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dc728e2d8b
openssl/openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
Tomas Mraz dc728e2d8b drop weak ciphers from the default TLS ciphersuite list 
- add back some symbols that were dropped with update to 1.0.1 branch
- more FIPS validation requirement changes
2013-12-18 15:55:26 +01:00

599 lines
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diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn.h 2013-12-13 11:58:58.623821669 +0100
@@ -386,9 +386,11 @@ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, i
* of Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996];
* original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error estimates
* for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993) 177-194) */
-#define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 2 : \
- (b) >= 850 ? 3 : \
- (b) >= 650 ? 4 : \
+/* FIPS 186-4 specifies error rate given the security strength of the
+ * resulting RSA key bit size. So the error rate is 2^-112 or 2^-128 for
+ * 1024 and 1536 bit keys.
+ */
+#define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 4 : \
(b) >= 550 ? 5 : \
(b) >= 450 ? 6 : \
(b) >= 400 ? 7 : \
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c 2013-12-11 16:50:54.181130000 +0100
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret,
return 0;
}
- if (FIPS_mode() && (prime_len < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (prime_len < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN))
{
DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h 2013-12-11 16:51:18.345675737 +0100
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
#endif
#define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+#define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
#define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01
#define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c 2013-12-11 18:02:26.759075219 +0100
@@ -134,7 +134,33 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const
BN_sub_word(q,1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key,q)>=0)
*ret|=DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ {
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_mod_exp_mont(q, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx, NULL) <= 0)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_is_one(q))
+ {
+ /* it would be more correct to add new return flag
+ * for this test, but we do not want to do it
+ * so just error out
+ */
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+#endif
ok = 1;
err:
if (q != NULL) BN_free(q);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c 2013-12-11 16:47:25.882425812 +0100
@@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_
}
if (FIPS_module_mode() &&
- (bits != 1024 || qbits != 160) &&
(bits != 2048 || qbits != 224) &&
(bits != 2048 || qbits != 256) &&
(bits != 3072 || qbits != 256))
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h 2013-12-13 11:53:04.637827187 +0100
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
#endif
#define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+#define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
#define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01
#define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA
@@ -254,9 +255,9 @@ int DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const D
int DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
#endif
-#define DSS_prime_checks 50
-/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1:
- * 50 rounds of Rabin-Miller */
+#define DSS_prime_checks 64
+/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-4], Appendix 2.1:
+ * 64 rounds of Rabin-Miller */
#define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \
BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips-reqs 2013-12-11 16:34:58.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c 2013-12-11 16:47:57.815146894 +0100
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa)
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
- && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+ && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN))
{
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.551708593 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c 2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *adin = NULL;
size_t adinlen = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ int locked;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
do
{
size_t rcnt;
@@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char
while (count);
rv = 1;
err:
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return rv;
}
@@ -141,8 +143,13 @@ static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)
static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)
return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return 1;
}
@@ -150,8 +157,13 @@ static int fips_drbg_add(const void *see
double add_entropy)
{
DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;
+ int locked;
+
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (dctx->rand_add_cb)
return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return 1;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.555708680 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c 2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -340,6 +340,42 @@ static const unsigned char kat_RSA_X931_
0x60, 0x83, 0x18, 0x88, 0xA3, 0xF5, 0x59, 0xC3
};
+static int fips_rsa_encrypt_test(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *plaintext, int ptlen)
+ {
+ unsigned char *ctbuf = NULL, *ptbuf = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int len;
+
+ ctbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ if (!ctbuf)
+ goto err;
+
+ len = RSA_public_encrypt(ptlen, plaintext, ctbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Check ciphertext doesn't match plaintext */
+ if (len >= ptlen && !memcmp(plaintext, ctbuf, ptlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ ptbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ if (!ptbuf)
+ goto err;
+
+ len = RSA_private_decrypt(len, ctbuf, ptbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (len != ptlen)
+ goto err;
+ if (memcmp(ptbuf, plaintext, len))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (ctbuf)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctbuf);
+ if (ptbuf)
+ OPENSSL_free(ptbuf);
+ return ret;
+ }
int FIPS_selftest_rsa()
{
@@ -353,7 +389,7 @@ int FIPS_selftest_rsa()
if ((pk=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
- EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pk, key);
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, key);
if (!fips_pkey_signature_test(pk, kat_tbs, sizeof(kat_tbs) - 1,
kat_RSA_SHA1, sizeof(kat_RSA_SHA1),
@@ -430,13 +466,15 @@ int FIPS_selftest_rsa()
"RSA SHA512 X931"))
goto err;
+ if (!fips_rsa_encrypt_test(key, kat_tbs, sizeof(kat_tbs) - 1))
+ goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
if (pk)
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- else if (key)
+ if (key)
RSA_free(key);
return ret;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c 2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT
# endif
#endif
+ ctx->totlen += len;
+ if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen<len))
+ return -1;
+
#if 0
n = (unsigned int)mlen%16; /* alternative to ctx->mres */
#endif
@@ -1200,6 +1204,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_C
# endif
#endif
+ ctx->totlen += len;
+ if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen<len))
+ return -1;
+
mlen += len;
if (mlen>((U64(1)<<36)-32) || (sizeof(len)==8 && mlen<len))
return -1;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.089698458 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h 2013-11-26 14:36:35.601709689 +0100
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct gcm128_context {
unsigned int mres, ares;
block128_f block;
void *key;
+ u64 totlen;
};
struct xts128_context {
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.557708724 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c 2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};
static double entropy=0;
static int initialized=0;
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
- * (to prevent double locking) */
-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable=0;
@@ -196,7 +190,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
@@ -213,19 +207,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
* hash function.
*/
- /* check if we already have the lock */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
@@ -257,7 +240,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
@@ -308,7 +292,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
@@ -319,7 +303,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *
}
if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
entropy += add;
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
@@ -344,6 +329,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
int do_stir_pool = 0;
+ int locked;
#ifdef PREDICT
if (rand_predictable)
@@ -381,13 +367,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
* global 'md'.
*/
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
/* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the
* expansion
@@ -461,9 +441,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
md_count[0] += 1;
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
while (num > 0)
{
@@ -515,10 +494,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch
MD_Init(&m);
MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD_Final(&m,md);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
@@ -548,32 +528,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
{
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
int ret;
- int do_not_lock;
+ int locked;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- /* check if we already have the lock
- * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
- }
+ locked = private_RAND_lock(1);
if (!initialized)
{
@@ -583,13 +541,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- }
+ if (locked)
+ private_RAND_lock(0);
return ret;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.558708746 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h 2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i
int RAND_init_fips(void);
#endif
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock);
+
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.239701748 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h 2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
#define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
-#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
+#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 48 /* require 384 bits = 48 bytes of randomness */
#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c 2013-11-26 14:36:35.602709711 +0100
@@ -181,6 +181,41 @@ int RAND_status(void)
return 0;
}
+int private_RAND_lock(int lock)
+ {
+ static int crypto_lock_rand;
+ static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
+ int do_lock;
+
+ if (!lock)
+ {
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_lock = !!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_lock = 1;
+ if (do_lock)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ return do_lock;
+ }
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the
@@ -239,12 +274,14 @@ static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx,
double entropy)
{
RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
+ FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen)
{
RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
+ FIPS_drbg_reseed(ctx, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2013-12-11 16:45:18.661552527 +0100
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa,
return 0;
}
- if (bits < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)
+ if (bits < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN)
{
FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,FIPS_R_KEY_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h.fips-reqs 2013-11-26 14:36:35.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rsa/rsa.h 2013-12-11 16:45:05.937265150 +0100
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ struct rsa_st
#define OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+#define OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS 3072
#endif
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fips-reqs 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c 2013-11-26 14:36:35.603709733 +0100
@@ -291,6 +291,27 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
err:
return ret;
}
+
+int private_tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+ const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
+ const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+ const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
+ const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+ const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
+ const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
+ unsigned char *out1,
+ unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+ {
+ return tls1_PRF(digest_mask,
+ seed1, seed1_len,
+ seed2, seed2_len,
+ seed3, seed3_len,
+ seed4, seed4_len,
+ seed5, seed5_len,
+ sec, slen,
+ out1, out2, olen);
+ }
+
static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
unsigned char *tmp, int num)
{
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