)
+ }
+ if (lstat(filename, &lbuf) == -1) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Error in fstat of input file");
-
- if (S_ISLNK(lbuf.st_mode))
+ }
+ if (S_ISLNK(lbuf.st_mode)) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Symbolic link encountered in job %8lu (%.500s) - aborting",
jobno, filename);
-
+ }
if ((lbuf.st_dev != buf.st_dev) || (lbuf.st_ino != buf.st_ino) ||
(lbuf.st_uid != buf.st_uid) || (lbuf.st_gid != buf.st_gid) ||
- (lbuf.st_size != buf.st_size))
+ (lbuf.st_size != buf.st_size)) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Somebody changed files from under us for job %8lu (%.500s) - "
"aborting", jobno, filename);
-
+ }
if (buf.st_nlink > 2) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Somebody is trying to run a linked script for job %8lu (%.500s)",
jobno, filename);
}
- if ((fflags = fcntl(fd_in, F_GETFD)) < 0)
+ if ((fflags = fcntl(fd_in, F_GETFD)) < 0) {
+ unlink( newname );
perr("Error in fcntl");
-
+ }
fcntl(fd_in, F_SETFD, fflags & ~FD_CLOEXEC);
/*
@@ -335,28 +351,44 @@
mailsize );
if (fscanf(stream, fmt,
- &nuid, &ngid, mailname, &send_mail) != 4)
+ &nuid, &ngid, mailname, &send_mail) != 4) {
+ unlink( newname );
pabort("File %.500s is in wrong format - aborting",
filename);
+ }
- if (mailname[0] == '-')
+ if (mailname[0] == '-') {
+ unlink( newname );
pabort("illegal mail name %.300s in job %8lu (%.300s)", mailname,
jobno, filename);
-
- if (nuid != uid)
+ }
+ if (nuid != uid) {
+ unlink( newname );
pabort("Job %8lu (%.500s) - userid %d does not match file uid %d",
jobno, filename, nuid, uid);
-
+ }
+ if (ngid != gid) {
+ unlink( newname );
+ pabort("Job %8lu %.500s - groupid %d does not match file gid %d",
+ jobno, filename, ngid, gid);
+ }
/* We are now committed to executing this script. Unlink the
* original.
*/
unlink(filename);
+ /* If we bail out from now on, the job gets stuck in "="
+ * The main loop should take care of that.
+ */
+
fclose(stream);
+
if (chdir(ATSPOOL_DIR) < 0)
perr("Cannot chdir to " ATSPOOL_DIR);
+ filename[0] = queue;
+
/* Create a file to hold the output of the job we are about to run.
* Write the mail header. Complain in case
*/
@@ -466,19 +498,19 @@
#endif
/* Send mail. Unlink the output file after opening it, so it
- * doesn't hang around after the run.
+ * doesn't hang around after the run (if we are to send mail).
*/
- stat(filename, &buf);
- if (open(filename, O_RDONLY) != STDIN_FILENO)
- perr("Open of jobfile failed");
-
- unlink(filename);
+ if( send_mail != -1 ) {
+ stat(filename, &buf);
+ if (open(filename, O_RDONLY) != STDIN_FILENO)
+ perr("Open of jobfile failed");
+ unlink(filename);
+ }
/* The job is now finished. We can delete its input file.
*/
chdir(ATJOB_DIR);
unlink(newname);
- free(newname);
if (((send_mail != -1) && (buf.st_size != size)) || (send_mail == 1)) {
@@ -508,6 +540,8 @@
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
+#define CHECK_INTERVAL_5MIN 300
+
static time_t
run_loop()
{
@@ -537,7 +571,7 @@
* atrun.
*/
- next_job = now + CHECK_INTERVAL;
+ next_job = now + CHECK_INTERVAL_5MIN;
if (next_batch == 0)
next_batch = now;
@@ -548,11 +582,11 @@
if (stat(".", &buf) == -1)
perr("Cannot stat " ATJOB_DIR);
-
+/*
if (nothing_to_do && buf.st_mtime <= last_chg)
return next_job;
last_chg = buf.st_mtime;
-
+*/
if ((spool = opendir(".")) == NULL)
perr("Cannot read " ATJOB_DIR);

14
at-3.1.10-lexer-parser.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
--- at-3.1.10/parsetime.y.parser 2005-08-05 05:31:04.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/parsetime.y 2006-09-07 12:47:45.000000000 +0200
@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@
%%
timespec : spec_base
| spec_base inc_or_dec
+ {
+ time_only = 0;
+ }
;
-
spec_base : date
| time
{

78
at-3.1.10-makefile.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
--- at-3.1.10/Makefile.in.makefile 2006-09-12 08:33:38.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/Makefile.in 2006-09-12 08:44:52.000000000 +0200
@@ -69,13 +69,13 @@
all: at atd atrun
at: $(ATOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB) $(PAMLIB)
rm -f $(CLONES)
$(LN_S) -f at atq
$(LN_S) -f at atrm
atd: $(RUNOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(PAMLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(SELINUXLIB) $(PAMLIB)
y.tab.c y.tab.h: parsetime.y
$(YACC) -d parsetime.y
@@ -90,35 +90,38 @@
$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -fpie $(DEFS) $*.c
install: all
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(etcdir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(bindir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(sbindir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(docdir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(atdocdir)
- $(INSTALL) -g $(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) -o $(DAEMON_USERNAME) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(ATSPOOL_DIR) $(IROOT)$(ATJOB_DIR)
- chmod 1770 $(IROOT)$(ATSPOOL_DIR) $(IROOT)$(ATJOB_DIR)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(etcdir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(bindir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(sbindir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(docdir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(atdocdir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(ATJOB_DIR)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/pam.d
+ $(INSTALL) -g $(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) -o $(DAEMON_USERNAME) -m 755 -d $(IROOT) $(ATSPOOL_DIR)
+ chmod 700 $(IROOT)$(ATSPOOL_DIR) $(IROOT)$(ATJOB_DIR)
touch $(IROOT)$(LFILE)
chmod 600 $(IROOT)$(LFILE)
- chown $(DAEMON_USERNAME):$(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) $(IROOT)$(LFILE)
- test -f $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/at.allow || test -f $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/at.deny || $(INSTALL) -o root -g $(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) -m 640 at.deny $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/
- $(INSTALL) -g $(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) -o $(DAEMON_USERNAME) -m 6755 -s at $(IROOT)$(bindir)
+ chown $(DAEMON_USERNAME):$(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) $(IROOT)$(ATJOB_DIR) $(IROOT)$(ATSPOOL_DIR)
+ test -f $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/at.allow || test -f $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/at.deny || $(INSTALL) -m 600 at.deny $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/
+ $(INSTALL) -o $(INSTALL_ROOT_USER) -g $(DAEMON_GROUPNAME) pam_atd $(IROOT)$(etcdir)/pam.d/atd
+ $(INSTALL) -m 4755 -s at $(IROOT)$(bindir)
$(LN_S) -f at $(IROOT)$(bindir)/atq
$(LN_S) -f at $(IROOT)$(bindir)/atrm
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 batch $(IROOT)$(bindir)
- $(INSTALL) -d -o root -g root -m 755 $(IROOT)$(man1dir)
- $(INSTALL) -d -o root -g root -m 755 $(IROOT)$(man5dir)
- $(INSTALL) -d -o root -g root -m 755 $(IROOT)$(man8dir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -s atd $(IROOT)$(sbindir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 atrun $(IROOT)$(sbindir)
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 644 at.1 $(IROOT)$(man1dir)/
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 batch $(IROOT)$(bindir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(man1dir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(man5dir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(man8dir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 -s atd $(IROOT)$(sbindir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 755 atrun $(IROOT)$(sbindir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 at.1 $(IROOT)$(man1dir)/
cd $(IROOT)$(man1dir) && $(LN_S) -f at.1 atq.1 && $(LN_S) -f at.1 batch.1 && $(LN_S) -f at.1 atrm.1
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 644 atd.8 $(IROOT)$(man8dir)/
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 atd.8 $(IROOT)$(man8dir)/
sed "s,\$${exec_prefix},$(exec_prefix),g" <atrun.8>tmpman
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 644 tmpman $(IROOT)$(man8dir)/atrun.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 tmpman $(IROOT)$(man8dir)/atrun.8
rm -f tmpman
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 644 at_allow.5 $(IROOT)$(man5dir)/
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 at_allow.5 $(IROOT)$(man5dir)/
cd $(IROOT)$(man5dir) && $(LN_S) -f at_allow.5 at_deny.5
- $(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 644 $(DOCS) $(IROOT)$(atdocdir)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(DOCS) $(IROOT)$(atdocdir)
rm -f $(IROOT)$(mandir)/cat1/at.1* $(IROOT)$(mandir)/cat1/batch.1* \
$(IROOT)$(mandir)/cat1/atq.1*
rm -f $(IROOT)$(mandir)/cat1/atd.8*

11
at-3.1.10-man-timespec-path.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
--- at-3.1.10/at.1.in.path 2005-08-29 10:09:24.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.1.in 2006-09-07 11:07:21.000000000 +0200
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@
.B at 1am tomorrow.
.PP
The exact definition of the time specification can be found in
-.IR @prefix@/share/doc/at/timespec .
+.IR @prefix@/share/doc/at-@VERSION@/timespec.
.PP
For both
.BR at " and " batch ,

481
at-3.1.10-pam.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.pam 2006-09-12 15:01:55.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c 2006-09-12 15:26:49.000000000 +0200
@@ -73,6 +73,42 @@
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <syslog.h>
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+/*
+ * We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ * credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+ setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+ setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+ setregid(gid,egid); \
+ setreuid(uid,euid); \
+ return(0); \
+ }
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+ setregid(gid,egid);
+ setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
/* Local headers */
@@ -83,6 +119,10 @@
#include "getloadavg.h"
#endif
+#ifndef LOG_ATD
+#define LOG_ATD LOG_DAEMON
+#endif
+
/* Macros */
#define BATCH_INTERVAL_DEFAULT 60
@@ -196,6 +236,19 @@
#define fork myfork
#endif
+#undef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
+#undef ATD_MAIL_NAME
+#if defined(SENDMAIL)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM SENDMAIL
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "sendmail"
+#elif defined(MAILC)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILC
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mail"
+#elif defined(MAILX)
+#define ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM MAILX
+#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mailx"
+#endif
+
static void
run_file(char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
@@ -420,6 +473,8 @@
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
PRIV_END
#endif
@@ -434,6 +489,14 @@
else if (pid == 0) {
char *nul = NULL;
char **nenvp = &nul;
+ char **pam_envp=0L;
+
+ PRIV_START
+ #ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_envp = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+ if ( ( pam_envp != 0L ) && (pam_envp[0] != 0L) )
+ nenvp = pam_envp;
+ #endif
/* Set up things for the child; we want standard input from the
* input file, and standard output and error sent to our output file.
@@ -455,8 +518,6 @@
if (chdir(ATJOB_DIR) < 0)
perr("Cannot chdir to " ATJOB_DIR);
- PRIV_START
-
nice((tolower((int) queue) - 'a' + 1) * 2);
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
@@ -472,10 +533,93 @@
perr("Cannot reset signal handler to default");
chdir("/");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ char *seuser=NULL;
+ char *level=NULL;
+
+ if (getseuserbyname(pentry->pw_name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
+ retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
+ free(seuser);
+ free(level);
+ if (retval) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ out:
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+
+
if (execle("/bin/sh", "sh", (char *) NULL, nenvp) != 0)
+
perr("Exec failed for /bin/sh");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ if ( ( nenvp != &nul ) && (pam_envp != 0L) && (*pam_envp != 0L))
+ {
+ for( nenvp = pam_envp; *nenvp != 0L; nenvp++)
+ free(*nenvp);
+ free( pam_envp );
+ nenvp = &nul;
+ pam_envp=0L;
+ }
+#endif
+
PRIV_END
}
/* We're the parent. Let's wait.
@@ -507,14 +651,43 @@
unlink(filename);
}
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
/* The job is now finished. We can delete its input file.
*/
chdir(ATJOB_DIR);
unlink(newname);
+#ifdef ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM
if (((send_mail != -1) && (buf.st_size != size)) || (send_mail == 1)) {
-
- PRIV_START
+ int mail_pid = -1;
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ /* PAM has now re-opened our log to auth.info ! */
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+
+ mail_pid = fork();
+
+ if ( mail_pid == 0 )
+ {
+ PRIV_START
if (initgroups(pentry->pw_name, pentry->pw_gid))
perr("Cannot delete saved userids");
@@ -527,16 +700,81 @@
chdir ("/");
-#if defined(SENDMAIL)
- execl(SENDMAIL, "sendmail", mailname, (char *) NULL);
-#else
-/*#error "No mail command specified."*/
- perr("No mail command specified.");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
+ int retval=0;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+
+ if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ /*
+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
+ * permission check for this purpose.
+ */
+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
+
+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
+ file_context,
+ SECCLASS_FILE,
+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
+ &avd);
+ freecon(file_context);
+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ } else {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
+ freecon(user_context);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ execl(ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM, ATD_MAIL_NAME, mailname, (char *) NULL);
+ perr("Exec failed for mail command");
+ exit(-1);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_enabled>0) {
+ if (setexeccon(NULL) < 0)
+ if (security_getenforce()==1)
+ perr("Could not resset exec context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
+ }
+ }
#endif
- perr("Exec failed for mail command");
- PRIV_END
+ PRIV_END
+ } else
+ if ( mail_pid == -1 ) {
+ perr("fork of mailer failed");
+ } else {
+ /* Parent */
+ waitpid(mail_pid, (int *) NULL, 0);
+
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ closelog();
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
+#endif
+ }
}
+#endif
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
@@ -736,6 +974,10 @@
struct passwd *pwe;
struct group *ge;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
/* We don't need root privileges all the time; running under uid and gid
* daemon is fine.
*/
@@ -752,11 +994,7 @@
RELINQUISH_PRIVS_ROOT(daemon_uid, daemon_gid)
-#ifndef LOG_CRON
-#define LOG_CRON LOG_DAEMON
-#endif
-
- openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_CRON);
+ openlog("atd", LOG_PID, LOG_ATD);
opterr = 0;
errno = 0;
--- at-3.1.10/perm.c.pam 2005-08-05 05:16:01.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/perm.c 2006-09-12 15:06:30.000000000 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@
#define PRIV_END while(0)
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+static const struct pam_conv conv = {
+ NULL
+};
+#endif
+
/* Structures and unions */
@@ -109,18 +117,58 @@
int
check_permission()
{
- uid_t uid = geteuid();
+ uid_t euid = geteuid(), uid=getuid(), egid=getegid(), gid=getgid();
struct passwd *pentry;
int allow = 0, deny = 1;
- if (uid == 0)
+ int retcode=0;
+
+ if (euid == 0)
return 1;
- if ((pentry = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+ if ((pentry = getpwuid(euid)) == NULL) {
perror("Cannot access user database");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
+#ifdef WITH_PAM
+/*
+ * We must check if the atd daemon userid will be allowed to gain the job owner user's
+ * credentials with PAM . If not, the user has been denied at(1) usage, eg. with pam_access.
+ */
+ setreuid(daemon_uid, daemon_uid);
+ setregid(daemon_gid, daemon_gid);
+
+# define PAM_FAIL_CHECK if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) { \
+ fprintf(stderr,"PAM authentication failure: %s\n",pam_strerror(pamh, retcode)); \
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT );
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT); \
+ pam_end(pamh, retcode); \
+ setregid(gid,egid); \
+ setreuid(uid,euid); \
+ return(0); \
+ }
+ retcode = pam_start("atd", pentry->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, "atd");
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+
+ pam_close_session(pamh,PAM_SILENT);
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+
+ setregid(gid,egid);
+ setreuid(uid,euid);
+
+#endif
+
+
+
allow = user_in_file(ETCDIR "/at.allow", pentry->pw_name);
if (allow==0 || allow==1)
return allow;
--- at-3.1.8/pam_atd.pam 2005-01-25 16:16:41.842416000 -0500
+++ at-3.1.8/pam_atd 2005-01-25 16:01:10.000000000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the at daemon
+#
+#
+auth sufficient /lib/security/$ISA/pam_rootok.so
+auth required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+auth required pam_env.so
+account required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session required /lib/security/$ISA/pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+# Sets up user limits, please uncomment and read /etc/security/limits.conf
+# to enable this functionality.
+# session required pam_limits.so
+#
--- at-3.1.10/config.h.in.__ 2006-09-07 18:47:06.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/config.h.in 2006-09-07 18:48:12.000000000 +0200
@@ -181,3 +181,9 @@
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN
#undef HAVE_PAM
+
+/* Define if you are building with_selinux */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* Define if you are building with_pam */
+#undef WITH_PAM
--- at-3.1.10/configure.in._ 2005-08-05 05:16:02.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/configure.in 2006-09-07 16:21:19.000000000 +0200
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@
if test "$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL" != "" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SENDMAIL,"$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL")
MAIL_CMD="$ac_cv_path_SENDMAIL"
+#AC_PATH_PROG(GETOPT, getopt, , $PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin )
+#if test "$ac_cv_path_GETOPT" != "" ; then
+#AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GETOPT,"$ac_cv_path_GETOPT")
fi
AC_SUBST(MAIL_CMD)

27
at-3.1.10-pie.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
--- at-3.1.10/Makefile.in.pie 2006-09-12 08:28:13.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/Makefile.in 2006-09-12 08:30:47.000000000 +0200
@@ -69,13 +69,13 @@
all: at atd atrun
at: $(ATOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o at -pie $(ATOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(LEXLIB)
rm -f $(CLONES)
$(LN_S) -f at atq
$(LN_S) -f at atrm
atd: $(RUNOBJECTS)
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(PAMLIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o atd -pie $(RUNOBJECTS) $(LIBS) $(PAMLIB)
y.tab.c y.tab.h: parsetime.y
$(YACC) -d parsetime.y
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
configure
.c.o:
- $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $(DEFS) $*.c
+ $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -fpie $(DEFS) $*.c
install: all
$(INSTALL) -g root -o root -m 755 -d $(IROOT)$(etcdir)

20
at-3.1.10-shell.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
--- at-3.1.10/at.c.shell 2006-09-12 11:25:31.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.c 2006-09-12 12:25:43.000000000 +0200
@@ -460,6 +460,8 @@
fprintf(fp, " || {\n\t echo 'Execution directory "
"inaccessible' >&2\n\t exit 1\n}\n");
+ fprintf(fp, "${SHELL:-/bin/sh} << `(dd if=/dev/urandom count=200 bs=1 2>/dev/null|LC_ALL=C tr -d -c '[:alnum:]')`\n\n");
+
istty = isatty(fileno(stdin));
if (istty) {
fprintf(stderr, "at> ");
@@ -1037,7 +1039,7 @@
It also alows a warning diagnostic to be printed. Because of the
possible variance, we always output the diagnostic. */
- fprintf(stderr, "warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh\n");
+// fprintf(stderr, "warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh\n");
writefile(timer, queue);
break;

56
at-3.1.10-typo.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
--- at-3.1.10/atrun.8.in.typo 2005-08-29 10:08:41.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atrun.8.in 2006-09-12 10:00:57.000000000 +0200
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
.B atrun
runs jobs queued by
.BR at(1) .
-It is a shell script containing invoking
+It is a shell script invoking
.B @sbindir@/atd
with the
.I -s
--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.typo 2006-09-12 10:00:57.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c 2006-09-12 10:07:19.000000000 +0200
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
"aborting", jobno, filename);
if (buf.st_nlink > 2) {
- perr("Someboy is trying to run a linked script for job %8lu (%.500s)",
+ perr("Somebody is trying to run a linked script for job %8lu (%.500s)",
jobno, filename);
}
if ((fflags = fcntl(fd_in, F_GETFD)) < 0)
@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@
* Let's remove the lockfile and reschedule.
*/
strncpy(lock_name, dirent->d_name, sizeof(lock_name));
+ lock_name[sizeof(lock_name)-1] = '\0';
lock_name[0] = '=';
unlink(lock_name);
next_job = now;
@@ -623,7 +624,7 @@
nothing_to_do = 0;
/* There's a job for later. Note its execution time if it's
- * the earlierst so far.
+ * the earliest so far.
*/
if (run_time > now) {
if (next_job > run_time) {
@@ -641,6 +642,7 @@
run_batch++;
if (strcmp(batch_name, dirent->d_name) > 0) {
strncpy(batch_name, dirent->d_name, sizeof(batch_name));
+ batch_name[sizeof(batch_name)-1] = '\0';
batch_uid = buf.st_uid;
batch_gid = buf.st_gid;
batch_queue = queue;
@@ -683,7 +685,7 @@
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
-/* Browse through ATJOB_DIR, checking all the jobfiles wether they should
+/* Browse through ATJOB_DIR, checking all the jobfiles whether they should
* be executed and or deleted. The queue is coded into the first byte of
* the job filename, the date (in minutes since Eon) as a hex number in the
* following eight bytes, followed by a dot and a serial number. A file

12
at-3.1.10-usage.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
--- at-3.1.10/panic.c.usage 2006-09-07 13:21:23.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/panic.c 2006-09-07 13:24:00.000000000 +0200
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@
/* Print usage and exit.
*/
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: at [-V] [-q x] [-f file] [-mldbv] time\n"
- " at -c job ...\n"
+ " at [-V] [-q x] [-f file] [-m] -t [[CC]YY]MMDDhhmm\n"
+ " at -c job [job...]\n"
" atq [-V] [-q x]\n"
" atrm [-V] job ...\n"
" batch\n");

74
at-3.1.8-t_option.patch
View File

@ -1,5 +1,40 @@
--- at-3.1.10/at.c.t_ 2006-09-12 10:15:56.000000000 +0200 --- at-3.1.10/at.1.in.t_opti 2006-09-12 12:48:04.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.c 2006-09-12 10:30:17.000000000 +0200 +++ at-3.1.10/at.1.in 2006-09-12 12:45:40.000000000 +0200
@@ -12,6 +12,16 @@
.RB [ -mldbv ]
.B TIME
.br
+.B at
+.RB [ -V ]
+.RB [ -q
+.IR queue ]
+.RB [ -f
+.IR file ]
+.RB [ -mldbv ]
+.RB -t
+.IR time_arg
+.br
.B "at -c"
.I job
.RI [ job... ]
@@ -227,6 +237,15 @@
.B
\-c
cats the jobs listed on the command line to standard output.
+.TP
+.BI \-t " time_arg"
+Submit the job to be run at the time specified by the
+.BI time_arg
+option argument, which must have the same format as specified for the
+.BR touch(1)
+utility's
+.B -t
+time option argument ([[CC]YY]MMDDhhmm).
.SH FILES
.I @ATJBD@
.br
--- at-3.1.10/at.c.t_ 2006-09-12 10:15:56.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.c 2006-09-12 10:30:17.000000000 +0200
@@ -750,6 +750,101 @@ @@ -750,6 +750,101 @@
return p; return p;
} }
@ -102,38 +137,3 @@
int int
main(int argc, char **argv) main(int argc, char **argv)
{ {
--- at-3.1.10/at.1.in.t_option 2006-09-12 12:48:04.000000000 +0200
+++ at-3.1.10/at.1.in 2006-09-12 12:45:40.000000000 +0200
@@ -12,6 +12,16 @@
.RB [ -mldbv ]
.B TIME
.br
+.B at
+.RB [ -V ]
+.RB [ -q
+.IR queue ]
+.RB [ -f
+.IR file ]
+.RB [ -mldbv ]
+.RB -t
+.IR time_arg
+.br
.B "at -c"
.I job
.RI [ job... ]
@@ -227,6 +237,15 @@
.B
\-c
cats the jobs listed on the command line to standard output.
+.TP
+.BI \-t " time_arg"
+Submit the job to be run at the time specified by the
+.BI time_arg
+option argument, which must have the same format as specified for the
+.BR touch(1)
+utility's
+.B -t
+time option argument ([[CC]YY]MMDDhhmm).
.SH FILES
.I @ATJBD@
.br

6
at.spec
View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
Summary: Job spooling tools. Summary: Job spooling tools.
Name: at Name: at
Version: 3.1.10 Version: 3.1.10
Release: 1%{?dist} Release: 2%{?dist}
License: GPL License: GPL
Group: System Environment/Daemons Group: System Environment/Daemons
Source: http://ftp.debian.org/debian/pool/main/a/at/at-%{major_ver}.tar.gz Source: http://ftp.debian.org/debian/pool/main/a/at/at-%{major_ver}.tar.gz
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Patch20: at-3.1.10-shell.patch
#Patch22: at-selinux.patch #Patch22: at-selinux.patch
#Patch22: at-3.1.10-selinux.patch #Patch22: at-3.1.10-selinux.patch
Patch23: at-3.1.10-pie.patch Patch23: at-3.1.10-pie.patch
Patch24: at-3.1.8-t_opti.patch Patch24: at-3.1.8-t_option.patch
Patch25: at-3.1.10-usage.patch Patch25: at-3.1.10-usage.patch
Patch26: at-3.1.10-fix_no_export.patch Patch26: at-3.1.10-fix_no_export.patch
#Patch27: at-3.1.8-pam.patch #Patch27: at-3.1.8-pam.patch
@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ fi
%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/at %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/at
%changelog %changelog
* Thu Sep 07 2006 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-1.fc6 * Tue Oct 24 2006 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-2
- new version from upstream 3.1.10 - new version from upstream 3.1.10
* Thu Aug 23 2006 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.8-82.fc6 * Thu Aug 23 2006 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.8-82.fc6

1
sources
View File

@ -1,2 +1 @@
81dbae5162aaa8a398a81424d6631c77 at_3.1.8-11.tar.gz
a020a2ec32e1d629c0eef91e5728efad at-3.1.10.tar.gz a020a2ec32e1d629c0eef91e5728efad at-3.1.10.tar.gz