forked from rpms/openssl
0dea6db970
Resolves: rhbz#2179379 Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
151 lines
6.3 KiB
Diff
151 lines
6.3 KiB
Diff
From ee6e381e4140efd5365ddf27a12055859103cf59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:39:15 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] asymciphers, kem: Add explicit FIPS indicator
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NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
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confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
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party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and key
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agreement schemes, but explicit key confirmation is not implemented and
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cannot be implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider
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does not implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on
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its callers to do that. We must thus mark RSA-OAEP encryption and RSASVE
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as unapproved until we have received clarification from NIST on how
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library modules such as OpenSSL should implement TTP validation.
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This does not affect RSA-OAEP decryption, because it is approved as
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a component according to the FIPS 140-3 IG, section 2.4.G.
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Resolves: rhbz#2179331
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Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
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---
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include/openssl/core_names.h | 2 ++
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include/openssl/evp.h | 4 +++
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.../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 24 +++++++++++++++
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providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++-
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4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
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index 832502a034..e15d208421 100644
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--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
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+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
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@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern "C" {
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#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
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#endif
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+#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
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/*
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* Encoder / decoder parameters
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@@ -503,6 +504,7 @@ extern "C" {
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/* KEM parameters */
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#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION "operation"
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+#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
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/* OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION values */
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#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION_RSASVE "RSASVE"
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diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
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index ec2ba46fbd..3803b03422 100644
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--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
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+++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
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@@ -1757,6 +1757,10 @@ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 size_t EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count(void);
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OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_get0(size_t idx);
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# endif
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+# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
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+# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED 1
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+# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
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+
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EVP_KEYMGMT *EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
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const char *properties);
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int EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
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diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
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index 568452ec56..2e7ea632d7 100644
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--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
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+++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
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@@ -399,6 +399,27 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
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if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
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return 0;
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
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+ if (p != NULL) {
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+ int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
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+
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+ /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
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+ * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
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+ * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme, but
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+ * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
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+ * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
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+ * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
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+ * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSA-OAEP as unapproved until
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+ * we have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such
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+ * as OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
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+ fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
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+
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+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
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+
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -465,6 +493,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
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#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
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+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
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index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
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--- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
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+++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
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@@ -151,11 +151,39 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
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static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
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{
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PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
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+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
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+
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+ if (ctx == NULL)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
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+ if (p != NULL) {
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+ /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
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+ * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
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+ * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for key agreement or key transport, but
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+ * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
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+ * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
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+ * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
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+ * callers to do that. We must thus mark RSASVE unapproved until we
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+ * have received clarification from NIST on how library modules such as
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+ * OpenSSL should implement TTP validation. */
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+ int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
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+
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+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
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- return ctx != NULL;
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+ return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_rsakem_ctx_params[] = {
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+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
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+#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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--
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2.39.2
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