- thanks dwalsh for selinux patch, which fix #460873
This commit is contained in:
Marcela Mašláňová
parent
c1bcbeddb1
commit
04cf46f800
7
at.spec
7
at.spec
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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Summary: Job spooling tools
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Summary: Job spooling tools
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Name: at
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Name: at
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Version: 3.1.10
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Version: 3.1.10
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Release: 24%{?dist}
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Release: 25%{?dist}
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License: GPLv2+
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License: GPLv2+
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Group: System Environment/Daemons
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Group: System Environment/Daemons
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URL: http://ftp.debian.org/debian/pool/main/a/at
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URL: http://ftp.debian.org/debian/pool/main/a/at
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@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ Patch14: at-3.1.10-pam_keyring.patch
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Patch15: at-3.1.10-PIE.patch
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Patch15: at-3.1.10-PIE.patch
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Patch16: at-3.1.10-pamfix.patch
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Patch16: at-3.1.10-pamfix.patch
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Patch17: nonposix.patch
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Patch17: nonposix.patch
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Patch18: selinux_mail.patch
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BuildRequires: fileutils chkconfig /etc/init.d
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BuildRequires: fileutils chkconfig /etc/init.d
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BuildRequires: flex bison autoconf
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BuildRequires: flex bison autoconf
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@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE1} .
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%patch15 -p1 -b .PIE
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%patch15 -p1 -b .PIE
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%patch16 -p1 -b .pamfix
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%patch16 -p1 -b .pamfix
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%patch17 -p1 -b .nonposix
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%patch17 -p1 -b .nonposix
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%patch18 -p1 -b .mailselinux
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%build
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%build
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# patch10 touches configure.in
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# patch10 touches configure.in
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@ -185,6 +187,9 @@ fi
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%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/at
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%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/at
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%changelog
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%changelog
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* Tue Sep 16 2008 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-25
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- thanks dwalsh for selinux patch, which fix #460873
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* Fri Jul 18 2008 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-24
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* Fri Jul 18 2008 Marcela Maslanova <mmaslano@redhat.com> - 3.1.10-24
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- 446004 hope adding || into scriptlets fix removing old package after upgrade
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- 446004 hope adding || into scriptlets fix removing old package after upgrade
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- fixes for fuzz=0
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- fixes for fuzz=0
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187
selinux_mail.patch
Normal file
187
selinux_mail.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
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diff -up at-3.1.10/atd.c.mailselinux at-3.1.10/atd.c
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--- at-3.1.10/atd.c.mailselinux 2008-09-17 10:45:38.000000000 +0200
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+++ at-3.1.10/atd.c 2008-09-17 10:49:48.000000000 +0200
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@@ -224,6 +224,69 @@ myfork()
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#define ATD_MAIL_NAME "mailx"
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#endif
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+static int set_selinux_context(const char *name, const char *filename) {
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+ security_context_t user_context=NULL;
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+ security_context_t file_context=NULL;
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+ struct av_decision avd;
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+ int retval=-1;
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+ char *seuser=NULL;
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+ char *level=NULL;
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+
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+ if (getseuserbyname(name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
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+ retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
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+ free(seuser);
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+ free(level);
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+ if (retval) {
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+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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+ perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", name);
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+ } else {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", name);
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
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+ * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
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+ * a context that is appropriate for the context of
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+ * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
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+ * permission check for this purpose.
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+ */
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+ if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
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+ perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
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+
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+ retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
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+ file_context,
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+ SECCLASS_FILE,
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+ FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
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+ &avd);
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+ freecon(file_context);
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+ if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
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+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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+ perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,name);
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+ } else {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,name);
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+ retval = -1;
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
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+ if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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+ perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,name);
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+ retval = -1;
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+ } else {
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+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,name);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ err:
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+ freecon(user_context);
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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+
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static void
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run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
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{
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@@ -486,61 +549,8 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
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#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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if (selinux_enabled>0) {
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- security_context_t user_context=NULL;
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- security_context_t file_context=NULL;
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- int retval=0;
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- struct av_decision avd;
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- char *seuser=NULL;
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- char *level=NULL;
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-
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- if (getseuserbyname(pentry->pw_name, &seuser, &level) == 0) {
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- retval=get_default_context_with_level(seuser, level, NULL, &user_context);
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- free(seuser);
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- free(level);
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- if (retval) {
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- if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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- perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
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- } else {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
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- goto out;
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- }
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- }
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- }
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-
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- /*
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- * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
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- * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
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- * a context that is appropriate for the context of
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- * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
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- * permission check for this purpose.
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- */
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- if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0) {
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- if (security_getenforce() > 0) {
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- perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
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- } else {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
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- goto out;
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- }
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- }
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- retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
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- file_context,
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- SECCLASS_FILE,
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- FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
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- &avd);
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- freecon(file_context);
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- if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
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- if (security_getenforce()==1)
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- perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- }
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-
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- if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
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- if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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- perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- } else {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- }
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- }
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- freecon(user_context);
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+ if (set_selinux_context(pentry->pw_name, filename) < 0)
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+ perr("SELinux Failed to set context\n");
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}
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#endif
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@@ -654,47 +664,8 @@ run_file(const char *filename, uid_t uid
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#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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if (selinux_enabled>0) {
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- security_context_t user_context=NULL;
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- security_context_t file_context=NULL;
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- int retval=0;
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- struct av_decision avd;
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-
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- if (get_default_context(pentry->pw_name, NULL, &user_context))
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- perr("execle: couldn't get security context for user %s\n", pentry->pw_name);
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- /*
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- * Since crontab files are not directly executed,
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- * crond must ensure that the crontab file has
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- * a context that is appropriate for the context of
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- * the user cron job. It performs an entrypoint
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- * permission check for this purpose.
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- */
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- if (fgetfilecon(STDIN_FILENO, &file_context) < 0)
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- perr("fgetfilecon FAILED %s", filename);
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-
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- retval = security_compute_av(user_context,
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- file_context,
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- SECCLASS_FILE,
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- FILE__ENTRYPOINT,
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- &avd);
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- freecon(file_context);
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- if (retval || ((FILE__ENTRYPOINT & avd.allowed) != FILE__ENTRYPOINT)) {
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- if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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- perr("Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- } else {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "Not allowed to set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- goto out;
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- }
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- }
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-
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- if (setexeccon(user_context) < 0) {
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- if (security_getenforce()==1) {
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- perr("Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- } else {
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- syslog(LOG_ERR, "Could not set exec context to %s for user %s\n", user_context,pentry->pw_name);
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- }
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- }
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- out:
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- freecon(user_context);
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+ if (set_selinux_context(pentry->pw_name, filename) < 0)
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+ perr("SELinux Failed to set context\n");
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}
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#endif
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execl(ATD_MAIL_PROGRAM, ATD_MAIL_NAME, mailname, (char *) NULL);
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