diff --git a/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12087.patch b/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12087.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..187f580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12087.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
+index 464d556..087f9da 100644
+--- a/flist.c
++++ b/flist.c
+@@ -2584,6 +2584,19 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
+ 		init_hard_links();
+ #endif
+ 
++	if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
++		if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) {
++			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used);
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++		}
++		struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
++		if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
++			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++		}
++		file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST;
++	}
++
+ 	flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list");
+ 
+ 	if (inc_recurse) {
+diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h
+index b357dad..bc9abac 100644
+--- a/rsync.h
++++ b/rsync.h
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
+ #define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10)	/* receiver/generator */
+ #define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */
+ #define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12)	/* sender/receiver/generator */
++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<13)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
+ 
+ /* These flags are passed to functions but not stored. */
+ 
diff --git a/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12088.patch b/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12088.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..412242e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12088.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
+index 75e7201..d2e318e 100644
+--- a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
++++ b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test_unsafe ..//../dest 		from/dir			unsafe
+ test_unsafe ..				from/file			safe
+ test_unsafe ../..			from/file			unsafe
+ test_unsafe ..//..			from//file			unsafe
+-test_unsafe dir/..			from				safe
++test_unsafe dir/..			from				unsafe
+ test_unsafe dir/../..			from				unsafe
+ test_unsafe dir/..//..			from				unsafe
+ 
+diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+index da50ff1..f260d39 100644
+--- a/util.c
++++ b/util.c
+@@ -1318,7 +1318,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create)
+  *
+  * "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level
+  * of the referenced symlink.  This is usually the symlink's full path
+- * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. */
++ * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer.
++ *
++ * NOTE: this also rejects dest names with a .. component in other
++ * than the first component of the name ie. it rejects names such as
++ * a/b/../x/y. This needs to be done as the leading subpaths 'a' or
++ * 'b' could later be replaced with symlinks such as a link to '.'
++ * resulting in the link being transferred now becoming unsafe
++ */
+ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
+ {
+ 	const char *name, *slash;
+@@ -1328,6 +1335,23 @@ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
+ 	if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/')
+ 		return 1;
+ 
++	// reject destinations with /../ in the name other than at the start of the name
++	const char *dest2 = dest;
++	while (strncmp(dest2, "../", 3) == 0) {
++	    dest2 += 3;
++	    while (*dest2 == '/') {
++		// allow for ..//..///../foo
++		dest2++;
++	    }
++	}
++	if (strstr(dest2, "/../"))
++	    return 1;
++
++	// reject if the destination ends in /..
++	const size_t dlen = strlen(dest);
++	if (dlen > 3 && strcmp(&dest[dlen-3], "/..") == 0)
++	    return 1;
++
+ 	/* find out what our safety margin is */
+ 	for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
+ 		/* ".." segment starts the count over.  "." segment is ignored. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12747.patch b/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12747.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85bd696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12747.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+diff --git a/checksum.c b/checksum.c
+index cb21882..66e8089 100644
+--- a/checksum.c
++++ b/checksum.c
+@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
+ 
+ 	memset(sum, 0, MAX_DIGEST_LEN);
+ 
+-	fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++	fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+ 	if (fd == -1)
+ 		return;
+ 
+diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
+index 110db28..3f13bb9 100644
+--- a/generator.c
++++ b/generator.c
+@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* open the file */
+-	if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
++	if ((fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
+ 		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing",
+ 			full_fname(fnamecmp));
+ 	  pretend_missing:
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index 8031b8f..edfbb21 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+ 		if (fd1 == -1 && protocol_version < 29) {
+ 			if (fnamecmp != fname) {
+ 				fnamecmp = fname;
+-				fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
++				fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY);
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
+diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
+index 2bbff2f..a4d46c3 100644
+--- a/sender.c
++++ b/sender.c
+@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
+ 			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ 		}
+ 
+-		fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++		fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+ 		if (fd == -1) {
+ 			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ 				enum logcode c = am_daemon
+diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
+index 47c5ea5..c55ae5f 100644
+--- a/syscall.c
++++ b/syscall.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int preallocate_files;
+ extern int preallocate_files;
+ extern int preserve_perms;
+ extern int preserve_executability;
++extern int copy_links;
++extern int copy_unsafe_links;
+ 
+ #ifndef S_BLKSIZE
+ # if defined hpux || defined __hpux__ || defined __hpux
+@@ -575,3 +575,21 @@ int do_open_nofollow(const char *pathname, int flags)
+ 
+ 	return fd;
+ }
++
++/*
++  varient of do_open/do_open_nofollow which does do_open() if the
++  copy_links or copy_unsafe_links options are set and does
++  do_open_nofollow() otherwise
++
++  This is used to prevent a race condition where an attacker could be
++  switching a file between being a symlink and being a normal file
++
++  The open is always done with O_RDONLY flags
++ */
++int do_open_checklinks(const char *pathname)
++{
++ if (copy_links || copy_unsafe_links) {
++   return do_open(pathname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++ }
++ return do_open_nofollow(pathname, O_RDONLY);
++}
+diff --git a/t_unsafe.c b/t_unsafe.c
+index 010cac5..e10619a 100644
+--- a/t_unsafe.c
++++ b/t_unsafe.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0;
+ int human_readable = 0;
+ int preserve_perms = 0;
+ int preserve_executability = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
++
+ short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/tls.c b/tls.c
+index e6b0708..858f8f1 100644
+--- a/tls.c
++++ b/tls.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0;
+ int preserve_executability = 0;
+ int preallocate_files = 0;
+ int inplace = 0;
++int safe_symlinks = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
+ 
+diff --git a/trimslash.c b/trimslash.c
+index 1ec928c..f2774cd 100644
+--- a/trimslash.c
++++ b/trimslash.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0;
+ int preserve_executability = 0;
+ int preallocate_files = 0;
+ int inplace = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+ 
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
+index f260d39..d84bc41 100644
+--- a/util.c
++++ b/util.c
+@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
+ 	int len;   /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
+ 	OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0;
+ 
+-	if ((ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
++	if ((ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ 		int save_errno = errno;
+ 		rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source));
+ 		errno = save_errno;
diff --git a/SPECS/rsync.spec b/SPECS/rsync.spec
index 848041c..d493056 100644
--- a/SPECS/rsync.spec
+++ b/SPECS/rsync.spec
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 Summary: A program for synchronizing files over a network
 Name: rsync
 Version: 3.1.3
-Release: 20%{?dist}
+Release: 21%{?dist}
 Group: Applications/Internet
 URL: http://rsync.samba.org/
 
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ Patch12: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2022-37434.patch
 Patch13: rsync-3.1.3-filtering-rules.patch
 Patch14: rsync-3.1.3-missing-xattr-filter.patch
 Patch15: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12085.patch
+Patch16: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12087.patch
+Patch17: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12088.patch
+Patch18: rsync-3.1.3-cve-2024-12747.patch
 
 %description
 Rsync uses a reliable algorithm to bring remote and host files into
@@ -96,6 +99,9 @@ patch -p1 -i patches/copy-devices.diff
 %patch13 -p1 -b .filtering-rules
 %patch14 -p1 -b .xattr-filter
 %patch15 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12085
+%patch16 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12087
+%patch17 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12088
+%patch18 -p1 -b .cve-2024-12747
 
 %build
 %configure
@@ -142,7 +148,13 @@ chmod -x support/*
 %systemd_postun_with_restart rsyncd.service
 
 %changelog
-* Fri Jan 03 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-20
+* Tue Feb 04 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-21
+- Resolves: RHEL-70207 - Path traversal vulnerability in rsync
+
+* Mon Feb 03 2025 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-20
+- Resolves: RHEL-70207 - Path traversal vulnerability in rsync
+- Resolves: RHEL-70209 - --safe-links option bypass leads to path traversal
+- Resolves: RHEL-72502 - Race Condition in rsync Handling Symbolic Links
 - Resolves: RHEL-70157 - Info Leak via Uninitialized Stack Contents
 
 * Wed Nov 02 2022 Michal Ruprich <mruprich@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-19.1