.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
+SOURCES/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz

.openssl.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-6fde639a66329f2cd9135eb192f2228f2a402c0e SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1k-hobbled.tar.xz
+f20736d6aae36bcbfa9aba0d358c71601833bf27 SOURCES/openssl-3.0.7.tar.gz

SOURCES/0001-Aarch64-and-ppc64le-use-lib64.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 603a35802319c0459737e3f067369ceb990fe2e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:01:41 +0200
+Subject: Aarch64 and ppc64le use lib64
+
+(Was openssl-1.1.1-build.patch)
+---
+ Configurations/10-main.conf | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/10-main.conf b/Configurations/10-main.conf
+index d7580bf3e1..a7dbfd7f40 100644
+--- a/Configurations/10-main.conf
++++ b/Configurations/10-main.conf
+@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ my %targets = (
+         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
+         asm_arch         => 'ppc64',
+         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
++        multilib         => "64",
+     },
+ 
+     "linux-armv4" => {
+@@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ my %targets = (
+         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64" ],
+         asm_arch         => 'aarch64',
+         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
++        multilib         => "64",
+     },
+     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
+         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32" ],
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

SOURCES/0002-Use-more-general-default-values-in-openssl.cnf.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,21 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf
---- openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults	2018-11-20 14:35:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf	2019-01-15 13:56:50.841719776 +0100
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate fi
+From 41df9ae215cee9574e17e6f887c96a7c97d588f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:03:40 +0200
+Subject: Use more general default values in openssl.cnf
+
+Also set sha256 as default hash, although that should not be
+necessary anymore.
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-defaults.patch)
+---
+ apps/openssl.cnf | 12 +++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/openssl.cnf b/apps/openssl.cnf
+index 97567a67be..eb25a0ac48 100644
+--- a/apps/openssl.cnf
++++ b/apps/openssl.cnf
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ cert_opt 	= ca_default		# Certificate field options
  
  default_days	= 365			# how long to certify for
  default_crl_days= 30			# how long before next CRL
@@ -10,7 +24,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  preserve	= no			# keep passed DN ordering
  
  # A few difference way of specifying how similar the request should look
-@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ emailAddress		= optional
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ emailAddress		= optional
  ####################################################################
  [ req ]
  default_bits		= 2048
@@ -18,7 +32,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
  distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
  attributes		= req_attributes
-@@ -128,17 +129,18 @@ string_mask = utf8only
+@@ -158,17 +159,18 @@ string_mask = utf8only
  
  [ req_distinguished_name ]
  countryName			= Country Name (2 letter code)
@@ -40,7 +54,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  
  # we can do this but it is not needed normally :-)
  #1.organizationName		= Second Organization Name (eg, company)
-@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city
+@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
  organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
  #organizationalUnitName_default	=
  
@@ -49,3 +63,6 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cnf.defaults openssl-1.1.1a/apps/openssl.cn
  commonName_max			= 64
  
  emailAddress			= Email Address
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

SOURCES/0003-Do-not-install-html-docs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 3d5755df8d09ca841c0aca2d7344db060f6cc97f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:05:55 +0200
+Subject: Do not install html docs
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-no-html.patch)
+---
+ Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+index 342e46d24d..9f369edf0e 100644
+--- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
++++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ install_sw: install_dev install_engines install_modules install_runtime
+ 
+ uninstall_sw: uninstall_runtime uninstall_modules uninstall_engines uninstall_dev
+ 
+-install_docs: install_man_docs install_html_docs
++install_docs: install_man_docs
+ 
+ uninstall_docs: uninstall_man_docs uninstall_html_docs
+ 	$(RM) -r $(DESTDIR)$(DOCDIR)
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

SOURCES/0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 6790960076742a9053c624e26fbb87fcd5789e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:17:26 +0200
+Subject: Override default paths for the CA directory tree
+
+Also add default section to load crypto-policies configuration
+for TLS.
+
+It needs to be reverted before running tests.
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-conf-paths.patch)
+---
+ apps/CA.pl.in    |  2 +-
+ apps/openssl.cnf | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/CA.pl.in b/apps/CA.pl.in
+index c0afb96716..d6a5fabd16 100644
+--- a/apps/CA.pl.in
++++ b/apps/CA.pl.in
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ my $X509 = "$openssl x509";
+ my $PKCS12 = "$openssl pkcs12";
+ 
+ # Default values for various configuration settings.
+-my $CATOP = "./demoCA";
++my $CATOP = "/etc/pki/CA";
+ my $CAKEY = "cakey.pem";
+ my $CAREQ = "careq.pem";
+ my $CACERT = "cacert.pem";
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf
+--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls	2021-07-06 13:41:39.204978272 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-07-06 13:49:50.362857683 +0200
+@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+ 
+ [openssl_init]
+ providers = provider_sect
++# Load default TLS policy configuration
++ssl_conf = ssl_module
++alg_section = evp_properties
++
++[ evp_properties ]
++#This section is intentionally added empty here
++#to be tuned on particular systems
+ 
+ # List of providers to load
+ [provider_sect]
+@@ -64,6 +66,13 @@ default = default_sect
+ [default_sect]
+ # activate = 1
+ 
++[ ssl_module ]
++
++system_default = crypto_policy
++
++[ crypto_policy ]
++
++.include = /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensslcnf.config
+ 
+ ####################################################################
+ [ ca ]
+@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ default_ca	= CA_default		# The default c
+ ####################################################################
+ [ CA_default ]
+ 
+-dir		= ./demoCA		# Where everything is kept
++dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# Where everything is kept
+ certs		= $dir/certs		# Where the issued certs are kept
+ crl_dir		= $dir/crl		# Where the issued crl are kept
+ database	= $dir/index.txt	# database index file.
+@@ -304,7 +313,7 @@ default_tsa = tsa_config1	# the default
+ [ tsa_config1 ]
+ 
+ # These are used by the TSA reply generation only.
+-dir		= ./demoCA		# TSA root directory
++dir		= /etc/pki/CA		# TSA root directory
+ serial		= $dir/tsaserial	# The current serial number (mandatory)
+ crypto_device	= builtin		# OpenSSL engine to use for signing
+ signer_cert	= $dir/tsacert.pem 	# The TSA signing certificate

SOURCES/0005-apps-ca-fix-md-option-help-text.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 3d8fa9859501b07e02b76b5577e2915d5851e927 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:27:18 +0200
+Subject: apps/ca: fix md option help text
+
+upstreamable
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch)
+---
+ apps/ca.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
+index 0f21b4fa1c..3d4b2c1673 100755
+--- a/apps/ca.c
++++ b/apps/ca.c
+@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
+     {"noemailDN", OPT_NOEMAILDN, '-', "Don't add the EMAIL field to the DN"},
+ 
+     OPT_SECTION("Signing"),
+-    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256"},
++    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest to use, such as sha256; see openssl help for list"},
+     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "The CA private key"},
+     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f',
+      "Private key file format (ENGINE, other values ignored)"},
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

SOURCES/0006-Disable-signature-verification-with-totally-unsafe-h.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 3f9deff30ae6efbfe979043b00cdf649b39793c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 09:51:34 +0200
+Subject: Disable signature verification with totally unsafe hash algorithms
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-no-weak-verify.patch)
+---
+ crypto/asn1/a_verify.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+index b7eed914b0..af62f0ef08 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,11 @@ int ASN1_item_verify_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+         if (ret <= 1)
+             goto err;
++    } else if ((mdnid == NID_md5
++               && ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY") == NULL) ||
++               mdnid == NID_md4 || mdnid == NID_md2 || mdnid == NID_sha) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
++        goto err;
+     } else {
+         const EVP_MD *type = NULL;
+ 
+-- 
+2.26.2
+

SOURCES/0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,25 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
---- openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist	2019-05-29 15:42:27.951329271 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl	2019-05-29 15:42:27.974328867 +0200
-@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
+From 736d709ec194b3a763e004696df22792c62a11fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 10:16:46 +0200
+Subject: Add support for PROFILE=SYSTEM system default cipherlist
+
+(was openssl-1.1.1-system-cipherlist.patch)
+---
+ Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl |  5 ++
+ Configure                         | 10 +++-
+ doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in   |  9 ++++
+ include/openssl/ssl.h.in          |  5 ++
+ ssl/ssl_ciph.c                    | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ ssl/ssl_lib.c                     |  4 +-
+ test/cipherlist_test.c            |  2 +
+ util/libcrypto.num                |  1 +
+ 8 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+index 9f369edf0e..c52389f831 100644
+--- a/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
++++ b/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+@@ -269,6 +269,10 @@ MANDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/man
  DOCDIR=$(INSTALLTOP)/share/doc/$(BASENAME)
  HTMLDIR=$(DOCDIR)/html
  
@@ -12,7 +30,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist open
  # MANSUFFIX is for the benefit of anyone who may want to have a suffix
  # appended after the manpage file section number.  "ssl" is popular,
  # resulting in files such as config.5ssl rather than config.5.
-@@ -203,6 +207,7 @@ CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $config{CC} -}
+@@ -292,6 +296,7 @@ CC=$(CROSS_COMPILE){- $config{CC} -}
  CXX={- $config{CXX} ? "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)$config{CXX}" : '' -}
  CPPFLAGS={- our $cppflags1 = join(" ",
                                    (map { "-D".$_} @{$config{CPPDEFINES}}),
@@ -20,60 +38,11 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.system-cipherlist open
                                    (map { "-I".$_} @{$config{CPPINCLUDES}}),
                                    @{$config{CPPFLAGS}}) -}
  CFLAGS={- join(' ', @{$config{CFLAGS}}) -}
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/Configure.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/Configure
---- openssl-1.1.1c/Configure.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/Configure	2019-05-29 15:45:10.465469533 +0200
-@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use OpenSSL::Glob;
- my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__};
- $SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler;
- 
--my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
-+my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--system-ciphers-file=SYSTEMCIPHERFILE] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
- 
- # Options:
- #
-@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher>
- #               This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C.
- #               (Default: PREFIX/ssl)
- #
-+# --system-ciphers-file  A file to read cipher string from when the PROFILE=SYSTEM
-+#		cipher is specified (default).
-+#
- # --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components.
- #
- # --api         One of 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or 1.1.0.  Do not compile support for
-@@ -295,6 +298,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
- $config{openssldir}="";
- $config{processor}="";
- $config{libdir}="";
-+$config{system_ciphers_file}="";
- my $auto_threads=1;    # enable threads automatically? true by default
- my $default_ranlib;
- 
-@@ -824,6 +828,10 @@ while (@argvcopy)
-                             push @seed_sources, $x;
-                             }
-                         }
-+		elsif (/^--system-ciphers-file=(.*)$/)
-+			{
-+			$config{system_ciphers_file}=$1;
-+			}
-                 elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/)
-                         {
-                         $user{CROSS_COMPILE}=$1;
-@@ -1016,6 +1024,8 @@ if ($target eq "HASH") {
-     exit 0;
- }
- 
-+chop $config{system_ciphers_file} if $config{system_ciphers_file} =~ /\/$/;
-+
- print "Configuring OpenSSL version $config{version} ($config{version_num}) ";
- print "for $target\n";
- 
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod
---- openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod	2019-05-29 15:42:27.975328849 +0200
-@@ -182,6 +182,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher s
+diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
+index b4ed3e51d5..2122e6bdfd 100644
+--- a/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
++++ b/doc/man1/openssl-ciphers.pod.in
+@@ -187,6 +187,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, the B<ALL> cipher suites are sensibly ordered by default.
  
  The cipher suites not enabled by B<ALL>, currently B<eNULL>.
  
@@ -89,34 +58,27 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/doc/man1/ciphers.pod.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/do
  =item B<HIGH>
  
  "High" encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h
---- openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/include/openssl/ssl.h	2019-05-29 15:42:27.975328849 +0200
-@@ -186,6 +186,11 @@ extern "C" {
+diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+index f9a61609e4..c6f95fed3f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
++++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ extern "C" {
   * throwing out anonymous and unencrypted ciphersuites! (The latter are not
   * actually enabled by ALL, but "ALL:RSA" would enable some of them.)
   */
 +# ifdef SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE
 +#  define SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "PROFILE=SYSTEM"
 +# else
-+#  define SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST
++#  define SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST OSSL_default_cipher_list()
 +# endif
  
  /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */
  # define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN       1
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2019-05-29 15:42:27.976328831 +0200
-@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
-  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
-  */
- 
-+/* for secure_getenv */
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <openssl/objects.h>
-@@ -1399,6 +1401,53 @@ int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const c
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+index b1d3f7919e..f7cc7fed48 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+@@ -1411,6 +1411,53 @@ int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str)
      return ret;
  }
  
@@ -129,7 +91,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
 +    const char *ciphers_path;
 +    unsigned len, slen;
 +
-+    if ((ciphers_path = secure_getenv("OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE")) == NULL)
++    if ((ciphers_path = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE")) == NULL)
 +        ciphers_path = SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE;
 +    fp = fopen(ciphers_path, "r");
 +    if (fp == NULL || fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) == NULL) {
@@ -167,13 +129,13 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
 +}
 +#endif
 +
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites,
                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
-@@ -1412,15 +1461,25 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
-     const char *rule_p;
+@@ -1425,15 +1472,25 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
      const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+     const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = ctx->method;
 +#ifdef SYSTEM_CIPHERS_FILE
 +    char *new_rules = NULL;
 +
@@ -191,23 +153,23 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
      if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
 -        return NULL;
 +        goto err;
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
      if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
 -        return NULL;
 +        goto err;
- #endif
  
      /*
-@@ -1443,7 +1502,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+      * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+@@ -1456,7 +1513,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers);
      if (co_list == NULL) {
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 -        return NULL;          /* Failure */
 +        goto err;
      }
  
      ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
-@@ -1509,8 +1568,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1522,8 +1579,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
       * in force within each class
       */
      if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) {
@@ -217,18 +179,18 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
      }
  
      /*
-@@ -1555,9 +1613,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1568,9 +1624,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
      ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max);
      if (ca_list == NULL) {
 -        OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 -        return NULL;          /* Failure */
 +        goto err;
      }
      ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
                                 disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
-@@ -1583,8 +1640,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1596,8 +1651,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      OPENSSL_free(ca_list);      /* Not needed anymore */
  
      if (!ok) {                  /* Rule processing failure */
@@ -238,7 +200,7 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
      }
  
      /*
-@@ -1592,14 +1648,18 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+@@ -1605,10 +1659,13 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
       * if we cannot get one.
       */
      if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) {
@@ -253,13 +215,8 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
 +
      /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */
      for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) {
-         if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack,
-                                 sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i))) {
-+            OPENSSL_free(co_list);
-             sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
-             return NULL;
-         }
-@@ -1631,6 +1691,14 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
+         const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i);
+@@ -1656,6 +1714,14 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
      *cipher_list = cipherstack;
  
      return cipherstack;
@@ -274,31 +231,33 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_
  }
  
  char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c.system-cipherlist	2019-05-29 15:42:27.970328937 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/ssl/ssl_lib.c	2019-05-29 15:42:27.977328814 +0200
-@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index d14d5819ba..48d491219a 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
                                  ctx->tls13_ciphersuites,
                                  &(ctx->cipher_list),
                                  &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
--                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
+-                                OSSL_default_cipher_list(), ctx->cert);
 +                                SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
      if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
          return 0;
-@@ -2954,7 +2954,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *m
-     if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+@@ -3193,7 +3193,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq,
+     if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret,
                                  ret->tls13_ciphersuites,
                                  &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
--                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
+-                                OSSL_default_cipher_list(), ret->cert)
 +                                SSL_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
          || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
          goto err2;
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c
---- openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c.system-cipherlist	2019-05-28 15:12:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c	2019-05-29 15:42:27.977328814 +0200
-@@ -251,7 +251,9 @@ end:
+diff --git a/test/cipherlist_test.c b/test/cipherlist_test.c
+index 380f0727fc..6922a87c30 100644
+--- a/test/cipherlist_test.c
++++ b/test/cipherlist_test.c
+@@ -244,7 +244,9 @@ end:
  
  int setup_tests(void)
  {
@@ -308,3 +267,57 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1c/test/cipherlist_test.c.system-cipherlist openssl-1.1.1c/
      ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_explicit);
      ADD_TEST(test_default_cipherlist_clear);
      return 1;
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 404a706fab..e81fa9ec3e 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -5282,3 +5282,4 @@ OSSL_DECODER_CTX_set_input_structure    ?	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_provider              5555	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      5556	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     5557	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++ossl_safe_getenv                        ?	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-- 
+2.26.2
+
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure.sys-default openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure
+--- openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure.sys-default	2021-06-29 11:47:58.978144386 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure	2021-06-29 11:52:01.631126260 +0200
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use OpenSSL::config;
+ my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__};
+ $SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler;
+ 
+-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
++my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--system-ciphers-file=SYSTEMCIPHERFILE] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+ 
+ my $banner = <<"EOF";
+ 
+@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ EOF
+ #               given with --prefix.
+ #               This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C.
+ #               (Default: PREFIX/ssl)
++#
++# --system-ciphers-file  A file to read cipher string from when the PROFILE=SYSTEM
++#		cipher is specified (default).
++#
+ # --banner=".." Output specified text instead of default completion banner
+ #
+ # -w            Don't wait after showing a Configure warning
+@@ -385,6 +389,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
+ $config{openssldir}="";
+ $config{processor}="";
+ $config{libdir}="";
++$config{system_ciphers_file}="";
+ my $auto_threads=1;    # enable threads automatically? true by default
+ my $default_ranlib;
+ 
+@@ -987,6 +992,10 @@ while (@argvcopy)
+                         die "FIPS key too long (64 bytes max)\n"
+                            if length $1 > 64;
+                         }
++		elsif (/^--system-ciphers-file=(.*)$/)
++			{
++			$config{system_ciphers_file}=$1;
++			}
+                 elsif (/^--banner=(.*)$/)
+                         {
+                         $banner = $1 . "\n";

SOURCES/0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 5b2ec9a54037d7b007324bf53e067e73511cdfe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 14:00:16 +0100
+Subject: Add FIPS_mode() compatibility macro
+
+The macro calls EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled() on the
+default context.
+---
+ include/openssl/crypto.h.in |  1 +
+ include/openssl/fips.h      | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/property_test.c        | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 include/openssl/fips.h
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/fips.h b/include/openssl/fips.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..c64f0f8e8f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/openssl/fips.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++ */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_H
++# define OPENSSL_FIPS_H
++# pragma once
++
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/macros.h>
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++# endif
++
++# define FIPS_mode() EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL)
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++# endif
++#endif
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c.fips-macro openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c.fips-macro	2021-06-29 12:14:58.851557698 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-beta1/test/property_test.c	2021-06-29 12:17:14.630143832 +0200
+@@ -488,6 +488,19 @@ static int test_property_list_to_string(
+     return ret;
+ }
+
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++static int test_downstream_FIPS_mode(void)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++
++    ret = TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=yes"))
++          && TEST_true(FIPS_mode())
++          && TEST_true(EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=no"))
++          && TEST_false(FIPS_mode());
++
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     ADD_TEST(test_property_string);
+@@ -500,6 +512,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(test_property);
+     ADD_TEST(test_query_cache_stochastic);
+     ADD_TEST(test_fips_mode);
++    ADD_TEST(test_downstream_FIPS_mode);
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_property_list_to_string, OSSL_NELEM(to_string_tests));
+     return 1;
+ }

SOURCES/0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c
+--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips	2021-03-16 00:09:55.814826432 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c	2021-03-16 00:15:55.129043811 +0100
+@@ -12,11 +12,46 @@
+ #include "internal/provider.h"
+ #include "crypto/ctype.h"
+ 
++# include <sys/types.h>
++# include <sys/stat.h>
++# include <fcntl.h>
++# include <unistd.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++
+ struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st {
+     ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn *fn;
+     struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st *next;
+ };
+ 
++# define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
++
++static int kernel_fips_flag;
++
++static void read_kernel_fips_flag(void)
++{
++	char buf[2] = "0";
++	int fd;
++
++	if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
++		buf[0] = '1';
++	} else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
++		while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;
++		close(fd);
++	}
++
++	if (buf[0] == '1') {
++		kernel_fips_flag = 1;
++	}
++
++		return;
++}
++
++int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()
++{
++	return kernel_fips_flag;
++}
++
++
+ struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
+     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+     CRYPTO_EX_DATA data;
+@@ -121,6 +170,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL default_conte
+ 
+ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(default_context_do_init)
+ {
++	 read_kernel_fips_flag();
+     return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL)
+         && context_init(&default_context_int);
+ }
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h
+--- openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips	2022-01-11 13:13:08.323238760 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/include/internal/provider.h	2022-01-11 13:13:43.522558909 +0100
+@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB
+                                 const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
+ void ossl_provider_deinit_child(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx);
+ 
++/* FIPS flag access */
++int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag(void);
++
+ # ifdef __cplusplus
+ }
+ # endif

SOURCES/0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+diff -up ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves ./apps/speed.c
+--- ./apps/speed.c.ec-curves	2023-03-14 04:44:12.545437892 +0100
++++ ./apps/speed.c	2023-03-14 04:48:28.606729067 +0100
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static double ffdh_results[FFDH_NUM][1];
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ 
+ enum ec_curves_t {
+-    R_EC_P160, R_EC_P192, R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
++    R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521,
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571,
+     R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571,
+@@ -376,8 +376,6 @@ enum ec_curves_t {
+ };
+ /* list of ecdsa curves */
+ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDSA_NUM] = {
+-    {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160},
+-    {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192},
+     {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224},
+     {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256},
+     {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384},
+@@ -404,8 +402,6 @@ static const OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[ECDS
+ enum { R_EC_X25519 = ECDSA_NUM, R_EC_X448, EC_NUM };
+ /* list of ecdh curves, extension of |ecdsa_choices| list above */
+ static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[EC_NUM] = {
+-    {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160},
+-    {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192},
+     {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224},
+     {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256},
+     {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384},
+@@ -1422,8 +1418,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
+      */
+     static const EC_CURVE ec_curves[EC_NUM] = {
+         /* Prime Curves */
+-        {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160},
+-        {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192},
+         {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224},
+         {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256},
+         {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384},
+diff -up ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c
+--- ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-curves	2023-03-14 06:22:41.542310442 +0100
++++ ./crypto/evp/ec_support.c	2023-03-21 11:24:18.378451683 +0100
+@@ -20,89 +20,15 @@ typedef struct ec_name2nid_st {
+ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] = {
+     /* prime field curves */
+     /* secg curves */
+-    {"secp112r1", NID_secp112r1 },
+-    {"secp112r2", NID_secp112r2 },
+-    {"secp128r1", NID_secp128r1 },
+-    {"secp128r2", NID_secp128r2 },
+-    {"secp160k1", NID_secp160k1 },
+-    {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1 },
+-    {"secp160r2", NID_secp160r2 },
+-    {"secp192k1", NID_secp192k1 },
+-    {"secp224k1", NID_secp224k1 },
+     {"secp224r1", NID_secp224r1 },
+     {"secp256k1", NID_secp256k1 },
+     {"secp384r1", NID_secp384r1 },
+     {"secp521r1", NID_secp521r1 },
+     /* X9.62 curves */
+-    {"prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1 },
+-    {"prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2 },
+-    {"prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3 },
+-    {"prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1 },
+-    {"prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2 },
+-    {"prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3 },
+     {"prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1 },
+     /* characteristic two field curves */
+     /* NIST/SECG curves */
+-    {"sect113r1", NID_sect113r1 },
+-    {"sect113r2", NID_sect113r2 },
+-    {"sect131r1", NID_sect131r1 },
+-    {"sect131r2", NID_sect131r2 },
+-    {"sect163k1", NID_sect163k1 },
+-    {"sect163r1", NID_sect163r1 },
+-    {"sect163r2", NID_sect163r2 },
+-    {"sect193r1", NID_sect193r1 },
+-    {"sect193r2", NID_sect193r2 },
+-    {"sect233k1", NID_sect233k1 },
+-    {"sect233r1", NID_sect233r1 },
+-    {"sect239k1", NID_sect239k1 },
+-    {"sect283k1", NID_sect283k1 },
+-    {"sect283r1", NID_sect283r1 },
+-    {"sect409k1", NID_sect409k1 },
+-    {"sect409r1", NID_sect409r1 },
+-    {"sect571k1", NID_sect571k1 },
+-    {"sect571r1", NID_sect571r1 },
+-    /* X9.62 curves */
+-    {"c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 },
+-    {"c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 },
+-    {"c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 },
+-    {"c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 },
+-    {"c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 },
+-    {"c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 },
+-    {"c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 },
+-    {"c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 },
+-    {"c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 },
+-    {"c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 },
+-    {"c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 },
+-    {"c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 },
+-    {"c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 },
+-    {"c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 },
+-    {"c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 },
+-    {"c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 },
+-    /*
+-     * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves
+-     * from X9.62]
+-     */
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 },
+-    {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 },
+-    /* IPSec curves */
+-    {"Oakley-EC2N-3", NID_ipsec3 },
+-    {"Oakley-EC2N-4", NID_ipsec4 },
+     /* brainpool curves */
+-    {"brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1 },
+-    {"brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1 },
+     {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1 },
+     {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1 },
+     {"brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1 },
+@@ -111,8 +37,6 @@ static const EC_NAME2NID curve_list[] =
+     {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1 },
+     {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1 },
+     {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1 },
+-    /* SM2 curve */
+-    {"SM2", NID_sm2 },
+ };
+ 
+ const char *OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(int nid)
+diff -up ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves ./test/acvp_test.inc
+--- ./test/acvp_test.inc.ec-curves	2023-03-14 06:38:20.563712586 +0100
++++ ./test/acvp_test.inc	2023-03-14 06:39:01.631080059 +0100
+@@ -212,15 +212,6 @@ static const unsigned char ecdsa_sigver_
+ };
+ static const struct ecdsa_sigver_st ecdsa_sigver_data[] = {
+     {
+-        "SHA-1",
+-        "P-192",
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg0),
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_pub0),
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_r0),
+-        ITM(ecdsa_sigver_s0),
+-        PASS,
+-    },
+-    {
+         "SHA2-512",
+         "P-521",
+         ITM(ecdsa_sigver_msg1),
+diff -up ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves ./test/ecdsatest.h
+--- ./test/ecdsatest.h.ec-curves	2023-03-14 04:49:16.148154472 +0100
++++ ./test/ecdsatest.h	2023-03-14 04:51:01.376096037 +0100
+@@ -32,23 +32,6 @@ typedef struct {
+ } ecdsa_cavs_kat_t;
+ 
+ static const ecdsa_cavs_kat_t ecdsa_cavs_kats[] = {
+-    /* prime KATs from X9.62 */
+-    {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, NID_sha1,
+-     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
+-     "1a8d598fc15bf0fd89030b5cb1111aeb92ae8baf5ea475fb",
+-     "0462b12d60690cdcf330babab6e69763b471f994dd702d16a563bf5ec08069705ffff65e"
+-     "5ca5c0d69716dfcb3474373902",
+-     "fa6de29746bbeb7f8bb1e761f85f7dfb2983169d82fa2f4e",
+-     "885052380ff147b734c330c43d39b2c4a89f29b0f749fead",
+-     "e9ecc78106def82bf1070cf1d4d804c3cb390046951df686"},
+-    {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, NID_sha1,
+-     "616263",                  /* "abc" */
+-     "7ef7c6fabefffdea864206e80b0b08a9331ed93e698561b64ca0f7777f3d",
+-     "045b6dc53bc61a2548ffb0f671472de6c9521a9d2d2534e65abfcbd5fe0c707fd9f1ed2e"
+-     "65f09f6ce0893baf5e8e31e6ae82ea8c3592335be906d38dee",
+-     "656c7196bf87dcc5d1f1020906df2782360d36b2de7a17ece37d503784af",
+-     "2cb7f36803ebb9c427c58d8265f11fc5084747133078fc279de874fbecb0",
+-     "2eeae988104e9c2234a3c2beb1f53bfa5dc11ff36a875d1e3ccb1f7e45cf"},
+     /* prime KATs from NIST CAVP */
+     {NID_secp224r1, NID_sha224,
+      "699325d6fc8fbbb4981a6ded3c3a54ad2e4e3db8a5669201912064c64e700c139248cdc1"
+diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t
+--- ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t.ec-curves	2023-03-14 04:51:45.215488277 +0100
++++ ./test/recipes/15-test_genec.t	2023-03-21 11:26:58.613885435 +0100
+@@ -41,37 +41,11 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupport
+     if disabled("ec");
+ 
+ my @prime_curves = qw(
+-    secp112r1
+-    secp112r2
+-    secp128r1
+-    secp128r2
+-    secp160k1
+-    secp160r1
+-    secp160r2
+-    secp192k1
+-    secp224k1
+     secp224r1
+     secp256k1
+     secp384r1
+     secp521r1
+-    prime192v1
+-    prime192v2
+-    prime192v3
+-    prime239v1
+-    prime239v2
+-    prime239v3
+     prime256v1
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9
+-    wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12
+-    brainpoolP160r1
+-    brainpoolP160t1
+-    brainpoolP192r1
+-    brainpoolP192t1
+-    brainpoolP224r1
+-    brainpoolP224t1
+     brainpoolP256r1
+     brainpoolP256t1
+     brainpoolP320r1
+@@ -136,7 +110,6 @@ push(@other_curves, 'SM2')
+     if !disabled("sm2");
+ 
+ my @curve_aliases = qw(
+-    P-192
+     P-224
+     P-256
+     P-384
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-remove openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c.ec-remove	2023-07-06 10:30:10.152621369 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/evp/ec_support.c	2023-07-06 10:34:00.557091758 +0200
+@@ -74,17 +74,6 @@ int ossl_ec_curve_name2nid(const char *n
+ /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
+ 
+ static const EC_NAME2NID nist_curves[] = {
+-    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
+-    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
+-    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
+-    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
+-    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
+-    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
+-    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
+-    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
+-    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
+-    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
+-    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
+     {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
+     {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
+     {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},

SOURCES/0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-22 13:10:45.718077845 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	2022-03-22 13:12:46.626599016 +0100
+@@ -895,6 +895,12 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **
+     if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT)
+         group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1;
+ 
++    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++        EC_GROUP_free(group);
++        ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     if (a) {
+         EC_GROUP_free(*a);
+         *a = group;
+@@ -954,6 +959,11 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(ret->group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     ret->version = priv_key->version;
+ 
+     if (priv_key->privateKey) {
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+index a84e088c19..6c37bf78ae 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+@@ -1724,6 +1724,11 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+         goto err;
+     }
+     if (named_group == group) {
++        if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
++            goto err;
++        }
++#if 0
+         /*
+          * If we did not find a named group then the encoding should be explicit
+          * if it was specified
+@@ -1739,6 +1744,7 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+             goto err;
+         }
+         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
++#endif
+     } else {
+         EC_GROUP_free(group);
+         group = named_group;
+diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
+index 4890b0555e..e11aec5b3b 100644
+--- a/test/ectest.c
++++ b/test/ectest.c
+@@ -2301,10 +2301,11 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
+     if (!TEST_ptr(params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld))
+         || !TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL))
+         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx), 0)
+-        || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
++        || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params), 0))
+         goto err;
+-
++/* As creating the key should fail, the rest of the test is pointless */
++# if 0
+     /*- Check that all the set values are retrievable -*/
+ 
+     /* There should be no match to a group name since the generator changed */
+@@ -2433,6 +2434,7 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ #endif
+         )
+         goto err;
++#endif
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     BN_free(order_out);
+@@ -2714,21 +2716,21 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
+ 
+     /* Compute keyexchange in both directions */
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx1 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey1, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 1)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
++            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 0)
++/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, NULL, &sslen), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, sslen)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1))
++            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1)*/)
+         goto err;
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx2 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey2, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
++            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
++/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, NULL, &t), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, t)
+             || !TEST_int_le(sslen, t)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1))
++            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1) */)
+         goto err;
+-
++#if 0
+     /* Both sides should expect the same shared secret */
+     if (!TEST_mem_eq(buf1, sslen, buf2, t))
+         goto err;
+@@ -2780,7 +2782,7 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
+             /* compare with previous result */
+             || !TEST_mem_eq(buf1, t, buf2, sslen))
+         goto err;
+-
++#endif
+     ret = 1;
+ 
+  err:
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-21 16:55:46.005558779 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c	2022-03-21 16:56:12.636792762 +0100
+@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
+ static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime_nc = NULL;
+ static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_prime = NULL;
+ static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = NULL;
+-static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;
++/*static OSSL_PARAM *ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = NULL;*/
+ 
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ static OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld_tri_nc = NULL;
+@@ -990,9 +990,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC, "EC")
+ DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
+ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC")
+-DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
+-IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)
+-IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")
++/*DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
++/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", 0)*/
++/*IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC")*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+ IMPLEMENT_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", 1)
+@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params_namedcurve(bld_prime_nc)
+         || !create_ec_explicit_prime_params(bld_prime)
+         || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime_nc))
+-        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))
++/*        || !TEST_ptr(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld_prime))*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri_nc = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
+         || !TEST_ptr(bld_tri = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
+@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     TEST_info("Generating EC keys...");
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC, "EC", EC_params);
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
+-    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
++/*    MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G, "EC", ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_nc);
+     MAKE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G, "EC", ec_explicit_tri_params_explicit);
+@@ -1389,8 +1389,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(EC);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+-        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);
+-        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);
++/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
++/*        ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
+ {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_nc);
+-    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);
++/*    OSSL_PARAM_free(ec_explicit_prime_params_explicit);*/
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime_nc);
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld_prime);
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(EC);
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrimeNamedCurve);
+-    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);
++/*    FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitPrime2G);*/
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTriNamedCurve);
+     FREE_DOMAIN_KEYS(ECExplicitTri2G);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-25 11:20:50.920949208 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt	2022-03-25 11:21:13.177147598 +0100
+@@ -121,18 +121,6 @@ AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEB
+ 3ev1gTwRBduzqqlwd54AUSgI+pjttW8zrWNitO8H1sf59MPWOESKxNtZ1+Nl
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
+-PrivateKey = EC_EXPLICIT
+------BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+-MIIBeQIBADCCAQMGByqGSM49AgEwgfcCAQEwLAYHKoZIzj0BAQIhAP////8AAAAB
+-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA////////////////MFsEIP////8AAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
+-///////////////8BCBaxjXYqjqT57PrvVV2mIa8ZR0GsMxTsPY7zjw+J9JgSwMV
+-AMSdNgiG5wSTamZ44ROdJreBn36QBEEE5JcIvn36opqjEm/k59Al40rBAxWM2TPG
+-l0L13Je51zHpfXQ9Z2o7IQicMXP4wSfJ0qCgg2bgydqoxlYrlLGuVQIhAP////8A
+-AAAA//////////+85vqtpxeehPO5ysL8YyVRAgEBBG0wawIBAQQgec92jwduadCk
+-OjoNRI+YT5Be5TkzZXzYCyTLkMOikDmhRANCAATtECEhQbLEaiUj/Wu0qjcr81lL
+-46dx5zYgArz/iaSNJ3W80oO+F7v04jlQ7wxQzg96R0bwKiMeq5CcW9ZFt6xg
+------END PRIVATE KEY-----
+-
+ PrivateKey = B-163
+ -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+ MGMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAA8ETDBKAgEBBBUDnQW0mLiHVha/jqFznX/K

SOURCES/0013-skipped-tests-EC-curves.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t
+--- ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 13:42:38.865508269 +0100
++++ ./test/recipes/15-test_ec.t	2023-03-14 13:43:36.237021635 +0100
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ subtest 'Ed448 conversions -- public key
+ 
+ subtest 'Check loading of fips and non-fips keys' => sub {
+     plan skip_all => "FIPS is disabled"
+-        if $no_fips;
++        if 1; #Red Hat specific, original value is $no_fips;
+ 
+     plan tests => 2;
+ 
+diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t
+--- ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 10:13:11.342056559 +0100
++++ ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_protect.t	2023-03-14 10:14:42.643873496 +0100
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not suppo
+ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a shared library build on Windows"
+     if $^O eq 'MSWin32' && !disabled("shared");
+ 
+-plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
++plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
+ 
+ my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_protect_test",
+                  data_file("server.pem"),
+diff -up ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t.skip-tests ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t
+--- ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t.skip-tests	2023-03-14 10:13:38.106296042 +0100
++++ ./test/recipes/65-test_cmp_vfy.t	2023-03-14 10:16:56.496071178 +0100
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ plan skip_all => "This test is not suppo
+ plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-ec build"
+     if disabled("ec");
+ 
+-plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
++plan skip_all => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
+ 
+ my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_vfy_test",
+                  data_file("server.crt"),     data_file("client.crt"),

SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
+--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:06:40.895793297 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-09-09 12:12:33.947482500 +0200
+@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+ tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
+ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+ 
+-# For FIPS
+-# Optionally include a file that is generated by the OpenSSL fipsinstall
+-# application. This file contains configuration data required by the OpenSSL
+-# fips provider. It contains a named section e.g. [fips_sect] which is
+-# referenced from the [provider_sect] below.
+-# Refer to the OpenSSL security policy for more information.
+-# .include fipsmodule.cnf
+-
+ [openssl_init]
+ providers = provider_sect
+ # Load default TLS policy configuration
+@@ -42,23 +42,27 @@ [ evp_properties ]
+ #This section is intentionally added empty here
+ #to be tuned on particular systems
+ 
+-# List of providers to load
+-[provider_sect]
+-default = default_sect
+-# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
+-# included fipsmodule.cnf.
+-# fips = fips_sect
++# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider.
++# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms:
++# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160
++# Symmetric Ciphers: Blowfish, CAST, DES, IDEA, RC2, RC4,RC5, SEED
++# Key Derivation Function (KDF): PBKDF1
++# In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
++# security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
++# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
+ 
+-# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
+-# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
+-#
+-# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
+-# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
+-# becomes unavailable in openssl.  As a consequence applications depending on
+-# OpenSSL may not work correctly which could lead to significant system
+-# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
+-[default_sect]
+-# activate = 1
++[provider_sect]
++default = default_sect
++##legacy = legacy_sect
++##
++[default_sect]
++activate = 1
++
++##[legacy_sect]
++##activate = 1
++
++#Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
++.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
+ 
+ [ ssl_module ]
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:09:38.079040853 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod	2021-09-09 12:11:56.646224876 +0200
+@@ -273,6 +273,14 @@ significant.
+ All parameters in the section as well as sub-sections are made
+ available to the provider.
+ 
++=head3 Loading the legacy provider
++
++Uncomment the sections that start with ## in openssl.cnf
++to enable the legacy provider.
++Note: In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
++security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
++to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
++
+ =head3 Default provider and its activation
+ 
+ If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.

SOURCES/0025-for-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
+--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx	2021-11-23 16:29:50.618691603 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-11-23 16:28:16.872882099 +0100
+@@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ providers = provider_sect
+ # to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
+ 
+ [provider_sect]
+-default = default_sect
++##default = default_sect
+ ##legacy = legacy_sect
+ ##
+-[default_sect]
+-activate = 1
++##[default_sect]
++##activate = 1
+ 
+ ##[legacy_sect]
+ ##activate = 1

SOURCES/0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit	2021-09-22 11:56:49.452507975 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t	2021-09-22 11:57:19.371764742 +0200
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ unless ($no_fips) {
+                              "recipes",
+                              "90-test_sslapi_data",
+                              "dhparams.pem")])),
+-                 "running sslapitest");
++                 "running sslapitest - FIPS");
+ }
+ 
+ unlink $tmpfilename;
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index e95d2657f46c..7af0eab3fce0 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -1158,6 +1158,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls(int cis_ktls, int sis_ktls,
+         goto end;
+     }
+ 
++    if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
++        testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
++        goto end;
++    }
++
+     /* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
+     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+                                        TLS_client_method(),
+@@ -1292,6 +1297,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls_sendfile(int tls_version, const char *cipher)
+         goto end;
+     }
+ 
++    if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
++        testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
++        goto end;
++    }
++
+     /* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
+     if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
+                                        TLS_client_method(),

SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#Note: provider_conf_activate() is introduced in downstream only. It is a rewrite
+#(partial) of the function provider_conf_load() under the 'if (activate) section.
+#If there is any change to this section, after deleting it in provider_conf_load()
+#ensure that you also add those changes to the provider_conf_activate() function.
+#additionally please add this check for cnf explicitly as shown below.
+#'ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;'
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact	2022-05-12 12:44:31.199034948 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c	2022-05-12 12:49:17.468318373 +0200
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/trace.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+ #include <openssl/safestack.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+@@ -136,58 +136,18 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
+-                              const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
++static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,const char *name,
++                                  const char *value, const char *path,
++                                  int soft, const CONF *cnf)
+ {
+-    int i;
+-    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
+-    int soft = 0;
+-    OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
+-    const char *path = NULL;
+-    long activate = 0;
+     int ok = 0;
+-
+-    name = skip_dot(name);
+-    OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
+-    /* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
+-    ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
+-
+-    if (!ecmds) {
+-        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR,
+-                       "section=%s not found", value);
+-        return 0;
+-    }
+-
+-    /* Find the needed data first */
+-    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
+-        CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
+-        const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
+-        const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
+-
+-        OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
+-                    confname, confvalue);
+-
+-        /* First handle some special pseudo confs */
+-
+-        /* Override provider name to use */
+-        if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
+-            name = confvalue;
+-        else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
+-            soft = 1;
+-        /* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
+-        else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
+-            path = confvalue;
+-        else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
+-            activate = 1;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (activate) {
+-        PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
+-            = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
+-                                    &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
++    PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
++        = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
++                                &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
+ 
+         if (pcgbl == NULL || !CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(pcgbl->lock)) {
+-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++           ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+             return 0;
+         }
+         if (!prov_already_activated(name, pcgbl->activated_providers)) {
+@@ -216,7 +176,7 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
+             if (path != NULL)
+                 ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
+ 
+-            ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf);
++            ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;
+ 
+             if (ok) {
+                 if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
+@@ -244,8 +204,59 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
+             }
+             if (!ok)
+                 ossl_provider_free(prov);
++        } else { /* No reason to activate the provider twice, returning OK */
++            ok = 1;
+         }
+         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
++    return ok;
++}
++
++static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
++                              const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
++{
++    int i;
++    STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
++    int soft = 0;
++    const char *path = NULL;
++    long activate = 0;
++    int ok = 0;
++
++    name = skip_dot(name);
++    OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
++    /* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
++    ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
++
++    if (!ecmds) {
++        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR,
++                       "section=%s not found", value);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    /* Find the needed data first */
++    for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
++        CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
++        const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
++        const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
++
++        OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
++                    confname, confvalue);
++
++        /* First handle some special pseudo confs */
++
++        /* Override provider name to use */
++        if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
++            name = confvalue;
++        else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
++            soft = 1;
++        /* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
++        else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
++            path = confvalue;
++        else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
++            activate = 1;
++    }
++
++    if (activate) {
++       ok = provider_conf_activate(libctx, name, value, path, soft, cnf);
+     } else {
+         OSSL_PROVIDER_INFO entry;
+ 
+@@ -306,6 +317,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODU
+             return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag() != 0) { /* XXX from provider_conf_load */
++        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf);
++#  define FIPS_LOCAL_CONF           OPENSSLDIR "/fips_local.cnf"
++
++        if (access(FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, R_OK) == 0) {
++            CONF *fips_conf = NCONF_new_ex(libctx, NCONF_default());
++            if (NCONF_load(fips_conf, FIPS_LOCAL_CONF, NULL) <= 0)
++                return 0;
++
++            if (provider_conf_load(libctx, "fips", "fips_sect", fips_conf) != 1) {
++                NCONF_free(fips_conf);
++                return 0;
++            }
++            NCONF_free(fips_conf);
++        } else {
++            if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
++                return 0;
++        }
++        /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even wwhen the test is failed so check explicitly */
++        if (OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "fips") != 1)
++            return 0;
++        if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
++            return 0;
++        if (EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(libctx, 1) != 1)
++            return 0;
++    }
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac	2023-01-05 10:03:44.864869710 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/fips/self_test.c	2023-01-05 10:15:17.041606472 +0100
+@@ -172,11 +172,27 @@ DEP_FINI_ATTRIBUTE void cleanup(void)
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
++#define HMAC_LEN 32
++/*
++ * The __attribute__ ensures we've created the .rodata1 section
++ * static ensures it's zero filled
++*/
++static const unsigned char __attribute__ ((section (".rodata1"))) fips_hmac_container[HMAC_LEN] = {0};
++
+ /*
+  * Calculate the HMAC SHA256 of data read using a BIO and read_cb, and verify
+  * the result matches the expected value.
+  * Return 1 if verified, or 0 if it fails.
+  */
++#ifndef __USE_GNU
++#define __USE_GNU
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#undef __USE_GNU
++#else
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#endif
++#include <link.h>
++
+ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
+                             unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
+                             OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
+@@ -189,9 +205,20 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
+     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
++    Dl_info info;
++    void *extra_info = NULL;
++    struct link_map *lm = NULL;
++    unsigned long paddr;
++    unsigned long off = 0;
+ 
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
+ 
++    if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
++                &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
++        goto err;
++    lm = extra_info;
++    paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
++
+     mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
+     if (mac == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -205,13 +233,42 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
+     if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    while (1) {
+-        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, sizeof(buf), &bytes_read);
++    while ((off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) <= paddr) {
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
+         if (status != 1)
+             break;
+         if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+             goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
+     }
++
++    if (off + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE > paddr) {
++        int delta = paddr - off;
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, delta, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            goto err;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
++        memset(buf, 0, HMAC_LEN);
++        if (status != 1)
++            goto err;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
++    while (bytes_read > 0) {
++        status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
++        if (status != 1)
++            break;
++        if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
++            goto err;
++	off += bytes_read;
++    }
++
+     if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
+         goto err;
+ 
+@@ -285,8 +342,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
+         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(fips_state_lock);
+     }
+ 
+-    if (st == NULL
+-            || st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
++    if (st == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
+         goto end;
+     }
+@@ -305,8 +361,9 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
+     if (ev == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
+-    module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
+-                                         &checksum_len);
++    module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
++    checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
++
+     if (module_checksum == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONFIG_DATA);
+         goto end;
+@@ -356,7 +413,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
+     ok = 1;
+ end:
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
+-    OPENSSL_free(module_checksum);
+     OPENSSL_free(indicator_checksum);
+ 
+     if (st != NULL) {
+diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-11-18 09:39:53.386817874 +0100
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ use platform;
+ 
+-my $no_check = disabled("fips");
++my $no_check = 1;
+ plan skip_all => "FIPS module config file only supported in a fips build"
+     if $no_check;
+ 
+diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t	2021-11-18 09:59:02.315619486 +0100
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ use platform;
+ 
+-my $no_check = disabled("fips");
++my $no_check = 1;
+ plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build"
+     if $no_check;
+ plan tests => 1;
+diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t	2021-11-18 09:59:55.365072074 +0100
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ use platform;
+ 
+-plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if disabled("fips");
++plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if 1;
+ 
+ plan tests => 29;
+ 
+diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t	2021-11-18 10:22:54.179659682 +0100
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+ 
+ plan tests =>
+     ($no_fips ? 1 : 5);
+diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t	2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t	2021-11-18 10:18:53.391721164 +0100
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
+ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+ 
+ $ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
+ 
+diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
+--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t	2021-11-18 10:32:17.734196705 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t	2021-11-18 10:18:30.695538445 +0100
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
+ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+ 
+ plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
+     if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
+--- /dev/null	2021-11-16 15:27:32.915000000 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/test/fipsmodule.cnf	2021-11-18 11:15:34.538060408 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++[fips_sect]
++activate = 1

SOURCES/0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c
+--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx	2021-11-22 13:09:28.232560235 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c	2021-11-22 13:12:22.272058910 +0100
+@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **ar
+     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+     CONF *conf = NULL;
+ 
++    BIO_printf(bio_err, "This command is not enabled in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL build, please consult Red Hat documentation to learn how to enable FIPS mode\n");
++    return 1;
++
+     if ((opts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:18:51.081406990 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod	2021-11-22 13:19:02.897508738 +0100
+@@ -158,10 +158,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and
+ 
+ Error Number to Error String Conversion.
+ 
+-=item B<fipsinstall>
+-
+-FIPS configuration installation.
+-
+ =item B<gendsa>
+ 
+ Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:24:51.359509501 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod	2021-11-22 13:26:02.360121820 +0100
+@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax wi
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+ L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
+-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
+ L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
+ L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
+ L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:21:13.812636065 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod	2021-11-22 13:24:12.278172847 +0100
+@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+-A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
+-is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
+-of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
+-This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
+-purposes:
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
+-
+-This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
+-run each time the module is used.
+-
+-=item - Verify the module's checksum.
+-
+-This is done each time the module is used.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
+-used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
+-
+-The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
+-whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
+-section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item B<activate>
+-
+-If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
+-significant.
+-
+-=item B<install-version>
+-
+-A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
+-
+-=item B<conditional-errors>
+-
+-The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
+-Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
+-accessible from this point on.
+-Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
+-generation, or the CRNG output test).
+-Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
+-continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
+-Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
+-continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
+-operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
+-
+-=item B<security-checks>
+-
+-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
+-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
+-A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
+-are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
+-the relevant Security Policy.
+-
+-=item B<module-mac>
+-
+-The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
+-
+-=item B<install-status>
+-
+-An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
+-This should only be written after the module has
+-successfully passed its self tests during installation.
+-If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
+-loads.
+-
+-=item B<install-mac>
+-
+-A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
+-changes to that value.
+-It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-For example:
+-
+- [fips_sect]
+- activate = 1
+- install-version = 1
+- conditional-errors = 1
+- security-checks = 1
+- module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
+- install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
+- install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
+-
+-=head1 NOTES
+-
+-When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
+-B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
+-non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
+-See L<config(5)>.
+-
+-=head1 SEE ALSO
+-
+-L<config(5)>
+-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
++This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
++automatically loaded when the system is booted in FIPS mode, or when the
++environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
++for more information.
+ 
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx	2021-11-22 13:18:13.850086386 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod	2021-11-22 13:18:24.607179038 +0100
+@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ A simple self test callback is shown bel
+ 
+ =head1 SEE ALSO
+ 
+-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
+ L<fips_config(5)>,
+ L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
+ L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
+--- openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.embed-hmac	2022-01-11 13:26:33.279906225 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in	2022-01-11 13:33:18.757994419 +0100
+@@ -8,236 +8,11 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS confi
+ =head1 SYNOPSIS
+ 
+ B<openssl fipsinstall>
+-[B<-help>]
+-[B<-in> I<configfilename>]
+-[B<-out> I<configfilename>]
+-[B<-module> I<modulefilename>]
+-[B<-provider_name> I<providername>]
+-[B<-section_name> I<sectionname>]
+-[B<-verify>]
+-[B<-mac_name> I<macname>]
+-[B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>]
+-[B<-noout>]
+-[B<-quiet>]
+-[B<-no_conditional_errors>]
+-[B<-no_security_checks>]
+-[B<-self_test_onload>]
+-[B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>]
+-[B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>]
+-[B<-config> I<parent_config>]
+ 
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+-
+-This command is used to generate a FIPS module configuration file.
+-This configuration file can be used each time a FIPS module is loaded
+-in order to pass data to the FIPS module self tests. The FIPS module always
+-verifies its MAC, but optionally only needs to run the KAT's once,
+-at installation.
+-
+-The generated configuration file consists of:
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item - A MAC of the FIPS module file.
+-
+-=item - A test status indicator.
+-
+-This indicates if the Known Answer Self Tests (KAT's) have successfully run.
+-
+-=item - A MAC of the status indicator.
+-
+-=item - A control for conditional self tests errors.
+-
+-By default if a continuous test (e.g a key pair test) fails then the FIPS module
+-will enter an error state, and no services or cryptographic algorithms will be
+-able to be accessed after this point.
+-The default value of '1' will cause the fips module error state to be entered.
+-If the value is '0' then the module error state will not be entered.
+-Regardless of whether the error state is entered or not, the current operation
+-(e.g. key generation) will return an error. The user is responsible for retrying
+-the operation if the module error state is not entered.
+-
+-=item - A control to indicate whether run-time security checks are done.
+-
+-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
+-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
+-The default value of '1' will perform the checks.
+-If the value is '0' the checks are not performed and FIPS compliance must
+-be done by procedures documented in the relevant Security Policy.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-This file is described in L<fips_config(5)>.
+-
+-=head1 OPTIONS
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item B<-help>
+-
+-Print a usage message.
+-
+-=item B<-module> I<filename>
+-
+-Filename of the FIPS module to perform an integrity check on.
+-The path provided in the filename is used to load the module when it is
+-activated, and this overrides the environment variable B<OPENSSL_MODULES>.
+-
+-=item B<-out> I<configfilename>
+-
+-Filename to output the configuration data to; the default is standard output.
+-
+-=item B<-in> I<configfilename>
+-
+-Input filename to load configuration data from.
+-Must be used if the B<-verify> option is specified.
+-
+-=item B<-verify>
+-
+-Verify that the input configuration file contains the correct information.
+-
+-=item B<-provider_name> I<providername>
+-
+-Name of the provider inside the configuration file.
+-The default value is C<fips>.
+-
+-=item B<-section_name> I<sectionname>
+-
+-Name of the section inside the configuration file.
+-The default value is C<fips_sect>.
+-
+-=item B<-mac_name> I<name>
+-
+-Specifies the name of a supported MAC algorithm which will be used.
+-The MAC mechanisms that are available will depend on the options
+-used when building OpenSSL.
+-To see the list of supported MAC's use the command
+-C<openssl list -mac-algorithms>.  The default is B<HMAC>.
+-
+-=item B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>
+-
+-Passes options to the MAC algorithm.
+-A comprehensive list of controls can be found in the EVP_MAC implementation
+-documentation.
+-Common control strings used for this command are:
+-
+-=over 4
+-
+-=item B<key>:I<string>
+-
+-Specifies the MAC key as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains
+-printable characters only).
+-The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
+-A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
+-If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
+-configured is used.
+-
+-=item B<hexkey>:I<string>
+-
+-Specifies the MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
+-The key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
+-A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
+-If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
+-configured is used.
+-
+-=item B<digest>:I<string>
+-
+-Used by HMAC as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains printable
+-characters only).
+-The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
+-To see the list of supported digests, use the command
+-C<openssl list -digest-commands>.
+-The default digest is SHA-256.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-=item B<-noout>
+-
+-Disable logging of the self tests.
+-
+-=item B<-no_conditional_errors>
+-
+-Configure the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test
+-fails as described above.
+-
+-=item B<-no_security_checks>
+-
+-Configure the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
+-
+-=item B<-self_test_onload>
+-
+-Do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and
+-"MAC status indicator" to the output configuration file. Without these fields
+-the self tests KATS will run each time the module is loaded. This option could be
+-used for cross compiling, since the self tests need to run at least once on each
+-target machine. Once the self tests have run on the target machine the user
+-could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other
+-mechanism.
+-
+-=item B<-quiet>
+-
+-Do not output pass/fail messages. Implies B<-noout>.
+-
+-=item B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>,
+-B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>
+-
+-The corrupt options can be used to test failure of one or more self tests by
+-name.
+-Either option or both may be used to select the tests to corrupt.
+-Refer to the entries for B<st-desc> and B<st-type> in L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)> for
+-values that can be used.
+-
+-=item B<-config> I<parent_config>
+-
+-Test that a FIPS provider can be loaded from the specified configuration file.
+-A previous call to this application needs to generate the extra configuration
+-data that is included by the base C<parent_config> configuration file.
+-See L<config(5)> for further information on how to set up a provider section.
+-All other options are ignored if '-config' is used.
+-
+-=back
+-
+-=head1 NOTES
+-
+-Self tests results are logged by default if the options B<-quiet> and B<-noout>
+-are not specified, or if either of the options B<-corrupt_desc> or
+-B<-corrupt_type> are used.
+-If the base configuration file is set up to autoload the fips module, then the
+-fips module will be loaded and self tested BEFORE the fipsinstall application
+-has a chance to set up its own self test callback. As a result of this the self
+-test output and the options B<-corrupt_desc> and B<-corrupt_type> will be ignored.
+-For normal usage the base configuration file should use the default provider
+-when generating the fips configuration file.
+-
+-=head1 EXAMPLES
+-
+-Calculate the mac of a FIPS module F<fips.so> and run a FIPS self test
+-for the module, and save the F<fips.cnf> configuration file:
+-
+- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips
+-
+-Verify that the configuration file F<fips.cnf> contains the correct info:
+-
+- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -in fips.cnf  -provider_name fips -verify
+-
+-Corrupt any self tests which have the description C<SHA1>:
+-
+- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips \
+-         -corrupt_desc 'SHA1'
+-
+-Validate that the fips module can be loaded from a base configuration file:
+-
+- export OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE=<path of configuration files>
+- export OPENSSL_MODULES=<provider-path>
+- openssl fipsinstall -config' 'default.cnf'
+-
+-
+-=head1 SEE ALSO
+-
+-L<config(5)>,
+-L<fips_config(5)>,
+-L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)>,
+-L<EVP_MAC(3)>
++This command is disabled.
++Please consult Red Hat Enterprise Linux documentation to learn how to correctly
++enable FIPS mode on Red Hat Enterprise
+ 
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 

SOURCES/0035-speed-skip-unavailable-dgst.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c
+--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c.beldmit	2021-12-21 15:14:04.210431584 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/speed.c	2021-12-21 15:46:05.554085125 +0100
+@@ -547,6 +547,9 @@ static int EVP_MAC_loop(int algindex, vo
+     for (count = 0; COND(c[algindex][testnum]); count++) {
+         size_t outl;
+ 
++        if (mctx == NULL)
++            return -1;
++
+         if (!EVP_MAC_init(mctx, NULL, 0, NULL)
+             || !EVP_MAC_update(mctx, buf, lengths[testnum])
+             || !EVP_MAC_final(mctx, mac, &outl, sizeof(mac)))

SOURCES/0044-FIPS-140-3-keychecks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c.fips3	2022-07-18 16:01:41.159543735 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/dh/dh_key.c	2022-07-18 16:24:30.251388248 +0200
+@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *k
+     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
+     int ret = -1;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int validate = 0;
++#endif
+ 
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+@@ -54,6 +57,13 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *k
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -262,6 +272,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+ #endif
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int validate = 0;
++#endif
+ 
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+@@ -354,8 +367,21 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+     if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, priv_key, pub_key))
+         goto err;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &validate) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
++        goto err;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+     dh->priv_key = priv_key;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (ossl_dh_check_pairwise(dh) <= 0) {
++        abort();
++    }
++#endif
++
+     dh->dirty_cnt++;
+     ok = 1;
+  err:
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.f188 openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.f188	2023-11-08 10:58:05.910031253 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2023-11-08 10:59:42.338526883 +0100
+@@ -326,6 +326,11 @@ static int ec_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey
+     eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+ 
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (ossl_ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_INVALID_KEY);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     pairwise_test = 1;
+ #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c.fips3	2022-07-25 13:42:46.814952053 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/exchange/ecdh_exch.c	2022-07-25 13:52:12.292065706 +0200
+@@ -488,6 +488,25 @@ int ecdh_plain_derive(void *vpecdhctx, u
+     }
+ 
+     ppubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(pecdhctx->peerk);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    {
++        BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(privk));
++        int check = 0;
++
++        if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++            goto end;
++        }
++
++        check = ossl_ec_key_public_check(pecdhctx->peerk, bn_ctx);
++        BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++
++        if (check <= 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EC_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++#endif
+ 
+     retlen = ECDH_compute_key(secret, size, ppubkey, privk, NULL);
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 11:44:18.451884117 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c	2023-02-20 12:39:46.037063842 +0100
+@@ -982,8 +982,17 @@ struct ec_gen_ctx {
+     int selection;
+     int ecdh_mode;
+     EC_GROUP *gen_group;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    void *ecdsa_sig_ctx;
++#endif
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
++void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx);
++int do_ec_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
++#endif
++
+ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection,
+                          const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+@@ -1002,6 +1011,10 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx,
+         OPENSSL_free(gctx);
+         gctx = NULL;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (gctx != NULL)
++        gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = ecdsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
++#endif
+     return gctx;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1272,6 +1285,12 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_C
+ 
+     if (gctx->ecdh_mode != -1)
+         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, gctx->ecdh_mode);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    /* Pairwise consistency test */
++    if ((gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0
++        && do_ec_pct(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx, "sha256", ec) != 1)
++        abort();
++#endif
+ 
+     if (gctx->group_check != NULL)
+         ret = ret && ossl_ec_set_check_group_type_from_name(ec, gctx->group_check);
+@@ -1341,7 +1359,10 @@ static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
+ 
+     if (gctx == NULL)
+         return;
+-
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    ecdsa_freectx(gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx);
++    gctx->ecdsa_sig_ctx = NULL;
++#endif
+     EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
+     BN_free(gctx->p);
+     BN_free(gctx->a);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 11:50:23.035194347 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c	2023-02-20 12:19:10.809768979 +0100
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ #include "crypto/ec.h"
+ #include "prov/der_ec.h"
+ 
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_sign_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign;
+@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_f
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final;
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ #endif
+ } PROV_ECDSA_CTX;
+ 
+-static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
++void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+ {
+     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx;
+ 
+@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx
+     return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+ }
+ 
+-static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
++void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
+ {
+     PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ 
+@@ -581,6 +581,35 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_
+     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++int do_ec_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *ec)
++{
++    static const unsigned char data[32];
++    unsigned char sigbuf[256];
++    size_t siglen = sizeof(sigbuf);
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, sizeof(sigbuf)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, ec, NULL) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (ecdsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    return 1;
++}
++#endif
++
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions[] = {
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign_init },
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 16:04:27.103364713 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c	2023-02-20 16:14:13.848119419 +0100
+@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct rsa_gen_ctx {
+ #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
+     /* ACVP test parameters */
+     OSSL_PARAM *acvp_test_params;
++    void *prov_rsa_ctx;
+ #endif
+ };
+ 
+@@ -447,6 +448,12 @@ static int rsa_gencb(int p, int n, BN_GE
+     return gctx->cb(params, gctx->cbarg);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq);
++void rsa_freectx(void *vctx);
++int do_rsa_pct(void *, const char *, void *);
++#endif
++
+ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type,
+                       const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+@@ -474,6 +481,10 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int
+ 
+     if (!rsa_gen_set_params(gctx, params))
+         goto err;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (gctx != NULL)
++        gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = rsa_newctx(provctx, NULL);
++#endif
+     return gctx;
+ 
+ err:
+@@ -630,6 +641,11 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_
+ 
+     rsa = rsa_tmp;
+     rsa_tmp = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    /* Pairwise consistency test */
++    if (do_rsa_pct(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx, "sha256", rsa) != 1)
++        abort();
++#endif
+  err:
+     BN_GENCB_free(gencb);
+     RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+@@ -645,6 +662,8 @@ static void rsa_gen_cleanup(void *genctx
+ #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
+     ossl_rsa_acvp_test_gen_params_free(gctx->acvp_test_params);
+     gctx->acvp_test_params = NULL;
++    rsa_freectx(gctx->prov_rsa_ctx);
++    gctx->prov_rsa_ctx = NULL;
+ #endif
+     BN_clear_free(gctx->pub_exp);
+     OPENSSL_free(gctx);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.pairwise	2023-02-20 16:04:22.548327811 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c	2023-02-20 16:17:50.064871695 +0100
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
+ 
+ #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
+ 
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
+@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_f
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
+-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
++OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
++void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
+     char *propq_copy = NULL;
+@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsac
+     return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+ }
+ 
+-static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
++void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ 
+@@ -1504,6 +1504,45 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ct
+     return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++int do_rsa_pct(void *vctx, const char *mdname, void *rsa)
++{
++    static const unsigned char data[32];
++    unsigned char *sigbuf = NULL;
++    size_t siglen = 0;
++    int ret = 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_sign_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, NULL, &siglen, 0) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++
++    if ((sigbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen)) == NULL)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_sign_final(vctx, sigbuf, &siglen, siglen) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_verify_init(vctx, mdname, rsa, NULL) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_signverify_update(vctx, data, sizeof(data)) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++
++    if (rsa_digest_verify_final(vctx, sigbuf, siglen) <= 0)
++        goto err;
++    ret = 1;
++
++ err:
++    OPENSSL_free(sigbuf);
++    return ret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+index e0d139d..35f23b2 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+@@ -463,6 +463,9 @@ static int rsa_keygen(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+             rsa->dmp1 = NULL;
+             rsa->dmq1 = NULL;
+             rsa->iqmp = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++            abort();
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         }
+     }
+     return ok;

SOURCES/0045-FIPS-services-minimize.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 17:11:36.146638536 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/capabilities.c	2022-05-05 17:12:00.138848787 +0200
+@@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM param_group_list
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", "EC", 25),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", "EC", 26),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", "EC", 27),
+-#  endif
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x25519", "X25519", "X25519", 28),
+     TLS_GROUP_ENTRY("x448", "X448", "X448", 29),
++#  endif
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+     /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are as per RFC 7919 */
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c.fipsmin2 openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c.fipsmin2	2022-05-05 11:42:58.596848856 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/fipsprov.c	2022-05-05 11:55:42.997562712 +0200
+@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ static void fips_deinit_casecmp(void);
+ 
+ #define ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, CHECK) { { NAMES, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, FUNC }, CHECK }
+ #define ALG(NAMES, FUNC) ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, NULL)
+-
+ extern OSSL_FUNC_core_thread_start_fn *c_thread_start;
+ int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ 
+@@ -191,13 +190,13 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx
+                                               &fips_prov_ossl_ctx_method);
+ 
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME);
+-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, "Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - OpenSSL FIPS Provider"))
+         return 0;
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION);
+-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR))
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
+         return 0;
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO);
+-    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_FULL_VERSION_STR))
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, REDHAT_FIPS_VERSION))
+         return 0;
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS);
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ossl_prov_is_running()))
+@@ -281,10 +280,11 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_digests
+      * KECCAK-KMAC-128 and KECCAK-KMAC-256 as hashes are mostly useful for
+      * KMAC128 and KMAC256.
+      */
+-    { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
++    /* We don't certify KECCAK in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+       ossl_keccak_kmac_128_functions },
+     { PROV_NAMES_KECCAK_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+-      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions },
++      ossl_keccak_kmac_256_functions }, */
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -343,8 +343,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM_CAPABLE fips
+     ALGC(PROV_NAMES_AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA256, ossl_aes256cbc_hmac_sha256_functions,
+          ossl_cipher_capable_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256),
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-    ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
+-    ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions),
++    /* We don't certify 3DES in our FIPS provider */
++    /* ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_ECB, ossl_tdes_ede3_ecb_functions),
++    ALG(PROV_NAMES_DES_EDE3_CBC, ossl_tdes_ede3_cbc_functions), */
+ #endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */
+     { { NULL, NULL, NULL }, NULL }
+ };
+@@ -356,8 +357,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_macs[]
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_GMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_gmac_functions },
+     { PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_hmac_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions },
++    /* We don't certify KMAC in our FIPS provider */
++    /*{ PROV_NAMES_KMAC_128, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac128_functions },
++    { PROV_NAMES_KMAC_256, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kmac256_functions }, */
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -392,8 +394,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     { PROV_NAMES_ECDH, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdh_keyexch_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },
++    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
++    /*{ PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keyexch_functions },
++    { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keyexch_functions },*/
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+       ossl_kdf_tls1_prf_keyexch_functions },
+@@ -403,12 +406,14 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch
+ 
+ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions },
++    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_signature_functions }, */
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_signature_functions },
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+-    { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions },
++    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_signature_functions },
++    { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_signature_functions }, */
+     { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ecdsa_signature_functions },
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_HMAC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
+@@ -438,8 +443,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt
+       PROV_DESCS_DHX },
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-    { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
+-      PROV_DESCS_DSA },
++    /* We don't certify DSA in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_DSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_dsa_keymgmt_functions,
++      PROV_DESCS_DSA }, */
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_RSA },
+@@ -448,14 +454,15 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keymgmt
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     { PROV_NAMES_EC, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ec_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_EC },
+-    { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
++    /* We don't certify Edwards curves in our FIPS provider */
++    /* { PROV_NAMES_X25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x25519_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_X25519 },
+     { PROV_NAMES_X448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_x448_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_X448 },
+     { PROV_NAMES_ED25519, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed25519_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_ED25519 },
+     { PROV_NAMES_ED448, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_ed448_keymgmt_functions,
+-      PROV_DESCS_ED448 },
++      PROV_DESCS_ED448 }, */
+ #endif
+     { PROV_NAMES_TLS1_PRF, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions,
+       PROV_DESCS_TLS1_PRF_SIGN },
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 12:36:32.335069046 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc	2022-05-05 12:40:02.427966128 +0200
+@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_DIGEST st_kat_digest
+ /*- CIPHER TEST DATA */
+ 
+ /* DES3 test data */
++#if 0
+ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_pt[] = {
+     0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
+     0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
+@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ static const unsigned char des_ede3_cbc_
+     0x51, 0x65, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1F, 0x25, 0xB5, 0x0F,
+     0x73, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x5C, 0x8E, 0x0D, 0xA7
+ };
+-
++#endif
+ /* AES-256 GCM test data */
+ static const unsigned char aes_256_gcm_key[] = {
+     0x92, 0xe1, 0x1d, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x86, 0x6f, 0x5c,
+@@ -235,6 +236,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_128_ecb_c
+ };
+ 
+ static const ST_KAT_CIPHER st_kat_cipher_tests[] = {
++#if 0
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+     {
+         {
+@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_CIPHER st_kat_cipher
+         ITM(des_ede3_cbc_iv),
+     },
+ #endif
++#endif
+     {
+         {
+             OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_CIPHER_AES_GCM,
+@@ -1424,8 +1427,9 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_bin_key[
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC2M */
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+ 
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ /* dsa 2048 */
++#if 0
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ static const unsigned char dsa_p[] = {
+     0xa2, 0x9b, 0x88, 0x72, 0xce, 0x8b, 0x84, 0x23,
+     0xb7, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x7e,
+@@ -1549,8 +1553,8 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dsa_key[] = {
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, dsa_priv),
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+ };
+-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+-
++#endif
++#endif
+ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tests[] = {
+     {
+         OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_RSA,
+@@ -1583,6 +1587,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
+     },
+ # endif
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
++#if 0
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+     {
+         OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_DSA,
+@@ -1595,6 +1600,7 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
+          */
+     },
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ static const ST_KAT_ASYM_CIPHER st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[] = {
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c.fipsmin2 openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c.fipsmin2	2022-05-05 11:42:58.597848865 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/acvp_test.c	2022-05-05 11:43:30.141126336 +0200
+@@ -1476,6 +1476,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+                   OSSL_NELEM(dh_safe_prime_keyver_data));
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+ 
++#if 0 /* Red Hat FIPS provider doesn't have fips=yes property on DSA */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_keygen_data));
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_paramgen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_paramgen_data));
+@@ -1483,6 +1484,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_siggen_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_siggen_data));
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(dsa_sigver_test, OSSL_NELEM(dsa_sigver_data));
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#endif
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(ecdsa_keygen_test, OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_keygen_data));
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 14:18:46.370911817 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/evp_libctx_test.c	2022-05-05 14:30:02.117911993 +0200
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+  */
+ #include "internal/deprecated.h"
+ #include <assert.h>
++#include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+@@ -725,8 +726,10 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     if (!test_get_libctx(&libctx, &nullprov, config_file, &libprov, prov_name))
+         return 0;
+ 
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+-    ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
++    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
++        ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dsa_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
++    }
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dh_safeprime_param_keygen, 3 * 3 * 3);
+@@ -746,7 +750,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     ADD_TEST(kem_invalid_keytype);
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-    ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
++    if (strcmp(prov_name, "fips") != 0) {
++        ADD_TEST(test_cipher_tdes_randkey);
++    }
+ #endif
+     return 1;
+ }
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 13:46:00.631590335 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/15-test_gendsa.t	2022-05-05 13:46:06.999644496 +0200
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use lib bldtop_dir('.');
+ plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-dsa build"
+     if disabled("dsa");
+ 
+-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
++my $no_fips = 1;
+ 
+ plan tests =>
+     ($no_fips ? 0 : 2)          # FIPS related tests
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 13:47:55.217564900 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/20-test_cli_fips.t	2022-05-05 13:48:02.824629600 +0200
+@@ -207,8 +207,7 @@ SKIP: {
+ }
+ 
+ SKIP : {
+-    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1
+-        if disabled("dsa");
++    skip "FIPS DSA tests because of no dsa in this build", 1;
+ 
+     subtest DSA => sub {
+         my $testtext_prefix = 'DSA';
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 13:55:05.257292637 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t	2022-05-05 13:58:35.307150750 +0200
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key",
++    [ "signed content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER", "-nodetach",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key",
++    [ "signed detached content DER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+       [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER",
+@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing)",
++    [ "signed detached content DER format, add RSA signer (with DSA existing), no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-resign", "-in", "{output}.cms", "-inform", "DER", "-outform", "DER",
+@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, DSA key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-nodetach", "-stream",
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smdsa1.pem"), "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-nodetach", "-stream",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no attributes, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-noattr", "-nodetach", "-stream",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&zero_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-nodetach",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming multipart S/MIME format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont,
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+ 
+ my @smime_cms_tests = (
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid",
++    [ "signed content test streaming BER format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, keyid, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "DER",
+         "-nodetach", "-keyid",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys",
++    [ "signed content test streaming PEM format, 2 DSA and 2 RSA keys, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM", "-nodetach",
+         "-signer", $smrsa1,
+         "-signer", catfile($smdir, "smrsa2.pem"),
+@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ my @smime_cms_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key",
++    [ "encrypted content test streaming PEM format, triple DES key, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-EncryptedData_encrypt", "-in", $smcont, "-outform", "PEM",
+         "-des3", "-secretkey", "000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617",
+         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 14:43:04.276857033 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp.t	2022-05-05 14:43:35.975138234 +0200
+@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ my @files = qw(
+                 evpciph_aes_cts.txt
+                 evpciph_aes_wrap.txt
+                 evpciph_aes_stitched.txt
+-                evpciph_des3_common.txt
+                 evpkdf_hkdf.txt
+                 evpkdf_pbkdf1.txt
+                 evpkdf_pbkdf2.txt
+@@ -66,12 +65,6 @@ push @files, qw(
+                 evppkey_dh.txt
+                ) unless $no_dh;
+ push @files, qw(
+-                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
+-                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
+-               ) unless $no_des;
+-push @files, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
+-push @files, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
+-push @files, qw(
+                 evppkey_ecc.txt
+                 evppkey_ecdh.txt
+                 evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+@@ -91,6 +84,7 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
+                      evpciph_cast5.txt
+                      evpciph_chacha.txt
+                      evpciph_des.txt
++                     evpciph_des3_common.txt
+                      evpciph_idea.txt
+                      evpciph_rc2.txt
+                      evpciph_rc4.txt
+@@ -117,6 +111,12 @@ my @defltfiles = qw(
+                      evppkey_kdf_tls1_prf.txt
+                      evppkey_rsa.txt
+                     );
++push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_dsa.txt) unless $no_dsa;
++push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_ecx.txt) unless $no_ec;
++push @defltfiles, qw(
++                evpkdf_x942_des.txt
++                evpmac_cmac_des.txt
++               ) unless $no_des;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_brainpool.txt) unless $no_ec;
+ push @defltfiles, qw(evppkey_sm2.txt) unless $no_sm2;
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 14:46:32.721700697 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac_common.txt	2022-05-05 14:51:40.205418897 +0200
+@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ Input = 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E54100
+ Output = 00BDA1B7E87608BCBF470F12157F4C07
+ 
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Title = KMAC Tests (From NIST)
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+@@ -338,12 +339,14 @@ Ctrl = xof:0
+ OutputSize = 32
+ BlockSize = 168
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 3B1FBA963CD8B0B59E8C1A6D71888B7143651AF8BA0A7070C0979E2811324AA5
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -351,6 +354,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 1F5B4E6CCA02209E0DCB5CA635B89A15E271ECC760071DFD805FAA38F9729230
+ Ctrl = size:32
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -359,12 +363,14 @@ Output = 20C570C31346F703C9AC36C61C03CB6
+ OutputSize = 64
+ BlockSize = 136
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+ Custom = ""
+ Output = 75358CF39E41494E949707927CEE0AF20A3FF553904C86B08F21CC414BCFD691589D27CF5E15369CBBFF8B9A4C2EB17800855D0235FF635DA82533EC6B759B69
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -374,12 +380,14 @@ Ctrl = size:64
+ 
+ Title = KMAC XOF Tests (From NIST)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+ Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -387,6 +395,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -395,6 +404,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF6584
+ XOF = 1
+ Ctrl = size:32
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -402,6 +412,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -409,6 +420,7 @@ Custom = ""
+ Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
+ XOF = 1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -419,6 +431,7 @@ XOF = 1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC long customisation string (from NIST ACVP)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
+ Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
+@@ -429,12 +442,14 @@ XOF = 1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC XOF Tests via ctrl (From NIST)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+ Output = CD83740BBD92CCC8CF032B1481A0F4460E7CA9DD12B08A0C4031178BACD6EC35
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -442,6 +457,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 31A44527B4ED9F5C6101D11DE6D26F0620AA5C341DEF41299657FE9DF1A3B16C
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -450,6 +466,7 @@ Output = 47026C7CD793084AA0283C253EF6584
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ Ctrl = size:32
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 00010203
+@@ -457,6 +474,7 @@ Custom = "My Tagged Application"
+ Output = 1755133F1534752AAD0748F2C706FB5C784512CAB835CD15676B16C0C6647FA96FAA7AF634A0BF8FF6DF39374FA00FAD9A39E322A7C92065A64EB1FB0801EB2B
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -464,6 +482,7 @@ Custom = ""
+ Output = FF7B171F1E8A2B24683EED37830EE797538BA8DC563F6DA1E667391A75EDC02CA633079F81CE12A25F45615EC89972031D18337331D24CEB8F8CA8E6A19FD98B
+ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -474,6 +493,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC long customisation string via ctrl (from NIST ACVP)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 9743DBF93102FAF11227B154B8ACD16CF142671F7AA16C559A393A38B4CEF461ED29A6A328D7379C99718790E38B54CA25E9E831CBEA463EE704D1689F94629AB795DF0C77F756DA743309C0E054596BA2D9CC1768ACF7CD351D9A7EB1ABD0A3
+ Input = BA63AC9C711F143CCE7FF92D0322649D1BE437D805FD225C0A2879A008373EC3BCCDB09971FAD2BCE5F4347AF7E5238EF01A90ED34193D6AFC1D
+@@ -484,6 +504,7 @@ Ctrl = xof:1
+ 
+ Title = KMAC long customisation string negative test
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC128
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+@@ -492,6 +513,7 @@ Result = MAC_INIT_ERROR
+ 
+ Title = KMAC output is too large
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ MAC = KMAC256
+ Key = 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F
+ Input = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.fipsmin3	2022-05-05 16:02:59.745500635 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t	2022-05-05 16:10:24.071348890 +0200
+@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ sub testssl {
+         my @exkeys = ();
+         my $ciphers = '-PSK:-SRP:@SECLEVEL=0';
+ 
+-        if (!$no_dsa) {
++        if (!$no_dsa && $provider ne "fips") {
+             push @exkeys, "-s_cert", "certD.ss", "-s_key", $Dkey;
+         }
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.fipsmin3 openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.fipsmin3	2022-05-06 16:25:57.296926271 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c	2022-05-06 16:27:42.712850840 +0200
+@@ -1387,6 +1387,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+          * so no legacy tests.
+          */
+ #endif
++    if (is_fips == 0) {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(DSA);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(DSA);
+@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PROTECTED_PVK(DSA);
+ # endif
+ #endif
++    }
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(EC);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_PARAMS(EC);
+@@ -1411,10 +1413,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ECExplicitTri2G);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE_LEGACY(ECExplicitTri2G);
+ # endif
++    if (is_fips == 0) {
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED25519);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(ED448);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X25519);
+         ADD_TEST_SUITE(X448);
++    }
+         /*
+          * ED25519, ED448, X25519 and X448 have no support for
+          * PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey_traditional(), so no legacy tests.
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c.dfc openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c.dfc	2022-05-12 13:31:21.957638329 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/req.c	2022-05-12 13:31:49.587984867 +0200
+@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, reqflag = 0;
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
++    cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ #endif
+ 
+     prog = opt_init(argc, argv, req_options);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c.fips_list_curves openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c.fips_list_curves	2022-05-19 11:46:22.682519422 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/ecparam.c	2022-05-19 11:50:44.559828701 +0200
+@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
+         const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
+         const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
+ 
++        if ((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
++            continue;
++
+         if (comment == NULL)
+             comment = "CURVE DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE";
+         if (sname == NULL)
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.nokrsa openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c.nokrsa	2022-05-19 13:32:32.536708638 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/ssl/ssl_ciph.c	2022-05-19 13:42:29.734002959 +0200
+@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+     ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
+     ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0;
+ 
++    if (EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(ctx->libctx))
++        ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
++
+     /*
+      * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail
+      * if theose algorithms are not available.
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.fipskeylen openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c.fipskeylen	2022-05-23 14:58:07.764281242 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c	2022-05-23 15:10:29.327993616 +0200
+@@ -692,6 +692,19 @@ static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprs
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+     int ret;
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
++
++    if (rsabits < 2048) {
++        if (rsabits != 1024
++            && rsabits != 1280
++            && rsabits != 1536
++            && rsabits != 1792) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++# endif
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+@@ -770,6 +770,19 @@ static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, co
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+     size_t rslen;
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    size_t rsabits = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
++
++    if (rsabits < 2048) {
++        if (rsabits != 1024
++            && rsabits != 1280
++            && rsabits != 1536
++            && rsabits != 1792) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_FIPS, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++# endif
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c.minfips openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c.minfips	2023-06-24 09:58:57.773344910 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/apps/ecparam.c	2023-06-26 09:18:06.843859405 +0200
+@@ -79,7 +79,11 @@ static int list_builtin_curves(BIO *out)
+         const char *comment = curves[n].comment;
+         const char *sname = OBJ_nid2sn(curves[n].nid);
+ 
+-        if ((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
++        if (((curves[n].nid == NID_secp256k1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP256t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP320t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP384t1) || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512r1)
++            || (curves[n].nid == NID_brainpoolP512t1)) && EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL))
+             continue;
+ 
+         if (comment == NULL)

SOURCES/0047-FIPS-early-KATS.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c.earlykats	2022-01-19 13:10:00.635830783 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test.c	2022-01-19 13:11:43.309342656 +0100
+@@ -362,6 +362,16 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
+     if (ev == NULL)
+         goto end;
+ 
++    /*
++     * Run the KAT's before HMAC verification according to FIPS-140-3 requirements
++     */
++    if (kats_already_passed == 0) {
++        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
++            goto end;
++        }
++    }
++
+     module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
+     checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
+ 
+@@ -411,18 +421,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
+             kats_already_passed = 1;
+         }
+     }
+-
+-    /*
+-     * Only runs the KAT's during installation OR on_demand().
+-     * NOTE: If the installation option 'self_test_onload' is chosen then this
+-     * path will always be run, since kats_already_passed will always be 0.
+-     */
+-    if (on_demand_test || kats_already_passed == 0) {
+-        if (!SELF_TEST_kats(ev, st->libctx)) {
+-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_SELF_TEST_KAT_FAILURE);
+-            goto end;
+-        }
+-    }
+     ok = 1;
+ end:
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);

SOURCES/0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+From 243201772cc6d583fae9eba81cb2c2c7425bc564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 17:24:44 +0100
+Subject: Selectively disallow SHA1 signatures
+
+For RHEL 9.0, we want to phase out SHA1. One of the steps to do that is
+disabling SHA1 signatures. Introduce a new configuration option in the
+alg_section named 'rh-allow-sha1-signatures'. This option defaults to
+false. If set to false (or unset), any signature creation or
+verification operations that involve SHA1 as digest will fail.
+
+This also affects TLS, where the signature_algorithms extension of any
+ClientHello message sent by OpenSSL will no longer include signatures
+with the SHA1 digest if rh-allow-sha1-signatures is false. For servers
+that request a client certificate, the same also applies for
+CertificateRequest messages sent by them.
+
+For signatures created using the EVP_PKEY API, this is a best-effort
+check that will deny signatures in cases where the digest algorithm is
+known. This means, for example, that that following steps will still
+work:
+
+ $> openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -out sha1 infile
+ $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey key.pem -sign -in sha1 -out sha1sig
+ $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey key.pem -verify -sigfile sha1sig -in sha1
+
+whereas these will not:
+
+ $> openssl dgst -sha1 -binary -out sha1 infile
+ $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey kem.pem -sign -in sha1 -out sha1sig -pkeyopt digest:sha1
+ $> openssl pkeyutl -inkey kem.pem -verify -sigfile sha1sig -in sha1 -pkeyopt digest:sha1
+
+This happens because in the first case, OpenSSL's signature
+implementation does not know that it is signing a SHA1 hash (it could be
+signing arbitrary data).
+
+Resolves: rhbz#2031742
+---
+ crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c                          | 13 ++++
+ crypto/evp/m_sigver.c                         | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c                        | 15 ++++
+ doc/man5/config.pod                           | 11 +++
+ include/internal/cryptlib.h                   |  3 +-
+ include/internal/sslconf.h                    |  4 +
+ providers/common/securitycheck.c              | 20 +++++
+ providers/common/securitycheck_default.c      |  9 ++-
+ providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c | 11 ++-
+ .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 +
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 20 ++++-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c                                  |  8 ++
+ util/libcrypto.num                            |  2 +
+ 13 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
+index 0e7fe64cf9..b9d3b6d226 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include <openssl/conf.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+@@ -57,6 +58,18 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
+                 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
+                 return 0;
+             }
++        } else if (strcmp(oval->name, "rh-allow-sha1-signatures") == 0) {
++            int m;
++
++            /* Detailed error already reported. */
++            if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m))
++                return 0;
++
++            if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(
++                    NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf), m > 0, 0)) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE);
++                return 0;
++            }
+         } else {
+             ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION,
+                            "name=%s, value=%s", oval->name, oval->value);
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+index 9188edbc21..db1a1d7bc3 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+@@ -16,6 +16,71 @@
+ #include "internal/numbers.h"   /* includes SIZE_MAX */
+ #include "evp_local.h"
+ 
++typedef struct ossl_legacy_digest_signatures_st {
++    int allowed;
++} OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES;
++
++static void ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free(void *vldsigs)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs = vldsigs;
++
++    if (ldsigs != NULL) {
++        OPENSSL_free(ldsigs);
++    }
++}
++
++static void *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES));
++}
++
++static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_method = {
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_DEFAULT_PRIORITY,
++    ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_new,
++    ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_free,
++};
++
++static OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(
++        OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
++{
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (loadconfig && !OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
++        return 0;
++#endif
++
++    return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES,
++                                 &ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_method);
++}
++
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
++        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
++
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENABLE_SHA1_SIGNATURES") != NULL)
++        /* used in tests */
++        return 1;
++#endif
++
++    return ldsigs != NULL ? ldsigs->allowed : 0;
++}
++
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
++                                                  int loadconfig)
++{
++    OSSL_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES *ldsigs
++        = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures(libctx, loadconfig);
++
++    if (ldsigs == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    ldsigs->allowed = allow;
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ 
+ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+@@ -258,6 +323,18 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
++        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(ctx->reqdigest);
++        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(locpctx->libctx, 0)
++                && (mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (ver) {
+         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+index 2b9c6c2351..3c5a1e6f5d 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/pmeth_lib.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include "internal/ffc.h"
+ #include "internal/numbers.h"
+ #include "internal/provider.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "evp_local.h"
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+@@ -946,6 +947,20 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+         return -2;
+     }
+ 
++    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
++            && md != NULL
++            && ctx->pkey != NULL
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
++            && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(ctx->pkey, SN_hkdf)) {
++        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
++        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
++                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
++            return -1;
++        }
++    }
++
+     if (fallback)
+         return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, op, ctrl, 0, (void *)(md));
+ 
+diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
+index 77a8055e81..aa1be5ca7f 100644
+--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
++++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
+@@ -304,6 +304,17 @@ Within the algorithm properties section, the following names have meaning:
+ The value may be anything that is acceptable as a property query
+ string for EVP_set_default_properties().
+ 
++=item B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures>
++
++The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is not set,
++it behaves as if it was set to B<no>.
++
++When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
++digest will fail.  For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this
++option to B<yes>.  This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms
++that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to
++B<no>.
++
+ =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
+ 
+ The value is a boolean that can be B<yes> or B<no>.  If the value is
+diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+index 1291299b6e..e234341e6a 100644
+--- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
++++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ typedef struct ossl_ex_data_global_st {
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX           16
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_BIO_CORE_INDEX                17
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_CHILD_PROVIDER_INDEX          18
+-# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   19
++# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_LEGACY_DIGEST_SIGNATURES      19
++# define OSSL_LIB_CTX_MAX_INDEXES                   20
+ 
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_LOW_PRIORITY          -1
+ # define OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_DEFAULT_PRIORITY       0
+diff --git a/include/internal/sslconf.h b/include/internal/sslconf.h
+index fd7f7e3331..05464b0655 100644
+--- a/include/internal/sslconf.h
++++ b/include/internal/sslconf.h
+@@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ int conf_ssl_name_find(const char *name, size_t *idx);
+ void conf_ssl_get_cmd(const SSL_CONF_CMD *cmd, size_t idx, char **cmdstr,
+                       char **arg);
+ 
++/* Methods to support disabling all signatures with legacy digests */
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int loadconfig);
++int ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int allow,
++                                                  int loadconfig);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck.c b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * FIPS requires a minimum security strength of 112 bits (for encryption or
+@@ -235,6 +236,15 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+             mdnid = -1; /* disallowed by security checks */
+     }
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
++
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
++        /* SHA1 is globally disabled, check whether we want to locally allow
++         * it. */
++        if (mdnid == NID_sha1 && !sha1_allowed)
++            mdnid = -1;
++#endif
++
+     return mdnid;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ 
+ /* Disable the security checks in the default provider */
+ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+@@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ }
+ 
+ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+-                                    ossl_unused int sha1_allowed)
++                                    int sha1_allowed)
+ {
+     int mdnid;
++    int ldsigs_allowed;
+ 
+     static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
+         { NID_md5,       OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5       },
+@@ -36,8 +38,11 @@ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+         { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
+     };
+ 
+-    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, 1);
++    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0);
++    mdnid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx, md, sha1_allowed || ldsigs_allowed);
+     if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+         mdnid = ossl_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid, OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));
++    if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1 && !ldsigs_allowed)
++        mdnid = -1;
+     return mdnid;
+ }
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+index 28fd7c498e..fa3822f39f 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+@@ -124,12 +124,17 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
+         mdprops = ctx->propq;
+ 
+     if (mdname != NULL) {
+-        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+         WPACKET pkt;
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+-        int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+-                                                            sha1_allowed);
++        int md_nid;
+         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
++#else
++        int sha1_allowed = 0;
++#endif
++        md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
++                                                            sha1_allowed);
+ 
+         if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) {
+             if (md == NULL)
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+index 865d49d100..99b228e82c 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+@@ -237,7 +237,11 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
++#else
++    sha1_allowed = 0;
++#endif
+     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                     sha1_allowed);
+     if (md_nid < 0) {
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index 325e855333..bea397f0c1 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "crypto/rsa.h"
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ 
+ #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
++#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256
+ 
+ OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+@@ -289,10 +291,15 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ 
+     if (mdname != NULL) {
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
++        int md_nid;
++        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+         int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-        int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
++#else
++        int sha1_allowed = 0;
++#endif
++        md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                      sha1_allowed);
+-        size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+ 
+         if (md == NULL
+             || md_nid <= 0
+@@ -1348,8 +1355,15 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
+ 
+     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
+-        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
++        && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++        if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
++            pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
++        }
++#endif
++    }
++
+ 
+     if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
+         && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fc32bb3556..4b74ee1a34 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
+ #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
+@@ -1145,11 +1146,13 @@ int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+         = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl));
+     EVP_PKEY *tmpkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+     int ret = 0;
++    int ldsigs_allowed;
+ 
+     if (cache == NULL || tmpkey == NULL)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     ERR_set_mark();
++    ldsigs_allowed = ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx->libctx, 0);
+     for (i = 0, lu = sigalg_lookup_tbl;
+          i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); lu++, i++) {
+         EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+@@ -1169,6 +1172,11 @@ int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+             cache[i].enabled = 0;
+             continue;
+         }
++        if ((lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_md5_sha1)
++                && !ldsigs_allowed) {
++            cache[i].enabled = 0;
++            continue;
++        }
+ 
+         if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey, lu->sig)) {
+             cache[i].enabled = 0;
+diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
+index 10b4e57d79..2d3c363bb0 100644
+--- a/util/libcrypto.num
++++ b/util/libcrypto.num
+@@ -5426,3 +5426,5 @@ ASN1_TIME_print_ex                      5553	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      5556	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     5557	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ ossl_safe_getenv                        ?	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

SOURCES/0050-FIPS-enable-pkcs12-mac.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c.pkc12_fips openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c.pkc12_fips	2022-02-21 12:35:24.829893907 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c	2022-02-21 13:01:22.711622967 +0100
+@@ -85,17 +85,41 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni_ex(unsigned char
+     EVP_KDF *kdf;
+     EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
++    char *adjusted_propq = NULL;
+ 
+     if (n <= 0)
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", propq);
+-    if (kdf == NULL)
++    if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()) {
++        const char *nofips = "-fips";
++        size_t len = propq ? strlen(propq) + 1 + strlen(nofips) + 1 :
++                                                 strlen(nofips) + 1;
++        char *ptr = NULL;
++
++        adjusted_propq = OPENSSL_zalloc(len);
++        if (adjusted_propq != NULL) {
++            ptr = adjusted_propq;
++            if (propq) {
++                memcpy(ptr, propq, strlen(propq));
++                ptr += strlen(propq);
++                *ptr = ',';
++                ptr++;
++            }
++            memcpy(ptr, nofips, strlen(nofips));
++        }
++    }
++
++    kdf = adjusted_propq ? EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", adjusted_propq) : EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, "PKCS12KDF", propq);
++    if (kdf == NULL) {
++        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
+         return 0;
++    }
+     ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+     EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+-    if (ctx == NULL)
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
+         return 0;
++    }
+ 
+     *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+                                             (char *)EVP_MD_get0_name(md_type),
+@@ -127,6 +149,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni_ex(unsigned char
+         } OSSL_TRACE_END(PKCS12_KEYGEN);
+     }
+     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++    OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
+     return res;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c.pkc12_fips_apps openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c.pkc12_fips_apps	2022-02-21 16:37:07.908923682 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/apps/pkcs12.c	2022-02-21 17:38:44.555345633 +0100
+@@ -765,15 +765,34 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
+     }
+     if (macver) {
+         EVP_KDF *pkcs12kdf;
++        char *adjusted_propq = NULL;
++        const char *nofips = "-fips";
++        size_t len = app_get0_propq() ? strlen(app_get0_propq()) + 1 + strlen(nofips) + 1 :
++                                                            strlen(nofips) + 1;
++        char *ptr = NULL;
++
++        adjusted_propq = OPENSSL_zalloc(len);
++        if (adjusted_propq != NULL) {
++                ptr = adjusted_propq;
++                if (app_get0_propq()) {
++                    memcpy(ptr, app_get0_propq(), strlen(app_get0_propq()));
++                    ptr += strlen(app_get0_propq());
++                    *ptr = ',';
++                    ptr++;
++                }
++                memcpy(ptr, nofips, strlen(nofips));
++        }
+ 
+         pkcs12kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(app_get0_libctx(), "PKCS12KDF",
+-                                  app_get0_propq());
++                                  adjusted_propq ? adjusted_propq : app_get0_propq());
+         if (pkcs12kdf == NULL) {
+             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error verifying PKCS12 MAC; no PKCS12KDF support.\n");
+             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Use -nomacver if MAC verification is not required.\n");
++            OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
+             goto end;
+         }
+         EVP_KDF_free(pkcs12kdf);
++        OPENSSL_free(adjusted_propq);
+         /* If we enter empty password try no password first */
+         if (!mpass[0] && PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
+             /* If mac and crypto pass the same set it to NULL too */

SOURCES/0052-Allow-SHA1-in-seclevel-2-if-rh-allow-sha1-signatures.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+From c63599ee9708d543205a9173207ee7167315c624 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 15:44:18 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Allow SHA1 in seclevel 2 if rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes
+
+References: rhbz#2055796
+---
+ crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c        | 19 ++++++++++-
+ doc/man5/config.pod           |  7 +++-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c                  | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ test/recipes/25-test_verify.t |  7 ++--
+ 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+index ff3ca83de6..a549c1c111 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include "internal/dane.h"
++#include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "crypto/x509.h"
+ #include "x509_local.h"
+ 
+@@ -3440,14 +3441,30 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+ {
+     int secbits = -1;
+     int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
++    int nid;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+ 
+     if (level <= 0)
+         return 1;
+     if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+         level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+ 
+-    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
++    if (ctx->libctx)
++        libctx = ctx->libctx;
++    else if (cert->libctx)
++        libctx = cert->libctx;
++    else
++        libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
++
++    if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, &nid, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
+         return 0;
+ 
++    if (nid == NID_sha1
++            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
++            && ctx->param->auth_level < 3)
++        /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
++         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
++        return 1;
++
+     return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+ }
+diff --git a/doc/man5/config.pod b/doc/man5/config.pod
+index aa1be5ca7f..aa69e2b844 100644
+--- a/doc/man5/config.pod
++++ b/doc/man5/config.pod
+@@ -305,7 +305,12 @@ When set to B<no>, any attempt to create or verify a signature with a SHA1
+ digest will fail.  For compatibility with older versions of OpenSSL, set this
+ option to B<yes>.  This setting also affects TLS, where signature algorithms
+ that use SHA1 as digest will no longer be supported if this option is set to
+-B<no>.
++B<no>.  Note that enabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> will allow TLS signature
++algorithms that use SHA1 in security level 2, despite the definition of
++security level 2 of 112 bits of security, which SHA1 does not meet.  Because
++TLS 1.1 or lower use MD5-SHA1 as pseudorandom function (PRF) to derive key
++material, disabling B<rh-allow-sha1-signatures> requires the use of TLS 1.2 or
++newer.
+ 
+ =item B<fips_mode> (deprecated)
+ 
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 4b74ee1a34..5f089de107 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/provider.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include "crypto/x509.h"
+ #include "internal/sslconf.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
+@@ -1561,19 +1562,27 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+         return 0;
+     }
+-    /*
+-     * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+-     * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+-     */
+-    sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+-    sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+-    secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+-    if (secbits == 0 ||
+-        !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+-                      md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
+-                      (void *)sigalgstr)) {
+-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+-        return 0;
++
++    if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
++            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
++            && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) {
++        /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
++         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
++    } else {
++        /*
++         * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
++         * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
++         */
++        sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
++        sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
++        secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
++        if (secbits == 0 ||
++            !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
++                          md != NULL ? EVP_MD_get_type(md) : NID_undef,
++                          (void *)sigalgstr)) {
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
++            return 0;
++        }
+     }
+     /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
+     s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+@@ -2106,6 +2115,14 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
++            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(s->ctx->libctx, 0)
++            && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3) {
++        /* when rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
++         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility */
++        return 1;
++    }
++
+     /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+     secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+     sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
+@@ -2977,6 +2994,8 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+ {
+     /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+     int secbits, nid, pknid;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
++
+     /* Don't check signature if self signed */
+     if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
+         return 1;
+@@ -2985,6 +3004,25 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+     /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
+     if (nid == NID_undef)
+         nid = pknid;
++
++    if (x && x->libctx)
++        libctx = x->libctx;
++    else if (ctx && ctx->libctx)
++        libctx = ctx->libctx;
++    else if (s && s->ctx && s->ctx->libctx)
++        libctx = s->ctx->libctx;
++    else
++        libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_get0_global_default();
++
++    if (nid == NID_sha1
++            && ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(libctx, 0)
++            && ((s != NULL && SSL_get_security_level(s) < 3)
++                || (ctx != NULL && SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx) < 3)
++            ))
++        /* When rh-allow-sha1-signatures = yes and security level <= 2,
++         * explicitly allow SHA1 for backwards compatibility. */
++        return 1;
++
+     if (s)
+         return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
+     else
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index 700bbd849c..2de1d76b5e 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
+     run(app([@args]));
+ }
+ 
+-plan tests => 163;
++plan tests => 162;
+ 
+ # Canonical success
+ ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+@@ -387,8 +387,9 @@ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"
+ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
+     "CA with PSS signature using SHA256");
+ 
+-ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
+-    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
++## rh-allow-sha1-signatures=yes allows this to pass despite -auth_level 1
++#ok(!verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "1"),
++#    "Reject PSS signature using SHA1 and auth level 1");
+ 
+ ok(verify("ee-pss-sha256-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
+     "PSS signature using SHA256 and auth level 2");
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

SOURCES/0056-strcasecmp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num
+--- openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num.locale	2022-06-01 12:35:52.667498724 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.3/util/libcrypto.num	2022-06-01 12:36:08.112633093 +0200
+@@ -5425,6 +5425,8 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_ex
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_provider              5555	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      5556	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     5557	3_0_3	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++OPENSSL_strcasecmp                      ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++OPENSSL_strncasecmp                     ? 	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ ossl_safe_getenv                        ?	3_0_0	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed_set ?	3_0_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp	2022-11-25 12:50:22.449760653 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c	2022-11-25 12:51:19.416350584 +0100
+@@ -342,7 +342,12 @@ int openssl_strerror_r(int errnum, char
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
++int
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
++__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
++                    symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
++#endif
++OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
+ {
+     int t;
+ 
+@@ -352,7 +354,12 @@ int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, c
+     return t;
+ }
+ 
+-int OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
++int
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
++__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
++                    symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
++#endif
++OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+ {
+     int t;
+     size_t i;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t
+--- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t.cmp	2022-11-25 18:19:05.669769076 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/01-test_symbol_presence.t	2022-11-25 18:31:20.993392678 +0100
+@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ foreach my $libname (@libnames) {
+                 s| .*||;
+                 # Drop OpenSSL dynamic version information if there is any
+                 s|\@\@.+$||;
++                s|\@.+$||;
+                 # Return the result
+                 $_
+             }

SOURCES/0058-FIPS-limit-rsa-encrypt.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c.rsaenc	2022-06-24 17:14:33.634692729 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/common/securitycheck.c	2022-06-24 17:16:08.966540605 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+  * Set protect = 1 for encryption or signing operations, or 0 otherwise. See
+  * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf.
+  */
++/* Red Hat build implements some extra limitations in providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c */
+ int ossl_rsa_check_key(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const RSA *rsa, int operation)
+ {
+     int protect = 0;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c.no_bad_pad	2022-05-02 16:04:47.000091901 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c	2022-05-02 16:14:50.922443581 +0200
+@@ -132,6 +132,17 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_init(void *vprsac
+     return rsa_init(vprsactx, vrsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT);
+ }
+ 
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++static int fips_padding_allowed(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
++{
++    if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING
++        || prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING)
++        return 0;
++
++    return 1;
++}
++# endif
++
+ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+                        size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+ {
+@@ -141,6 +152,18 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, u
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+ 
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++        return 0;
++    }
++# endif
++
+     if (out == NULL) {
+         size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ 
+@@ -202,6 +220,18 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, u
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+ 
++# ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (fips_padding_allowed(prsactx) == 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++        return 0;
++    }
++# endif
++
+     if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) {
+         if (out == NULL) {
+             *outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t.no_bad_pad	2022-05-02 17:04:07.610782138 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t	2022-05-02 17:06:03.595814620 +0200
+@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+ 
+-    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients",
++    [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, AES-256 cipher, 3 recipients, no Red Hat FIPS",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+         "-aes256", "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
+         $smrsa1,
+@@ -865,5 +865,8 @@ sub check_availability {
+     return "$tnam: skipped, DSA disabled\n"
+         if ($no_dsa && $tnam =~ / DSA/);
+ 
++    return "$tnam: skipped, Red Hat FIPS\n"
++        if ($tnam =~ /no Red Hat FIPS/);
++
+     return "";
+ }
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.no_bad_pad openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t.no_bad_pad	2022-05-02 17:26:37.962838053 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t	2022-05-02 17:34:20.297950449 +0200
+@@ -483,6 +483,18 @@ sub testssl {
+             # the default choice if TLSv1.3 enabled
+             my $flag = $protocol eq "-tls1_3" ? "" : $protocol;
+             my $ciphersuites = "";
++            my %redhat_skip_cipher = map {$_ => 1} qw(
++AES256-GCM-SHA384:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-GCM-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-CCM8:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-CCM:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-SHA256:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES256-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
++AES128-SHA:@SECLEVEL=0
++	    );
+             foreach my $cipher (@{$ciphersuites{$protocol}}) {
+                 if ($protocol eq "-ssl3" && $cipher =~ /ECDH/ ) {
+                     note "*****SKIPPING $protocol $cipher";
+@@ -494,11 +506,16 @@ sub testssl {
+                     } else {
+                         $cipher = $cipher.':@SECLEVEL=0';
+                     }
+-                    ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
+-                                 $cipher,
+-                                 "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
+-                                 $flag || ()])),
+-                       "Testing $cipher");
++                    if ($provider eq "fips" && exists $redhat_skip_cipher{$cipher}) {
++                        note "*****SKIPPING $cipher in Red Hat FIPS mode";
++                        ok(1);
++                    } else {
++                        ok(run(test([@ssltest, @exkeys, "-cipher",
++                                     $cipher,
++                                     "-ciphersuites", $ciphersuites,
++                                     $flag || ()])),
++                           "Testing $cipher");
++                    }
+                 }
+             }
+             next if $protocol eq "-tls1_3";
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fipskeylen openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+--- openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt.fipskeylen	2022-06-16 14:26:19.383530498 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt	2022-06-16 14:39:53.637777701 +0200
+@@ -263,12 +263,13 @@ Input = 64b0e9f9892371110c40ba5739dc0974
+ Output = 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
+ 
+ # RSA decrypt
+-
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input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
+ Output = "Hello World"
+ 
+ # Corrupted ciphertext
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt = RSA-2048
+ Input = 550AF55A2904E7B9762352F8FB7FA235A9CB053AACB2D5FCB8CA48453CB2EE3619746C701ABF2D4CC67003471A187900B05AA812BD25ED05C675DFC8C97A24A7BF49BD6214992CAD766D05A9A2B57B74F26A737E0237B8B76C45F1F226A836D7CFBC75BA999BDBE48DBC09227AA46C88F21DCCBA7840141AD5A5D71FD122E6BD6AC3E564780DFE623FC1CA9B995A6037BF0BBD43B205A84AC5444F34202C05CE9113087176432476576DE6FFFF9A52EA57C08BE3EC2F49676CB8E12F762AC71FA3C321E00AC988910C85FF52F93825666CE0D40FFAA0592078919D4493F46D95CCF76364C6D57760DD0B64805F9AFC76A2365A5575CA301D5103F0EA76CB9A79
+ Output = "Hello World"
+@@ -665,36 +666,42 @@ vcDtKrdWo6btTWc1Kml9QhbpMhKxJ6Y9VBHOb6mN
+ h90qjKHS9PvY4Q==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=354fe67b4a126d5d35fe36c777791a3f7ba13def484e2d3908aff722fad468fb21696de95d0be911c2d3174f8afcc201035f7b6d8e69402de5451618c21a535fa9d7bfc5b8dd9fc243f8cf927db31322d6e881eaa91a996170e657a05a266426d98c88003f8477c1227094a0d9fa1e8c4024309ce1ecccb5210035d47ac72e8a
+ Output=6628194e12073db03ba94cda9ef9532397d50dba79b987004afefe34
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=640db1acc58e0568fe5407e5f9b701dff8c3c91e716c536fc7fcec6cb5b71c1165988d4a279e1577d730fc7a29932e3f00c81515236d8d8e31017a7a09df4352d904cdeb79aa583adcc31ea698a4c05283daba9089be5491f67c1a4ee48dc74bbbe6643aef846679b4cb395a352d5ed115912df696ffe0702932946d71492b44
+ Output=750c4047f547e8e41411856523298ac9bae245efaf1397fbe56f9dd5
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=423736ed035f6026af276c35c0b3741b365e5f76ca091b4e8c29e2f0befee603595aa8322d602d2e625e95eb81b2f1c9724e822eca76db8618cf09c5343503a4360835b5903bc637e3879fb05e0ef32685d5aec5067cd7cc96fe4b2670b6eac3066b1fcf5686b68589aafb7d629b02d8f8625ca3833624d4800fb081b1cf94eb
+ Output=d94ae0832e6445ce42331cb06d531a82b1db4baad30f746dc916df24d4e3c2451fff59a6423eb0e1d02d4fe646cf699dfd818c6e97b051
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=45ead4ca551e662c9800f1aca8283b0525e6abae30be4b4aba762fa40fd3d38e22abefc69794f6ebbbc05ddbb11216247d2f412fd0fba87c6e3acd888813646fd0e48e785204f9c3f73d6d8239562722dddd8771fec48b83a31ee6f592c4cfd4bc88174f3b13a112aae3b9f7b80e0fc6f7255ba880dc7d8021e22ad6a85f0755
+ Output=52e650d98e7f2a048b4f86852153b97e01dd316f346a19f67a85
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=36f6e34d94a8d34daacba33a2139d00ad85a9345a86051e73071620056b920e219005855a213a0f23897cdcd731b45257c777fe908202befdd0b58386b1244ea0cf539a05d5d10329da44e13030fd760dcd644cfef2094d1910d3f433e1c7c6dd18bc1f2df7f643d662fb9dd37ead9059190f4fa66ca39e869c4eb449cbdc439
+ Output=8da89fd9e5f974a29feffb462b49180f6cf9e802
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -719,36 +726,42 @@ SwGNdhGLJDiac1Dsg2sAY6IXISNv2O222JtR5+64
+ eG2e4XlBcKjI6A==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0181af8922b9fcb4d79d92ebe19815992fc0c1439d8bcd491398a0f4ad3a329a5bd9385560db532683c8b7da04e4b12aed6aacdf471c34c9cda891addcc2df3456653aa6382e9ae59b54455257eb099d562bbe10453f2b6d13c59c02e10f1f8abb5da0d0570932dacf2d0901db729d0fefcc054e70968ea540c81b04bcaefe720e
+ Output=8ff00caa605c702830634d9a6c3d42c652b58cf1d92fec570beee7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=018759ff1df63b2792410562314416a8aeaf2ac634b46f940ab82d64dbf165eee33011da749d4bab6e2fcd18129c9e49277d8453112b429a222a8471b070993998e758861c4d3f6d749d91c4290d332c7a4ab3f7ea35ff3a07d497c955ff0ffc95006b62c6d296810d9bfab024196c7934012c2df978ef299aba239940cba10245
+ Output=2d
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=018802bab04c60325e81c4962311f2be7c2adce93041a00719c88f957575f2c79f1b7bc8ced115c706b311c08a2d986ca3b6a9336b147c29c6f229409ddec651bd1fdd5a0b7f610c9937fdb4a3a762364b8b3206b4ea485fd098d08f63d4aa8bb2697d027b750c32d7f74eaf5180d2e9b66b17cb2fa55523bc280da10d14be2053
+ Output=74fc88c51bc90f77af9d5e9a4a70133d4b4e0b34da3c37c7ef8e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00a4578cbc176318a638fba7d01df15746af44d4f6cd96d7e7c495cbf425b09c649d32bf886da48fbaf989a2117187cafb1fb580317690e3ccd446920b7af82b31db5804d87d01514acbfa9156e782f867f6bed9449e0e9a2c09bcecc6aa087636965e34b3ec766f2fe2e43018a2fddeb140616a0e9d82e5331024ee0652fc7641
+ Output=a7eb2a5036931d27d4e891326d99692ffadda9bf7efd3e34e622c4adc085f721dfe885072c78a203b151739be540fa8c153a10f00a
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00ebc5f5fda77cfdad3c83641a9025e77d72d8a6fb33a810f5950f8d74c73e8d931e8634d86ab1246256ae07b6005b71b7f2fb98351218331ce69b8ffbdc9da08bbc9c704f876deb9df9fc2ec065cad87f9090b07acc17aa7f997b27aca48806e897f771d95141fe4526d8a5301b678627efab707fd40fbebd6e792a25613e7aec
+ Output=2ef2b066f854c33f3bdcbb5994a435e73d6c6c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-2
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -773,36 +786,42 @@ iUGx07dw5a0x7jc7KKzaaf+bb0D+V4ufGvuFg2+W
+ Ya4qnqZe1onjY5o=
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=026a0485d96aebd96b4382085099b962e6a2bdec3d90c8db625e14372de85e2d5b7baab65c8faf91bb5504fb495afce5c988b3f6a52e20e1d6cbd3566c5cd1f2b8318bb542cc0ea25c4aab9932afa20760eaddec784396a07ea0ef24d4e6f4d37e5052a7a31e146aa480a111bbe926401307e00f410033842b6d82fe5ce4dfae80
+ Output=087820b569e8fa8d
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=024db89c7802989be0783847863084941bf209d761987e38f97cb5f6f1bc88da72a50b73ebaf11c879c4f95df37b850b8f65d7622e25b1b889e80fe80baca2069d6e0e1d829953fc459069de98ea9798b451e557e99abf8fe3d9ccf9096ebbf3e5255d3b4e1c6d2ecadf067a359eea86405acd47d5e165517ccafd47d6dbee4bf5
+ Output=4653acaf171960b01f52a7be63a3ab21dc368ec43b50d82ec3781e04
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0239bce681032441528877d6d1c8bb28aa3bc97f1df584563618995797683844ca86664732f4bed7a0aab083aaabfb7238f582e30958c2024e44e57043b97950fd543da977c90cdde5337d618442f99e60d7783ab59ce6dd9d69c47ad1e962bec22d05895cff8d3f64ed5261d92b2678510393484990ba3f7f06818ae6ffce8a3a
+ Output=d94cd0e08fa404ed89
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=02994c62afd76f498ba1fd2cf642857fca81f4373cb08f1cbaee6f025c3b512b42c3e8779113476648039dbe0493f9246292fac28950600e7c0f32edf9c81b9dec45c3bde0cc8d8847590169907b7dc5991ceb29bb0714d613d96df0f12ec5d8d3507c8ee7ae78dd83f216fa61de100363aca48a7e914ae9f42ddfbe943b09d9a0
+ Output=6cc641b6b61e6f963974dad23a9013284ef1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0162042ff6969592a6167031811a239834ce638abf54fec8b99478122afe2ee67f8c5b18b0339805bfdbc5a4e6720b37c59cfba942464c597ff532a119821545fd2e59b114e61daf71820529f5029cf524954327c34ec5e6f5ba7efcc4de943ab8ad4ed787b1454329f70db798a3a8f4d92f8274e2b2948ade627ce8ee33e43c60
+ Output=df5151832b61f4f25891fb4172f328d2eddf8371ffcfdbe997939295f30eca6918017cfda1153bf7a6af87593223
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-3
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -827,36 +846,42 @@ s/XkIiO6MDAcQabYfLtw4wy308Z9JUc9sfbL8D4/
+ aD0x7TDrmEvkEro=
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=04cce19614845e094152a3fe18e54e3330c44e5efbc64ae16886cb1869014cc5781b1f8f9e045384d0112a135ca0d12e9c88a8e4063416deaae3844f60d6e96fe155145f4525b9a34431ca3766180f70e15a5e5d8e8b1a516ff870609f13f896935ced188279a58ed13d07114277d75c6568607e0ab092fd803a223e4a8ee0b1a8
+ Output=4a86609534ee434a6cbca3f7e962e76d455e3264c19f605f6e5ff6137c65c56d7fb344cd52bc93374f3d166c9f0c6f9c506bad19330972d2
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0097b698c6165645b303486fbf5a2a4479c0ee85889b541a6f0b858d6b6597b13b854eb4f839af03399a80d79bda6578c841f90d645715b280d37143992dd186c80b949b775cae97370e4ec97443136c6da484e970ffdb1323a20847821d3b18381de13bb49aaea66530c4a4b8271f3eae172cd366e07e6636f1019d2a28aed15e
+ Output=b0adc4f3fe11da59ce992773d9059943c03046497ee9d9f9a06df1166db46d98f58d27ec074c02eee6cbe2449c8b9fc5080c5c3f4433092512ec46aa793743c8
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0301f935e9c47abcb48acbbe09895d9f5971af14839da4ff95417ee453d1fd77319072bb7297e1b55d7561cd9d1bb24c1a9a37c619864308242804879d86ebd001dce5183975e1506989b70e5a83434154d5cbfd6a24787e60eb0c658d2ac193302d1192c6e622d4a12ad4b53923bca246df31c6395e37702c6a78ae081fb9d065
+ Output=bf6d42e701707b1d0206b0c8b45a1c72641ff12889219a82bdea965b5e79a96b0d0163ed9d578ec9ada20f2fbcf1ea3c4089d83419ba81b0c60f3606da99
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=02d110ad30afb727beb691dd0cf17d0af1a1e7fa0cc040ec1a4ba26a42c59d0a796a2e22c8f357ccc98b6519aceb682e945e62cb734614a529407cd452bee3e44fece8423cc19e55548b8b994b849c7ecde4933e76037e1d0ce44275b08710c68e430130b929730ed77e09b015642c5593f04e4ffb9410798102a8e96ffdfe11e4
+ Output=fb2ef112f5e766eb94019297934794f7be2f6fc1c58e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00dbb8a7439d90efd919a377c54fae8fe11ec58c3b858362e23ad1b8a44310799066b99347aa525691d2adc58d9b06e34f288c170390c5f0e11c0aa3645959f18ee79e8f2be8d7ac5c23d061f18dd74b8c5f2a58fcb5eb0c54f99f01a83247568292536583340948d7a8c97c4acd1e98d1e29dc320e97a260532a8aa7a758a1ec2
+ Output=28ccd447bb9e85166dabb9e5b7d1adadc4b9d39f204e96d5e440ce9ad928bc1c2284
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-4
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -881,36 +906,42 @@ OPlAQGLrhaQpJFILOPW7iGoBlvSLuNzqYP2SzAJ/
+ MSwGUGLx60i3nRyDyw==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=036046a4a47d9ed3ba9a89139c105038eb7492b05a5d68bfd53accff4597f7a68651b47b4a4627d927e485eed7b4566420e8b409879e5d606eae251d22a5df799f7920bfc117b992572a53b1263146bcea03385cc5e853c9a101c8c3e1bda31a519807496c6cb5e5efb408823a352b8fa0661fb664efadd593deb99fff5ed000e5
+ Output=af71a901e3a61d3132f0fc1fdb474f9ea6579257ffc24d164170145b3dbde8
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=03d6eb654edce615bc59f455265ed4e5a18223cbb9be4e4069b473804d5de96f54dcaaa603d049c5d94aa1470dfcd2254066b7c7b61ff1f6f6770e3215c51399fd4e34ec5082bc48f089840ad04354ae66dc0f1bd18e461a33cc1258b443a2837a6df26759aa2302334986f87380c9cc9d53be9f99605d2c9a97da7b0915a4a7ad
+ Output=a3b844a08239a8ac41605af17a6cfda4d350136585903a417a79268760519a4b4ac3303ec73f0f87cfb32399
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0770952181649f9f9f07ff626ff3a22c35c462443d905d456a9fd0bff43cac2ca7a9f554e9478b9acc3ac838b02040ffd3e1847de2e4253929f9dd9ee4044325a9b05cabb808b2ee840d34e15d105a3f1f7b27695a1a07a2d73fe08ecaaa3c9c9d4d5a89ff890d54727d7ae40c0ec1a8dd86165d8ee2c6368141016a48b55b6967
+ Output=308b0ecbd2c76cb77fc6f70c5edd233fd2f20929d629f026953bb62a8f4a3a314bde195de85b5f816da2aab074d26cb6acddf323ae3b9c678ac3cf12fbdde7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0812b76768ebcb642d040258e5f4441a018521bd96687e6c5e899fcd6c17588ff59a82cc8ae03a4b45b31299af1788c329f7dcd285f8cf4ced82606b97612671a45bedca133442144d1617d114f802857f0f9d739751c57a3f9ee400912c61e2e6992be031a43dd48fa6ba14eef7c422b5edc4e7afa04fdd38f402d1c8bb719abf
+ Output=15c5b9ee1185
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=07b60e14ec954bfd29e60d0047e789f51d57186c63589903306793ced3f68241c743529aba6a6374f92e19e0163efa33697e196f7661dfaaa47aac6bde5e51deb507c72c589a2ca1693d96b1460381249b2cdb9eac44769f2489c5d3d2f99f0ee3c7ee5bf64a5ac79c42bd433f149be8cb59548361640595513c97af7bc2509723
+ Output=21026e6800c7fa728fcaaba0d196ae28d7a2ac4ffd8abce794f0985f60c8a6737277365d3fea11db8923a2029a
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-5
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -935,36 +966,42 @@ xT1F29tenZbQ/s9Cdd8JdLxKBza0p0wyaQU++2hq
+ Yejn5Ly8mU2q+jBcRQ==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0630eebcd2856c24f798806e41f9e67345eda9ceda386acc9facaea1eeed06ace583709718d9d169fadf414d5c76f92996833ef305b75b1e4b95f662a20faedc3bae0c4827a8bf8a88edbd57ec203a27a841f02e43a615bab1a8cac0701de34debdef62a088089b55ec36ea7522fd3ec8d06b6a073e6df833153bc0aefd93bd1a3
+ Output=4046ca8baa3347ca27f49e0d81f9cc1d71be9ba517d4
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0ebc37376173a4fd2f89cc55c2ca62b26b11d51c3c7ce49e8845f74e7607317c436bc8d23b9667dfeb9d087234b47bc6837175ae5c0559f6b81d7d22416d3e50f4ac533d8f0812f2db9e791fe9c775ac8b6ad0f535ad9ceb23a4a02014c58ab3f8d3161499a260f39348e714ae2a1d3443208fd8b722ccfdfb393e98011f99e63f
+ Output=5cc72c60231df03b3d40f9b57931bc31109f972527f28b19e7480c7288cb3c92b22512214e4be6c914792ddabdf57faa8aa7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0a98bf1093619394436cf68d8f38e2f158fde8ea54f3435f239b8d06b8321844202476aeed96009492480ce3a8d705498c4c8c68f01501dc81db608f60087350c8c3b0bd2e9ef6a81458b7c801b89f2e4fe99d4900ba6a4b5e5a96d865dc676c7755928794130d6280a8160a190f2df3ea7cf9aa0271d88e9e6905ecf1c5152d65
+ Output=b20e651303092f4bccb43070c0f86d23049362ed96642fc5632c27db4a52e3d831f2ab068b23b149879c002f6bf3feee97591112562c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=008e7a67cacfb5c4e24bec7dee149117f19598ce8c45808fef88c608ff9cd6e695263b9a3c0ad4b8ba4c95238e96a8422b8535629c8d5382374479ad13fa39974b242f9a759eeaf9c83ad5a8ca18940a0162ba755876df263f4bd50c6525c56090267c1f0e09ce0899a0cf359e88120abd9bf893445b3cae77d3607359ae9a52f8
+ Output=684e3038c5c041f7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=00003474416c7b68bdf961c385737944d7f1f40cb395343c693cc0b4fe63b31fedf1eaeeac9ccc0678b31dc32e0977489514c4f09085f6298a9653f01aea4045ff582ee887be26ae575b73eef7f3774921e375a3d19adda0ca31aa1849887c1f42cac9677f7a2f4e923f6e5a868b38c084ef187594dc9f7f048fea2e02955384ab
+ Output=32488cb262d041d6e4dd35f987bf3ca696db1f06ac29a44693
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-6
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -989,36 +1026,42 @@ tu4XIedy0DiaVZw9PN+VUNRXxGsDe3RkGx1SFmr4
+ FMlxv0gq65dqc3DC
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=1688e4ce7794bba6cb7014169ecd559cede2a30b56a52b68d9fe18cf1973ef97b2a03153951c755f6294aa49adbdb55845ab6875fb3986c93ecf927962840d282f9e54ce8b690f7c0cb8bbd73440d9571d1b16cd9260f9eab4783cc482e5223dc60973871783ec27b0ae0fd47732cbc286a173fc92b00fb4ba6824647cd93c85c1
+ Output=47aae909
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=1052ed397b2e01e1d0ee1c50bf24363f95e504f4a03434a08fd822574ed6b9736edbb5f390db10321479a8a139350e2bd4977c3778ef331f3e78ae118b268451f20a2f01d471f5d53c566937171b2dbc2d4bde459a5799f0372d6574239b2323d245d0bb81c286b63c89a361017337e4902f88a467f4c7f244bfd5ab46437ff3b6
+ Output=1d9b2e2223d9bc13bfb9f162ce735db48ba7c68f6822a0a1a7b6ae165834e7
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2155cd843ff24a4ee8badb7694260028a490813ba8b369a4cbf106ec148e5298707f5965be7d101c1049ea8584c24cd63455ad9c104d686282d3fb803a4c11c1c2e9b91c7178801d1b6640f003f5728df007b8a4ccc92bce05e41a27278d7c85018c52414313a5077789001d4f01910b72aad05d220aa14a58733a7489bc54556b
+ Output=d976fc
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0ab14c373aeb7d4328d0aaad8c094d88b9eb098b95f21054a29082522be7c27a312878b637917e3d819e6c3c568db5d843802b06d51d9e98a2be0bf40c031423b00edfbff8320efb9171bd2044653a4cb9c5122f6c65e83cda2ec3c126027a9c1a56ba874d0fea23f380b82cf240b8cf540004758c4c77d934157a74f3fc12bfac
+ Output=d4738623df223aa43843df8467534c41d013e0c803c624e263666b239bde40a5f29aeb8de79e3daa61dd0370f49bd4b013834b98212aef6b1c5ee373b3cb
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=028387a318277434798b4d97f460068df5298faba5041ba11761a1cb7316b24184114ec500257e2589ed3b607a1ebbe97a6cc2e02bf1b681f42312a33b7a77d8e7855c4a6de03e3c04643f786b91a264a0d6805e2cea91e68177eb7a64d9255e4f27e713b7ccec00dc200ebd21c2ea2bb890feae4942df941dc3f97890ed347478
+ Output=bb47231ca5ea1d3ad46c99345d9a8a61
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-7
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -1043,36 +1086,42 @@ njraT2MgdSwJ2AX/fR8a4NAXru7pzvoNfdf/d15E
+ 2MiPa249Z+lh3Luj0A==
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=09b3683d8a2eb0fb295b62ed1fb9290b714457b7825319f4647872af889b30409472020ad12912bf19b11d4819f49614824ffd84d09c0a17e7d17309d12919790410aa2995699f6a86dbe3242b5acc23af45691080d6b1ae810fb3e3057087f0970092ce00be9562ff4053b6262ce0caa93e13723d2e3a5ba075d45f0d61b54b61
+ Output=050b755e5e6880f7b9e9d692a74c37aae449b31bfea6deff83747a897f6c2c825bb1adbf850a3c96994b5de5b33cbc7d4a17913a7967
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2ecf15c97c5a15b1476ae986b371b57a24284f4a162a8d0c8182e7905e792256f1812ba5f83f1f7a130e42dcc02232844edc14a31a68ee97ae564a383a3411656424c5f62ddb646093c367be1fcda426cf00a06d8acb7e57776fbbd855ac3df506fc16b1d7c3f2110f3d8068e91e186363831c8409680d8da9ecd8cf1fa20ee39d
+ Output=4eb68dcd93ca9b19df111bd43608f557026fe4aa1d5cfac227a3eb5ab9548c18a06dded23f81825986b2fcd71109ecef7eff88873f075c2aa0c469f69c92bc
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=4bc89130a5b2dabb7c2fcf90eb5d0eaf9e681b7146a38f3173a3d9cfec52ea9e0a41932e648a9d69344c50da763f51a03c95762131e8052254dcd2248cba40fd31667786ce05a2b7b531ac9dac9ed584a59b677c1a8aed8c5d15d68c05569e2be780bf7db638fd2bfd2a85ab276860f3777338fca989ffd743d13ee08e0ca9893f
+ Output=8604ac56328c1ab5ad917861
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2e456847d8fc36ff0147d6993594b9397227d577752c79d0f904fcb039d4d812fea605a7b574dd82ca786f93752348438ee9f5b5454985d5f0e1699e3e7ad175a32e15f03deb042ab9fe1dd9db1bb86f8c089ccb45e7ef0c5ee7ca9b7290ca6b15bed47039788a8a93ff83e0e8d6244c71006362deef69b6f416fb3c684383fbd0
+ Output=fdda5fbf6ec361a9d9a4ac68af216a0686f438b1e0e5c36b955f74e107f39c0dddcc
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=1fb9356fd5c4b1796db2ebf7d0d393cc810adf6145defc2fce714f79d93800d5e2ac211ea8bbecca4b654b94c3b18b30dd576ce34dc95436ef57a09415645923359a5d7b4171ef22c24670f1b229d3603e91f76671b7df97e7317c97734476d5f3d17d21cf82b5ba9f83df2e588d36984fd1b584468bd23b2e875f32f68953f7b2
+ Output=4a5f4914bee25de3c69341de07
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-8
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -1103,36 +1152,42 @@ Z7CDuaemy2HkLbNiuMmJbbcGTgKtWuYVh9oVtGSc
+ tKo5Eb69iFQvBb4=
+ -----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=267bcd118acab1fc8ba81c85d73003cb8610fa55c1d97da8d48a7c7f06896a4db751aa284255b9d36ad65f37653d829f1b37f97b8001942545b2fc2c55a7376ca7a1be4b1760c8e05a33e5aa2526b8d98e317088e7834c755b2a59b12631a182c05d5d43ab1779264f8456f515ce57dfdf512d5493dab7b7338dc4b7d78db9c091ac3baf537a69fc7f549d979f0eff9a94fda4169bd4d1d19a69c99e33c3b55490d501b39b1edae118ff6793a153261584d3a5f39f6e682e3d17c8cd1261fa72
+ Output=f735fd55ba92592c3b52b8f9c4f69aaa1cbef8fe88add095595412467f9cf4ec0b896c59eda16210e7549c8abb10cdbc21a12ec9b6b5b8fd2f10399eb6
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=93ac9f0671ec29acbb444effc1a5741351d60fdb0e393fbf754acf0de49761a14841df7772e9bc82773966a1584c4d72baea00118f83f35cca6e537cbd4d811f5583b29783d8a6d94cd31be70d6f526c10ff09c6fa7ce069795a3fcd0511fd5fcb564bcc80ea9c78f38b80012539d8a4ddf6fe81e9cddb7f50dbbbbcc7e5d86097ccf4ec49189fb8bf318be6d5a0715d516b49af191258cd32dc833ce6eb4673c03a19bbace88cc54895f636cc0c1ec89096d11ce235a265ca1764232a689ae8
+ Output=81b906605015a63aabe42ddf11e1978912f5404c7474b26dce3ed482bf961ecc818bf420c54659
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=81ebdd95054b0c822ef9ad7693f5a87adfb4b4c4ce70df2df84ed49c04da58ba5fc20a19e1a6e8b7a3900b22796dc4e869ee6b42792d15a8eceb56c09c69914e813cea8f6931e4b8ed6f421af298d595c97f4789c7caa612c7ef360984c21b93edc5401068b5af4c78a8771b984d53b8ea8adf2f6a7d4a0ba76c75e1dd9f658f20ded4a46071d46d7791b56803d8fea7f0b0f8e41ae3f09383a6f9585fe7753eaaffd2bf94563108beecc207bbb535f5fcc705f0dde9f708c62f49a9c90371d3
+ Output=fd326429df9b890e09b54b18b8f34f1e24
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=bcc35f94cde66cb1136625d625b94432a35b22f3d2fa11a613ff0fca5bd57f87b902ccdc1cd0aebcb0715ee869d1d1fe395f6793003f5eca465059c88660d446ff5f0818552022557e38c08a67ead991262254f10682975ec56397768537f4977af6d5f6aaceb7fb25dec5937230231fd8978af49119a29f29e424ab8272b47562792d5c94f774b8829d0b0d9f1a8c9eddf37574d5fa248eefa9c5271fc5ec2579c81bdd61b410fa61fe36e424221c113addb275664c801d34ca8c6351e4a858
+ Output=f1459b5f0c92f01a0f723a2e5662484d8f8c0a20fc29dad6acd43bb5f3effdf4e1b63e07fdfe6628d0d74ca19bf2d69e4a0abf86d293925a796772f8088e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=232afbc927fa08c2f6a27b87d4a5cb09c07dc26fae73d73a90558839f4fd66d281b87ec734bce237ba166698ed829106a7de6942cd6cdce78fed8d2e4d81428e66490d036264cef92af941d3e35055fe3981e14d29cbb9a4f67473063baec79a1179f5a17c9c1832f2838fd7d5e59bb9659d56dce8a019edef1bb3accc697cc6cc7a778f60a064c7f6f5d529c6210262e003de583e81e3167b89971fb8c0e15d44fffef89b53d8d64dd797d159b56d2b08ea5307ea12c241bd58d4ee278a1f2e
+ Output=53e6e8c729d6f9c319dd317e74b0db8e4ccca25f3c8305746e137ac63a63ef3739e7b595abb96e8d55e54f7bd41ab433378ffb911d
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Decrypt=RSA-OAEP-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:oaep
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1

SOURCES/0060-FIPS-KAT-signature-tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 15:49:24.786455707 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_backend.c	2022-04-04 16:06:13.250271963 +0200
+@@ -393,6 +393,10 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
+     const OSSL_PARAM *param_priv_key = NULL, *param_pub_key = NULL;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    const OSSL_PARAM *param_sign_kat_k = NULL;
++    BIGNUM *sign_kat_k = NULL;
++#endif
+     unsigned char *pub_key = NULL;
+     size_t pub_key_len;
+     const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
+@@ -408,7 +412,10 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
+     if (include_private)
+         param_priv_key =
+             OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY);
+-
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    param_sign_kat_k =
++        OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K);
++#endif
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(ec));
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -481,6 +489,17 @@ int ossl_ec_key_fromdata(EC_KEY *ec, con
+         && !EC_KEY_set_public_key(ec, pub_point))
+         goto err;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (param_sign_kat_k) {
++        if ((sign_kat_k = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
++            goto err;
++        BN_set_flags(sign_kat_k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_sign_kat_k, &sign_kat_k))
++            goto err;
++        ec->sign_kat_k = sign_kat_k;
++    }
++#endif
+     ok = 1;
+ 
+  err:
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 17:01:35.725323127 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c	2022-04-04 17:03:42.000427050 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
+ #include "crypto/bn.h"
+ #include "ec_local.h"
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++extern int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st;
++#endif
++
+ int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                           BIGNUM **rp)
+ {
+@@ -126,6 +130,11 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
+         goto err;
+ 
+     do {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++       if (REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st && eckey->sign_kat_k != NULL) {
++           BN_copy(k, eckey->sign_kat_k);
++       } else {
++#endif
+         /* get random k */
+         do {
+             if (dgst != NULL) {
+@@ -141,7 +150,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *ecke
+                 }
+             }
+         } while (BN_is_zero(k));
+-
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        }
++#endif
+         /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
+         if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 13:48:52.231172299 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_key.c	2022-04-04 14:00:35.077368605 +0200
+@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
+     EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
+     EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
+     BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    BN_clear_free(r->sign_kat_k);
++#endif
+     OPENSSL_free(r->propq);
+ 
+     OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 13:46:57.576161867 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_local.h	2022-04-04 13:48:07.827780835 +0200
+@@ -298,6 +298,9 @@ struct ec_key_st {
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+ #endif
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    BIGNUM *sign_kat_k;
++#endif
+     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+     OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+     char *propq;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h
+--- openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 14:06:15.717370014 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/include/openssl/core_names.h	2022-04-04 14:07:35.376071229 +0200
+@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID             "distid"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY             "pub"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY            "priv"
++#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K   "rh_sign_kat_k"
+ 
+ /* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P               "p"
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.fips_kat_signature openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c.fips_kat_signature	2022-04-04 14:21:03.043180906 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c	2022-04-04 14:38:33.949406645 +0200
+@@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ end:
+ # define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PUBLIC_KEY                                            \
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NULL, 0)
+ # define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PRIVATE_KEY                                           \
+-    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0)
++    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0),                          \
++    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K, NULL, 0)
+ # define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_OTHER_PARAMETERS                                      \
+     OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, NULL),                   \
+     OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_INCLUDE_PUBLIC, NULL)
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c.kat openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c.kat	2022-05-10 15:10:32.502185265 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c	2022-05-10 15:13:21.465653720 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
+ #include "self_test.h"
+ #include "self_test_data.inc"
+ 
++int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 0;
++
+ static int self_test_digest(const ST_KAT_DIGEST *t, OSSL_SELF_TEST *st,
+                             OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+@@ -446,6 +448,7 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+     unsigned char sig[256];
+     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
++    BIGNUM *K = NULL;
+     size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
+     static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
+         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
+@@ -462,6 +465,9 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
+     bnctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx);
+     if (bnctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
++    K = BN_CTX_get(bnctx);
++    if (K == NULL || BN_bin2bn(dgst, sizeof(dgst), K) == NULL)
++        goto err;
+ 
+     bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+     if (bld == NULL)
+@@ -469,6 +475,9 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_S
+ 
+     if (!add_params(bld, t->key, bnctx))
+         goto err;
++    /* set K for ECDSA KAT tests */
++    if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_REDHAT_SIGN_KAT_K, K))
++        goto err;
+     params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
+ 
+     /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to load the DSA key into */
+@@ -689,11 +698,13 @@ static int self_test_kas(OSSL_SELF_TEST
+ static int self_test_signatures(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+     int i, ret = 1;
++    REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 1;
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_sign_tests); ++i) {
+         if (!self_test_sign(&st_kat_sign_tests[i], st, libctx))
+             ret = 0;
+     }
++    REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st = 0;
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.kat openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc.kat	2022-05-16 17:37:34.962807400 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc	2022-05-16 17:48:10.709376779 +0200
+@@ -1399,7 +1399,151 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_ke
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv),
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+ };
++static const unsigned char ec224r1_kat_sig[] = {
++0x30, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x1c, 0x2f, 0x24, 0x30, 0x96, 0x3b, 0x39, 0xe0, 0xab, 0xe2, 0x5a, 0x6f, 0xe0,
++0x40, 0x7e, 0x19, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0xaa, 0xc2, 0x34, 0x6c, 0xc8, 0xce,
++0x02, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xe1, 0xac, 0xfd, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x36, 0xcd, 0xdd, 0x22,
++0x2a, 0x2d, 0x29, 0x64, 0x70, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x3e, 0x18, 0x51, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xad, 0x3c
++};
+ 
++static const char ecd_prime_curve_name384[] = "secp384r1";
++/*
++priv:
++    58:12:2b:94:be:29:23:13:83:f5:c4:20:e8:22:34:
++    54:73:49:91:10:05:e9:10:e9:d7:2d:72:9c:5e:6a:
++    ba:8f:6d:d6:e4:a7:eb:e0:ae:e3:d4:c9:aa:33:87:
++    4c:91:87
++pub:
++    04:d1:86:8b:f5:c4:a2:f7:a5:92:e6:85:2a:d2:92:
++    81:97:0a:8d:fa:09:3f:84:6c:17:43:03:43:49:23:
++    77:c4:31:f4:0a:a4:de:87:ac:5c:c0:d1:bc:e4:43:
++    7f:8d:44:e1:3b:5f:bc:27:c8:79:0f:d0:31:9f:a7:
++    6d:de:fb:f7:da:19:40:fd:aa:83:dc:69:ce:a6:f3:
++    4d:65:20:1c:66:82:80:03:f7:7b:2e:f3:b3:7c:1f:
++    11:f2:a3:bf:e8:0e:88
++*/
++static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv384[] = {
++    0x58, 0x12, 0x2b, 0x94, 0xbe, 0x29, 0x23, 0x13, 0x83, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0x20, 0xe8, 0x22, 0x34,
++    0x54, 0x73, 0x49, 0x91, 0x10, 0x05, 0xe9, 0x10, 0xe9, 0xd7, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x9c, 0x5e, 0x6a,
++    0xba, 0x8f, 0x6d, 0xd6, 0xe4, 0xa7, 0xeb, 0xe0, 0xae, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0xc9, 0xaa, 0x33, 0x87,
++    0x4c, 0x91, 0x87
++};
++static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub384[] = {
++    0x04, 0xd1, 0x86, 0x8b, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xa2, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0x92, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x92,
++    0x81, 0x97, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x09, 0x3f, 0x84, 0x6c, 0x17, 0x43, 0x03, 0x43, 0x49, 0x23,
++    0x77, 0xc4, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x0a, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x87, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xc0, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0xe4, 0x43,
++    0x7f, 0x8d, 0x44, 0xe1, 0x3b, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0x27, 0xc8, 0x79, 0x0f, 0xd0, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xa7,
++    0x6d, 0xde, 0xfb, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x19, 0x40, 0xfd, 0xaa, 0x83, 0xdc, 0x69, 0xce, 0xa6, 0xf3,
++    0x4d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x1c, 0x66, 0x82, 0x80, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xf3, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x1f,
++    0x11, 0xf2, 0xa3, 0xbf, 0xe8, 0x0e, 0x88
++};
++static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key384[] = {
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name384),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub384),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv384),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
++};
++static const unsigned char ec384r1_kat_sig[] = {
++0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x30, 0x1a, 0xd5, 0x57, 0x1b, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x66, 0x68, 0x8a, 0x98,
++0xe3, 0x9c, 0xce, 0x7f, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xdc, 0x84, 0x5a, 0x65, 0xdc, 0x2b, 0x5d, 0x7e, 0xf3, 0x9b,
++0xa0, 0x40, 0xe8, 0x7a, 0x02, 0xc7, 0x82, 0xe0, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xa5, 0xda, 0x55, 0x27, 0xbf, 0x79,
++0xee, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x14, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0x67, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xd2, 0x58, 0x68, 0xe7,
++0x71, 0x08, 0xb2, 0xa4, 0xe4, 0xe8, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x0a, 0x3d, 0x76, 0x49, 0x31, 0x17, 0x6e, 0x33,
++0x16, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xf9, 0x7c, 0xdb, 0x93, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x7d, 0xb3, 0xd3, 0x30,
++0x98, 0x81, 0x6f, 0xb0, 0xc9, 0x30, 0x2f
++};
++static const char ecd_prime_curve_name521[] = "secp521r1";
++/*
++priv:
++    00:44:0f:96:31:a9:87:f2:5f:be:a0:bc:ef:0c:ae:
++    58:cc:5f:f8:44:9e:89:86:7e:bf:db:ce:cb:0e:20:
++    10:4a:11:ec:0b:51:1d:e4:91:ca:c6:40:fb:c6:69:
++    ad:68:33:9e:c8:f5:c4:c6:a5:93:a8:4d:a9:a9:a2:
++    af:fe:6d:cb:c2:3b
++pub:
++    04:01:5f:58:a9:40:0c:ee:9b:ed:4a:f4:7a:3c:a3:
++    89:c2:f3:7e:2c:f4:b5:53:80:ae:33:7d:36:d1:b5:
++    18:bd:ef:a9:48:00:ea:88:ee:00:5c:ca:07:08:b5:
++    67:4a:c3:2b:10:c6:07:b0:c2:45:37:b7:1d:e3:6c:
++    e1:bf:2c:44:18:4a:aa:01:af:75:40:6a:e3:f5:b2:
++    7f:d1:9d:1b:8b:29:1f:91:4d:db:93:bf:bd:8c:b7:
++    6a:8d:4b:2c:36:2a:6b:ab:54:9d:7b:31:99:a4:de:
++    c9:10:c4:f4:a3:f4:6d:94:97:62:16:a5:34:65:1f:
++    42:cd:8b:9e:e6:db:14:5d:a9:8d:19:95:8d
++*/
++static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv521[] = {
++    0x00, 0x44, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x31, 0xa9, 0x87, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xbe, 0xa0, 0xbc, 0xef, 0x0c, 0xae,
++    0x58, 0xcc, 0x5f, 0xf8, 0x44, 0x9e, 0x89, 0x86, 0x7e, 0xbf, 0xdb, 0xce, 0xcb, 0x0e, 0x20,
++    0x10, 0x4a, 0x11, 0xec, 0x0b, 0x51, 0x1d, 0xe4, 0x91, 0xca, 0xc6, 0x40, 0xfb, 0xc6, 0x69,
++    0xad, 0x68, 0x33, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0xa5, 0x93, 0xa8, 0x4d, 0xa9, 0xa9, 0xa2,
++    0xaf, 0xfe, 0x6d, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x3b
++};
++static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub521[] = {
++    0x04, 0x01, 0x5f, 0x58, 0xa9, 0x40, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x9b, 0xed, 0x4a, 0xf4, 0x7a, 0x3c, 0xa3,
++    0x89, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xf4, 0xb5, 0x53, 0x80, 0xae, 0x33, 0x7d, 0x36, 0xd1, 0xb5,
++    0x18, 0xbd, 0xef, 0xa9, 0x48, 0x00, 0xea, 0x88, 0xee, 0x00, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x07, 0x08, 0xb5,
++    0x67, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x2b, 0x10, 0xc6, 0x07, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x1d, 0xe3, 0x6c,
++    0xe1, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x18, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x75, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xe3, 0xf5, 0xb2,
++    0x7f, 0xd1, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0x93, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x8c, 0xb7,
++    0x6a, 0x8d, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0x36, 0x2a, 0x6b, 0xab, 0x54, 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x31, 0x99, 0xa4, 0xde,
++    0xc9, 0x10, 0xc4, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xf4, 0x6d, 0x94, 0x97, 0x62, 0x16, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x65, 0x1f,
++    0x42, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x9e, 0xe6, 0xdb, 0x14, 0x5d, 0xa9, 0x8d, 0x19, 0x95, 0x8d
++};
++static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key521[] = {
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name521),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub521),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv521),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
++};
++static const unsigned char ec521r1_kat_sig[] = {
++0x30, 0x81, 0x88, 0x02, 0x42, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x64, 0x9c, 0xc8, 0x5b, 0xdd, 0x0b, 0x7f, 0x69, 0x7e,
++0xdb, 0x83, 0x58, 0x67, 0x63, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xfa, 0x40, 0x29, 0xde, 0xb9, 0xde, 0xe9, 0x96, 0x65,
++0xe6, 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0xe9, 0x6a, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x47, 0x9c, 0x62, 0xb8,
++0x6c, 0xc1, 0x36, 0x19, 0x65, 0xff, 0xab, 0xcf, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xde, 0xd1, 0x4b, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x89,
++0xcf, 0xf8, 0x72, 0x7b, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x02, 0x02, 0x42, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x07, 0x77, 0xb8, 0xcb, 0xa2,
++0xe2, 0x1f, 0x53, 0x9a, 0x7c, 0x16, 0xb5, 0x8e, 0xad, 0xe3, 0xc3, 0xac, 0xb7, 0xb2, 0x51, 0x8f,
++0xf9, 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x5c, 0x4a, 0x5e, 0x3d, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0xbb, 0x5a,
++0x92, 0x69, 0xec, 0x71, 0xa2, 0x35, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xc9, 0x69, 0xa7, 0xaa, 0x94, 0xf9,
++0xf9, 0x50, 0x87, 0x7b, 0x5d, 0x87, 0xe3, 0xd6, 0x3f, 0xb6, 0x6e
++};
++static const char ecd_prime_curve_name256[] = "prime256v1";
++/*
++priv:
++    84:88:11:3f:a9:c9:9e:23:72:8b:40:cb:a2:b1:88:
++    01:1e:92:48:af:13:2d:9b:33:8e:6d:43:40:30:c7:
++    30:fa
++pub:
++    04:22:58:b6:f9:01:3b:8c:a6:9b:9f:ae:75:fc:73:
++    cf:1b:f0:81:dc:55:a3:cc:5d:81:46:85:06:32:34:
++    99:0d:c5:7e:a1:95:bb:21:73:33:40:4b:35:17:f6:
++    8e:26:61:46:94:2c:4c:ac:9b:20:f8:08:72:25:74:
++    98:66:c4:63:a6
++*/
++static const unsigned char ecd_prime_priv256[] = {
++    0x84, 0x88, 0x11, 0x3f, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x23, 0x72, 0x8b, 0x40, 0xcb, 0xa2, 0xb1, 0x88,
++    0x01, 0x1e, 0x92, 0x48, 0xaf, 0x13, 0x2d, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8e, 0x6d, 0x43, 0x40, 0x30, 0xc7,
++    0x30, 0xfa
++};
++static const unsigned char ecd_prime_pub256[] = {
++    0x04, 0x22, 0x58, 0xb6, 0xf9, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xa6, 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xae, 0x75, 0xfc, 0x73,
++    0xcf, 0x1b, 0xf0, 0x81, 0xdc, 0x55, 0xa3, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x81, 0x46, 0x85, 0x06, 0x32, 0x34,
++    0x99, 0x0d, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xa1, 0x95, 0xbb, 0x21, 0x73, 0x33, 0x40, 0x4b, 0x35, 0x17, 0xf6,
++    0x8e, 0x26, 0x61, 0x46, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x9b, 0x20, 0xf8, 0x08, 0x72, 0x25, 0x74,
++    0x98, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x63, 0xa6
++};
++static const ST_KAT_PARAM ecdsa_prime_key256[] = {
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, ecd_prime_curve_name256),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, ecd_prime_pub256),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_BIGNUM(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, ecd_prime_priv256),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
++};
++static const unsigned char ec256v1_kat_sig[] = {
++0x30, 0x46, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x11, 0x27, 0x06, 0x51, 0x2b, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x6b, 0xc0, 0xa6,
++0x85, 0xaa, 0xf4, 0x66, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x54, 0x0a, 0x10, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x87, 0xfc, 0xa2, 0xbc, 0x8f,
++0x3c, 0x58, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x41, 0x02, 0x21, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x72, 0x94, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x52, 0xca, 0x21,
++0x82, 0x66, 0x7a, 0x68, 0xcb, 0x1e, 0x3b, 0x12, 0x71, 0x4d, 0x56, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xdd, 0xca, 0x2b,
++0x18, 0xa3, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x0d, 0xfa, 0x9c, 0x66
++};
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ static const char ecd_bin_curve_name[] = "sect233r1";
+ static const unsigned char ecd_bin_priv[] = {
+@@ -1571,8 +1715,42 @@ static const ST_KAT_SIGN st_kat_sign_tes
+         ecdsa_prime_key,
+         /*
+          * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
+-         * So there is no expected KAT for this case.
++         * We provide this value in our build
++         */
++        ITM(ec224r1_kat_sig)
++    },
++    {
++        OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
++        "EC",
++        "SHA-256",
++        ecdsa_prime_key384,
++        /*
++         * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
++         * We provide this value in our build
++         */
++        ITM(ec384r1_kat_sig)
++    },
++    {
++        OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
++        "EC",
++        "SHA-256",
++        ecdsa_prime_key521,
++        /*
++         * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
++         * We provide this value in our build
++         */
++        ITM(ec521r1_kat_sig)
++    },
++    {
++        OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_SIGN_ECDSA,
++        "EC",
++        "SHA-256",
++        ecdsa_prime_key256,
++        /*
++         * The ECDSA signature changes each time due to it using a random k.
++         * We provide this value in our build
+          */
++        ITM(ec256v1_kat_sig)
+     },
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+     {
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c.fipskat openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c.fipskat	2022-05-30 14:48:53.180999124 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c	2022-05-30 14:58:52.841286228 +0200
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@
+ #define S390X_OFF_RN(n)                 (4 * n)
+ #define S390X_OFF_Y(n)                  (4 * n)
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++extern int REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st;
++#endif
++
+ static int ec_GFp_s390x_nistp_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+                                   const BIGNUM *scalar,
+                                   size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[],
+@@ -183,11 +187,21 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_s390x_nistp_sign
+          * because kdsa instruction constructs an in-range, invertible nonce
+          * internally implementing counter-measures for RNG weakness.
+          */
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++       if (REDHAT_FIPS_signature_st && eckey->sign_kat_k != NULL) {
++           BN_bn2binpad(eckey->sign_kat_k, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len), len);
++           /* Turns KDSA internal nonce-generation off. */
++           fc |= S390X_KDSA_D;
++       } else {
++#endif
+          if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(eckey->libctx, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len),
+                                 (size_t)len, 0) != 1) {
+              ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+              goto ret;
+          }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        }
++#endif
+     } else {
+         /* Reconstruct k = (k^-1)^-1. */
+         if (ossl_ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group, k, kinv, NULL) == 0

SOURCES/0061-Deny-SHA-1-signature-verification-in-FIPS-provider.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+From 5f4f350ce797a7cd2fdca84c474ee196da9d6fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 17:25:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Deny SHA-1 signature verification in FIPS provider
+
+For RHEL, we already disable SHA-1 signatures by default in the default
+provider, so it is unexpected that the FIPS provider would have a more
+lenient configuration in this regard. Additionally, we do not think
+continuing to accept SHA-1 signatures is a good idea due to the
+published chosen-prefix collision attacks.
+
+As a consequence, disable verification of SHA-1 signatures in the FIPS
+provider.
+
+This requires adjusting a few tests that would otherwise fail:
+- 30-test_acvp: Remove the test vectors that use SHA-1.
+- 30-test_evp: Mark tests in evppkey_rsa_common.txt and
+  evppkey_ecdsa.txt that use SHA-1 digests as "Availablein = default",
+  which will not run them when the FIPS provider is enabled.
+- 80-test_cms: Re-create all certificates in test/smime-certificates
+  with SHA256 signatures while keeping the same private keys. These
+  certificates were signed with SHA-1 and thus fail verification in the
+  FIPS provider.
+  Fix some other tests by explicitly running them in the default
+  provider, where SHA-1 is available.
+- 80-test_ssl_old: Skip tests that rely on SSLv3 and SHA-1 when run with
+  the FIPS provider.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c |  4 --
+ .../implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c     |  4 --
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |  8 +--
+ test/acvp_test.inc                            | 20 -------
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt        |  7 +++
+ .../30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt   | 51 +++++++++++++++-
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                    |  4 +-
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t                |  4 ++
+ test/smime-certs/smdh.pem                     | 18 +++---
+ test/smime-certs/smdsa1.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
+ test/smime-certs/smdsa2.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
+ test/smime-certs/smdsa3.pem                   | 60 +++++++++----------
+ test/smime-certs/smec1.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
+ test/smime-certs/smec2.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
+ test/smime-certs/smec3.pem                    | 30 +++++-----
+ test/smime-certs/smroot.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ test/smime-certs/smrsa1.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ test/smime-certs/smrsa2.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ test/smime-certs/smrsa3.pem                   | 38 ++++++------
+ 19 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 256 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+index fa3822f39f..c365d7b13a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c
+@@ -128,11 +128,7 @@ static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+         int md_nid;
+         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-#else
+         int sha1_allowed = 0;
+-#endif
+         md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                             sha1_allowed);
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+index 99b228e82c..44a22832ec 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa_sig.c
+@@ -237,11 +237,7 @@ static int ecdsa_setup_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+                        "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+         return 0;
+     }
+-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-    sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-#else
+     sha1_allowed = 0;
+-#endif
+     md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                     sha1_allowed);
+     if (md_nid < 0) {
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index f66d7705c3..34f45175e8 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -292,11 +292,7 @@ static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+         EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+         int md_nid;
+         size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-        int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+-#else
+         int sha1_allowed = 0;
+-#endif
+         md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(ctx->libctx, md,
+                                                      sha1_allowed);
+ 
+@@ -1355,8 +1351,10 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ 
+     if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
+         && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
++#else
+         pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         if (!ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(prsactx->libctx, 0)) {
+             pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME_NONLEGACY;
+         }
+diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
+index ad11d3ae1e..73b24bdb0c 100644
+--- a/test/acvp_test.inc
++++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
+@@ -1841,17 +1841,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
+         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+         FAIL
+     },
+-    {
+-        "x931",
+-        3072,
+-        "SHA1",
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_msg),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_n),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_e),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_0_sig),
+-        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+-        PASS
+-    },
+     {
+         "x931",
+         3072,
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+index f36982845d..51e507a61c 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecdsa.txt
+@@ -37,12 +37,14 @@ PrivPubKeyPair = P-256:P-256-PUBLIC
+ 
+ Title = ECDSA tests
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec8
+ 
+ # Digest too long
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF12345"
+@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Digest too short
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123"
+@@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Digest invalid
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1235"
+@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Invalid signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -79,12 +84,14 @@ Output = 3045022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # BER signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 3080022100b1d1cb1a577035bccdd5a86c6148c2cc7c633cd42b7234139b593076d041e15202201898cdd52b41ca502098184b409cf83a21bc945006746e3b7cea52234e043ec80000
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = P-256-PUBLIC
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+index b8d8bb2993..8dd566067b 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
++++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_common.txt
+@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ NDL6WCBbets=
+ 
+ Title = RSA tests
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -112,24 +113,28 @@ Ctrl = digest:SHA512-224
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF123456789ABC"
+ Output = 5f720e9488139bb21e1c2f027fd5ce5993e6d31c5a8faaee833487b3a944d66891178868ace8070cad3ee2ffbe54aa4885a15fd1a7cc5166970fe1fd8c0423e72bd3e3b56fc4a53ed80aaaeca42497f0ec3c62113edc05cd006608f5eef7ce3ad4cba1069f68731dd28a524a1f93fcdc5547112d48d45586dd943ba0d443be9635720d8a61697c54c96627f0d85c5fbeaa3b4af86a65cf2fc3800dd5de34c046985f25d0efc0bb6edccc1d08b3a4fb9c8faffe181c7e68b31e374ad1440a4a664eec9ca0dc53a9d2f5bc7d9940d866f64201bcbc63612754df45727ea24b531d7de83d1bb707444859fa35521320c33bf6f4dbeb6fb56e653adbf7af15843f17
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = 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
+ Output = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ 
+ # Leading zero in the signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # Mismatched digest
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
+@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Corrupted signature
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1233"
+@@ -144,6 +150,7 @@ Output = c09d402423cbf233d26cae21f954547bc43fe80fd41360a0336cfdbe9aedad05bef6fd2
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # parameter is not NULLt
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -151,42 +158,49 @@ Output = 3ec3fc29eb6e122bd7aa361cd09fe1bcbe85311096a7b9e4799cedfb2351ce0ab7fe4e7
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # embedded digest too long
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # embedded digest too short
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # Garbage after DigestInfo
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+ Output = 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
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ VerifyRecover = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = 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
+ Result = KEYOP_ERROR
+ 
+ # invalid tag for parameter
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048
+ Ctrl = digest:sha1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Verify using public key
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+ Ctrl = digest:SHA1
+ Input = "0123456789ABCDEF1234"
+@@ -370,6 +385,8 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF"
+ Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068780D52706D7D1E4D50EFB7D58C9D547D83A747DDD0635A96B28F854E50145518482CB49E963054621B53C60C498D07C16E9C2789C893CF38D4D86900DE71BDE463BD2761D1271E358C7480A1AC0BAB930DDF39602AD1BC165B5D7436B516B7A7858E8EB7AB1C420EEB482F4D207F0E462B1724959320A084E13848D11D10FB593E66BF680BF6D3F345FC3E9C3DE60ABBAC37E1C6EC80A268C8D9FC49626C679097AA690BC1AA662B95EB8DB70390861AA0898229F9349B4B5FDD030D4928C47084708A933144BE23BD3C6E661B85B2C0EF9ED36D498D5B7320E8194D363D4AD478C059BAE804181965E0B81B663158A
+ 
+ # Verify using salt length auto detect
++# In the FIPS provider on RHEL-9, the default digest for PSS signatures is SHA-256
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-2048-PUBLIC
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:auto
+@@ -404,6 +421,10 @@ Output=4DE433D5844043EF08D354DA03CB29068780D52706D7D1E4D50EFB7D58C9D547D83A747DD
+ Result = VERIFY_ERROR
+ 
+ # Verify using default parameters, explicitly setting parameters
++# NOTE: RSA-PSS-DEFAULT contains a restriction to use SHA1 as digest, which
++# RHEL-9 does not support in FIPS mode; all these tests are thus marked
++# Availablein = default.
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:20
+@@ -412,6 +433,7 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output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
+ 
+ # Verify explicitly setting parameters "digest" salt length
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:digest
+@@ -420,18 +442,21 @@ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output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
+ 
+ # Verify using salt length larger than minimum
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:30
+ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output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
+ 
+ # Verify using maximum salt length
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:max
+ Input="0123456789ABCDEF0123"
+ Output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
+ 
+ # Attempt to change salt length below minimum
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_pss_saltlen:0
+ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+@@ -439,21 +464,25 @@ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+ # Attempt to change padding mode
+ # Note this used to return PKEY_CTRL_INVALID
+ # but it is limited because setparams only returns 0 or 1.
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pkcs1
+ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+ 
+ # Attempt to change digest
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-DEFAULT
+ Ctrl = digest:sha256
+ Result = PKEY_CTRL_ERROR
+ 
+ # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD
+ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+ Reason = invalid salt length
+ 
+ # Invalid key: rejected when we try to init
++Availablein = default
+ Verify = RSA-PSS-BAD2
+ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
+ Reason = invalid salt length
+@@ -472,36 +501,42 @@ CAltWyuLbfXWce9jd8CSHLI8Jwpw4lmOb/idGfEFrMLT8Ms18pKA4Thrb2TE7yLh
+ 4fINDOjP+yJJvZohNwIDAQAB
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=cd8b6538cb8e8de566b68bd067569dbf1ee2718e
+ Output=9074308fb598e9701b2294388e52f971faac2b60a5145af185df5287b5ed2887e57ce7fd44dc8634e407c8e0e4360bc226f3ec227f9d9e54638e8d31f5051215df6ebb9c2f9579aa77598a38f914b5b9c1bd83c4e2f9f382a0d0aa3542ffee65984a601bc69eb28deb27dca12c82c2d4c3f66cd500f1ff2b994d8a4e30cbb33c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=e35befc17a1d160b9ce35fbd8eb16e7ee491d3fd
+ Output=3ef7f46e831bf92b32274142a585ffcefbdca7b32ae90d10fb0f0c729984f04ef29a9df0780775ce43739b97838390db0a5505e63de927028d9d29b219ca2c4517832558a55d694a6d25b9dab66003c4cccd907802193be5170d26147d37b93590241be51c25055f47ef62752cfbe21418fafe98c22c4d4d47724fdb5669e843
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0652ec67bcee30f9d2699122b91c19abdba89f91
+ Output=666026fba71bd3e7cf13157cc2c51a8e4aa684af9778f91849f34335d141c00154c4197621f9624a675b5abc22ee7d5baaffaae1c9baca2cc373b3f33e78e6143c395a91aa7faca664eb733afd14d8827259d99a7550faca501ef2b04e33c23aa51f4b9e8282efdb728cc0ab09405a91607c6369961bc8270d2d4f39fce612b1
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=39c21c4cceda9c1adf839c744e1212a6437575ec
+ Output=4609793b23e9d09362dc21bb47da0b4f3a7622649a47d464019b9aeafe53359c178c91cd58ba6bcb78be0346a7bc637f4b873d4bab38ee661f199634c547a1ad8442e03da015b136e543f7ab07c0c13e4225b8de8cce25d4f6eb8400f81f7e1833b7ee6e334d370964ca79fdb872b4d75223b5eeb08101591fb532d155a6de87
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=36dae913b77bd17cae6e7b09453d24544cebb33c
+ Output=1d2aad221ca4d31ddf13509239019398e3d14b32dc34dc5af4aeaea3c095af73479cf0a45e5629635a53a018377615b16cb9b13b3e09d671eb71e387b8545c5960da5a64776e768e82b2c93583bf104c3fdb23512b7b4e89f633dd0063a530db4524b01c3f384c09310e315a79dcd3d684022a7f31c865a664e316978b759fad
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-1
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -517,36 +552,42 @@ swU7R97S7NSkyu/WFIM9yLtiLzF+0Ha4BX/o3j+ESArV6D5KYZBKTySPs5cCc1fh
+ 0w5GMTmBXG/U/VrFuBcqRSMOy2MYoE8UVdhOWosCAwEAAQ==
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2715a49b8b0012cd7aee84c116446e6dfe3faec0
+ Output=586107226c3ce013a7c8f04d1a6a2959bb4b8e205ba43a27b50f124111bc35ef589b039f5932187cb696d7d9a32c0c38300a5cdda4834b62d2eb240af33f79d13dfbf095bf599e0d9686948c1964747b67e89c9aba5cd85016236f566cc5802cb13ead51bc7ca6bef3b94dcbdbb1d570469771df0e00b1a8a06777472d2316279edae86474668d4e1efff95f1de61c6020da32ae92bbf16520fef3cf4d88f61121f24bbd9fe91b59caf1235b2a93ff81fc403addf4ebdea84934a9cdaf8e1a9e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=2dac956d53964748ac364d06595827c6b4f143cd
+ Output=80b6d643255209f0a456763897ac9ed259d459b49c2887e5882ecb4434cfd66dd7e1699375381e51cd7f554f2c271704b399d42b4be2540a0eca61951f55267f7c2878c122842dadb28b01bd5f8c025f7e228418a673c03d6bc0c736d0a29546bd67f786d9d692ccea778d71d98c2063b7a71092187a4d35af108111d83e83eae46c46aa34277e06044589903788f1d5e7cee25fb485e92949118814d6f2c3ee361489016f327fb5bc517eb50470bffa1afa5f4ce9aa0ce5b8ee19bf5501b958
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=28d98c46cccafbd3bc04e72f967a54bd3ea12298
+ Output=484408f3898cd5f53483f80819efbf2708c34d27a8b2a6fae8b322f9240237f981817aca1846f1084daa6d7c0795f6e5bf1af59c38e1858437ce1f7ec419b98c8736adf6dd9a00b1806d2bd3ad0a73775e05f52dfef3a59ab4b08143f0df05cd1ad9d04bececa6daa4a2129803e200cbc77787caf4c1d0663a6c5987b605952019782caf2ec1426d68fb94ed1d4be816a7ed081b77e6ab330b3ffc073820fecde3727fcbe295ee61a050a343658637c3fd659cfb63736de32d9f90d3c2f63eca
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=0866d2ff5a79f25ef668cd6f31b42dee421e4c0e
+ Output=84ebeb481be59845b46468bafb471c0112e02b235d84b5d911cbd1926ee5074ae0424495cb20e82308b8ebb65f419a03fb40e72b78981d88aad143053685172c97b29c8b7bf0ae73b5b2263c403da0ed2f80ff7450af7828eb8b86f0028bd2a8b176a4d228cccea18394f238b09ff758cc00bc04301152355742f282b54e663a919e709d8da24ade5500a7b9aa50226e0ca52923e6c2d860ec50ff480fa57477e82b0565f4379f79c772d5c2da80af9fbf325ece6fc20b00961614bee89a183e
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=6a5b4be4cd36cc97dfde9995efbf8f097a4a991a
+ Output=82102df8cb91e7179919a04d26d335d64fbc2f872c44833943241de8454810274cdf3db5f42d423db152af7135f701420e39b494a67cbfd19f9119da233a23da5c6439b5ba0d2bc373eee3507001378d4a4073856b7fe2aba0b5ee93b27f4afec7d4d120921c83f606765b02c19e4d6a1a3b95fa4c422951be4f52131077ef17179729cddfbdb56950dbaceefe78cb16640a099ea56d24389eef10f8fecb31ba3ea3b227c0a86698bb89e3e9363905bf22777b2a3aa521b65b4cef76d83bde4c
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-9
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -564,36 +605,42 @@ F7jfF3jbOB3OCctK0FilEQAac4GY7ifPVaE7dUU5kGWC7IsXS9WNXR89dnxhNyGu
+ BQIDAQAB
+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=9596bb630cf6a8d4ea4600422b9eba8b13675dd4
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=b503319399277fd6c1c8f1033cbf04199ea21716
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=50aaede8536b2c307208b275a67ae2df196c7628
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=aa0b72b8b371ddd10c8ae474425ccccf8842a294
+ Output=34047ff96c4dc0dc90b2d4ff59a1a361a4754b255d2ee0af7d8bf87c9bc9e7ddeede33934c63ca1c0e3d262cb145ef932a1f2c0a997aa6a34f8eaee7477d82ccf09095a6b8acad38d4eec9fb7eab7ad02da1d11d8e54c1825e55bf58c2a23234b902be124f9e9038a8f68fa45dab72f66e0945bf1d8bacc9044c6f07098c9fcec58a3aab100c805178155f030a124c450e5acbda47d0e4f10b80a23f803e774d023b0015c20b9f9bbe7c91296338d5ecb471cafb032007b67a60be5f69504a9f01abb3cb467b260e2bce860be8d95bf92c0c8e1496ed1e528593a4abb6df462dde8a0968dffe4683116857a232f5ebf6c85be238745ad0f38f767a5fdbf486fb
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+ Input=fad3902c9750622a2bc672622c48270cc57d3ea8
+ Output=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
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ Verify=RSA-PSS-10
+ Ctrl = rsa_padding_mode:pss
+ Ctrl = rsa_mgf1_md:sha1
+@@ -1329,11 +1376,13 @@ Title = RSA FIPS tests
+ 
+ # FIPS tests
+ 
+-# Verifying with SHA1 is permitted in fips mode for older applications
++# Verifying with SHA1 is not permitted on RHEL-9 in FIPS mode
++Availablein = fips
+ DigestVerify = SHA1
+ Key = RSA-2048
+ Input = "Hello "
+ Output = 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
++Result = DIGESTVERIFYINIT_ERROR
+ 
+ # Verifying with a 1024 bit key is permitted in fips mode for older applications
+ DigestVerify = SHA256
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index 48a92f735d..34afe91b88 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont, "-md", "sha1",
+         "-certfile", $smroot,
+         "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+-      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
++      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
+         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
+       \&final_compare
+     ],
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+     [ "signed zero-length content S/MIME format, RSA key SHA1",
+       [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-sign", "-in", $smcont_zero, "-md", "sha1",
+         "-certfile", $smroot, "-signer", $smrsa1, "-out", "{output}.cms" ],
+-      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
++      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-verify", "-in", "{output}.cms",
+         "-CAfile", $smroot, "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
+       \&zero_compare
+     ],
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+index 8c52b637fc..ff75c5b6ec 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ sub testssl {
+                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
+           }
+ 
++        SKIP: {
++          skip "SSLv3 is not supported by the FIPS provider", 4
++              if $provider eq "fips";
+           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", @CA])),
+              'test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication');
+           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-client_auth", @CA])),
+@@ -402,6 +405,7 @@ sub testssl {
+              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair');
+           ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-server_auth", "-client_auth", "-app_verify", @CA])),
+              'test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair and app verify');
++         }
+ 
+         SKIP: {
+             skip "No IPv4 available on this machine", 4

SOURCES/0062-fips-Expose-a-FIPS-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+From e3d6fca1af033d00c47bcd8f9ba28fcf1aa476aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 12:02:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fips: Expose a FIPS indicator
+
+FIPS 140-3 requires us to indicate whether an operation was using
+approved services or not. The FIPS 140-3 implementation guidelines
+provide two basic approaches to doing this: implicit indicators, and
+explicit indicators.
+
+Implicit indicators are basically the concept of "if the operation
+passes, it was approved". We were originally aiming for implicit
+indicators in our copy of OpenSSL. However, this proved to be a problem,
+because we wanted to certify a signature service, and FIPS 140-3
+requires that a signature service computes the digest to be signed
+within the boundaries of the FIPS module. Since we were planning to
+certify fips.so only, this means that EVP_PKEY_sign/EVP_PKEY_verify
+would have to be blocked. Unfortunately, EVP_SignFinal uses
+EVP_PKEY_sign internally, but outside of fips.so and thus outside of the
+FIPS module boundary. This means that using implicit indicators in
+combination with certifying only fips.so would require us to block both
+EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal, which are the two APIs currently used
+by most users of OpenSSL for signatures.
+
+EVP_DigestSign would be acceptable, but has only been added in 3.0 and
+is thus not yet widely used.
+
+As a consequence, we've decided to introduce explicit indicators so that
+EVP_PKEY_sign and EVP_SignFinal can continue to work for now, but
+FIPS-aware applications can query the explicit indicator to check
+whether the operation was approved.
+
+To avoid affecting the ABI and public API too much, this is implemented
+as an exported symbol in fips.so and a private header, so applications
+that wish to use this will have to dlopen(3) fips.so, locate the
+function using dlsym(3), and then call it. These applications will have
+to build against the private header in order to use the returned
+pointer.
+
+Modify util/mkdef.pl to support exposing a symbol only for a specific
+provider identified by its name and path.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ doc/build.info                      |   6 ++
+ doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ providers/fips/fipsprov.c           |  71 +++++++++++++
+ providers/fips/indicator.h          |  66 ++++++++++++
+ util/mkdef.pl                       |  25 ++++-
+ util/providers.num                  |   1 +
+ 6 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+ create mode 100644 providers/fips/indicator.h
+
+diff --git a/doc/build.info b/doc/build.info
+index b0aa4297a4..af235113bb 100644
+--- a/doc/build.info
++++ b/doc/build.info
+@@ -4389,6 +4389,10 @@ DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
+ GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module.html]=man7/fips_module.pod
+ DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
+ GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module.7]=man7/fips_module.pod
++DEPEND[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
++GENERATE[html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
++DEPEND[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
++GENERATE[man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7]=man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+ DEPEND[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
+ GENERATE[html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
+ DEPEND[man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7]=man7/life_cycle-cipher.pod
+@@ -4631,6 +4635,7 @@ html/man7/ct.html \
+ html/man7/des_modes.html \
+ html/man7/evp.html \
+ html/man7/fips_module.html \
++html/man7/fips_module_indicators.html \
+ html/man7/life_cycle-cipher.html \
+ html/man7/life_cycle-digest.html \
+ html/man7/life_cycle-kdf.html \
+@@ -4754,6 +4759,7 @@ man/man7/ct.7 \
+ man/man7/des_modes.7 \
+ man/man7/evp.7 \
+ man/man7/fips_module.7 \
++man/man7/fips_module_indicators.7 \
+ man/man7/life_cycle-cipher.7 \
+ man/man7/life_cycle-digest.7 \
+ man/man7/life_cycle-kdf.7 \
+diff --git a/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..23db2b395c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/doc/man7/fips_module_indicators.pod
+@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
++=pod
++
++=head1 NAME
++
++fips_module_indicators - Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS module indicators guide
++
++=head1 DESCRIPTION
++
++This guide documents how the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 OpenSSL FIPS provider
++implements Approved Security Service Indicators according to the FIPS 140-3
++Implementation Guidelines, section 2.4.C. See
++L<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf>
++for the FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidelines.
++
++For all approved services except signatures, the Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider
++uses the return code as the indicator as understood by FIPS 140-3. That means
++that every operation that succeeds denotes use of an approved security service.
++Operations that do not succeed may not have been approved security services, or
++may have been used incorrectly.
++
++For signatures, an explicit indicator API is available to determine whether
++a selected operation is an approved security service, in combination with the
++return code of the operation. For a signature operation to be approved, the
++explicit indicator must claim it as approved, and it must succeed.
++
++=head2 Querying the explicit indicator
++
++The Red Hat OpenSSL FIPS provider exports a symbol named
++I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> that provides information on which signature
++operations are approved security functions. To use this function, either link
++against I<fips.so> directly, or load it at runtime using dlopen(3) and
++dlsym(3).
++
++    #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
++    #include "providers/fips/indicator.h"
++
++    void *provider = dlopen("/usr/lib64/ossl-modules/fips.so", RTLD_LAZY);
++    if (provider == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALORITHM *(*redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator)(int) \
++        = dlsym(provider, "redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator");
++    if (redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", dlerror());
++        fprintf(stderr, "Does your copy of fips.so have the required Red Hat"
++                        " patches?\n");
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++Note that this uses the I<providers/fips/indicator.h> header, which is not
++public. Install the I<openssl-debugsource> package from the I<BaseOS-debuginfo>
++repository using I<dnf debuginfo-install openssl> and include
++I</usr/src/debug/openssl-3.*/> in the compiler's include path.
++
++I<redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator> expects an operation ID as its only
++argument. Currently, the only supported operation ID is I<OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE> to
++obtain the indicators for signature operations. On success, the return value is
++a pointer to an array of I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_STRUCT>s. On failure, NULL is
++returned. The last entry in the array is indicated by I<algorithm_names> being
++NULL.
++
++    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
++        const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
++        const char *property_definition; /* key */
++        const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
++    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
++
++    typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
++        int function_id;
++        int approved;
++    } OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
++
++The I<algorithm_names> field is a colon-separated list of algorithm names from
++one of the I<PROV_NAMES_...> constants, e.g., I<PROV_NAMES_RSA>. strtok(3) can
++be used to locate the appropriate entry. See the example below, where
++I<algorithm> contains the algorithm name to search for:
++
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicator_dispatch = NULL;
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *indicator =
++        redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(operation_id);
++    if (indicator == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for operation, probably using implicit"
++                        " indicators.\n");
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++    for (; indicator->algorithm_names != NULL; ++indicator) {
++        char *algorithm_names = strdup(indicator->algorithm_names);
++        if (algorithm_names == NULL) {
++            perror("strdup(3)");
++            // handle error
++        }
++
++        const char *algorithm_name = strtok(algorithm_names, ":");
++        for (; algorithm_name != NULL; algorithm_name = strtok(NULL, ":")) {
++            if (strcasecmp(algorithm_name, algorithm) == 0) {
++                indicator_dispatch = indicator->indicators;
++                free(algorithm_names);
++                algorithm_names = NULL;
++                break;
++            }
++        }
++        free(algorithm_names);
++    }
++    if (indicator_dispatch == NULL) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "No indicator for algorithm %s.\n", algorithm);
++        // handle error
++    }
++
++If an appropriate I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH> array is available for the
++given algorithm name, it maps function IDs to their approval status. The last
++entry is indicated by a zero I<function_id>. I<approved> is
++I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED> if the operation is an approved security
++service, or part of an approved security service, or
++I<OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED> otherwise. Any other value is invalid.
++Function IDs are I<OSSL_FUNC_*> constants from I<openssl/core_dispatch.h>,
++e.g., I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE> or I<OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN>.
++
++Assuming I<function_id> is the function in question, the following code can be
++used to query the approval status:
++
++    for (; indicator_dispatch->function_id != 0; ++indicator_dispatch) {
++        if (indicator_dispatch->function_id == function_id) {
++            switch (indicator_dispatch->approved) {
++                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED:
++                    // approved security service
++                    break;
++                case OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED:
++                    // unapproved security service
++                    break;
++                default:
++                    // invalid result
++                    break;
++            }
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++
++=head1 SEE ALSO
++
++L<fips_module(7)>, L<provider(7)>
++
++=head1 COPYRIGHT
++
++Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
++
++Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
++
++=cut
+diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+index de391ce067..1cfd71c5cf 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
++++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include "prov/seeding.h"
+ #include "self_test.h"
+ #include "internal/core.h"
++#include "indicator.h"
+ 
+ static const char FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=yes";
+ static const char FIPS_UNAPPROVED_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=no";
+@@ -425,6 +426,68 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+ };
+ 
++static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_rsa_signature_indicators[] = {
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
++};
++
++static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators[] = {
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED },
++    { 0, OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED }
++};
++
++static const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM redhat_indicator_fips_signature[] = {
++    { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
++        redhat_rsa_signature_indicators },
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
++    { PROV_NAMES_ECDSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES,
++        redhat_ecdsa_signature_indicators },
++#endif
++    { NULL, NULL, NULL }
++};
++
+ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_asym_cipher[] = {
+     { PROV_NAMES_RSA, FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ossl_rsa_asym_cipher_functions },
+     { NULL, NULL, NULL }
+@@ -527,6 +590,14 @@ static void fips_deinit_casecmp(void) {
+     return NULL;
+ }
+ 
++const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id) {
++    switch (operation_id) {
++    case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE:
++        return redhat_indicator_fips_signature;
++    }
++    return NULL;
++}
++
+ static void fips_teardown(void *provctx)
+ {
+     OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx));
+diff --git a/providers/fips/indicator.h b/providers/fips/indicator.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..b323efe44c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/providers/fips/indicator.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++ */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
++# define OPENSSL_FIPS_INDICATOR_H
++# pragma once
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++# endif
++
++# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_UNAPPROVED (0)
++# define OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_APPROVED (1)
++
++/*
++ * FIPS indicator dispatch table element.  function_id numbers and the
++ * functions are defined in core_dispatch.h, see macros with
++ * 'OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC' in their names.
++ *
++ * An array of these is always terminated by function_id == 0
++ */
++typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_dispatch_st {
++    int function_id;
++    int approved;
++} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH;
++
++/*
++ * Type to tie together algorithm names, property definition string and the
++ * algorithm implementation's FIPS indicator status in the form of a FIPS
++ * indicator dispatch table.
++ *
++ * An array of these is always terminated by algorithm_names == NULL
++ */
++typedef struct ossl_rh_fipsindicator_algorithm_st {
++    const char *algorithm_names;     /* key */
++    const char *property_definition; /* key */
++    const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH *indicators;
++} OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM;
++
++/**
++ * Query FIPS indicator status for the given operation.  Possible values for
++ * 'operation_id' are currently only OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE, as all other algorithms
++ * use implicit indicators.  The return value is an array of
++ * OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHMs, terminated by an entry with
++ * algorithm_names == NULL.  'algorithm_names' is a colon-separated list of
++ * algorithm names, 'property_definition' a comma-separated list of properties,
++ * and 'indicators' is a list of OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_DISPATCH structs.  This
++ * list is terminated by function_id == 0.  'function_id' is one of the
++ * OSSL_FUNC_* constants, e.g., OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL.
++ *
++ * If there is no entry in the returned struct for the given operation_id,
++ * algorithm name, or function_id, the algorithm is unapproved.
++ */
++const OSSL_RH_FIPSINDICATOR_ALGORITHM *redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator(int operation_id);
++
++# ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++# endif
++
++#endif
+diff --git a/util/mkdef.pl b/util/mkdef.pl
+index a1c76f7c97..eda39b71ee 100755
+--- a/util/mkdef.pl
++++ b/util/mkdef.pl
+@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ $ordinal_opts{filter} =
+         return
+             $item->exists()
+             && platform_filter($item)
+-            && feature_filter($item);
++            && feature_filter($item)
++            && fips_filter($item, $name);
+     };
+ my $ordinals = OpenSSL::Ordinals->new(from => $ordinals_file);
+ 
+@@ -205,6 +206,28 @@ sub feature_filter {
+     return $verdict;
+ }
+ 
++sub fips_filter {
++    my $item = shift;
++    my $name = uc(shift);
++    my @features = ( $item->features() );
++
++    # True if no features are defined
++    return 1 if scalar @features == 0;
++
++    my @matches = grep(/^ONLY_.*$/, @features);
++    if (@matches) {
++        # There is at least one only_* flag on this symbol, check if any of
++        # them match the name
++        for (@matches) {
++            if ($_ eq "ONLY_${name}") {
++                return 1;
++            }
++        }
++        return 0;
++    }
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ sub sorter_unix {
+     my $by_name = OpenSSL::Ordinals::by_name();
+     my %weight = (
+diff --git a/util/providers.num b/util/providers.num
+index 4e2fa81b98..77879d0e5f 100644
+--- a/util/providers.num
++++ b/util/providers.num
+@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+ OSSL_provider_init                     1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++redhat_ossl_query_fipsindicator        1	*	EXIST::FUNCTION:ONLY_PROVIDERS/FIPS
+-- 
+2.35.3
+

SOURCES/0067-ppc64le-Montgomery-multiply.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+From 33ffd36afa7594aeb958a925f521cb287ca850c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 12:14:55 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Revert "Revert "bn: Add fixed length (n=6), unrolled PPC
+ Montgomery Multiplication""
+
+This reverts commit 712d9cc90e355b2c98a959d4e9398610d2269c9e.
+---
+ crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl | 581 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c                |  15 +
+ crypto/bn/build.info              |   3 +-
+ 3 files changed, 598 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+index e69de29bb2d1..0fb397bc5f12 100755
+--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
++++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
++#! /usr/bin/env perl
++# Copyright 2021-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++#
++# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++
++# ====================================================================
++# Written by Amitay Isaacs <amitay@ozlabs.org>, Martin Schwenke
++# <martin@meltin.net> & Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org> for
++# the OpenSSL project.
++# ====================================================================
++
++#
++# Fixed length (n=6), unrolled PPC Montgomery Multiplication
++#
++
++# 2021
++#
++# Although this is a generic implementation for unrolling Montgomery
++# Multiplication for arbitrary values of n, this is currently only
++# used for n = 6 to improve the performance of ECC p384.
++#
++# Unrolling allows intermediate results to be stored in registers,
++# rather than on the stack, improving performance by ~7% compared to
++# the existing PPC assembly code.
++#
++# The ISA 3.0 implementation uses combination multiply/add
++# instructions (maddld, maddhdu) to improve performance by an
++# additional ~10% on Power 9.
++#
++# Finally, saving non-volatile registers into volatile vector
++# registers instead of onto the stack saves a little more.
++#
++# On a Power 9 machine we see an overall improvement of ~18%.
++#
++
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++
++my ($flavour, $output, $dir, $xlate);
++
++# $output is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
++# $flavour is the first argument if it doesn't look like a file
++$output = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[$#ARGV] =~ m|\.\w+$| ? pop : undef;
++$flavour = $#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] !~ m|\.| ? shift : undef;
++
++$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
++( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
++( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
++die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl";
++
++open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour \"$output\""
++    or die "can't call $xlate: $!";
++
++if ($flavour !~ /64/) {
++	die "bad flavour ($flavour) - only ppc64 permitted";
++}
++
++my $SIZE_T= 8;
++
++# Registers are global so the code is remotely readable
++
++# Parameters for Montgomery multiplication
++my $sp	= "r1";
++my $toc	= "r2";
++my $rp	= "r3";
++my $ap	= "r4";
++my $bp	= "r5";
++my $np	= "r6";
++my $n0	= "r7";
++my $num	= "r8";
++
++my $i	= "r9";
++my $c0	= "r10";
++my $bp0	= "r11";
++my $bpi	= "r11";
++my $bpj	= "r11";
++my $tj	= "r12";
++my $apj	= "r12";
++my $npj	= "r12";
++my $lo	= "r14";
++my $c1	= "r14";
++
++# Non-volatile registers used for tp[i]
++#
++# 12 registers are available but the limit on unrolling is 10,
++# since registers from $tp[0] to $tp[$n+1] are used.
++my @tp = ("r20" .. "r31");
++
++# volatile VSRs for saving non-volatile GPRs - faster than stack
++my @vsrs = ("v32" .. "v46");
++
++package Mont;
++
++sub new($$)
++{
++	my ($class, $n) = @_;
++
++	if ($n > 10) {
++		die "Can't unroll for BN length ${n} (maximum 10)"
++	}
++
++	my $self = {
++		code => "",
++		n => $n,
++	};
++	bless $self, $class;
++
++	return $self;
++}
++
++sub add_code($$)
++{
++	my ($self, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->{code} .= $c;
++}
++
++sub get_code($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	return $self->{code};
++}
++
++sub get_function_name($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	return "bn_mul_mont_fixed_n" . $self->{n};
++}
++
++sub get_label($$)
++{
++	my ($self, $l) = @_;
++
++	return "L" . $l . "_" . $self->{n};
++}
++
++sub get_labels($@)
++{
++	my ($self, @labels) = @_;
++
++	my %out = ();
++
++	foreach my $l (@labels) {
++		$out{"$l"} = $self->get_label("$l");
++	}
++
++	return \%out;
++}
++
++sub nl($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code("\n");
++}
++
++sub copy_result($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	my ($n) = $self->{n};
++
++	for (my $j = 0; $j < $n; $j++) {
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	std		$tp[$j],`$j*$SIZE_T`($rp)
++___
++	}
++
++}
++
++sub mul_mont_fixed($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	my ($n) = $self->{n};
++	my $fname = $self->get_function_name();
++	my $label = $self->get_labels("outer", "enter", "sub", "copy", "end");
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++
++.globl	.${fname}
++.align	5
++.${fname}:
++
++___
++
++	$self->save_registers();
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$n0,0($n0)
++
++	ld		$bp0,0($bp)
++
++	ld		$apj,0($ap)
++___
++
++	$self->mul_c_0($tp[0], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
++
++	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n - 1; $j++) {
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$apj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($ap)
++___
++		$self->mul($tp[$j], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
++	}
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$apj,`($n-1)*$SIZE_T`($ap)
++___
++
++	$self->mul_last($tp[$n-1], $tp[$n], $apj, $bp0, $c0);
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	li		$tp[$n+1],0
++
++___
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	li		$i,0
++	mtctr		$num
++	b		$label->{"enter"}
++
++.align	4
++$label->{"outer"}:
++	ldx		$bpi,$bp,$i
++
++	ld		$apj,0($ap)
++___
++
++	$self->mul_add_c_0($tp[0], $tp[0], $apj, $bpi, $c0);
++
++	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n; $j++) {
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$apj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($ap)
++___
++		$self->mul_add($tp[$j], $tp[$j], $apj, $bpi, $c0);
++	}
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	addc		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$c0
++	addze		$tp[$n+1],$tp[$n+1]
++___
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++.align	4
++$label->{"enter"}:
++	mulld		$bpi,$tp[0],$n0
++
++	ld		$npj,0($np)
++___
++
++	$self->mul_add_c_0($lo, $tp[0], $bpi, $npj, $c0);
++
++	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n; $j++) {
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$npj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($np)
++___
++		$self->mul_add($tp[$j-1], $tp[$j], $npj, $bpi, $c0);
++	}
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	addc		$tp[$n-1],$tp[$n],$c0
++	addze		$tp[$n],$tp[$n+1]
++
++	addi		$i,$i,$SIZE_T
++	bdnz		$label->{"outer"}
++
++	and.		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
++	bne		$label->{"sub"}
++
++	cmpld	$tp[$n-1],$npj
++	blt		$label->{"copy"}
++
++$label->{"sub"}:
++___
++
++	#
++	# Reduction
++	#
++
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$bpj,`0*$SIZE_T`($np)
++	subfc		$c1,$bpj,$tp[0]
++	std		$c1,`0*$SIZE_T`($rp)
++
++___
++	for (my $j = 1; $j < $n - 1; $j++) {
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld		$bpj,`$j*$SIZE_T`($np)
++	subfe		$c1,$bpj,$tp[$j]
++	std		$c1,`$j*$SIZE_T`($rp)
++
++___
++	}
++
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	subfe		$c1,$npj,$tp[$n-1]
++	std		$c1,`($n-1)*$SIZE_T`($rp)
++
++___
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	addme.		$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
++	beq		$label->{"end"}
++
++$label->{"copy"}:
++___
++
++	$self->copy_result();
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++
++$label->{"end"}:
++___
++
++	$self->restore_registers();
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	li		r3,1
++	blr
++.size .${fname},.-.${fname}
++___
++
++}
++
++package Mont::GPR;
++
++our @ISA = ('Mont');
++
++sub new($$)
++{
++    my ($class, $n) = @_;
++
++    return $class->SUPER::new($n);
++}
++
++sub save_registers($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	my $n = $self->{n};
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	std	$lo,-8($sp)
++___
++
++	for (my $j = 0; $j <= $n+1; $j++) {
++		$self->{code}.=<<___;
++	std	$tp[$j],-`($j+2)*8`($sp)
++___
++	}
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++
++___
++}
++
++sub restore_registers($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	my $n = $self->{n};
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	ld	$lo,-8($sp)
++___
++
++	for (my $j = 0; $j <= $n+1; $j++) {
++		$self->{code}.=<<___;
++	ld	$tp[$j],-`($j+2)*8`($sp)
++___
++	}
++
++	$self->{code} .=<<___;
++
++___
++}
++
++# Direct translation of C mul()
++sub mul($$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
++	addc		$r,$lo,$c
++	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
++	addze		$c,$c
++
++___
++}
++
++# Like mul() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
++# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
++sub mul_c_0($$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mulld		$r,$a,$w
++	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
++
++___
++}
++
++# Like mul() but does not to the final addition of CA into $c - an
++# optimisation to save an instruction
++sub mul_last($$$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r1, $r2, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
++	addc		$r1,$lo,$c
++	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
++
++	addze		$r2,$c
++___
++}
++
++# Like C mul_add() but allow $r_out and $r_in to be different
++sub mul_add($$$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
++	addc		$lo,$lo,$c
++	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
++	addze		$c,$c
++	addc		$r_out,$r_in,$lo
++	addze		$c,$c
++
++___
++}
++
++# Like mul_add() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
++# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
++sub mul_add_c_0($$$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mulld		$lo,$a,$w
++	addc		$r_out,$r_in,$lo
++	mulhdu		$c,$a,$w
++	addze		$c,$c
++
++___
++}
++
++package Mont::GPR_300;
++
++our @ISA = ('Mont::GPR');
++
++sub new($$)
++{
++	my ($class, $n) = @_;
++
++	my $mont = $class->SUPER::new($n);
++
++	return $mont;
++}
++
++sub get_function_name($)
++{
++	my ($self) = @_;
++
++	return "bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n" . $self->{n};
++}
++
++sub get_label($$)
++{
++	my ($self, $l) = @_;
++
++	return "L" . $l . "_300_" . $self->{n};
++}
++
++# Direct translation of C mul()
++sub mul($$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c, $last) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	maddld		$r,$a,$w,$c
++	maddhdu		$c,$a,$w,$c
++
++___
++}
++
++# Save the last carry as the final entry
++sub mul_last($$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r1, $r2, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	maddld		$r1,$a,$w,$c
++	maddhdu		$r2,$a,$w,$c
++
++___
++}
++
++# Like mul() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
++# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
++sub mul_c_0($$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mulld          $r,$a,$w
++	mulhdu          $c,$a,$w
++
++___
++}
++
++# Like C mul_add() but allow $r_out and $r_in to be different
++sub mul_add($$$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	maddld		$lo,$a,$w,$c
++	maddhdu		$c,$a,$w,$c
++	addc		$r_out,$r_in,$lo
++	addze		$c,$c
++
++___
++}
++
++# Like mul_add() but $c is ignored as an input - an optimisation to save a
++# preliminary instruction that would set input $c to 0
++sub mul_add_c_0($$$$$$)
++{
++	my ($self, $r_out, $r_in, $a, $w, $c) = @_;
++
++	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	maddld		$lo,$a,$w,$r_in
++	maddhdu		$c,$a,$w,$r_in
++___
++
++	if ($r_out ne $lo) {
++		$self->add_code(<<___);
++	mr			$r_out,$lo
++___
++	}
++
++	$self->nl();
++}
++
++
++package main;
++
++my $code;
++
++$code.=<<___;
++.machine "any"
++.text
++___
++
++my $mont;
++
++$mont = new Mont::GPR(6);
++$mont->mul_mont_fixed();
++$code .= $mont->get_code();
++
++$mont = new Mont::GPR_300(6);
++$mont->mul_mont_fixed();
++$code .= $mont->get_code();
++
++$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
++
++$code.=<<___;
++.asciz  "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC by <amitay\@ozlabs.org>, <alastair\@d-silva.org>"
++___
++
++print $code;
++close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
+index 3ee76ea96574..1e9421bee213 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_ppc.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                         const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+     int bn_mul4x_mont_int(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                           const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
++    int bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
++                             const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
++                             const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
++    int bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
++                                 const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
++                                 const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
+ 
+     if (num < 4)
+         return 0;
+@@ -34,5 +40,14 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+      * no opportunity to figure it out...
+      */
+ 
++#if defined(_ARCH_PPC64) && !defined(__ILP32__)
++    if (num == 6) {
++        if (OPENSSL_ppccap_P & PPC_MADD300)
++            return bn_mul_mont_300_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
++        else
++            return bn_mul_mont_fixed_n6(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
++    }
++#endif
++
+     return bn_mul_mont_int(rp, ap, bp, np, n0, num);
+ }
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
+index 4f8d0689b5ea..987a70ae263b 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/build.info
++++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
+ 
+   $BNASM_ppc32=bn_ppc.c bn-ppc.s ppc-mont.s
+   $BNDEF_ppc32=OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+-  $BNASM_ppc64=$BNASM_ppc32
++  $BNASM_ppc64=$BNASM_ppc32 ppc64-mont-fixed.s
+   $BNDEF_ppc64=$BNDEF_ppc32
+ 
+   $BNASM_c64xplus=asm/bn-c64xplus.asm
+@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ GENERATE[parisc-mont.s]=asm/parisc-mont.pl
+ GENERATE[bn-ppc.s]=asm/ppc.pl
+ GENERATE[ppc-mont.s]=asm/ppc-mont.pl
+ GENERATE[ppc64-mont.s]=asm/ppc64-mont.pl
++GENERATE[ppc64-mont-fixed.s]=asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+ 
+ GENERATE[alpha-mont.S]=asm/alpha-mont.pl
+ 
+
+From 01ebad0d6e3a09bc9e32350b402901471610a3dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rohan McLure <rohanmclure@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 16:21:06 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix unrolled montgomery multiplication for POWER9
+
+In the reference C implementation in bn_asm.c, tp[num + 1] contains the
+carry bit for accumulations into tp[num]. tp[num + 1] is only ever
+assigned, never itself incremented.
+---
+ crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+index 0fb397bc5f12..e27d0ad93d85 100755
+--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
++++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont-fixed.pl
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ # Registers are global so the code is remotely readable
+ 
+ # Parameters for Montgomery multiplication
++my $ze	= "r0";
+ my $sp	= "r1";
+ my $toc	= "r2";
+ my $rp	= "r3";
+@@ -192,6 +193,7 @@ ($)
+ 	$self->save_registers();
+ 
+ 	$self->add_code(<<___);
++	li		$ze,0
+ 	ld		$n0,0($n0)
+ 
+ 	ld		$bp0,0($bp)
+@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@ ($)
+ 
+ 	$self->add_code(<<___);
+ 	addc		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$c0
+-	addze		$tp[$n+1],$tp[$n+1]
++	addze		$tp[$n+1],$ze
+ ___
+ 
+ 	$self->add_code(<<___);
+@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ ($)
+ 	and.		$tp[$n],$tp[$n],$tp[$n]
+ 	bne		$label->{"sub"}
+ 
+-	cmpld	$tp[$n-1],$npj
++	cmpld		$tp[$n-1],$npj
+ 	blt		$label->{"copy"}
+ 
+ $label->{"sub"}:

SOURCES/0073-FIPS-Use-OAEP-in-KATs-support-fixed-OAEP-seed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+From 4a2239bd7d444c30c55b20ea8b4aeadafdfe1afd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 13:59:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use OAEP in KATs, support fixed OAEP seed
+
+Review by our lab for FIPS 140-3 certification expects the RSA
+encryption and decryption tests to use a supported padding mode, not raw
+RSA signatures. Switch to RSA-OAEP for the self tests to fulfill that.
+
+The FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance specifies in section 10.3.A
+"Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test Requirements" that a self-test may be
+a known-answer test, a comparison test, or a fault-detection test.
+
+Comparison tests are not an option, because they would require
+a separate implementation of RSA-OAEP, which we do not have. Fault
+detection tests require implementing fault detection mechanisms into the
+cryptographic algorithm implementation, we we also do not have.
+
+As a consequence, a known-answer test must be used to test RSA
+encryption and decryption, but RSA encryption with OAEP padding is not
+deterministic, and thus encryption will always yield different results
+that could not be compared to known answers. For this reason, this
+change explicitly sets the seed in OAEP (see RFC 8017 section 7.1.1),
+which is the source of randomness for RSA-OAEP, to a fixed value. This
+setting is only available during self-test execution, and the parameter
+set using EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() will be ignored otherwise.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h                        |  8 ++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c                         | 34 ++++++--
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  3 +
+ providers/fips/self_test_data.inc             | 83 +++++++++++--------
+ providers/fips/self_test_kats.c               |  7 ++
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 41 ++++++++-
+ 6 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
+index ea70da05ad..dde57a1a0e 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h
+@@ -193,4 +193,12 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to
+                                          int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
+                                          int flen);
+ 
++int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
++                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                             const unsigned char *param,
++                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
++                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
++                                             const char *redhat_st_seed);
++
+ #endif /* OSSL_CRYPTO_RSA_LOCAL_H */
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+index d9be1a4f98..b2f7f7dc4b 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                                    param, plen, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
++
+ /*
+  * Perform the padding as per NIST 800-56B 7.2.2.3
+  *      from (K) is the key material.
+@@ -51,12 +55,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+  * Step numbers are included here but not in the constant time inverse below
+  * to avoid complicating an already difficult enough function.
+  */
+-int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+-                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+-                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+-                                            const unsigned char *param,
+-                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
+-                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
++int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
++                                             unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                             const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                             const unsigned char *param,
++                                             int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
++                                             const EVP_MD *mgf1md,
++                                             const char *redhat_st_seed)
+ {
+     int rv = 0;
+     int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+@@ -107,6 +112,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     db[emlen - flen - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
+     memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+     /* step 3d: generate random byte string */
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (redhat_st_seed != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
++        memcpy(seed, redhat_st_seed, mdlen);
++    } else
++#endif
+     if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, seed, mdlen, 0) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+@@ -138,6 +148,18 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     return rv;
+ }
+ 
++int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
++                                            unsigned char *to, int tlen,
++                                            const unsigned char *from, int flen,
++                                            const unsigned char *param,
++                                            int plen, const EVP_MD *md,
++                                            const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
++{
++    return ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(libctx, to, tlen, from,
++                                                    flen, param, plen, md,
++                                                    mgf1md, NULL);
++}
++
+ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+                                     const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+                                     const unsigned char *param, int plen,
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 59a6e79566..11216fb8f8 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -469,6 +469,9 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL               "oaep-label"
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION       "tls-client-version"
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION   "tls-negotiated-version"
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
++#endif
+ 
+ /*
+  * Encoder / decoder parameters
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+index 4e30ec56dd..0103c87528 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+@@ -1294,15 +1294,22 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_priv_key[] = {
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+ };
+ 
+-/*-
+- * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE directly in the expansion of the
+- * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
+- * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
+- */
+-static const char pad_mode_none[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE;
+-
++/*-
++ * Using OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP directly in the expansion of the
++ * ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING macro below causes a failure on ancient
++ * HP/UX PA-RISC compilers.
++ */
++static const char pad_mode_oaep[] = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP;
++static const char oaep_fixed_seed[] = {
++    0xf6, 0x10, 0xef, 0x0a, 0x97, 0xbf, 0x91, 0x25,
++    0x97, 0xcf, 0x8e, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x51, 0x2f, 0xab,
++    0x2e, 0x4b, 0x2c, 0xe6
++};
++
+ static const ST_KAT_PARAM rsa_enc_params[] = {
+-    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_none),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode_oaep),
++    ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED,
++                       oaep_fixed_seed),
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_END()
+ };
+ 
+@@ -1335,43 +1348,43 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_expected_sig[256] = {
+     0x2c, 0x68, 0xf0, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xd2, 0x56, 0xd6
+ };
+ 
+-static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[256] = {
++static const unsigned char rsa_asym_plaintext_encrypt[208] = {
+    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+ };
+ static const unsigned char rsa_asym_expected_encrypt[256] = {
+-    0x54, 0xac, 0x23, 0x96, 0x1d, 0x82, 0x5d, 0x8b,
+-    0x8f, 0x36, 0x33, 0xd0, 0xf4, 0x02, 0xa2, 0x61,
+-    0xb1, 0x13, 0xd4, 0x4a, 0x46, 0x06, 0x37, 0x3c,
+-    0xbf, 0x40, 0x05, 0x3c, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x64, 0xdc,
+-    0x22, 0x22, 0xaf, 0x36, 0x79, 0x62, 0x45, 0xf0,
+-    0x97, 0x82, 0x22, 0x44, 0x86, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0xfa,
+-    0xac, 0x03, 0x21, 0x84, 0x3f, 0x31, 0xad, 0x2a,
+-    0xa4, 0x6e, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0x93, 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xfc,
+-    0xf1, 0x62, 0xce, 0x82, 0x12, 0x45, 0xc9, 0x35,
+-    0xb0, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0x99, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b, 0x5a,
+-    0xd3, 0x46, 0xdb, 0xf9, 0x9e, 0x52, 0x49, 0xbd,
+-    0x1e, 0xe8, 0xda, 0xac, 0x61, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xda,
+-    0xfc, 0x1e, 0xfb, 0x74, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0x18,
+-    0x86, 0x3e, 0x20, 0x9c, 0x7a, 0xe1, 0x04, 0xb7,
+-    0x38, 0x43, 0xb1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0xd8, 0xc1, 0x39,
+-    0x4d, 0xe1, 0xd3, 0xb0, 0xb3, 0xf1, 0x82, 0x87,
+-    0x1f, 0x74, 0xb5, 0x69, 0xfd, 0x33, 0xd6, 0x21,
+-    0x7c, 0x61, 0x60, 0x28, 0xca, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xa0,
+-    0xbb, 0xc8, 0x73, 0xa9, 0x82, 0xf8, 0x6b, 0xd8,
+-    0xf0, 0xc9, 0x7b, 0x20, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0x8c,
+-    0xd4, 0xa2, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x9b, 0x04, 0xad, 0xaa,
+-    0x11, 0x6c, 0x8f, 0xce, 0x83, 0x29, 0x56, 0x69,
+-    0xbb, 0x00, 0x3b, 0xef, 0xca, 0x2d, 0xcd, 0x52,
+-    0xc8, 0xf1, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0x4f, 0x6d, 0x9c,
+-    0x3d, 0x69, 0xcc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xe6,
+-    0xbb, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xdc, 0x5f, 0xa9, 0x24, 0x93,
+-    0x03, 0x46, 0xa2, 0x33, 0x6c, 0xf4, 0xd8, 0x5d,
+-    0x68, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0x30, 0xdb, 0xf5,
+-    0x4f, 0x0f, 0xad, 0xc7, 0xd0, 0xaa, 0x47, 0xd9,
+-    0x9f, 0x85, 0x1b, 0x2e, 0x6c, 0x3c, 0x57, 0x04,
+-    0x29, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0x66, 0x7d, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xaa,
+-    0x05, 0x52, 0x55, 0xc1, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x90, 0xab,
++    0x6c, 0x21, 0xc1, 0x9e, 0x94, 0xee, 0xdf, 0x74,
++    0x3a, 0x3c, 0x7c, 0x04, 0x1a, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x7c,
++    0x42, 0xac, 0x7e, 0x28, 0x9a, 0xb7, 0xe2, 0x4e,
++    0x87, 0xd4, 0x00, 0x69, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x0b,
++    0xc1, 0xda, 0xd6, 0xbd, 0x21, 0x39, 0x4f, 0x25,
++    0x22, 0x1f, 0x76, 0x0d, 0x62, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x89,
++    0xdb, 0x38, 0x32, 0x88, 0x21, 0x1d, 0x89, 0xf1,
++    0xe0, 0x14, 0xd4, 0xb7, 0x90, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x50,
++    0xb0, 0x8d, 0x5c, 0x2f, 0x49, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x17,
++    0x9e, 0x60, 0x9f, 0xe1, 0x77, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa2,
++    0xcf, 0x16, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x4a, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xcb,
++    0x1e, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xdc, 0x27, 0x06, 0x9d,
++    0xf4, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x14, 0x6a, 0x7e,
++    0xfd, 0xa7, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0x51, 0x82, 0x62, 0x0f,
++    0x29, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0xd3,
++    0x51, 0x92, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x39, 0x9d, 0xdd, 0x06,
++    0xff, 0xb1, 0xb0, 0xd5, 0x61, 0x03, 0x8f, 0x25,
++    0x5c, 0x49, 0x12, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x67, 0x61, 0x78,
++    0xb3, 0xe3, 0xc4, 0xf6, 0x36, 0x16, 0xa9, 0x04,
++    0x91, 0x0a, 0x4b, 0x27, 0x28, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7c,
++    0x65, 0x2d, 0xd0, 0x08, 0x71, 0x84, 0xe7, 0x47,
++    0x79, 0x83, 0x91, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x79, 0xce,
++    0x49, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x8b, 0x34, 0xac, 0x61, 0xe0,
++    0xe6, 0x55, 0xbf, 0x10, 0xe4, 0xac, 0x9a, 0xd6,
++    0xed, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xb6, 0xb6, 0xf7, 0x41, 0x99,
++    0xde, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x11, 0x16, 0xa2, 0x18, 0x30,
++    0x30, 0xdc, 0x95, 0x76, 0x2f, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20,
++    0xc4, 0xe7, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x1e, 0xcd, 0x69, 0xbb,
++    0x29, 0x94, 0x27, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0xab, 0xb4, 0x27,
++    0x8b, 0x4d, 0xe1, 0xcb, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x2c, 0x66,
++    0x41, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xeb, 0x61, 0x4c, 0x77, 0x5a,
++    0xee, 0xb0, 0xca, 0x99, 0x0e, 0x7f, 0xbe, 0x06
+ };
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+index 064794d9bf..b6d5e8e134 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+@@ -647,14 +647,21 @@ static int self_test_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
++
+ static int self_test_asym_ciphers(OSSL_SELF_TEST *st, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+     int i, ret = 1;
+ 
++    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 1;
++
+     for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(st_kat_asym_cipher_tests); ++i) {
+         if (!self_test_asym_cipher(&st_kat_asym_cipher_tests[i], st, libctx))
+             ret = 0;
+     }
++
++    REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st = 0;
++
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index 00cf65fcd6..83be3d8ede 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++# include "crypto/rsa/rsa_local.h"
++#endif
+ 
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ 
+@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* TLS padding */
+     unsigned int client_version;
+     unsigned int alt_version;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    char *redhat_st_oaep_seed;
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+ } PROV_RSA_CTX;
+ 
+ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+@@ -190,12 +196,21 @@ static int rsa_encrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+             return 0;
+         }
+         ret =
+-            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex2(
++#else
++            ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(
++#endif
++                                                    prsactx->libctx, tbuf,
+                                                     rsasize, in, inlen,
+                                                     prsactx->oaep_label,
+                                                     prsactx->oaep_labellen,
+                                                     prsactx->oaep_md,
+-                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md);
++                                                    prsactx->mgf1_md
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++                                                    , prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed
++#endif
++                                                    );
+ 
+         if (!ret) {
+             OPENSSL_free(tbuf);
+@@ -326,6 +341,9 @@ static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
+     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->oaep_md);
+     EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
+     OPENSSL_free(prsactx->oaep_label);
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+ 
+     OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
+ }
+@@ -445,6 +463,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+                     NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+@@ -454,6 +475,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vprsactx,
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++extern int REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st;
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
++
+ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+@@ -563,6 +588,18 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         prsactx->oaep_labellen = tmp_labellen;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED);
++    if (p != NULL && REDHAT_FIPS_asym_cipher_st) {
++        void *tmp_oaep_seed = NULL;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &tmp_oaep_seed, 0, NULL))
++            return 0;
++        OPENSSL_free(prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed);
++        prsactx->redhat_st_oaep_seed = (char *)tmp_oaep_seed;
++    }
++#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
++
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION);
+     if (p != NULL) {
+         unsigned int client_version;
+-- 
+2.37.1
+

SOURCES/0074-FIPS-Use-digest_sign-digest_verify-in-self-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+From 97ac06e5a8e3a8699279c06eeb64c8e958bad7bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 17:45:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] FIPS: Use digest_sign & digest_verify in self test
+
+In review for FIPS 140-3, the lack of a self-test for the digest_sign
+and digest_verify provider functions was highlighted as a problem. NIST
+no longer provides ACVP tests for the RSA SigVer primitive (see
+https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1347). Because FIPS 140-3
+recommends the use of functions that compute the digest and signature
+within the module, we have been advised in our module review that the
+self tests should also use the combined digest and signature APIs, i.e.
+the digest_sign and digest_verify provider functions.
+
+Modify the signature self-test to use these instead by switching to
+EVP_DigestSign and EVP_DigestVerify. This requires adding more ifdefs to
+crypto/evp/m_sigver.c to make these functions usable in the FIPS module.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/evp/m_sigver.c           | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ providers/fips/self_test_kats.c | 37 +++++++++++++++-------------
+ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+index db1a1d7bc3..c94c3c53bd 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED);
+     return 0;
+ }
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+ /*
+  * If we get the "NULL" md then the name comes back as "UNDEF". We want to use
+@@ -130,8 +131,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+         reinit = 0;
+         if (e == NULL)
+             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, props);
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+         else
+             ctx->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     }
+     if (ctx->pctx == NULL)
+         return 0;
+@@ -139,8 +142,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+     locpctx = ctx->pctx;
+     ERR_set_mark();
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(locpctx))
+         goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     /* do not reinitialize if pkey is set or operation is different */
+     if (reinit
+@@ -225,8 +230,10 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             signature =
+                 evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
+                                               supported_sig, locpctx->propquery);
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+             if (signature == NULL)
+                 goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+             break;
+         }
+         if (signature == NULL)
+@@ -310,6 +317,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             ctx->fetched_digest = EVP_MD_fetch(locpctx->libctx, mdname, props);
+             if (ctx->fetched_digest != NULL) {
+                 ctx->digest = ctx->reqdigest = ctx->fetched_digest;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+             } else {
+                 /* legacy engine support : remove the mark when this is deleted */
+                 ctx->reqdigest = ctx->digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname);
+@@ -318,11 +326,13 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+                     ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+                     goto err;
+                 }
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+             }
+             (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
+         }
+     }
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (ctx->reqdigest != NULL
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_hmac)
+             && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(locpctx->pkey, SN_tls1_prf)
+@@ -334,6 +344,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+             goto err;
+         }
+     }
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     if (ver) {
+         if (signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) {
+@@ -366,6 +377,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+     EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
+     return 0;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+     /*
+      * If we don't have the full support we need with provided methods,
+@@ -437,6 +449,7 @@ static int do_sigver_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+         ctx->pctx->flag_call_digest_custom = 1;
+ 
+     ret = 1;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+  end:
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+@@ -479,7 +492,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
+     return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, NULL, NULL, NULL, e, pkey, 1,
+                           NULL);
+ }
+-#endif /* FIPS_MDOE */
+ 
+ int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
+ {
+@@ -541,23 +553,29 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
+     return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, dsize);
+ }
+ 
+-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                         size_t *siglen)
+ {
+-    int sctx = 0, r = 0;
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
++    int r = 0;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    int sctx = 0;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (pctx == NULL
+             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX
+             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
+             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
+         goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     if (sigret == NULL || (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) != 0)
+         return pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+                                                          sigret, siglen,
+                                                          sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
+     if (dctx == NULL)
+         return 0;
+@@ -566,8 +584,10 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+                                                   sigret, siglen,
+                                                   *siglen);
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     return r;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+@@ -639,6 +659,7 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
+         }
+     }
+     return 1;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ }
+ 
+ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
+@@ -669,21 +690,27 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
+ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+                           size_t siglen)
+ {
+-    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     int r = 0;
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+     unsigned int mdlen = 0;
+     int vctx = 0;
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *pctx = ctx->pctx;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ctx->pctx;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (pctx == NULL
+             || pctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX
+             || pctx->op.sig.algctx == NULL
+             || pctx->op.sig.signature == NULL)
+         goto legacy;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     if ((ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE) != 0)
+         return pctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx,
+                                                            sig, siglen);
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+     dctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(pctx);
+     if (dctx == NULL)
+         return 0;
+@@ -691,8 +718,10 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+     r = dctx->op.sig.signature->digest_verify_final(dctx->op.sig.algctx,
+                                                     sig, siglen);
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(dctx);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     return r;
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+  legacy:
+     if (pctx == NULL || pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+@@ -732,6 +761,7 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+     if (vctx || !r)
+         return r;
+     return EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ }
+ 
+ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
+@@ -757,4 +787,3 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
+         return -1;
+     return EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigret, siglen);
+ }
+-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+index b6d5e8e134..77eec075e6 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_kats.c
+@@ -444,11 +444,14 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
+     int ret = 0;
+     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL, *params_sig = NULL;
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
++    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
++    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *sctx = NULL, *kctx = NULL;
+     EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+-    unsigned char sig[256];
+     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *K = NULL;
++    const char *msg = "Hello World!";
++    unsigned char sig[256];
+     size_t siglen = sizeof(sig);
+     static const unsigned char dgst[] = {
+         0x7f, 0x83, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x7f, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0x81,
+@@ -488,23 +491,26 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
+         || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(kctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    /* Create a EVP_PKEY_CTX to use for the signing operation */
+-    sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey, NULL);
+-    if (sctx == NULL
+-        || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(sctx) <= 0)
+-        goto err;
+-
+-    /* set signature parameters */
+-    if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST,
+-                                         t->mdalgorithm,
+-                                         strlen(t->mdalgorithm) + 1))
+-        goto err;
++    /* Create a EVP_MD_CTX to use for the signature operation, assign signature
++     * parameters and sign */
+     params_sig = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
++    md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA256", NULL);
++    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++    if (md == NULL || ctx == NULL)
++        goto err;
++    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
++    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0
++        || EVP_DigestSign(ctx, sig, &siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0
++        || EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_sign(sctx, sig, &siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0
+-        || EVP_PKEY_verify_init(sctx) <= 0
++    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
++    sctx = NULL;
++
++    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISE | EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT);
++    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &sctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+         || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(sctx, params_sig) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+ 
+@@ -509,14 +510,17 @@ static int self_test_sign(const ST_KAT_SIGN *t,
+         goto err;
+ 
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, sig);
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(sctx, sig, siglen, dgst, sizeof(dgst)) <= 0)
++    if (EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, sig, siglen, (const unsigned char *)msg, strlen(msg)) <= 0)
+         goto err;
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+     EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
++    EVP_MD_free(md);
++    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++    /* sctx is not freed automatically inside the FIPS module */
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(sctx);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+     OSSL_PARAM_free(params_sig);
+     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
+-- 
+2.37.1
+

SOURCES/0075-FIPS-Use-FFDHE2048-in-self-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+From e385647549c467fe263b68b72dd21bdfb875ee88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 17:51:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] FIPS: Use FFDHE2048 in self test
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 342 +++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 172 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+index a29cc650b5..1b5623833f 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+@@ -821,188 +821,190 @@ static const ST_KAT_DRBG st_kat_drbg_tests[] =
+ 
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ /* DH KAT */
++/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 p */
+ static const unsigned char dh_p[] = {
+-    0xdc, 0xca, 0x15, 0x11, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25,
+-    0xf5, 0x21, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x54, 0x27, 0x89, 0xe0,
+-    0x01, 0xf0, 0x42, 0x5b, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0x66,
+-    0xf7, 0x40, 0x64, 0x07, 0xf1, 0xc9, 0xfa, 0x8b,
+-    0xe6, 0x10, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x8b, 0xb1, 0x70, 0xbe,
+-    0x39, 0xdb, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0x85, 0xbf, 0x24, 0xce,
+-    0x68, 0x80, 0xad, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x9f, 0x7c, 0x6d,
+-    0x01, 0x5e, 0x61, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x4d,
+-    0xe1, 0x85, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0x41, 0xff, 0xde,
+-    0x9d, 0x41, 0x84, 0x07, 0xe1, 0x51, 0x38, 0xbb,
+-    0x02, 0x1d, 0xae, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x2d, 0x17,
+-    0x82, 0xac, 0xc6, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xb0,
+-    0x23, 0x2c, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x97,
+-    0xb3, 0xd1, 0x85, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0xac, 0xaf, 0xb9,
+-    0x8f, 0x06, 0x66, 0x08, 0xfc, 0x64, 0x4e, 0xc7,
+-    0xdd, 0xb6, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x99, 0xf9, 0x2a, 0xc1,
+-    0xb5, 0x98, 0x25, 0xda, 0x84, 0x32, 0x07, 0x7d,
+-    0xef, 0x69, 0x56, 0x46, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x20, 0x82,
+-    0x3c, 0x95, 0x07, 0xab, 0x6f, 0x01, 0x76, 0xd4,
+-    0x73, 0x0d, 0x99, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x36, 0x1c,
+-    0xd8, 0xb2, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x3d, 0x2f, 0x32, 0x9b,
+-    0x82, 0x09, 0x9b, 0xd6, 0x61, 0xf4, 0x29, 0x50,
+-    0xf4, 0x03, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xde, 0x62, 0xa3, 0x31,
+-    0x88, 0xb0, 0x27, 0x98, 0xba, 0x82, 0x3f, 0x44,
+-    0xb9, 0x46, 0xfe, 0x9d, 0xf6, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xc5,
+-    0xa1, 0x23, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x97, 0xb7, 0x0f, 0x80,
+-    0xda, 0x8c, 0xac, 0x88, 0xe0, 0x92, 0xb1, 0x12,
+-    0x70, 0x60, 0xff, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x57, 0x99, 0x94,
+-    0x01, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0xfa, 0xa5, 0xe7, 0xf6, 0xc7,
+-    0x62, 0x45, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0x31, 0x22, 0x31, 0xc1,
+-    0x7d, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xef, 0x0d,
+-    0xb9, 0x9f, 0x9c, 0xb6, 0x0e, 0x1d, 0x5f, 0x69
+-};
++    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++    0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a,
++    0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
++    0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95,
++    0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb,
++    0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
++    0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8,
++    0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a,
++    0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
++    0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0,
++    0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3,
++    0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
++    0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77,
++    0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda, 0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72,
++    0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
++    0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a,
++    0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61,
++    0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
++    0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68,
++    0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3, 0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4,
++    0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
++    0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70,
++    0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1, 0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec,
++    0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
++    0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff,
++    0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32, 0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83,
++    0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
++    0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05,
++    0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2,
++    0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
++    0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97,
++    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++};
++/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 q */
+ static const unsigned char dh_q[] = {
+-    0x89, 0x8b, 0x22, 0x67, 0x17, 0xef, 0x03, 0x9e,
+-    0x60, 0x3e, 0x82, 0xe5, 0xc7, 0xaf, 0xe4, 0x83,
+-    0x74, 0xac, 0x5f, 0x62, 0x5c, 0x54, 0xf1, 0xea,
+-    0x11, 0xac, 0xb5, 0x7d
+-};
++    0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++    0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c, 0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d,
++    0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
++    0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a,
++    0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd,
++    0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
++    0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec,
++    0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01, 0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd,
++    0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
++    0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68,
++    0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa, 0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79,
++    0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
++    0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb,
++    0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed, 0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39,
++    0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
++    0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd,
++    0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1, 0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0,
++    0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
++    0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34,
++    0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51, 0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa,
++    0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
++    0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8,
++    0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76,
++    0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
++    0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff,
++    0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1,
++    0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
++    0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02,
++    0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9,
++    0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
++    0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b,
++    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++};
++/* RFC7919 FFDHE2048 g */
+ static const unsigned char dh_g[] = {
+-    0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb8, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0xf6, 0x01, 0x39,
+-    0x35, 0x1d, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0x12, 0x66, 0x80, 0x5f,
+-    0xdf, 0x35, 0x6c, 0xdf, 0xd1, 0x3a, 0x4d, 0xa0,
+-    0x05, 0x0c, 0x7e, 0xde, 0x24, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9f,
+-    0x6a, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xad, 0xe5, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0x8f,
+-    0xfe, 0x88, 0xd6, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x89, 0x4a,
+-    0x3d, 0x53, 0x5f, 0xc8, 0x21, 0x26, 0xdd, 0xd4,
+-    0x24, 0x87, 0x2e, 0x16, 0xb8, 0x38, 0xdf, 0x8c,
+-    0x51, 0xe9, 0x01, 0x6f, 0x88, 0x9c, 0x7c, 0x20,
+-    0x3e, 0x98, 0xa8, 0xb6, 0x31, 0xf9, 0xc7, 0x25,
+-    0x63, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x49, 0x58, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x53,
+-    0xd3, 0x58, 0xe7, 0x83, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xef, 0xd9,
+-    0x67, 0x7c, 0x7b, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0x77, 0xd6, 0xdc,
+-    0xe2, 0xa1, 0x96, 0x37, 0x95, 0xca, 0x64, 0xb9,
+-    0x2d, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xac, 0x6d, 0x0e, 0x8d, 0x43,
+-    0x1d, 0xe5, 0xe5, 0x00, 0x60, 0xdf, 0xf7, 0x86,
+-    0x89, 0xc9, 0xec, 0xa1, 0xc1, 0x24, 0x8c, 0x16,
+-    0xed, 0x09, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x41, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x40,
+-    0x6d, 0x2b, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xbb, 0x23,
+-    0x7b, 0x97, 0x34, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x8c, 0xe3, 0xfa,
+-    0xe0, 0x2f, 0x29, 0xc5, 0xef, 0xed, 0x30, 0xd6,
+-    0x91, 0x87, 0xda, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0xe2,
+-    0xaa, 0xdb, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0x4c, 0x61,
+-    0x66, 0x55, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x43, 0x1c, 0x6b, 0x4a,
+-    0x37, 0x97, 0x63, 0xb0, 0xa9, 0x16, 0x58, 0xef,
+-    0xc8, 0x4e, 0x8b, 0x06, 0x35, 0x8c, 0x8b, 0x4f,
+-    0x21, 0x37, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x10, 0x17, 0x2c, 0xf3,
+-    0x9b, 0x83, 0x0c, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x8a,
+-    0xb8, 0x25, 0x16, 0xec, 0xab, 0x99, 0x5f, 0xa4,
+-    0x21, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0x80, 0x74,
+-    0xc3, 0x9d, 0x6c, 0x88, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x1e, 0xe4,
+-    0xe9, 0x6f, 0xdc, 0x20, 0xea, 0x11, 0x5c, 0x32
++    0x02
+ };
+ static const unsigned char dh_priv[] = {
+-    0x14, 0x33, 0xe0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0x17, 0xb6, 0x0a,
+-    0x30, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x70,
+-    0xd2, 0x96, 0x8a, 0xba, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc8, 0x15,
+-    0x40, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xe6
++    0x01, 0xdc, 0x2a, 0xb9, 0x87, 0x71, 0x57, 0x0f,
++    0xcd, 0x93, 0x65, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xd6, 0x56, 0x6d,
++    0xc5, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xad, 0x8d,
++    0x6c, 0xdc, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x94
+ };
+ static const unsigned char dh_pub[] = {
+-    0x95, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x04,
+-    0x92, 0xb9, 0x18, 0x31, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xa3, 0x69,
+-    0x36, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59,
+-    0x16, 0x99, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x9b,
+-    0xdd, 0x6d, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x98, 0x89, 0x0c,
+-    0x62, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x71, 0x21,
+-    0x11, 0xe6, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x55, 0x37, 0x25, 0x06,
+-    0x99, 0xef, 0xe3, 0x30, 0x53, 0x73, 0x91, 0xfb,
+-    0xc2, 0xc5, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2,
+-    0x33, 0x86, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xc0,
+-    0x99, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x02, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x83,
+-    0x96, 0x42, 0x48, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x90,
+-    0x8e, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x31, 0x93, 0x15, 0xf6, 0xd2,
+-    0x60, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0xe7,
+-    0xc5, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x22, 0x51, 0x9c, 0xf0,
+-    0xf0, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0x88,
+-    0x99, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x36, 0x43, 0x51, 0xfb,
+-    0x6a, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x17, 0xe5, 0x44, 0x5a,
+-    0xda, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x39, 0x97,
+-    0xb8, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x83, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x1d,
+-    0x3a, 0x77, 0x75, 0xe0, 0xf6, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xdf,
+-    0x73, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x80, 0x1e, 0x66, 0x5a, 0x0e,
+-    0x5a, 0x79, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x9f,
+-    0xa1, 0x82, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xa0, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x4d,
+-    0xb9, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x86, 0x37, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xb1,
+-    0x64, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x6c,
+-    0x4f, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x47,
+-    0x9a, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x77, 0x26, 0x3e,
+-    0x07, 0xd9, 0x95, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x3f,
+-    0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0x89, 0xc9,
+-    0x9e, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x73, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x8c,
+-    0x65, 0x81, 0xac, 0xc4, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xd3
++    0x00, 0xc4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x69, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x05,
++    0x55, 0x2a, 0x7e, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x02, 0xbb, 0x7f,
++    0xcc, 0x63, 0x74, 0xee, 0xcb, 0xb4, 0x98, 0x43,
++    0x0e, 0x29, 0x43, 0x0d, 0x44, 0xc7, 0xf1, 0x23,
++    0x81, 0xca, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x01, 0x4a,
++    0x1a, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0x4e, 0xa0, 0x0b,
++    0xb9, 0x5c, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x14, 0x01, 0x62, 0x3c,
++    0x8a, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xbb, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x38, 0x63,
++    0xb7, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x0b, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x38,
++    0x10, 0x0f, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x24, 0xf6,
++    0xe3, 0x70, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x4d, 0x01, 0xf8, 0x7a,
++    0x87, 0x49, 0x64, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x75, 0x3b, 0x94,
++    0xc8, 0x09, 0x2d, 0x6a, 0x63, 0xd8, 0x9a, 0x92,
++    0xb9, 0x5b, 0x1a, 0xc3, 0x47, 0x0b, 0x63, 0x44,
++    0x3b, 0xe3, 0xc0, 0x09, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x53,
++    0xd8, 0xfb, 0x06, 0x44, 0xdb, 0xdf, 0xe8, 0x13,
++    0x2b, 0x40, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x52, 0x30,
++    0xd6, 0xc1, 0xd8, 0x59, 0x9d, 0x59, 0xba, 0x1b,
++    0xbf, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x01,
++    0x0b, 0x54, 0xe0, 0x6a, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x2b, 0x3d,
++    0xe8, 0xef, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0x52, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x18,
++    0x6f, 0xa3, 0x27, 0xab, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xc3, 0x81,
++    0xcb, 0xae, 0x23, 0x11, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x6f,
++    0x23, 0x17, 0x40, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0xb7,
++    0x34, 0xbe, 0x87, 0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9e, 0x98, 0x39,
++    0xbf, 0x2e, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x70, 0xad, 0xed,
++    0x1b, 0x5e, 0x47, 0x90, 0x49, 0x2e, 0x61, 0x71,
++    0x5f, 0x07, 0x0b, 0x35, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x53, 0xce,
++    0x58, 0x60, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x8b, 0xfe, 0x70, 0x04,
++    0x2a, 0x6a, 0x98, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x80, 0xae, 0x69,
++    0x95, 0xf9, 0x99, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x8e, 0xed,
++    0x61, 0xd9, 0x02, 0x9d, 0x4e, 0x05, 0xe9, 0xf2,
++    0x32
+ };
+ static const unsigned char dh_peer_pub[] = {
+-    0x1f, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x34, 0x1d, 0x1a, 0x84, 0x6a,
+-    0x96, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0x24, 0x34, 0x0f, 0x87, 0x7d,
+-    0xd0, 0x10, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x56, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x58,
+-    0xaa, 0xe9, 0xc7, 0xb0, 0x8f, 0x74, 0x9a, 0x32,
+-    0x23, 0x51, 0x10, 0xb5, 0xd8, 0x8e, 0xb5, 0xdb,
+-    0xfa, 0x97, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xec, 0xc5, 0x30, 0xf0,
+-    0x2d, 0x31, 0x14, 0x00, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xb1, 0xc0,
+-    0xe0, 0x24, 0xcb, 0x8a, 0xe2, 0x16, 0x98, 0xbc,
+-    0xa9, 0xe6, 0x0d, 0x42, 0x80, 0x86, 0x22, 0xf1,
+-    0x81, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0xe7, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x6e,
+-    0xfe, 0xe9, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x67, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x97,
+-    0x70, 0x42, 0xc7, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x8f, 0x05,
+-    0xfb, 0x77, 0xf5, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0xc8, 0xd3,
+-    0x3c, 0xc3, 0xc3, 0x1e, 0xd3, 0xb3, 0x1f, 0x0f,
+-    0xec, 0xb6, 0xdb, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0xa3, 0x11, 0xe7,
+-    0x7a, 0xfd, 0xbc, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xee, 0x1b, 0xb1,
+-    0x50, 0xf2, 0x16, 0x87, 0x35, 0x78, 0xfb, 0x96,
+-    0x46, 0x8e, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x3d, 0xe8, 0xef, 0xbf,
+-    0xce, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0x53, 0x22,
+-    0xa3, 0x4f, 0x14, 0x63, 0xe8, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x98,
+-    0x4c, 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0xc8, 0x42,
+-    0xe5, 0x31, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x8c,
+-    0xa1, 0x71, 0xb8, 0xd5, 0x75, 0x98, 0x0d, 0xde,
+-    0x7f, 0xc5, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x36, 0x52, 0x38, 0x20,
+-    0xd4, 0x31, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd5, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x22,
+-    0x89, 0x78, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xb9, 0x44, 0x72, 0xf3,
+-    0x39, 0xca, 0xeb, 0x99, 0x31, 0xb4, 0x2b, 0xe3,
+-    0x01, 0x26, 0x8b, 0xc9, 0x97, 0x89, 0xc9, 0xb2,
+-    0x55, 0x71, 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0xcb, 0x3f, 0x00,
+-    0x7f, 0x1a, 0x51, 0x1c, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xc8, 0x51,
+-    0x9c, 0xdd, 0x13, 0x02, 0xab, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x0f,
+-    0x34, 0xf9, 0x67, 0x39, 0xf1, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x8b
++    0x00, 0xef, 0x15, 0x02, 0xf5, 0x56, 0xa3, 0x79,
++    0x40, 0x58, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x56, 0xad, 0xcb, 0xda,
++    0x8c, 0xda, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x25, 0x29,
++    0x9e, 0x43, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xb2, 0xd8, 0xbc, 0x84,
++    0xbc, 0x85, 0xd0, 0x94, 0x8d, 0x44, 0x27, 0x57,
++    0xe4, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x78, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x08, 0xf5,
++    0x74, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x56, 0xd2, 0x09, 0xc8, 0x68,
++    0xef, 0xed, 0x18, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0x2e, 0x95, 0x6c,
++    0xba, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf5, 0xd1, 0x1b, 0xf6,
++    0x15, 0x14, 0x5b, 0x67, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x6a, 0x20,
++    0x76, 0x43, 0x51, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x1e, 0xf9, 0x2d,
++    0xd6, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0x18, 0x33, 0xd1, 0xa3,
++    0x3b, 0xe6, 0xdd, 0x57, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x13, 0x7a,
++    0x53, 0xde, 0xb3, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x7e, 0xd7, 0x77,
++    0x6b, 0xf8, 0xbd, 0x13, 0x70, 0x8c, 0xba, 0x73,
++    0x80, 0xb3, 0x80, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0xda, 0x53,
++    0x4d, 0x3c, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x37, 0xce, 0xb1,
++    0xde, 0x45, 0x97, 0x58, 0x65, 0x4d, 0xcf, 0x05,
++    0xbb, 0xc3, 0xd7, 0x38, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x59, 0x7a,
++    0x99, 0x15, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x61, 0xe5,
++    0x1a, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xee, 0xe9,
++    0xa9, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x14, 0x6e, 0x91,
++    0x0d, 0xf1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x7e, 0x1d, 0x31,
++    0x79, 0xf1, 0x6d, 0x5f, 0xcb, 0xaf, 0xb2, 0x4f,
++    0x22, 0x12, 0xbf, 0x72, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x30, 0xe4,
++    0x1c, 0x35, 0x96, 0x61, 0x98, 0x39, 0xfb, 0x7e,
++    0x6d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0x69, 0x41, 0x0d, 0x0d, 0x59,
++    0xbb, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x34, 0xe0, 0x39, 0x36, 0x84,
++    0x5e, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x2d, 0xcf, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x8a,
++    0xba, 0x59, 0x88, 0x47, 0xc4, 0x4d, 0xd7, 0xbd,
++    0x78, 0x76, 0x24, 0xf1, 0x45, 0x56, 0x44, 0xc2,
++    0x4a, 0xc2, 0xd5, 0x3a, 0x59, 0x40, 0xab, 0x87,
++    0x64
+ };
+ 
+ static const unsigned char dh_secret_expected[] = {
+-    0x08, 0xff, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0xf4, 0x9a,
+-    0x7d, 0x4a, 0x79, 0x12, 0xae, 0xb1, 0xbb, 0x6a,
+-    0xb5, 0x11, 0x64, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0x76, 0x77, 0x0c,
+-    0x8c, 0xc1, 0xbc, 0xc2, 0x33, 0x34, 0x3d, 0xfe,
+-    0x70, 0x0d, 0x11, 0x81, 0x3d, 0x2c, 0x9e, 0xd2,
+-    0x3b, 0x21, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xe8, 0x78, 0x69, 0x21,
+-    0xed, 0xca, 0x28, 0x3c, 0x68, 0xb1, 0x61, 0x53,
+-    0xfa, 0x01, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x2c, 0x90, 0xdd,
+-    0xab, 0x4a, 0x95, 0x81, 0x67, 0x70, 0xa9, 0x87,
+-    0x10, 0xe1, 0x4c, 0x92, 0xab, 0x83, 0xb6, 0xe4,
+-    0x6e, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x6e, 0xe8, 0x52, 0x43, 0x0d,
+-    0x61, 0x87, 0xda, 0xa3, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x6b, 0xcd,
+-    0x73, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x33,
+-    0x64, 0xf5, 0x04, 0x20, 0x55, 0x1a, 0x4b, 0xfe,
+-    0xaf, 0xe2, 0xbc, 0x43, 0x85, 0x05, 0xa5, 0x9a,
+-    0x4a, 0x40, 0xda, 0xca, 0x7a, 0x89, 0x5a, 0x73,
+-    0xdb, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x74, 0xc1, 0x3a, 0x23, 0xad,
+-    0x88, 0x32, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x58, 0x2d, 0x38, 0xf0,
+-    0xa6, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xb0, 0xd7, 0xe9, 0xb8, 0x79,
+-    0x9e, 0x42, 0xfd, 0x32, 0x20, 0xe3, 0x32, 0xe9,
+-    0x81, 0x85, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x42, 0x97, 0x57, 0xb2,
+-    0xd0, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x17, 0xdb, 0xaa, 0x1f, 0xf6,
+-    0xed, 0x93, 0xd7, 0xe7, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x1e, 0xae,
+-    0xd9, 0x0c, 0xaf, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x2b, 0xc6, 0x57,
+-    0x0f, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0xe5, 0xd0, 0x1a,
+-    0x2c, 0xa9, 0x9f, 0xf1, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xd9, 0x63,
+-    0xf9, 0xf5, 0x00, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x75, 0x56, 0xf9,
+-    0x58, 0x49, 0xb3, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x47, 0x94, 0x86,
+-    0xbe, 0x1d, 0x45, 0x96, 0xa3, 0x10, 0x6b, 0xd5,
+-    0xcb, 0x4f, 0x61, 0xc5, 0x7e, 0xc5, 0xf1, 0x00,
+-    0xfb, 0x7a, 0x0c, 0x82, 0xa1, 0x0b, 0x82, 0x52,
+-    0x6a, 0x97, 0xd1, 0xd9, 0x7d, 0x98, 0xea, 0xf6
++    0x56, 0x13, 0xe3, 0x12, 0x6b, 0x5f, 0x67, 0xe5,
++    0x08, 0xe5, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x90, 0x9d, 0xf5,
++    0x1a, 0x24, 0xfa, 0x42, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x50, 0x93,
++    0x5b, 0xf4, 0x11, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xa5,
++    0x80, 0xae, 0x01, 0x3d, 0x66, 0x92, 0xc0, 0x3e,
++    0x5f, 0xe9, 0x75, 0xb6, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x82, 0x39,
++    0x72, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xa2, 0x73, 0x94, 0xe5, 0x04,
++    0x7c, 0x0c, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc4, 0x9d,
++    0xc1, 0x0f, 0xc3, 0xec, 0x0e, 0x2e, 0xa3, 0x7c,
++    0x07, 0x0e, 0xaf, 0x18, 0x1d, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x47,
++    0x4b, 0x94, 0x05, 0x6d, 0xec, 0xdd, 0xa1, 0xae,
++    0x7b, 0x21, 0x86, 0x53, 0xd3, 0x62, 0x38, 0x08,
++    0xea, 0xda, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x7c, 0xef, 0x19,
++    0xf8, 0x29, 0xef, 0xf8, 0xd0, 0xfb, 0xde, 0xe8,
++    0xb8, 0x2f, 0xb3, 0xa1, 0x16, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x8f,
++    0x48, 0xdc, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0xee, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x1e,
++    0x2a, 0x66, 0xe8, 0x1f, 0xdb, 0x18, 0xe9, 0xd2,
++    0xfd, 0xa2, 0x4e, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x2e, 0x88, 0x3d,
++    0x7d, 0xac, 0x15, 0x18, 0x25, 0xe6, 0xba, 0xd4,
++    0x0e, 0x89, 0x26, 0x60, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0x4a, 0xb4,
++    0x49, 0x8f, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x62, 0x8c, 0xc6, 0x66,
++    0x20, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0xed, 0xfc, 0x01, 0x88, 0x46,
++    0xa7, 0x67, 0x48, 0x39, 0xc5, 0x22, 0x95, 0xa0,
++    0x23, 0xb9, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x87, 0xcf, 0xa7, 0x70,
++    0x1c, 0xac, 0xd3, 0xaf, 0x5c, 0x26, 0x50, 0x3c,
++    0xe4, 0x23, 0xb6, 0xcc, 0xd7, 0xc5, 0xda, 0x2f,
++    0xf4, 0x45, 0xf1, 0xe4, 0x40, 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x25,
++    0x86, 0xe6, 0xde, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x46, 0x16, 0xbc,
++    0x41, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x19, 0x81, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x02,
++    0x87, 0xd0, 0x15, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x04,
++    0x82, 0xd2, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0xb1,
++    0x41, 0xa8, 0x2b, 0x28, 0xbb, 0x86, 0x0c, 0x89
+ };
+ 
+ static const ST_KAT_PARAM dh_group[] = {
+-- 
+2.35.3
+

SOURCES/0076-FIPS-140-3-DRBG.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 11:09:01.301637515 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c	2022-08-03 11:13:00.058688605 +0200
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
+ # include <fcntl.h>
+ # include <unistd.h>
+ # include <sys/time.h>
++# include <sys/random.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
+ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
+@@ -342,66 +342,8 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf,
+      * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
+      * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
+      */
+-
+-    /*
+-     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
+-     *
+-     * Known OSs that should support this:
+-     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
+-     * - Solaris since 11.3
+-     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
+-     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
+-     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
+-     *
+-     * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented
+-     * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS
+-     */
+-#  if !defined(__DragonFly__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
+-#    if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
+-    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
+-
+-    if (getentropy != NULL) {
+-        if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0)
+-            return (ssize_t)buflen;
+-        if (errno != ENOSYS)
+-            return -1;
+-    }
+-#    elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM)
+-
+-    if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess)
+-	    return (ssize_t)buflen;
+-
+-    return -1;
+-#    else
+-    union {
+-        void *p;
+-        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
+-    } p_getentropy;
+-
+-    /*
+-     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
+-     * call this function often.
+-     */
+-    ERR_set_mark();
+-    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
+-    ERR_pop_to_mark();
+-    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
+-        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
+-#    endif
+-#  endif /* !__DragonFly__ */
+-
+-    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
+-#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
+-    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
+-#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
+-    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
+-#  elif (defined(__DragonFly__)  && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) \
+-     || (defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version >= 1000000000)
+-    return getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
+-#  else
+-    errno = ENOSYS;
+-    return -1;
+-#  endif
++    /* Red Hat uses downstream patch to always seed from getrandom() */
++    return EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled(NULL) ? getrandom(buf, buflen, GRND_RANDOM) : getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
+ }
+ #  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
+ 
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c.fipsrand	2022-08-03 12:14:39.409370134 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c	2022-08-03 12:19:06.320700346 +0200
+@@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(PROV_DRBG *drb
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    prediction_resistance = 1;
++#endif
+     /* Reseed using our sources in addition */
+     entropylen = get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
+                              drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen,
+@@ -669,8 +669,14 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *d
+             reseed_required = 1;
+     }
+     if (drbg->parent != NULL
+-            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter)
++            && get_parent_reseed_count(drbg) != drbg->parent_reseed_counter) {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        /* Red Hat patches provide chain reseeding when necessary so just sync counters*/
++        drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
++#else
+         reseed_required = 1;
++#endif
++        }
+ 
+     if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
+         if (!ossl_prov_drbg_reseed(drbg, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 12:17:52.148556301 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rand/prov_seed.c	2022-08-04 12:19:41.783533552 +0200
+@@ -20,7 +20,14 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused
+     size_t entropy_available;
+     RAND_POOL *pool;
+ 
+-    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of
++     * some size that is hashed to get seed data.
++     * Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires
++     * 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested
++     * amount of entropy.
++     */
++    pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy + 64, 1, min_len, max_len);
+     if (pool == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+         return 0;
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c.fipsrand	2022-08-04 11:56:10.100950299 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c	2022-08-04 11:59:11.241564925 +0200
+@@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG
+      * to the nearest byte.  If the entropy is of less than full quality,
+      * the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
+      */
+-    bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
++    /*
++     * FIPS 140-3: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy
++     * + 128 bits during initial seeding
++     */
++    bytes_needed = (entropy + 128 + 7) / 8;
+     if (bytes_needed < min_len)
+         bytes_needed = min_len;
+     if (bytes_needed > max_len)
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
+--- openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h.drbg	2023-03-13 12:17:47.705538612 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.7/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h	2023-03-13 12:18:03.060702092 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
+  *
+  * The value is in bytes.
+  */
+-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ    16
++#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ   32
+ 
+ /*
+  * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)

SOURCES/0077-FIPS-140-3-zeroization.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:11:27.211413931 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c	2022-08-05 13:11:34.151475891 +0200
+@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ void ossl_ffc_params_init(FFC_PARAMS *pa
+ 
+ void ossl_ffc_params_cleanup(FFC_PARAMS *params)
+ {
+-    BN_free(params->p);
+-    BN_free(params->q);
+-    BN_free(params->g);
+-    BN_free(params->j);
++    BN_clear_free(params->p);
++    BN_clear_free(params->q);
++    BN_clear_free(params->g);
++    BN_clear_free(params->j);
+     OPENSSL_free(params->seed);
+     ossl_ffc_params_init(params);
+ }
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:08:31.875848536 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c	2022-08-05 13:09:35.438416025 +0200
+@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
+ 
+     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
+ 
+-    BN_free(r->n);
+-    BN_free(r->e);
++    BN_clear_free(r->n);
++    BN_clear_free(r->e);
+     BN_clear_free(r->d);
+     BN_clear_free(r->p);
+     BN_clear_free(r->q);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:14:58.827303241 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c	2022-08-05 13:16:24.530068399 +0200
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
+ 
+     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+-    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
++    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
+     OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
+     OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:12:40.552068717 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c	2022-08-05 13:13:34.324548799 +0200
+@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provct
+ static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
+ {
+     ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+-    OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
++    OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
+     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ }
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.fipszero openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c.fipszero	2022-08-05 13:48:32.221345774 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c	2022-08-05 13:49:16.138741452 +0200
+@@ -744,12 +744,16 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *g
+ 
+ void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point)
+ {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
++#else
+     if (point == NULL)
+         return;
+ 
+     if (point->meth->point_finish != 0)
+         point->meth->point_finish(point);
+     OPENSSL_free(point);
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point)

SOURCES/0078-KDF-Add-FIPS-indicators.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,906 @@
+From 2290280617183863eb15425b8925765966723725 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 09:27:12 +0200
+Subject: KDF: Add FIPS indicators
+
+FIPS requires a number of restrictions on the parameters of the various
+key derivation functions implemented in OpenSSL. The KDFs that use
+digest algorithms usually should not allow SHAKE (due to FIPS 140-3 IG
+C.C). Additionally, some application-specific KDFs have further
+restrictions defined in SP 800-135r1.
+
+Generally, all KDFs shall use a key-derivation key length of at least
+112 bits due to SP 800-131Ar2 section 8. Additionally any use of a KDF
+to generate and output length of less than 112 bits will also set the
+indicator to unapproved.
+
+Add explicit indicators to all KDFs usable in FIPS mode except for
+PBKDF2 (which has its specific FIPS limits already implemented). The
+indicator can be queried using EVP_KDF_CTX_get_params() after setting
+the required parameters and keys for the KDF.
+
+Our FIPS provider implements SHA1, SHA2 (both -256 and -512, and the
+truncated variants -224 and -384) and SHA3 (-256 and -512, and the
+truncated versions -224 and -384), as well as SHAKE-128 and -256.
+
+The SHAKE functions are generally not allowed in KDFs. For the rest, the
+support matrix is:
+
+ KDF         | SHA-1 | SHA-2 | SHA-2 truncated  | SHA-3 | SHA-3 truncated
+==========================================================================
+KBKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+HKDF         |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+TLS1PRF      |       | SHA-{256,384,512} only   |       |
+SSHKDF       |   x   |   x   |         x        |       |
+SSKDF        |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+X9.63KDF     |       |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+X9.42-ASN1   |   x   |   x   |         x        |   x   |     x
+TLS1.3PRF    |       | SHA-{256,384} only       |       |
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Resolves: rhbz#2160733 rhbz#2164763
+Related: rhbz#2114772 rhbz#2141695
+---
+ include/crypto/evp.h                      |   7 ++
+ include/openssl/core_names.h              |   1 +
+ include/openssl/kdf.h                     |   4 +
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c     | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c    |  82 ++++++++++++++++--
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c   |  75 +++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c    | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c |  74 +++++++++++++++-
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c  |  67 ++++++++++++++-
+ 9 files changed, 488 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
+index e70d8e9e84..76fb990de4 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
++++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
+@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ struct evp_mac_st {
+     OSSL_FUNC_mac_set_ctx_params_fn *set_ctx_params;
+ };
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++/* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8: Deriving
++ * Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of the
++ * key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112 bits". */
++# define EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
++#endif
++
+ struct evp_kdf_st {
+     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
+     int name_id;
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 6bed5a8a67..680bfbc7cc 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO    "supp-pubinfo"
+ #define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO   "supp-privinfo"
+ #define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS     "use-keybits"
++#define OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
+ 
+ /* Known KDF names */
+ #define OSSL_KDF_NAME_HKDF           "HKDF"
+diff --git a/include/openssl/kdf.h b/include/openssl/kdf.h
+index 0983230a48..86171635ea 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/kdf.h
++++ b/include/openssl/kdf.h
+@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ int EVP_KDF_names_do_all(const EVP_KDF *kdf,
+ # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY        1
+ # define EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY         2
+ 
++# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_CLI_TO_SRV     65
+ #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_INITIAL_IV_SRV_TO_CLI     66
+ #define EVP_KDF_SSHKDF_TYPE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_CLI_TO_SRV 67
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+index dfa7786bde..f01e40ff5a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/hkdf.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
++static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_3_new;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_3_derive;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
+@@ -85,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct {
+     size_t data_len;
+     unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
+     size_t info_len;
++    int is_tls13;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_HKDF;
+ 
+ static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
+@@ -170,6 +175,11 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     switch (ctx->mode) {
+     case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
+     default:
+@@ -332,15 +342,78 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
+         size_t sz = kdf_hkdf_size(ctx);
+ 
+-        if (sz == 0)
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (sz == 0 || !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz))
+             return 0;
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz);
+     }
+-    return -2;
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
++            != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++        const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        if (ctx->is_tls13) {
++            if (md != NULL
++                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")
++                    && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
++                /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic
++                 * Module Validation Program, Section 2.4.B, (5): "The TLS 1.3
++                 * key derivation function documented in Section 7.1 of RFC
++                 * 8446. This is considered an approved CVL because the
++                 * underlying functions performed within the TLS 1.3 KDF map to
++                 * NIST approved standards, namely: SP 800-133rev2 (Section 6.3
++                 * Option #3), SP 800-56Crev2, and SP 800-108."
++                 *
++                 * RFC 8446 appendix B.4 only lists SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        } else {
++            if (md != NULL
++                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") ||
++                        EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++                /* HKDF is a SP 800-56Cr2 TwoStep KDF, for which all SHA-1,
++                 * SHA-2 and SHA-3 are approved. SHAKE is not approved, because
++                 * of FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++                 * extendable-output functions may only be used as the
++                 * standalone algorithms." */
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        }
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -348,6 +421,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -677,6 +753,17 @@ static int prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static void *kdf_tls1_3_new(void *provctx)
++{
++    KDF_HKDF *hkdf = kdf_hkdf_new(provctx);
++
++    if (hkdf != NULL)
++        hkdf->is_tls13 = 1;
++
++    return hkdf;
++}
++
++
+ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                              const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+@@ -692,6 +779,11 @@ static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     switch (ctx->mode) {
+     default:
+         return 0;
+@@ -769,7 +861,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ }
+ 
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
+-    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_new },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_derive },
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
+index a542f84dfa..6b6dfb94ac 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/kbkdf.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     kbkdf_mode mode;
+     EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init;
+ 
++    /* HMAC digest algorithm, if any; used to compute FIPS indicator */
++    PROV_DIGEST digest;
++
+     /* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
+     int r;
+     unsigned char *ki;
+@@ -70,6 +73,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     size_t iv_len;
+     int use_l;
+     int use_separator;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KBKDF;
+ 
+ /* Definitions needed for typechecking. */
+@@ -138,6 +144,7 @@ static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx)
+     void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
+ 
+     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
++    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
+@@ -240,6 +247,11 @@ static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     h = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx->ctx_init);
+     if (h == 0)
+         goto done;
+@@ -297,6 +309,9 @@ static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
++        return 0;
++
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE);
+     if (p != NULL
+         && OPENSSL_strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
+@@ -363,20 +378,77 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE);
+-    if (p == NULL)
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->ki_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms." Note that the digest is only used when the MAC
++         * algorithm is HMAC. */
++        if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
++                && EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->ctx_init), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
++            const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
++            if (md != NULL
++                    && (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
+         return -2;
+ 
+-    /* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
+-    return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+                                                    ossl_unused void *provctx)
+ {
+-    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] =
+-        { OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };
++    static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
++        OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++        OSSL_PARAM_END
++    };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
+index c592ba72f1..4a52b38266 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sshkdf.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     char type; /* X */
+     unsigned char *session_id;
+     size_t session_id_len;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_SSHKDF;
+ 
+ static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
+@@ -126,6 +129,12 @@ static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
+         return 0;
+     }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
+                   ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
+                   ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
+@@ -194,10 +203,67 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+-    return -2;
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->key_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms."
++         *
++         * Additionally, SP 800-135r1 section 5.2 specifies that the hash
++         * function used in SSHKDF "is one of the hash functions specified in
++         * FIPS 180-3.", which rules out SHA-3 and truncated variants of SHA-2.
++         * */
++        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-224")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
++            && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -205,6 +271,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
+index eb54972e1c..23865cd70f 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/sskdf.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ typedef struct {
+     unsigned char *salt;
+     size_t salt_len;
+     size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
++    int is_x963kdf;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_SSKDF;
+ 
+ #define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
+@@ -73,6 +77,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
+ 
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
++static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x963kdf_new;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
+@@ -296,6 +301,16 @@ static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
+     return ctx;
+ }
+ 
++static void *x963kdf_new(void *provctx)
++{
++    KDF_SSKDF *ctx = sskdf_new(provctx);
++
++    if (ctx)
++        ctx->is_x963kdf = 1;
++
++    return ctx;
++}
++
+ static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
+ {
+     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+@@ -361,6 +376,11 @@ static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+     }
+     md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
+         /* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
+         int ret;
+@@ -442,6 +462,11 @@ static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                           ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
+ }
+@@ -514,10 +539,74 @@ static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
++
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx)))
++            return 0;
++    }
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
+-    return -2;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms." */
++        if (ctx->macctx == NULL
++                || (ctx->macctx != NULL &&
++                    EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_get0_mac(ctx->macctx), OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC))) {
++            if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
++                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++
++            /* Table H-3 in ANS X9.63-2001 says that 160-bit hash functions
++             * should only be used for 80-bit key agreement, but FIPS 140-3
++             * requires a security strength of 112 bits, so SHA-1 cannot be
++             * used with X9.63. See the discussion in
++             * https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/issues/1403#issuecomment-1435300395.
++             */
++            if (ctx->is_x963kdf
++                    && ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                    && EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA-1")) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -525,6 +614,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+@@ -545,7 +637,7 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
+ };
+ 
+ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
+-    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_new },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+index a4d64b9352..f6782a6ca2 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ typedef struct {
+     /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
+     unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
+     size_t seedlen;
++
++    /* MAC digest algorithm; used to compute FIPS indicator */
++    PROV_DIGEST digest;
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } TLS1_PRF;
+ 
+ static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
+@@ -129,6 +136,7 @@ static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
+     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
+     OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+     OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
++    ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
+     memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+     ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ }
+@@ -157,6 +165,10 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+     return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
+                         ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
+@@ -191,6 +203,9 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
++        return 0;
++
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
+         OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
+         ctx->sec = NULL;
+@@ -232,10 +247,60 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(
+ static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
++
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->seclen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* SP 800-135r1 section 4.2.2 says TLS 1.2 KDF is approved when "(3)
++         * P_HASH uses either SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512." */
++        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-256")
++                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-384")
++                && !EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHA2-512")) {
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+-    return -2;
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
+@@ -243,6 +308,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
+index b1bc6f7e1b..8173fc2cc7 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/x942kdf.c
+@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@
+ #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ #include <openssl/params.h>
+ #include <openssl/proverr.h>
+ #include "internal/packet.h"
+ #include "internal/der.h"
++#include "internal/nelem.h"
++#include "crypto/evp.h"
+ #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ typedef struct {
+     const unsigned char *cek_oid;
+     size_t cek_oid_len;
+     int use_keybits;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    int fips_indicator;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ } KDF_X942;
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -460,6 +466,10 @@ static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+         return 0;
+     }
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (keylen < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++        ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
+                            der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
+     OPENSSL_free(der);
+@@ -563,10 +573,58 @@ static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
+-    return -2;
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx)))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        /* According to NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, Section 8:
++         * Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key, "[t]he length of
++         * the key-derivation key [i.e., the input key] shall be at least 112
++         * bits". */
++        if (ctx->secret_len < EVP_KDF_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section D.B and NIST Special Publication
++         * 800-131Ar2, Section 1.2.2 say that any algorithm at a security
++         * strength < 112 bits is legacy use only, so all derived keys should
++         * be longer than that. If a derived key has ever been shorter than
++         * that, ctx->output_keyelen_indicator will be NOT_APPROVED, and we
++         * should also set the returned FIPS indicator to unapproved. */
++        if (ctx->fips_indicator == EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Validation Program, Section C.C: "The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
++         * extendable-output functions may only be used as the standalone
++         * algorithms." */
++        if (ctx->digest.md != NULL
++                && (EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-128") ||
++                    EVP_MD_is_a(ctx->digest.md, "SHAKE-256"))) {
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -574,6 +632,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, 0),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

SOURCES/0081-signature-Remove-X9.31-padding-from-FIPS-prov.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+From 4de5fa26873297f5c2eeed53e5c988437f837f55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 13:53:31 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] signature: Remove X9.31 padding from FIPS prov
+
+The current draft of FIPS 186-5 [1] no longer contains specifications
+for X9.31 signature padding. Instead, it contains the following
+information in Appendix E:
+
+> ANSI X9.31 was withdrawn, so X9.31 RSA signatures were removed from
+> this standard.
+
+Since this situation is unlikely to change in future revisions of the
+draft, and future FIPS 140-3 validations of the provider will require
+X9.31 to be disabled or marked as not approved with an explicit
+indicator, disallow this padding mode now.
+
+Remove the X9.31 tests from the acvp test, since they will always fail
+now.
+
+ [1]: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5-draft.pdf
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c |   6 +
+ test/acvp_test.inc                            | 214 ------------------
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index 34f45175e8..49e7f9158a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -1233,7 +1233,13 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
+             goto cont;
+         case RSA_X931_PADDING:
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+             err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
++#else /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++            err_extra_text = "X.931 padding no longer allowed in FIPS mode,"
++                             " since it was removed from FIPS 186-5";
++            goto bad_pad;
++#endif /* !defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         cont:
+             if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
+                                RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
+diff --git a/test/acvp_test.inc b/test/acvp_test.inc
+index 73b24bdb0c..96a72073f9 100644
+--- a/test/acvp_test.inc
++++ b/test/acvp_test.inc
+@@ -1204,13 +1204,6 @@ static const struct rsa_siggen_st rsa_siggen_data[] = {
+         ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
+         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+     },
+-    {
+-        "x931",
+-        2048,
+-        "SHA384",
+-        ITM(rsa_siggen0_msg),
+-        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+-    },
+     {
+         "pss",
+         2048,
+@@ -1622,202 +1615,6 @@ static const unsigned char rsa_sigverpss_1_sig[] = {
+     0x5c, 0xea, 0x8a, 0x92, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x11, 0x4b,
+ };
+ 
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_n[] = {
+-    0xa0, 0x16, 0x14, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x17, 0x2b, 0xad,
+-    0xd7, 0x07, 0x31, 0x6d, 0xfc, 0xba, 0x25, 0x83,
+-    0x09, 0xa0, 0xf7, 0x71, 0xc6, 0x06, 0x22, 0x87,
+-    0xd6, 0xbd, 0x13, 0xd9, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0xf7, 0xe6,
+-    0x48, 0xdb, 0x27, 0xd8, 0xa5, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x8c,
+-    0xea, 0xbe, 0xe0, 0x04, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0x3b, 0x73,
+-    0xdc, 0xc5, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x85, 0xef, 0xea, 0x10,
+-    0x46, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xb9, 0x93, 0xbc, 0xa0, 0xb6,
+-    0x06, 0x02, 0x82, 0xb4, 0x2d, 0x54, 0xec, 0x79,
+-    0x50, 0x8a, 0xfc, 0xfa, 0x62, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xd7,
+-    0x26, 0xcd, 0x88, 0xfa, 0xe8, 0x0f, 0x26, 0x5b,
+-    0x1f, 0x21, 0x3f, 0x3b, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x3f, 0x02,
+-    0x8c, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0xc0, 0x70, 0x4d, 0xd1, 0x41,
+-    0xfd, 0xb9, 0x55, 0x12, 0x90, 0xc8, 0x6e, 0x0f,
+-    0x19, 0xa8, 0x5c, 0x31, 0xd6, 0x16, 0x0e, 0xdf,
+-    0x08, 0x84, 0xcd, 0x4b, 0xfd, 0x28, 0x8d, 0x7d,
+-    0x6e, 0xea, 0xc7, 0x95, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0x84, 0x54,
+-    0x7f, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x29, 0x96, 0x39, 0x4c, 0x3e,
+-    0x85, 0xec, 0x22, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x14, 0xbb, 0x04,
+-    0x2f, 0x4c, 0x0c, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xae, 0x47, 0x79,
+-    0x59, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x17, 0xae, 0x16,
+-    0x38, 0x66, 0x4e, 0xff, 0x45, 0x7f, 0xac, 0x5e,
+-    0x75, 0x9f, 0x51, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x6b, 0x8b,
+-    0x3d, 0x08, 0x4d, 0x9a, 0xd2, 0x11, 0xba, 0xa8,
+-    0xc3, 0xb5, 0x17, 0xb5, 0xdf, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x89,
+-    0x27, 0x7b, 0xeb, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0x7b,
+-    0x39, 0x40, 0x6f, 0xe4, 0x82, 0x14, 0x3d, 0x62,
+-    0xb6, 0xd4, 0x43, 0xd0, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0xc1, 0x73,
+-    0x3d, 0x99, 0x37, 0xbe, 0x62, 0x13, 0x6a, 0x8b,
+-    0xeb, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x2a, 0x8b, 0x4f, 0x7f,
+-    0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x3e, 0x08, 0x1b, 0xb5, 0x77,
+-    0xd3, 0xdc, 0x1b, 0x2c, 0xe5, 0x59, 0xf6, 0x33,
+-    0x47, 0xa0, 0x0f, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x6a, 0x1d, 0x66,
+-    0x24, 0x67, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x21, 0xda, 0xc1, 0xd4,
+-    0x11, 0x6c, 0xe8, 0x5f, 0xd7, 0x8a, 0x53, 0x5c,
+-    0xb2, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x14, 0x29, 0x0f, 0xcf, 0x28,
+-    0x32, 0x4f, 0xc6, 0x17, 0xf6, 0xbc, 0x0e, 0xb8,
+-    0x99, 0x7c, 0x14, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x3f, 0xf3, 0xe4,
+-    0x31, 0xbe, 0x54, 0x64, 0x5a, 0xad, 0x1d, 0xb0,
+-    0x37, 0xcc, 0xd9, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x07,
+-    0x37, 0xd1, 0xe1, 0x65, 0xc6, 0x53, 0xfe, 0x60,
+-    0x6a, 0x64, 0xa4, 0x01, 0x00, 0xf3, 0x5b, 0x9a,
+-    0x28, 0x61, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xd7, 0x0d, 0x56, 0x1e,
+-    0x4d, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x86, 0x2a, 0x4e,
+-    0xaa, 0x37, 0x23, 0x5a, 0x3b, 0x69, 0x66, 0x81,
+-    0xc8, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0f, 0x28, 0x31, 0x9a,
+-    0x2d, 0xe5, 0x79, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0xca, 0x60, 0x45,
+-    0xf7, 0x83, 0x73, 0x5a, 0x01, 0x29, 0xda, 0xf7,
+-
+-};
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_e[] = {
+-    0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
+-};
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_msg[] = {
+-    0x82, 0x2e, 0x41, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0x47,
+-    0xec, 0xf1, 0x79, 0xcc, 0x05, 0xef, 0xdb, 0xcd,
+-    0xca, 0x8b, 0x8e, 0x61, 0x45, 0xad, 0xa6, 0xd9,
+-    0xd7, 0x4b, 0x15, 0xf4, 0x92, 0x3a, 0x2a, 0x52,
+-    0xe3, 0x44, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x74, 0x7a, 0x37, 0x41,
+-    0x50, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x13, 0x49, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x54,
+-    0x97, 0xfd, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0x5c,
+-    0xc1, 0x37, 0x58, 0x17, 0x63, 0x19, 0x9c, 0xcf,
+-    0xee, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xbe, 0x06, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x47,
+-    0xd1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x59, 0x97, 0x02, 0x01,
+-    0x31, 0x45, 0x8c, 0xe1, 0x5c, 0xac, 0xe7, 0x5f,
+-    0x6a, 0x23, 0xda, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0x25, 0xc6, 0x67,
+-    0xea, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x90, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x0f, 0x41,
+-    0xb5, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x7e, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0xaa, 0xbd,
+-    0xe2, 0x8d, 0xad, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x29, 0x70, 0xca,
+-    0x1b, 0x38, 0x21, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0xaf, 0x00,
+-
+-};
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_0_sig[] = {
+-    0x29, 0xa9, 0x3a, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0x90, 0x1b, 0xdb,
+-    0xaf, 0x0b, 0x47, 0x5b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x8c, 0xc3,
+-    0x70, 0xbe, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x65, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0x1e,
+-    0x95, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x24, 0x76, 0x79, 0xf1, 0x00,
+-    0x71, 0xcd, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x7b, 0xd2, 0x8b, 0x18,
+-    0xc4, 0xdd, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x31, 0x04, 0x3f, 0xfc,
+-    0x36, 0x06, 0x20, 0x71, 0x3d, 0x62, 0xf2, 0xb5,
+-    0x79, 0x0a, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0x81, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0x4f,
+-    0x9a, 0x17, 0xe8, 0x67, 0x64, 0x48, 0x09, 0x75,
+-    0xff, 0x2d, 0xee, 0x36, 0xca, 0xca, 0x1d, 0x74,
+-    0x99, 0xbe, 0x5c, 0x94, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xf4,
+-    0x59, 0x7e, 0x17, 0x00, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0xa4, 0xb1,
+-    0xda, 0xdb, 0x3e, 0xa4, 0x34, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x19,
+-    0x0a, 0xd2, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0xef, 0x82,
+-    0xd4, 0x2e, 0x21, 0xbe, 0x15, 0x73, 0xac, 0xef,
+-    0x05, 0xdb, 0x6a, 0x8a, 0x1a, 0xcb, 0x8e, 0xa5,
+-    0xee, 0xfb, 0x28, 0xbf, 0x96, 0xa4, 0x2b, 0xd2,
+-    0x85, 0x2b, 0x20, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x04,
+-    0xa0, 0x49, 0x24, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xcf,
+-    0x73, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0x70, 0xda, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0x5a,
+-    0x28, 0x2e, 0x14, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xbd, 0x2a, 0x7c,
+-    0x8e, 0xc1, 0xa8, 0x0e, 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x8d,
+-    0x76, 0xea, 0x70, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x63, 0x74,
+-    0xbc, 0x7e, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x7b, 0x1b, 0x75,
+-    0x82, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x55, 0xd4, 0xbd,
+-    0x14, 0xde, 0x58, 0x56, 0x3a, 0x5d, 0x4e, 0x57,
+-    0x0d, 0x54, 0x74, 0xe8, 0x86, 0x8c, 0xcb, 0x07,
+-    0x9f, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0xc2, 0x08, 0x5c, 0xd7, 0x05,
+-    0x3b, 0xc8, 0xd2, 0x15, 0x68, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0x3c,
+-    0x4e, 0x85, 0xa9, 0x25, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xca,
+-    0xca, 0xa8, 0x27, 0x89, 0x61, 0x4e, 0x1f, 0x57,
+-    0x2d, 0x99, 0x10, 0x3f, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x96, 0x5e,
+-    0x2f, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xea, 0x65, 0x2a,
+-    0x22, 0x35, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0x13, 0x89, 0x05, 0x2e,
+-    0x19, 0x73, 0x1d, 0x70, 0x74, 0x98, 0x15, 0x4b,
+-    0xab, 0x56, 0x52, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x42, 0x95, 0x6a,
+-    0x46, 0x2c, 0x78, 0xff, 0x26, 0xbc, 0x48, 0x10,
+-    0x38, 0x25, 0xab, 0x32, 0x7c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x5d,
+-    0x6f, 0x45, 0x54, 0x74, 0x2d, 0x93, 0x56, 0x52,
+-    0x11, 0x34, 0x1e, 0xe3, 0x4b, 0x6a, 0x17, 0x4f,
+-    0x37, 0x14, 0x75, 0xac, 0xa3, 0xa1, 0xca, 0xda,
+-    0x38, 0x06, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0xd0, 0x59,
+-    0x1b, 0x5d, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x0b, 0xfb, 0x39, 0x37,
+-    0x44, 0x85, 0xb6, 0x36, 0x06, 0x95, 0xbc, 0x15,
+-    0x35, 0xb9, 0xe6, 0x27, 0x42, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0xec,
+-    0x30, 0x37, 0x20, 0x26, 0x9a, 0x11, 0x61, 0xc0,
+-    0xdb, 0xb2, 0x5a, 0x26, 0x78, 0x27, 0xb9, 0x13,
+-    0xc9, 0x1a, 0xa7, 0x67, 0x93, 0xe8, 0xbe, 0xcb,
+-};
+-
+-#define rsa_sigverx931_1_n rsa_sigverx931_0_n
+-#define rsa_sigverx931_1_e rsa_sigverx931_0_e
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_msg[] = {
+-    0x79, 0x02, 0xb9, 0xd2, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x02, 0xc8,
+-    0x2a, 0x94, 0x92, 0x14, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0x8d,
+-    0xb2, 0xf6, 0x00, 0x8b, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0xf9,
+-    0xa8, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xac, 0xdc, 0xa5, 0x34, 0xf3,
+-    0xda, 0x6c, 0xd4, 0x70, 0x92, 0xfb, 0x40, 0x26,
+-    0xc7, 0x9b, 0xe8, 0xd2, 0x10, 0x11, 0xcf, 0x7f,
+-    0x23, 0xd0, 0xed, 0x55, 0x52, 0x6d, 0xd3, 0xb2,
+-    0x56, 0x53, 0x8d, 0x7c, 0x4c, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xb5,
+-    0xfd, 0xd0, 0x45, 0x4f, 0x62, 0x40, 0x54, 0x42,
+-    0x68, 0xd5, 0xe5, 0xdd, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x94, 0x59,
+-    0x1a, 0x57, 0x13, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0x70, 0xcc, 0xbd,
+-    0x4c, 0x2e, 0xc8, 0x6b, 0x9d, 0x68, 0xd0, 0x72,
+-    0x6a, 0x94, 0xd2, 0x18, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0x86, 0x45,
+-    0x95, 0xaa, 0x50, 0xda, 0x35, 0xeb, 0x69, 0x44,
+-    0x1f, 0xf3, 0x3a, 0x51, 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x08, 0x42,
+-    0x12, 0xd7, 0xd6, 0x21, 0xd8, 0x9b, 0x87, 0x55,
+-};
+-
+-static const unsigned char rsa_sigverx931_1_sig[] = {
+-    0x3b, 0xba, 0xb3, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0x29, 0xb5,
+-    0xf9, 0x94, 0xf1, 0x00, 0x5c, 0x16, 0x67, 0x67,
+-    0x73, 0xd3, 0xde, 0x7e, 0x07, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0x95,
+-    0xeb, 0x5a, 0x55, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0xa9, 0x70, 0x5a,
+-    0xee, 0x8f, 0x8d, 0x69, 0x85, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xe3,
+-    0xdc, 0xe2, 0x73, 0x9b, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x69,
+-    0x08, 0x03, 0x17, 0xd6, 0x50, 0x21, 0x14, 0x23,
+-    0x8c, 0xe6, 0x54, 0x3a, 0xd9, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x14,
+-    0x81, 0xb1, 0x8b, 0x9d, 0xd2, 0xbe, 0x58, 0x75,
+-    0x94, 0x74, 0x93, 0xc9, 0xbb, 0x4e, 0xf6, 0x1f,
+-    0x73, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x5f, 0xbd, 0xbf, 0x59, 0x37,
+-    0x5b, 0x98, 0x54, 0xad, 0x3a, 0xef, 0xa0, 0xef,
+-    0xcb, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x84, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0xf5, 0x60,
+-    0xb8, 0xc3, 0x8d, 0x1e, 0x78, 0xa0, 0x91, 0x94,
+-    0xb7, 0xd7, 0xb1, 0xd4, 0xe2, 0xee, 0x81, 0x93,
+-    0xfc, 0x41, 0xf0, 0x31, 0xbb, 0x03, 0x52, 0xde,
+-    0x80, 0x20, 0x3a, 0x68, 0xe6, 0xc5, 0x50, 0x1b,
+-    0x08, 0x3f, 0x40, 0xde, 0xb3, 0xe5, 0x81, 0x99,
+-    0x7f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x27, 0xd4, 0xfb,
+-    0xcd, 0xc5, 0x7a, 0xea, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x66, 0xef,
+-    0x55, 0x3f, 0x85, 0xea, 0x84, 0xc5, 0x0a, 0xf6,
+-    0x3c, 0x40, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xbe,
+-    0x61, 0x41, 0xd3, 0xb1, 0x08, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0xf9,
+-    0x6e, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63,
+-    0x3e, 0x41, 0x33, 0x94, 0xd6, 0x27, 0xa4, 0xd9,
+-    0x3a, 0x20, 0x2b, 0x39, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x82, 0x48,
+-    0xd6, 0x5b, 0x58, 0x85, 0x44, 0xb0, 0xd2, 0xfd,
+-    0xfb, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x78, 0xac, 0xbc, 0xba, 0x16,
+-    0x92, 0x0e, 0x20, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8,
+-    0x00, 0x88, 0xc0, 0x41, 0x46, 0x38, 0xb6, 0x54,
+-    0x70, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x62, 0x97, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x66,
+-    0x5a, 0xa1, 0x6c, 0xf7, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x27, 0x56,
+-    0x60, 0x5b, 0x0c, 0x52, 0xac, 0x5c, 0xae, 0x99,
+-    0x55, 0x11, 0x62, 0x52, 0x09, 0x48, 0x53, 0x90,
+-    0x3c, 0x0b, 0xd4, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe3, 0x4c, 0xe3,
+-    0xa8, 0x6d, 0xc5, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x5c, 0x59, 0x25,
+-    0x99, 0x30, 0xde, 0x57, 0x6a, 0x84, 0x25, 0x34,
+-    0x3e, 0x64, 0x11, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x70,
+-    0xd2, 0x5c, 0x0e, 0x81, 0xa0, 0x24, 0x53, 0x75,
+-    0x98, 0xd6, 0x10, 0x01, 0x6a, 0x14, 0xed, 0xc3,
+-    0x6f, 0xc4, 0x18, 0xb8, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x59, 0x53,
+-    0x81, 0x3a, 0x86, 0x31, 0xfc, 0x9e, 0xbf, 0x6c,
+-    0x52, 0x93, 0x86, 0x9c, 0xaa, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x07,
+-    0x8a, 0x40, 0x33, 0x64, 0xb2, 0x70, 0x48, 0x85,
+-    0x05, 0x59, 0x65, 0x2d, 0x6b, 0x9a, 0xad, 0xab,
+-    0x20, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x6d, 0xde, 0xcf, 0x22, 0x0b,
+-    0xea, 0x6e, 0xbd, 0x1c, 0x39, 0x3a, 0xfd, 0xa4,
+-    0xde, 0x54, 0xae, 0xde, 0x5e, 0xf7, 0xb0, 0x6d,
+-};
+-
+ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
+     {
+         "pkcs1", /* pkcs1v1.5 */
+@@ -1841,17 +1638,6 @@ static const struct rsa_sigver_st rsa_sigver_data[] = {
+         NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+         FAIL
+     },
+-    {
+-        "x931",
+-        3072,
+-        "SHA256",
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_msg),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_n),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_e),
+-        ITM(rsa_sigverx931_1_sig),
+-        NO_PSS_SALT_LEN,
+-        FAIL
+-    },
+     {
+         "pss",
+         4096,
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0083-hmac-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-key-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From e1eba21921ceeffa45ffd2115868c14e4c7fb8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:08:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] hmac: Add explicit FIPS indicator for key length
+
+NIST SP 800-131Ar2, table 9 "Approval Status of MAC Algorithms"
+specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and
+are legacy use for HMAC verification.
+
+Add an explicit indicator that will mark shorter key lengths as
+unsupported. The indicator can be queries from the EVP_MAC_CTX object
+using EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params() with the
+  OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR
+parameter.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/crypto/evp.h                       |  7 +++++++
+ include/openssl/core_names.h               |  1 +
+ include/openssl/evp.h                      |  3 +++
+ providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
+index 76fb990de4..1e2240516e 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
++++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
+@@ -196,6 +196,13 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_ed448_pkey_method(void);
+ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void);
+ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void);
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++/* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms specifies key
++ * lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation and legacy use for
++ * HMAC verification. */
++# define EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN (112 / 8)
++#endif
++
+ struct evp_mac_st {
+     OSSL_PROVIDER *prov;
+     int name_id;
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index c019afbbb0..94fab83193 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE             "size"                    /* size_t */
+ #define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE       "block-size"              /* size_t */
+ #define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE    "tls-data-size"           /* size_t */
++#define OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
+ 
+ /* Known MAC names */
+ #define OSSL_MAC_NAME_BLAKE2BMAC    "BLAKE2BMAC"
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index 49e8e1df78..a5e78efd6e 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -1192,6 +1192,9 @@ void EVP_MD_do_all_provided(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+                             void *arg);
+ 
+ /* MAC stuff */
++# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
+ 
+ EVP_MAC *EVP_MAC_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algorithm,
+                        const char *properties);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
+index 52ebb08b8f..cf5c3ecbe7 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/macs/hmac_prov.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+ 
++#include "crypto/evp.h"
++
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+ #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+ #include "prov/provider_util.h"
+@@ -244,6 +246,9 @@ static int hmac_final(void *vmacctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -265,6 +270,18 @@ static int hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vmacctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, hmac_block_size(macctx)))
+         return 0;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR)) != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++        /* NIST SP 800-131Ar2, Table 9: Approval Status of MAC Algorithms
++         * specifies key lengths < 112 bytes are disallowed for HMAC generation
++         * and legacy use for HMAC verification. */
++        if (macctx->keylen < EVP_HMAC_GEN_FIPS_MIN_KEY_LEN)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_MAC_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0084-pbkdf2-Set-minimum-password-length-of-8-bytes.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 754862899058cfb5f2341c81f9e04dd2f7b37056 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:37:17 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pbkdf2: Set minimum password length of 8 bytes
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
+"Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the
+vendor shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
+a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper
+bound for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random.
+This probability shall take into account not only the length of the
+password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The
+decision on the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is
+the vendor’s, but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the
+decision."
+
+We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's
+ACVP testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer
+passwords combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error)
+would cause the module to fail ACVP testing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+index 2a0ae63acc..aa0adce5e6 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,21 @@
+ #define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
+ #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
+ #define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN   (128 / 8)
++/* The Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 says in section D.N
++ * "Password-Based Key Derivation for Storage Applications" that "the vendor
++ * shall document in the module’s Security Policy the length of
++ * a password/passphrase used in key derivation and establish an upper bound
++ * for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random. This
++ * probability shall take into account not only the length of the
++ * password/passphrase, but also the difficulty of guessing it. The decision on
++ * the minimum length of a password used for key derivation is the vendor’s,
++ * but the vendor shall at a minimum informally justify the decision."
++ *
++ * We are choosing a minimum password length of 8 bytes, because NIST's ACVP
++ * testing uses passwords as short as 8 bytes, and requiring longer passwords
++ * combined with an implicit indicator (i.e., returning an error) would cause
++ * the module to fail ACVP testing. */
++#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN (8)
+ 
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
+@@ -186,9 +201,15 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL) {
++        if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
++            && p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
+         if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
+             return 0;
++    }
+ 
+     if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
+         if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
+@@ -297,6 +318,10 @@ static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
+     }
+ 
+     if (lower_bound_checks) {
++        if (passlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
++            return 0;
++        }
+         if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+             return 0;
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0085-FIPS-RSA-disable-shake.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 52b347703ba2b98a0efee86c1a483c2f0f9f73d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 12:52:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Disallow SHAKE in OAEP and PSS in FIPS prov
+
+According to FIPS 140-3 IG, section C.C, the SHAKE digest algorithms
+must not be used in higher-level algorithms (such as RSA-OAEP and
+RSASSA-PSS):
+
+"To be used in an approved mode of operation, the SHA-3 hash functions
+may be implemented either as part of an approved higher-level algorithm,
+for example, a digital signature algorithm, or as the standalone
+functions. The SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 extendable-output functions may
+only be used as the standalone algorithms."
+
+Add a check to prevent their use as message digest in PSS signatures and
+as MGF1 hash function in both OAEP and PSS.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+index d9be1a4f98..dfe9c9f0e8 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+@@ -73,9 +73,23 @@ int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+         return 0;
+ #endif
+     }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
+     if (mgf1md == NULL)
+         mgf1md = md;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+     if (mdlen <= 0) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
+@@ -181,9 +195,23 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ #endif
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return -1;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     if (mgf1md == NULL)
+         mgf1md = md;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1md, "SHAKE-256")) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
++        return -1;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     mdlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+ 
+     if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+index 33874bfef8..e8681b0351 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+         mgf1Hash = Hash;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++#endif
++
+     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
+     if (hLen < 0)
+         goto err;
+@@ -164,6 +172,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+         mgf1Hash = Hash;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-128") || EVP_MD_is_a(mgf1Hash, "SHAKE-256"))
++        goto err;
++#endif
++
+     hLen = EVP_MD_get_size(Hash);
+     if (hLen < 0)
+         goto err;
+-- 
+2.39.0
+

SOURCES/0088-signature-Add-indicator-for-PSS-salt-length.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From a325a23bc83f4efd60130001c417ca5b96bdbff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 19:33:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] signature: Add indicator for PSS salt length
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
+5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
+salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 ≤ sLen ≤ hLen, where hLen is the length of
+the hash function output block (in bytes)."
+
+It is not exactly clear from this text whether hLen refers to the
+message digest or the hash function used for the mask generation
+function MGF1. PKCS#1 v2.1 suggests it is the former:
+
+| Typical salt lengths in octets are hLen (the length of the output of
+| the hash function Hash) and 0. In both cases the security of
+| RSASSA-PSS can be closely related to the hardness of inverting RSAVP1.
+| Bellare and Rogaway [4] give a tight lower bound for the security of
+| the original RSA-PSS scheme, which corresponds roughly to the former
+| case, while Coron [12] gives a lower bound for the related Full Domain
+| Hashing scheme, which corresponds roughly to the latter case. In [13]
+| Coron provides a general treatment with various salt lengths ranging
+| from 0 to hLen; see [27] for discussion. See also [31], which adapts
+| the security proofs in [4][13] to address the differences between the
+| original and the present version of RSA-PSS as listed in Note 1 above.
+
+Since OpenSSL defaults to creating signatures with the maximum salt
+length, blocking the use of longer salts would probably lead to
+significant problems in practice. Instead, introduce an explicit
+indicator that can be obtained from the EVP_PKEY_CTX object using
+EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() with the
+  OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR
+parameter.
+
+We also add indicator for RSA_NO_PADDING here to avoid patch-over-patch.
+Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  1 +
+ include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 ++++
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 94fab83193..69c59f0b46 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES    \
+     OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
+ #define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE
++#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator"
+ 
+ /* Asym cipher parameters */
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST                   OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index a5e78efd6e..f239200465 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -797,6 +797,10 @@ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+ __owur int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
+                               int *outl);
+ 
++# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ __owur int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
+                          EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ __owur int EVP_SignFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s,
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index 49e7f9158a..0c45008a00 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -1127,6 +1127,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+         }
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++        if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
++            if (prsactx->md == NULL) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED;
++            } else if (rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(prsactx) > EVP_MD_get_size(prsactx->md)) {
++                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++            }
++        } else if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
++            if (prsactx->md == NULL) /* Should always be the case */
++                fips_indicator = EVP_SIGNATURE_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++        }
++        return OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator);
++    }
++#endif
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1136,6 +1151,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0089-PSS-salt-length-from-provider.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From 0879fac692cb1bff0ec4c196cb364d970ad3ecec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 14:33:57 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Obtain PSS salt length from provider
+
+Rather than computing the PSS salt length again in core using
+ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string, which calls rsa_ctx_to_pss and computes the
+salt length, obtain it from the provider using the
+OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID param to handle the case where the
+interpretation of the magic constants in the provider differs from that
+of OpenSSL core.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c   | 19 +++++++++++++++----
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c b/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
+index 20ed816918..997567fdbf 100644
+--- a/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
++++ b/crypto/cms/cms_rsa.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <assert.h>
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include "crypto/asn1.h"
+ #include "crypto/rsa.h"
+ #include "cms_local.h"
+@@ -191,7 +192,10 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+     int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+     X509_ALGOR *alg;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
+-    ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
++    unsigned char aid[128];
++    const unsigned char *pp = aid;
++    size_t aid_len = 0;
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+ 
+     CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
+     if (pkctx != NULL) {
+@@ -205,10 +209,17 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
+     /* We don't support it */
+     if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+         return 0;
+-    os = ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
+-    if (os == NULL)
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
++        OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, aid, sizeof(aid));
++    params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(pkctx, params) <= 0)
++        return 0;
++    if ((aid_len = params[0].return_size) == 0)
++        return 0;
++    if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
+         return 0;
+-    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+index c15554505b..61ec53d424 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+@@ -637,22 +637,30 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const void *asn,
+     if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+         return 2;
+     if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+-        ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL;
+-        os1 = ossl_rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
+-        if (!os1)
++        unsigned char aid[128];
++        size_t aid_len = 0;
++        OSSL_PARAM params[2];
++
++        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
++            OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, aid, sizeof(aid));
++        params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++
++        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(pkctx, params) <= 0)
+             return 0;
+-        /* Duplicate parameters if we have to */
+-        if (alg2) {
+-            ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
+-            if (!os2) {
+-                ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
++        if ((aid_len = params[0].return_size) == 0)
++            return 0;
++
++        if (alg1 != NULL) {
++            const unsigned char *pp = aid;
++            if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg1, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
++                return 0;
++        }
++        if (alg2 != NULL) {
++            const unsigned char *pp = aid;
++            if (d2i_X509_ALGOR(&alg2, &pp, aid_len) == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+-            }
+-            X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
+-                            V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
+         }
+-        X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
+-                        V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
++
+         return 3;
+     }
+     return 2;
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0090-signature-Clamp-PSS-salt-len-to-MD-len.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+From 9cc914ff3e1fda124bdc76d72ebc9349ec19f8ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 12:35:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] signature: Clamp PSS salt len to MD len
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
+5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
+salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
+the hash function output block (in bytes)."
+
+Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
+default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
+not use more than the digest legth when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
+not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
+RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
+verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
+RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
+work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
+digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
+SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c                        | 18 ++++++++-
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c                          | 26 ++++++++++--
+ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod                | 11 ++++-
+ doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod                |  5 +++
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  1 +
+ include/openssl/rsa.h                         |  3 ++
+ providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c | 40 ++++++++++++++-----
+ test/recipes/25-test_req.t                    |  2 +-
+ 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+index 61ec53d424..e69a98d116 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
+     const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
+     EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+     int saltlen;
++    int saltlenMax = -1;
+ 
+     if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
+         return NULL;
+@@ -457,14 +458,27 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
+         return NULL;
+     if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen) <= 0)
+         return NULL;
+-    if (saltlen == -1) {
++    if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+         saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd);
+-    } else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) {
++    } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
++        /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm",
++         * subsection 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in
++         * bytes) of the salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where
++         * hLen is the length of the hash function output block (in bytes)."
++         *
++         * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default
++         * does not violate FIPS 186-4. */
++        saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
++        saltlenMax = EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd);
++    }
++    if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
+         saltlen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pk) - EVP_MD_get_size(sigmd) - 2;
+         if ((EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
+             saltlen--;
+         if (saltlen < 0)
+             return NULL;
++        if (saltlenMax >= 0 && saltlen > saltlenMax)
++            saltlen = saltlenMax;
+     }
+ 
+     return ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+index 33874bfef8..430c36eb2a 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+@@ -61,11 +61,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+      *      -1      sLen == hLen
+      *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
+      *      -3      salt length is maximized
++     *      -4      salt length is autorecovered from signature
+      *      -N      reserved
+      */
+     if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+         sLen = hLen;
+-    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
++    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -112,7 +113,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
+         goto err;
+     }
+-    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
++    if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
++            && sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX
++            && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
+         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED,
+                        "expected: %d retrieved: %d", sLen,
+                        maskedDBLen - i);
+@@ -160,6 +163,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+     int hLen, maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
+     unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
+     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int sLenMax = -1;
+ 
+     if (mgf1Hash == NULL)
+         mgf1Hash = Hash;
+@@ -172,13 +176,25 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+      *      -1      sLen == hLen
+      *      -2      salt length is maximized
+      *      -3      same as above (on signing)
++     *      -4      salt length is min(hLen, maximum salt length)
+      *      -N      reserved
+      */
++    /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
++     * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
++     * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
++     * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
++     *
++     * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
++     * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
+     if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+         sLen = hLen;
+-    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
++    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN
++            || sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
+         sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+-    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
++    } else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
++        sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
++        sLenMax = hLen;
++    } else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
+         goto err;
+     }
+@@ -195,6 +211,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
+     }
+     if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+         sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
++        if (sLenMax >= 0 && sLen > sLenMax)
++            sLen = sLenMax;
+     } else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+index 3075eaafd6..9b96f42dbc 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+@@ -270,8 +270,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding() gets the RSA padding mode for I<ctx>.
+ 
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() sets the RSA PSS salt length to I<saltlen>.
+ As its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. If this function is
+-not called then the maximum salt length is used when signing and auto detection
+-when verifying. Three special values are supported:
++not called then the salt length is maximized up to the digest length when
++signing and auto detection when verifying. Four special values are supported:
+ 
+ =over 4
+ 
+@@ -289,6 +289,13 @@ causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the
+ B<PSS> block structure when verifying.  When signing, it has the same
+ meaning as B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX>.
+ 
++=item B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX>
++
++causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B<PSS> block
++structure when verifying, like B<RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO>.  When signing, the salt
++length is maximized up to a maximum of the digest length to comply with FIPS
++186-4 section 5.5.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen() gets the RSA PSS salt length for I<ctx>.
+diff --git a/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod b/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
+index 1ce32cc443..13d053e262 100644
+--- a/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
++++ b/doc/man7/EVP_SIGNATURE-RSA.pod
+@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ Use the maximum salt length.
+ 
+ Auto detect the salt length.
+ 
++=item "auto-digestmax" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX>)
++
++Auto detect the salt length when verifying.  Maximize the salt length up to the
++digest size when signing to comply with FIPS 186-4 section 5.5.
++
+ =back
+ 
+ =back
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 69c59f0b46..5779f41427 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST "digest"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX    "max"
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO   "auto"
++#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX "auto-digestmax"
+ 
+ /* Key generation parameters */
+ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS             OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS
+diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
+index a55c9727c6..daf55bc6d4 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
++++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
+@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp);
+ # define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO   -2
+ /* Set salt length to maximum possible */
+ # define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX    -3
++/* Auto-detect on verify, set salt length to min(maximum possible, digest
++ * length) on sign */
++# define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX  -4
+ /* Old compatible max salt length for sign only */
+ # define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN    -2
+ 
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+index 0c45008a00..1a787d77db 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
+@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+     prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
+     prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+     prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
+-    /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+-    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
++    /* Maximum up to digest length for sign, auto for verify */
++    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
+     prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
+     return prsactx;
+ }
+@@ -200,13 +200,27 @@ static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+ static int rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+     int saltlen = ctx->saltlen;
+- 
++    int saltlenMax = -1;
++
++    /* FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
++     * 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
++     * salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
++     * the hash function output block (in bytes)."
++     *
++     * Provide a way to use at most the digest length, so that the default does
++     * not violate FIPS 186-4. */
+     if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+         saltlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md);
+-    } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
++    } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
++        saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
++        saltlenMax = EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md);
++    }
++    if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) {
+         saltlen = RSA_size(ctx->rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(ctx->md) - 2;
+         if ((RSA_bits(ctx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+             saltlen--;
++        if (saltlenMax >= 0 && saltlen > saltlenMax)
++            saltlen = saltlenMax;
+     }
+     if (saltlen < 0) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+@@ -411,8 +425,8 @@ static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
+ 
+     prsactx->operation = operation;
+ 
+-    /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+-    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
++    /* Maximize up to digest length for sign, auto for verify */
++    prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
+     prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
+ 
+     switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
+@@ -1110,6 +1124,9 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+             case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+                 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
+                 break;
++            case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX:
++                value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
++                break;
+             default:
+                 {
+                     int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
+@@ -1297,6 +1314,8 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+                 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+             else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
+                 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
++            else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) == 0)
++                saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX;
+             else
+                 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
+             break;
+@@ -1305,11 +1324,11 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         }
+ 
+         /*
+-         * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
+-         * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
+-         * lowest saltlen number possible.
++         * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
++         * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently lowest
++         * saltlen number possible.
+          */
+-        if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
++        if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+             return 0;
+         }
+@@ -1317,6 +1336,7 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+         if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+             switch (saltlen) {
+             case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
++            case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX:
+                 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+                     ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH,
+                                    "Cannot use autodetected salt length");
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+index e615f1b338..35541aed12 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
+@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ subtest "generating certificate requests with RSA-PSS" => sub {
+         ok(!run(app(["openssl", "req",
+                      "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+                      "-new", "-out", "testreq-rsapss3.pem", "-utf8",
+-                     "-sigopt", "rsa_pss_saltlen:-4",
++                     "-sigopt", "rsa_pss_saltlen:-5",
+                      "-key", srctop_file("test", "testrsapss.pem")])),
+            "Generating request with expected failure");
+ 
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0091-FIPS-RSA-encapsulate.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c.encap openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+--- openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c.encap	2022-11-22 12:27:30.994530801 +0100
++++ openssl-3.0.1/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c	2022-11-22 12:32:15.916875495 +0100
+@@ -264,6 +264,14 @@ static int rsasve_generate(PROV_RSA_CTX
+             *secretlen = nlen;
+         return 1;
+     }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     /*
+      * Step (2): Generate a random byte string z of nlen bytes where
+      *            1 < z < n - 1
+@@ -307,6 +315,13 @@ static int rsasve_recover(PROV_RSA_CTX *
+         return 1;
+     }
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (nlen < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS/8) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     /* Step (2): check the input ciphertext 'inlen' matches the nlen */
+     if (inlen != nlen) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);

SOURCES/0092-provider-improvements.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,705 @@
+From 98642df4ba886818900ab7e6b23703544e6addd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 10:46:32 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Propagate selection all the way on key export
+
+EVP_PKEY_eq() is used to check, among other things, if a certificate
+public key corresponds to a private key. When the private key belongs to
+a provider that does not allow to export private keys this currently
+fails as the internal functions used to import/export keys ignored the
+selection given (which specifies that only the public key needs to be
+considered) and instead tries to export everything.
+
+This patch allows to propagate the selection all the way down including
+adding it in the cache so that a following operation actually looking
+for other selection parameters does not mistakenly pick up an export
+containing only partial information.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c b/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
+index b06730dc7a..2d0238ee27 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/keymgmt_lib.c
+@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
+                               export_cb, export_cbarg);
+ }
+ 
+-void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
++void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                          int selection)
+ {
+     struct evp_keymgmt_util_try_import_data_st import_data;
+     OP_CACHE_ELEM *op;
+@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+      */
+     if (pk->dirty_cnt == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
+         /* If this key is already exported to |keymgmt|, no more to do */
+-        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt);
++        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt, selection);
+         if (op != NULL && op->keymgmt != NULL) {
+             void *ret = op->keydata;
+ 
+@@ -157,13 +158,13 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+     /* Setup for the export callback */
+     import_data.keydata = NULL;  /* evp_keymgmt_util_try_import will create it */
+     import_data.keymgmt = keymgmt;
+-    import_data.selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL;
++    import_data.selection = selection;
+ 
+     /*
+      * The export function calls the callback (evp_keymgmt_util_try_import),
+      * which does the import for us.  If successful, we're done.
+      */
+-    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_export(pk, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL,
++    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_export(pk, selection,
+                                  &evp_keymgmt_util_try_import, &import_data))
+         /* If there was an error, bail out */
+         return NULL;
+@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+         return NULL;
+     }
+     /* Check to make sure some other thread didn't get there first */
+-    op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt);
++    op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, keymgmt, selection);
+     if (op != NULL && op->keydata != NULL) {
+         void *ret = op->keydata;
+ 
+@@ -196,7 +197,8 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+         evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(pk, 0);
+ 
+     /* Add the new export to the operation cache */
+-    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, keymgmt, import_data.keydata)) {
++    if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, keymgmt, import_data.keydata,
++                                        selection)) {
+         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock);
+         evp_keymgmt_freedata(keymgmt, import_data.keydata);
+         return NULL;
+@@ -232,7 +234,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking)
+ }
+ 
+ OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+-                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
++                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                                     int selection)
+ {
+     int i, end = sk_OP_CACHE_ELEM_num(pk->operation_cache);
+     OP_CACHE_ELEM *p;
+@@ -243,14 +246,14 @@ OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+      */
+     for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+         p = sk_OP_CACHE_ELEM_value(pk->operation_cache, i);
+-        if (keymgmt == p->keymgmt)
++        if (keymgmt == p->keymgmt && (p->selection & selection) == selection)
+             return p;
+     }
+     return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+-                                   EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata)
++int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                   void *keydata, int selection)
+ {
+     OP_CACHE_ELEM *p = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+             return 0;
+         p->keydata = keydata;
+         p->keymgmt = keymgmt;
++        p->selection = selection;
+ 
+         if (!EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(keymgmt)) {
+             OPENSSL_free(p);
+@@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_match(EVP_PKEY *pk1, EVP_PKEY *pk2, int selection)
+             ok = 1;
+             if (keydata1 != NULL) {
+                 tmp_keydata =
+-                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk1, keymgmt2);
++                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk1, keymgmt2,
++                                                        selection);
+                 ok = (tmp_keydata != NULL);
+             }
+             if (ok) {
+@@ -411,7 +416,8 @@ int evp_keymgmt_util_match(EVP_PKEY *pk1, EVP_PKEY *pk2, int selection)
+             ok = 1;
+             if (keydata2 != NULL) {
+                 tmp_keydata =
+-                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk2, keymgmt1);
++                    evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk2, keymgmt1,
++                                                        selection);
+                 ok = (tmp_keydata != NULL);
+             }
+             if (ok) {
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+index 70d17ec37e..905e9c9ce4 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+@@ -1822,6 +1822,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ {
+     EVP_KEYMGMT *allocated_keymgmt = NULL;
+     EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
++    int selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL;
+     void *keydata = NULL;
+     int check;
+ 
+@@ -1883,7 +1884,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+         if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
+             if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(pk->lock))
+                 goto end;
+-            op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
++            op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt,
++                                                       selection);
+ 
+             /*
+              * If |tmp_keymgmt| is present in the operation cache, it means
+@@ -1938,7 +1940,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+         EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt); /* refcnt-- */
+ 
+         /* Check to make sure some other thread didn't get there first */
+-        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
++        op = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(pk, tmp_keymgmt, selection);
+         if (op != NULL && op->keymgmt != NULL) {
+             void *tmp_keydata = op->keydata;
+ 
+@@ -1949,7 +1951,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+         }
+ 
+         /* Add the new export to the operation cache */
+-        if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, tmp_keymgmt, keydata)) {
++        if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, tmp_keymgmt, keydata,
++                                            selection)) {
+             CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock);
+             evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
+             keydata = NULL;
+@@ -1964,7 +1967,7 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+     }
+ #endif  /* FIPS_MODULE */
+ 
+-    keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
++    keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt, selection);
+ 
+  end:
+     /*
+diff --git a/include/crypto/evp.h b/include/crypto/evp.h
+index f601b72807..dbbdcccbda 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/evp.h
++++ b/include/crypto/evp.h
+@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ int evp_cipher_asn1_to_param_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type,
+ typedef struct {
+     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt;
+     void *keydata;
++    int selection;
+ } OP_CACHE_ELEM;
+ 
+ DEFINE_STACK_OF(OP_CACHE_ELEM)
+@@ -778,12 +779,14 @@ EVP_PKEY *evp_keymgmt_util_make_pkey(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
+ 
+ int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
+                             OSSL_CALLBACK *export_cb, void *export_cbarg);
+-void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
++void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                          int selection);
+ OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+-                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
++                                                     EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                                     int selection);
+ int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking);
+-int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+-                                   EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
++int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                   void *keydata, int selection);
+ void evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ void *evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata(EVP_PKEY *target, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+                                 int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+-- 
+2.38.1
+
+From 504427eb5f32108dd64ff7858012863fe47b369b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2022 16:58:28 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Update documentation for keymgmt export utils
+
+Change function prototypes and explain how to use the selection
+argument.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
+
+diff --git a/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod b/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
+index 1fee9f6ff9..7099e44964 100644
+--- a/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
++++ b/doc/internal/man3/evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider.pod
+@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ OP_CACHE_ELEM
+ 
+  int evp_keymgmt_util_export(const EVP_PKEY *pk, int selection,
+                              OSSL_CALLBACK *export_cb, void *export_cbarg);
+- void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
++ void *evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                           int selection);
+  OP_CACHE_ELEM *evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+-                                                      EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
++                                                      EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                                      int selection);
+  int evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(EVP_PKEY *pk, int locking);
+- int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk,
+-                                    EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *keydata);
++ int evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(EVP_PKEY *pk, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
++                                    void *keydata, int selection);
+  void evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(EVP_PKEY *pk);
+  void *evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata(EVP_PKEY *target, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt,
+                                  int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+@@ -65,6 +67,11 @@ evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata() can be used to add key object data to a
+ given key I<target> via a B<EVP_KEYMGMT> interface.  This is used as a
+ helper for L<EVP_PKEY_fromdata(3)>.
+ 
++In all functions that take a I<selection> argument, the selection is used to
++constraint the information requested on export. It is also used in the cache
++so that key data is guaranteed to contain all the information requested in
++the selection.
++
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+ evp_keymgmt_export_to_provider() and evp_keymgmt_util_fromdata()
+-- 
+2.38.1
+
+From e5202fbd461cb6c067874987998e91c6093e5267 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 12:18:26 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add test for EVP_PKEY_eq
+
+This tests that the comparison work even if a provider can only return
+a public key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19648)
+
+diff --git a/test/fake_rsaprov.c b/test/fake_rsaprov.c
+index d556551bb6..5e92e72d4b 100644
+--- a/test/fake_rsaprov.c
++++ b/test/fake_rsaprov.c
+@@ -22,24 +22,34 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_has;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_query_operation_name_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_query;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_import;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes;
++static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_export;
++static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes;
+ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load_fn fake_rsa_keymgmt_load;
+ 
+ static int has_selection;
+ static int imptypes_selection;
++static int exptypes_selection;
+ static int query_id;
+ 
++struct fake_rsa_keydata {
++    int selection;
++    int status;
++};
++
+ static void *fake_rsa_keymgmt_new(void *provctx)
+ {
+-    unsigned char *keydata = OPENSSL_zalloc(1);
++    struct fake_rsa_keydata *key;
+ 
+-    TEST_ptr(keydata);
++    if (!TEST_ptr(key = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(struct fake_rsa_keydata))))
++        return NULL;
+ 
+     /* clear test globals */
+     has_selection = 0;
+     imptypes_selection = 0;
++    exptypes_selection = 0;
+     query_id = 0;
+ 
+-    return keydata;
++    return key;
+ }
+ 
+ static void fake_rsa_keymgmt_free(void *keydata)
+@@ -67,14 +77,104 @@ static const char *fake_rsa_keymgmt_query(int id)
+ static int fake_rsa_keymgmt_import(void *keydata, int selection,
+                                    const OSSL_PARAM *p)
+ {
+-    unsigned char *fake_rsa_key = keydata;
++    struct fake_rsa_keydata *fake_rsa_key = keydata;
+ 
+     /* key was imported */
+-    *fake_rsa_key = 1;
++    fake_rsa_key->status = 1;
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_n[] =
++   "\x00\xAA\x36\xAB\xCE\x88\xAC\xFD\xFF\x55\x52\x3C\x7F\xC4\x52\x3F"
++   "\x90\xEF\xA0\x0D\xF3\x77\x4A\x25\x9F\x2E\x62\xB4\xC5\xD9\x9C\xB5"
++   "\xAD\xB3\x00\xA0\x28\x5E\x53\x01\x93\x0E\x0C\x70\xFB\x68\x76\x93"
++   "\x9C\xE6\x16\xCE\x62\x4A\x11\xE0\x08\x6D\x34\x1E\xBC\xAC\xA0\xA1"
++   "\xF5";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_e[] = "\x11";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_d[] =
++    "\x0A\x03\x37\x48\x62\x64\x87\x69\x5F\x5F\x30\xBC\x38\xB9\x8B\x44"
++    "\xC2\xCD\x2D\xFF\x43\x40\x98\xCD\x20\xD8\xA1\x38\xD0\x90\xBF\x64"
++    "\x79\x7C\x3F\xA7\xA2\xCD\xCB\x3C\xD1\xE0\xBD\xBA\x26\x54\xB4\xF9"
++    "\xDF\x8E\x8A\xE5\x9D\x73\x3D\x9F\x33\xB3\x01\x62\x4A\xFD\x1D\x51";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_p[] =
++    "\x00\xD8\x40\xB4\x16\x66\xB4\x2E\x92\xEA\x0D\xA3\xB4\x32\x04\xB5"
++    "\xCF\xCE\x33\x52\x52\x4D\x04\x16\xA5\xA4\x41\xE7\x00\xAF\x46\x12"
++    "\x0D";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_q[] =
++    "\x00\xC9\x7F\xB1\xF0\x27\xF4\x53\xF6\x34\x12\x33\xEA\xAA\xD1\xD9"
++    "\x35\x3F\x6C\x42\xD0\x88\x66\xB1\xD0\x5A\x0F\x20\x35\x02\x8B\x9D"
++    "\x89";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_dmp1[] =
++    "\x59\x0B\x95\x72\xA2\xC2\xA9\xC4\x06\x05\x9D\xC2\xAB\x2F\x1D\xAF"
++    "\xEB\x7E\x8B\x4F\x10\xA7\x54\x9E\x8E\xED\xF5\xB4\xFC\xE0\x9E\x05";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_dmq1[] =
++    "\x00\x8E\x3C\x05\x21\xFE\x15\xE0\xEA\x06\xA3\x6F\xF0\xF1\x0C\x99"
++    "\x52\xC3\x5B\x7A\x75\x14\xFD\x32\x38\xB8\x0A\xAD\x52\x98\x62\x8D"
++    "\x51";
++
++static unsigned char fake_rsa_iqmp[] =
++    "\x36\x3F\xF7\x18\x9D\xA8\xE9\x0B\x1D\x34\x1F\x71\xD0\x9B\x76\xA8"
++    "\xA9\x43\xE1\x1D\x10\xB2\x4D\x24\x9F\x2D\xEA\xFE\xF8\x0C\x18\x26";
++
++OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_key_params(int priv)
++{
++    if (priv) {
++        OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, fake_rsa_n,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_n) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, fake_rsa_e,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_e) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, fake_rsa_d,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_d) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, fake_rsa_p,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_p) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, fake_rsa_q,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_q) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, fake_rsa_dmp1,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_dmp1) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, fake_rsa_dmq1,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_dmq1) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, fake_rsa_iqmp,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_iqmp) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_END
++        };
++        return OSSL_PARAM_dup(params);
++    } else {
++        OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, fake_rsa_n,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_n) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, fake_rsa_e,
++                          sizeof(fake_rsa_e) -1),
++            OSSL_PARAM_END
++        };
++        return OSSL_PARAM_dup(params);
++    }
++}
++
++static int fake_rsa_keymgmt_export(void *keydata, int selection,
++                                   OSSL_CALLBACK *param_callback, void *cbarg)
++{
++    OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++    int ret;
++
++    if (selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY)
++        return 0;
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0)))
++        return 0;
++
++    ret = param_callback(params, cbarg);
++    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ static const OSSL_PARAM fake_rsa_import_key_types[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, NULL, 0),
+@@ -95,19 +195,33 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes(int selection)
+     return fake_rsa_import_key_types;
+ }
+ 
++static const OSSL_PARAM fake_rsa_export_key_types[] = {
++    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, NULL, 0),
++    OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, NULL, 0),
++    OSSL_PARAM_END
++};
++
++static const OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes(int selection)
++{
++    /* record global for checking */
++    exptypes_selection = selection;
++
++    return fake_rsa_export_key_types;
++}
++
+ static void *fake_rsa_keymgmt_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
+ {
+-    unsigned char *key = NULL;
++    struct fake_rsa_keydata *key = NULL;
+ 
+-    if (reference_sz != sizeof(key))
++    if (reference_sz != sizeof(*key))
+         return NULL;
+ 
+-    key = *(unsigned char **)reference;
+-    if (*key != 1)
++    key = *(struct fake_rsa_keydata **)reference;
++    if (key->status != 1)
+         return NULL;
+ 
+     /* detach the reference */
+-    *(unsigned char **)reference = NULL;
++    *(struct fake_rsa_keydata  **)reference = NULL;
+ 
+     return key;
+ }
+@@ -129,7 +243,7 @@ static void *fake_rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
+ {
+     unsigned char *gctx = genctx;
+     static const unsigned char inited[] = { 1 };
+-    unsigned char *keydata;
++    struct fake_rsa_keydata *keydata;
+ 
+     if (!TEST_ptr(gctx)
+         || !TEST_mem_eq(gctx, sizeof(*gctx), inited, sizeof(inited)))
+@@ -138,7 +252,7 @@ static void *fake_rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
+     if (!TEST_ptr(keydata = fake_rsa_keymgmt_new(NULL)))
+         return NULL;
+ 
+-    *keydata = 2;
++    keydata->status = 2;
+     return keydata;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -156,6 +270,9 @@ static const OSSL_DISPATCH fake_rsa_keymgmt_funcs[] = {
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_import },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT_TYPES,
+         (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_imptypes },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_export },
++    { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT_TYPES,
++        (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_exptypes },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_LOAD, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_keymgmt_load },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_INIT, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_gen_init },
+     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN, (void (*)(void))fake_rsa_gen },
+@@ -191,14 +308,14 @@ static int fake_rsa_sig_sign_init(void *ctx, void *provkey,
+                                   const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     unsigned char *sigctx = ctx;
+-    unsigned char *keydata = provkey;
++    struct fake_rsa_keydata *keydata = provkey;
+ 
+     /* we must have a ctx */
+     if (!TEST_ptr(sigctx))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     /* we must have some initialized key */
+-    if (!TEST_ptr(keydata) || !TEST_int_gt(keydata[0], 0))
++    if (!TEST_ptr(keydata) || !TEST_int_gt(keydata->status, 0))
+         return 0;
+ 
+     /* record that sign init was called */
+@@ -289,7 +406,7 @@ static int fake_rsa_st_load(void *loaderctx,
+     unsigned char *storectx = loaderctx;
+     OSSL_PARAM params[4];
+     int object_type = OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY;
+-    void *key = NULL;
++    struct fake_rsa_keydata *key = NULL;
+     int rv = 0;
+ 
+     switch (*storectx) {
+@@ -307,7 +424,7 @@ static int fake_rsa_st_load(void *loaderctx,
+         /* The address of the key becomes the octet string */
+         params[2] =
+             OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_OBJECT_PARAM_REFERENCE,
+-                                              &key, sizeof(key));
++                                              &key, sizeof(*key));
+         params[3] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+         rv = object_cb(params, object_cbarg);
+         *storectx = 1;
+diff --git a/test/fake_rsaprov.h b/test/fake_rsaprov.h
+index 57de1ecf8d..190c46a285 100644
+--- a/test/fake_rsaprov.h
++++ b/test/fake_rsaprov.h
+@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
+ /* Fake RSA provider implementation */
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rsa_start(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ void fake_rsa_finish(OSSL_PROVIDER *p);
++OSSL_PARAM *fake_rsa_key_params(int priv);
+diff --git a/test/provider_pkey_test.c b/test/provider_pkey_test.c
+index 5c398398f4..3b190baa5e 100644
+--- a/test/provider_pkey_test.c
++++ b/test/provider_pkey_test.c
+@@ -176,6 +176,67 @@ end:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++static int test_pkey_eq(void)
++{
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *deflt = NULL;
++    OSSL_PROVIDER *fake_rsa = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey_fake = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey_dflt = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++    int ret = 0;
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(fake_rsa = fake_rsa_start(libctx)))
++        return 0;
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(deflt = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(libctx, "default")))
++        goto end;
++
++    /* Construct a public key for fake-rsa */
++    if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0))
++        || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "RSA",
++                                                      "provider=fake-rsa"))
++        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx))
++        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey_fake, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY,
++                                        params))
++        || !TEST_ptr(pkey_fake))
++        goto end;
++
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    ctx = NULL;
++    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++    params = NULL;
++
++    /* Construct a public key for default */
++    if (!TEST_ptr(params = fake_rsa_key_params(0))
++        || !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "RSA",
++                                                      "provider=default"))
++        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx))
++        || !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey_dflt, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY,
++                                        params))
++        || !TEST_ptr(pkey_dflt))
++        goto end;
++
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    ctx = NULL;
++    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++    params = NULL;
++
++    /* now test for equality */
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_eq(pkey_fake, pkey_dflt), 1))
++        goto end;
++
++    ret = 1;
++end:
++    fake_rsa_finish(fake_rsa);
++    OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(deflt);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_fake);
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_dflt);
++    OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++    return ret;
++}
++
+ static int test_pkey_store(int idx)
+ {
+     OSSL_PROVIDER *deflt = NULL;
+@@ -235,6 +296,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+ 
+     ADD_TEST(test_pkey_sig);
+     ADD_TEST(test_alternative_keygen_init);
++    ADD_TEST(test_pkey_eq);
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_pkey_store, 2);
+ 
+     return 1;
+-- 
+2.38.1
+
+From 2fea56832780248af2aba2e4433ece2d18428515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2022 10:25:15 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Drop explicit check for engines in opt_legacy_okay
+
+The providers indication should always indicate that this is not a
+legacy request.
+This makes a check for engines redundant as the default return is that
+legacy is ok if there are no explicit providers.
+
+Fixes #19662
+
+Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19671)
+---
+ apps/lib/apps.c                    |  8 --------
+ test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
+
+diff --git a/apps/lib/apps.c b/apps/lib/apps.c
+index 3d52e030ab7e258f9cd983b2d9755d954cb3aee5..bbe0d009efb35fcf1a902c86cbddc61e657e57f1 100644
+--- a/apps/lib/apps.c
++++ b/apps/lib/apps.c
+@@ -3405,14 +3405,6 @@ int opt_legacy_okay(void)
+ {
+     int provider_options = opt_provider_option_given();
+     int libctx = app_get0_libctx() != NULL || app_get0_propq() != NULL;
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+-    ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_first();
+-
+-    if (e != NULL) {
+-        ENGINE_free(e);
+-        return 1;
+-    }
+-#endif
+     /*
+      * Having a provider option specified or a custom library context or
+      * property query, is a sure sign we're not using legacy.
+diff --git a/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t b/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..183499f3fd93f97e8a4a30681a9f383d2f6e0c56
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/20-test_legacy_okay.t
+@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
++#! /usr/bin/env perl
++# Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++#
++# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
++# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
++# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
++# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
++
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++
++use OpenSSL::Test;
++
++setup("test_legacy");
++
++plan tests => 3;
++
++ok(run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-out', 'rand.txt', '256'])), "Generate random file");
++
++ok(run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sha256', 'rand.txt'])), "Generate a digest");
++
++ok(!run(app(['openssl', 'dgst', '-sha256', '-propquery', 'foo=1',
++             'rand.txt'])), "Fail to generate a digest");
+-- 
+2.38.1
+

SOURCES/0093-DH-Disable-FIPS-186-4-type-parameters-in-FIPS-mode.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+From 8a2d1b22ede5eeca4d104bb027b84f3ecfc69549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 12:51:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] DH: Disable FIPS 186-4 type parameters in FIPS mode
+
+For DH parameter and key pair generation/verification, the DSA
+procedures specified in FIPS 186-4 are used. With the release of FIPS
+186-5 and the removal of DSA, the approved status of these groups is in
+peril. Once the transition for DSA ends (this transition will be 1 year
+long and start once CMVP has published the guidance), no more
+submissions claiming DSA will be allowed. Hence, FIPS 186-type
+parameters will also be automatically non-approved.
+
+In the FIPS provider, disable validation of any DH parameters that are
+not well-known groups, and remove DH parameter generation completely.
+
+Adjust tests to use well-known groups or larger DH groups where this
+change would now cause failures, and skip tests that are expected to
+fail due to this change.
+
+Related: rhbz#2169757, rhbz#2169757
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ crypto/dh/dh_backend.c                       | 10 ++++
+ crypto/dh/dh_check.c                         | 12 ++--
+ crypto/dh/dh_gen.c                           | 12 +++-
+ crypto/dh/dh_key.c                           | 13 ++--
+ crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c                         | 10 +++-
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c |  5 ++
+ test/endecode_test.c                         |  4 +-
+ test/evp_libctx_test.c                       |  2 +-
+ test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c           | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h           |  1 +
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                   |  4 +-
+ test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t               |  3 +
+ 12 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
+index 726843fd30..24c65ca84f 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_backend.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ int ossl_dh_params_fromdata(DH *dh, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     if (!dh_ffc_params_fromdata(dh, params))
+         return 0;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (!ossl_dh_is_named_safe_prime_group(dh)) {
++        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                       "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                       " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines"
++                       " were removed from FIPS 186-5");
++        return 0;
++    }
++#endif
++
+     param_priv_len =
+         OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN);
+     if (param_priv_len != NULL
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 0b391910d6..75581ca347 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -57,13 +57,15 @@ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
+     if (nid != NID_undef)
+         return 1;
++
+     /*
+-     * OR
+-     * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
+-     * validity tests.
++     * FIPS 186-4 explicit domain parameters are no longer supported in FIPS mode.
+      */
+-    return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+-                                              FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL);
++    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                   " FIPS mode, since the required validation routines were"
++                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
++    return 0;
+ }
+ #else
+ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
+index aec6b85316..9c55121067 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c
+@@ -38,18 +38,26 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
+ int ossl_dh_generate_ffc_parameters(DH *dh, int type, int pbits, int qbits,
+                                     BN_GENCB *cb)
+ {
+-    int ret, res;
++    int ret = 0;
+ 
+ #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    int res;
++
+     if (type == DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
+         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_2_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
+                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
+     else
+-#endif
+         ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+                                                  FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
+                                                  pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
++#else
++    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
++    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
++                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
++#endif
+     if (ret > 0)
+         dh->dirty_cnt++;
+     return ret;
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index 4e9705beef..14c0b0b6b3 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -308,8 +308,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+                 goto err;
+         } else {
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+-            if (dh->params.q == NULL)
+-                goto err;
++            ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                           "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer"
++                           " allowed in FIPS mode, since the required"
++                           " generation routines were removed from FIPS"
++                           " 186-5");
++            goto err;
+ #else
+             if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
+                 /* secret exponent length, must satisfy 2^(l-1) <= p */
+@@ -330,9 +334,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+                     if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key, 0))
+                         goto err;
+                 }
+-            } else
+-#endif
+-            {
++            } else {
+                 /* Do a partial check for invalid p, q, g */
+                 if (!ossl_ffc_params_simple_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+                                                      FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, NULL))
+@@ -348,6 +350,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+                                                    priv_key))
+                     goto err;
+             }
++#endif
+         }
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+index f201eede0d..30f90d15be 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
+@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static DH *ffc_params_generate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, DH_PKEY_CTX *dctx,
+                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
+                                                 pcb);
+     else
+-# endif
+-    /* For FIPS we always use the DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_4 generator */
+-    if (dctx->paramgen_type >= DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
+         rv = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(libctx, &ret->params,
+                                                 FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
+                                                 prime_len, subprime_len, &res,
+                                                 pcb);
++# else
++    /* In FIPS mode, we no longer support FIPS 186-4 domain parameters */
++    ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS,
++                   "FIPS 186-4 type domain parameters no longer allowed in"
++                   " FIPS mode, since the required generation routines were"
++                   " removed from FIPS 186-5");
++# endif
+     if (rv <= 0) {
+         DH_free(ret);
+         return NULL;
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+index 9a7dde7c66..b3e7bca5ac 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+@@ -414,6 +414,11 @@ static int dh_validate(const void *keydata, int selection, int checktype)
+     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
+         return 1; /* nothing to validate */
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    /* In FIPS provider, always check the domain parameters to disallow
++     * operations on keys with FIPS 186-4 params. */
++    selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
++#endif
+     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0) {
+         /*
+          * Both of these functions check parameters. DH_check_params_ex()
+diff --git a/test/endecode_test.c b/test/endecode_test.c
+index e3f7b81f69..1b63daaed5 100644
+--- a/test/endecode_test.c
++++ b/test/endecode_test.c
+@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ static EVP_PKEY *make_template(const char *type, OSSL_PARAM *genparams)
+      * for testing only. Use a minimum key size of 2048 for security purposes.
+      */
+     if (strcmp(type, "DH") == 0)
+-        return get_dh512(keyctx);
++        return get_dh2048(keyctx);
+ 
+     if (strcmp(type, "X9.42 DH") == 0)
+-        return get_dhx512(keyctx);
++        return get_dhx_ffdhe2048(keyctx);
+ # endif
+ 
+     /*
+diff --git a/test/evp_libctx_test.c b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+index 2448c35a14..92d484fb12 100644
+--- a/test/evp_libctx_test.c
++++ b/test/evp_libctx_test.c
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int do_dh_param_keygen(int tstid, const BIGNUM **bn)
+ 
+     if (!TEST_ptr(gen_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pkey_parm, NULL))
+         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(gen_ctx), 0)
+-        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey), expected))
++        || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_keygen(gen_ctx, &pkey) == 1, expected))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     if (expected) {
+diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
+index 4bdadc4143..e5186e4b4a 100644
+--- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
++++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,68 @@ EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+                           dhx512_q, sizeof(dhx512_q));
+ }
+ 
++EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
++{
++    /* This is RFC 7919 ffdhe2048, since Red Hat removes support for
++     * non-well-known groups in FIPS mode. */
++    static unsigned char dhx_p[] = {
++        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xad, 0xf8, 0x54, 0x58,
++        0xa2, 0xbb, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0xaf, 0xdc, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3d, 0x3c, 0xf1,
++        0xd8, 0xb9, 0xc5, 0x83, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x95, 0xa9, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x41,
++        0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xfb, 0xcc, 0x93, 0x9d, 0xce, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x3e, 0xf9,
++        0x7d, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0c, 0x75, 0xd8, 0xf6, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x02,
++        0xae, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x7a, 0xd3, 0xdf, 0x1e, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x61,
++        0x24, 0x33, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x6e, 0xd0, 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55,
++        0x3d, 0xed, 0x1a, 0xf3, 0xb5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0x57, 0xc9, 0x35,
++        0x98, 0x4f, 0x0c, 0x70, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x8b, 0x77, 0xe2, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xda,
++        0xf3, 0xef, 0xe8, 0x72, 0x1d, 0xf1, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x36, 0xad, 0xe7, 0x35,
++        0x30, 0xac, 0xca, 0x4f, 0x48, 0x3a, 0x79, 0x7a, 0xbc, 0x0a, 0xb1, 0x82,
++        0xb3, 0x24, 0xfb, 0x61, 0xd1, 0x08, 0xa9, 0x4b, 0xb2, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0xfb,
++        0xb9, 0x6a, 0xda, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xd7, 0xf4, 0x68, 0x1d, 0x4f, 0x42, 0xa3,
++        0xde, 0x39, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0xae, 0x56, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x19,
++        0x0b, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0xee, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x9e, 0x02, 0xfc, 0xe1,
++        0xcd, 0xf7, 0xe2, 0xec, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xcd, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61,
++        0x91, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xff, 0x8e, 0x4f, 0x12, 0x32,
++        0xee, 0xf2, 0x81, 0x83, 0xc3, 0xfe, 0x3b, 0x1b, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x73,
++        0x3b, 0xb5, 0xfc, 0xbc, 0x2e, 0xc2, 0x20, 0x05, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x83,
++        0x7d, 0x16, 0x83, 0xb2, 0xc6, 0xf3, 0x4a, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xb2, 0xef, 0xfa,
++        0x88, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5c, 0x97, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++    };
++    static unsigned char dhx_g[] = {
++        0x02
++    };
++    static unsigned char dhx_q[] = {
++        0x7f, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xd6, 0xfc, 0x2a, 0x2c,
++        0x51, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4d, 0x57, 0xee, 0x2b, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x78,
++        0xec, 0x5c, 0xe2, 0xc1, 0xe7, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0xd4, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x20,
++        0x8a, 0x32, 0x19, 0xfd, 0xe6, 0x49, 0xce, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x9f, 0x7c,
++        0xbe, 0x97, 0xf1, 0xb1, 0xb1, 0x86, 0x3a, 0xec, 0x7b, 0x40, 0xd9, 0x01,
++        0x57, 0x62, 0x30, 0xbd, 0x69, 0xef, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xb2, 0xb0,
++        0x92, 0x19, 0xfa, 0x8f, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x37, 0x68, 0x42, 0xb1, 0xb2, 0xaa,
++        0x9e, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x79, 0xda, 0xab, 0x89, 0xaf, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x9a,
++        0xcc, 0x27, 0x86, 0x38, 0x70, 0x73, 0x45, 0xbb, 0xf1, 0x53, 0x44, 0xed,
++        0x79, 0xf7, 0xf4, 0x39, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0xac, 0x50, 0x9b, 0x56, 0xf3, 0x9a,
++        0x98, 0x56, 0x65, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x1d, 0x3c, 0xbd, 0x5e, 0x05, 0x58, 0xc1,
++        0x59, 0x92, 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0x84, 0x54, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x64, 0x71, 0xfd,
++        0xdc, 0xb5, 0x6d, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0x51,
++        0xef, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0x57, 0x2b, 0x76, 0xf3, 0xb1, 0xb9, 0x5d, 0x8c,
++        0x85, 0x83, 0xd3, 0xe4, 0x77, 0x05, 0x36, 0xb8, 0x4f, 0x01, 0x7e, 0x70,
++        0xe6, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x76, 0x60, 0x1a, 0x02, 0x66, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x17, 0xb0,
++        0xc8, 0xb9, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x74, 0xc2, 0xc1, 0xff, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x89, 0x19,
++        0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0xff, 0x1d, 0x8d, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xd6, 0xb9,
++        0x9d, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0x17, 0x61, 0x10, 0x02, 0xe2, 0xc7, 0x78, 0xc1,
++        0xbe, 0x8b, 0x41, 0xd9, 0x63, 0x79, 0xa5, 0x13, 0x60, 0xd9, 0x77, 0xfd,
++        0x44, 0x35, 0xa1, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x94, 0x2e, 0x4b, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
++        0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
++    };
++
++    return get_dh_from_pg(libctx, "X9.42 DH",
++                          dhx_p, sizeof(dhx_p),
++                          dhx_g, sizeof(dhx_g),
++                          dhx_q, sizeof(dhx_q));
++}
++
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+     static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+diff --git a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
+index f0e8709062..2ff6d6e721 100644
+--- a/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
++++ b/test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dhx512(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
++EVP_PKEY *get_dhx_ffdhe2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh1024dsa(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libct);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh2048(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ EVP_PKEY *get_dh4096(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index cabbe3ecdf..efe56c5665 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -627,10 +627,10 @@ my @smime_cms_param_tests = (
+     ],
+ 
+     [ "enveloped content test streaming S/MIME format, X9.42 DH",
+-      [ "{cmd1}", @prov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
++      [ "{cmd1}", @defaultprov, "-encrypt", "-in", $smcont,
+         "-stream", "-out", "{output}.cms",
+         "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"), "-aes128" ],
+-      [ "{cmd2}", @prov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
++      [ "{cmd2}", @defaultprov, "-decrypt", "-recip", catfile($smdir, "smdh.pem"),
+         "-in", "{output}.cms", "-out", "{output}.txt" ],
+       \&final_compare
+     ]
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+index 8c52b637fc..31ed54621b 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
+@@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ sub testssl {
+             skip "skipping dhe1024dsa test", 1
+                 if ($no_dh);
+ 
++            skip "FIPS 186-4 type DH groups are no longer supported by the FIPS provider", 1
++                if $provider eq "fips";
++
+             ok(run(test([@ssltest, "-bio_pair", "-dhe1024dsa", "-v"])),
+                'test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024bit DHE via BIO pair');
+           }
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0101-CVE-2022-4203-nc-match.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+From c927a3492698c254637da836762f9b1f86cffabc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 08:49:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 01/18] Fix type confusion in nc_match_single()
+
+This function assumes that if the "gen" is an OtherName, then the "base"
+is a rfc822Name constraint. This assumption is not true in all cases.
+If the end-entity certificate contains an OtherName SAN of any type besides
+SmtpUtf8Mailbox and the CA certificate contains a name constraint of
+OtherName (of any type), then "nc_email_eai" will be invoked, with the
+OTHERNAME "base" being incorrectly interpreted as a ASN1_IA5STRING.
+
+Reported by Corey Bonnell from Digicert.
+
+CVE-2022-4203
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
+index 70a7e8304e..5101598512 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/v3_ncons.c
+@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+ static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip);
+ 
+ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
+-static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen);
++static int nc_match_single(int effective_type, GENERAL_NAME *sub,
++                           GENERAL_NAME *gen);
+ static int nc_dn(const X509_NAME *sub, const X509_NAME *nm);
+ static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns);
+ static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml);
+@@ -472,14 +473,17 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+ {
+     GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub;
+     int i, r, match = 0;
++    int effective_type = gen->type;
++
+     /*
+      * We need to compare not gen->type field but an "effective" type because
+      * the otherName field may contain EAI email address treated specially
+      * according to RFC 8398, section 6
+      */
+-    int effective_type = ((gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) &&
+-                          (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) ==
+-                           NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) ? GEN_EMAIL : gen->type;
++    if (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
++        (OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id) == NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox)) {
++        effective_type = GEN_EMAIL;
++    }
+ 
+     /*
+      * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at
+@@ -488,7 +492,10 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) {
+         sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i);
+-        if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
++        if (effective_type != sub->base->type
++            || (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
++                OBJ_cmp(gen->d.otherName->type_id,
++                        sub->base->d.otherName->type_id) != 0))
+             continue;
+         if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
+             return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
+@@ -497,7 +504,7 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+             continue;
+         if (match == 0)
+             match = 1;
+-        r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
++        r = nc_match_single(effective_type, gen, sub->base);
+         if (r == X509_V_OK)
+             match = 2;
+         else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
+@@ -511,12 +518,15 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) {
+         sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i);
+-        if (effective_type != sub->base->type)
++        if (effective_type != sub->base->type
++            || (effective_type == GEN_OTHERNAME &&
++                OBJ_cmp(gen->d.otherName->type_id,
++                        sub->base->d.otherName->type_id) != 0))
+             continue;
+         if (!nc_minmax_valid(sub))
+             return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX;
+ 
+-        r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base);
++        r = nc_match_single(effective_type, gen, sub->base);
+         if (r == X509_V_OK)
+             return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION;
+         else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION)
+@@ -528,15 +538,22 @@ static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc)
+ 
+ }
+ 
+-static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base)
++static int nc_match_single(int effective_type, GENERAL_NAME *gen,
++                           GENERAL_NAME *base)
+ {
+     switch (gen->type) {
+     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+-        /*
+-         * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
+-         * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
+-         */
+-        return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
++        switch (effective_type) {
++        case GEN_EMAIL:
++            /*
++             * We are here only when we have SmtpUTF8 name,
++             * so we match the value of othername with base->d.rfc822Name
++             */
++            return nc_email_eai(gen->d.otherName->value, base->d.rfc822Name);
++
++        default:
++            return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE;
++        }
+ 
+     case GEN_DIRNAME:
+         return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName);
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From fe6842f5a5dc2fb66da7fb24bf4343a3aeedd50a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 19:45:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 02/18] Add testcase for nc_match_single type confusion
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/certs/setup.sh               | 11 +++++++++++
+ test/recipes/25-test_verify.t     |  5 ++++-
+ 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
+ create mode 100644 test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem b/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..cf279de5ea
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/bad-othername-cert.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem b/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f9b9b07b80
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/nccaothername-cert.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem b/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..d3e300ac2f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/nccaothername-key.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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++-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
+index b9766aab20..2240cd9df0 100755
+--- a/test/certs/setup.sh
++++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
+@@ -388,6 +388,17 @@ REQMASK=MASK:0x800 ./mkcert.sh req badalt7-key "O = Bad NC Test Certificate 7" \
+     "email.1 = good@good.org" "email.2 = any@good.com" \
+     "IP = 127.0.0.1" "IP = 192.168.0.1"
+ 
++# Certs for CVE-2022-4203 testcase
++
++NC="excluded;otherName:SRVName;UTF8STRING:foo@example.org" ./mkcert.sh genca \
++    "Test NC CA othername" nccaothername-key nccaothername-cert \
++    root-key root-cert
++
++./mkcert.sh req alt-email-key "O = NC email in othername Test Certificate" | \
++    ./mkcert.sh geneealt bad-othername-key bad-othername-cert \
++    nccaothername-key nccaothername-cert \
++    "otherName.1 = SRVName;UTF8STRING:foo@example.org"
++
+ # RSA-PSS signatures
+ # SHA1
+ ./mkcert.sh genee PSS-SHA1 ee-key ee-pss-sha1-cert ca-key ca-cert \
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index 4613489f57..e6a2bca731 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
+     run(app([@args]));
+ }
+ 
+-plan tests => 162;
++plan tests => 163;
+ 
+ # Canonical success
+ ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+@@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ ok(!verify("badalt9-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
+ ok(!verify("badalt10-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
+    "Name constraints nested DNS name excluded");
+ 
++ok(!verify("bad-othername-cert", "", ["root-cert"], ["nccaothername-cert"], ),
++   "CVE-2022-4203 type confusion test");
++
+ #Check that we get the expected failure return code
+ with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 2; } },
+      sub {
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0102-CVE-2022-4304-RSA-time-oracle.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From 43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:54 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
+From 8e257b86e5812c6e1cfa9e8e5f5660ac7bed899d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:03:40 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 03/18] Fix Timing Oracle in RSA decryption
 
 A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
 implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
@@ -14,23 +14,20 @@ Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario
 
 CVE-2022-4304
 
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
  crypto/bn/bn_blind.c    |  14 -
- crypto/bn/bn_err.c      |   2 +
  crypto/bn/bn_local.h    |  14 +
- crypto/bn/build.info    |   3 +-
- crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 614 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- crypto/err/openssl.txt  |   3 +-
- crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  17 +-
- include/crypto/bn.h     |   5 +
- include/openssl/bnerr.h |   1 +
- 9 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+ crypto/bn/build.info    |   2 +-
+ crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c | 604 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c   |  19 +-
+ include/crypto/bn.h     |   6 +
+ 6 files changed, 638 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
  create mode 100644 crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
 
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
-index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
+index 72457b34cf..6061ebb4c0 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
 @@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
@@ -54,24 +51,11 @@ index 76fc7ebcff..6e9d239321 100644
  BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
  {
      BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-index dd87c152cf..3dd8d9a568 100644
---- a/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_err.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS, 0), "bn_set_words"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH, 0), "BN_STACK_push"},
-     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_BN_USUB, 0), "BN_usub"},
-+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, 0),
-+    "ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind"},
-     {0, NULL}
- };
- 
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
+index c9a7ecf298..8c428f919d 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
 +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_local.h
-@@ -283,6 +283,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
+@@ -290,6 +290,20 @@ struct bn_gencb_st {
      } cb;
  };
  
@@ -93,25 +77,24 @@ index 62a969b134..4d8cb64675 100644
   * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions
   *
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/build.info b/crypto/bn/build.info
-index b9ed5322fa..c9fe2fdada 100644
+index c4ba51b265..f4ff619239 100644
 --- a/crypto/bn/build.info
 +++ b/crypto/bn/build.info
-@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
-         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_err.c bn_sqr.c \
-         {- $target{bn_asm_src} -} \
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ $COMMON=bn_add.c bn_div.c bn_exp.c bn_lib.c bn_ctx.c bn_mul.c \
+         bn_mod.c bn_conv.c bn_rand.c bn_shift.c bn_word.c bn_blind.c \
+         bn_kron.c bn_sqrt.c bn_gcd.c bn_prime.c bn_sqr.c \
          bn_recp.c bn_mont.c bn_mpi.c bn_exp2.c bn_gf2m.c bn_nist.c \
--        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c
-+        bn_depr.c bn_const.c bn_x931p.c bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_srp.c \
-+        rsa_sup_mul.c
- 
- INCLUDE[bn_exp.o]=..
- 
+-        bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_rsa_fips186_4.c bn_const.c
++        bn_intern.c bn_dh.c bn_rsa_fips186_4.c bn_const.c rsa_sup_mul.c
+ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON $BNASM bn_print.c bn_err.c bn_srp.c
+ DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$BNDEF
+ IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
 new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
+index 0000000000..0e0d02e194
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/crypto/bn/rsa_sup_mul.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
 +#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
 +#include <stddef.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -119,6 +102,7 @@ index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 +#include <openssl/bn.h>
 +#include <openssl/err.h>
 +#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
++#include "internal/endian.h"
 +#include "internal/numbers.h"
 +#include "internal/constant_time.h"
 +#include "bn_local.h"
@@ -126,8 +110,7 @@ index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 +# if BN_BYTES == 8
 +typedef uint64_t limb_t;
 +#  if defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16
-+/* nonstandard; implemented by gcc on 64-bit platforms */
-+typedef __uint128_t limb2_t;
++typedef uint128_t limb2_t;
 +#   define HAVE_LIMB2_T
 +#  endif
 +#  define LIMB_BIT_SIZE 64
@@ -553,7 +536,7 @@ index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 +
 +    /* add multiples of the modulus to the value until R divides it cleanly */
 +    for (i = modnum; i > 0; i--, rp--) {
-+        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum - 1] * ni0, tmp2);
++        v = _mul_add_limb(rp, mod, modnum, rp[modnum-1] * ni0, tmp2);
 +        v = v + carry + rp[-1];
 +        carry |= (v != rp[-1]);
 +        carry &= (v <= rp[-1]);
@@ -581,48 +564,38 @@ index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 +#if LIMB_BYTE_SIZE == 8
 +static ossl_inline uint64_t be64(uint64_t host)
 +{
-+    const union {
-+        long one;
-+        char little;
-+    } is_endian = { 1 };
++    uint64_t big = 0;
++    DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN;
 +
-+    if (is_endian.little) {
-+        uint64_t big = 0;
-+
-+        big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
-+        return big;
-+    } else {
++    if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
 +        return host;
-+    }
++
++    big |= (host & 0xff00000000000000) >> 56;
++    big |= (host & 0x00ff000000000000) >> 40;
++    big |= (host & 0x0000ff0000000000) >> 24;
++    big |= (host & 0x000000ff00000000) >>  8;
++    big |= (host & 0x00000000ff000000) <<  8;
++    big |= (host & 0x0000000000ff0000) << 24;
++    big |= (host & 0x000000000000ff00) << 40;
++    big |= (host & 0x00000000000000ff) << 56;
++    return big;
 +}
 +
 +#else
 +/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
 +static ossl_inline uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
 +{
-+    const union {
-+        long one;
-+        char little;
-+    } is_endian = { 1 };
++    uint32_t big = 0;
++    DECLARE_IS_ENDIAN;
 +
-+    if (is_endian.little) {
-+        uint32_t big = 0;
-+
-+        big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
-+        big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
-+        big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
-+        return big;
-+    } else {
++    if (!IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
 +        return host;
-+    }
++
++    big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
++    big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
++    big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
++    big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
++    return big;
 +}
 +#endif
 +
@@ -693,7 +666,7 @@ index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 +
 +    /* modulus size in bytes can be equal to num but after limbs conversion it becomes bigger */
 +    if (num < BN_num_bytes(to_mod)) {
-+        BNerr(BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
 +        goto err;
 +    }
 +
@@ -726,29 +699,11 @@ index 0000000000..acafefd5fe
 +
 +    return ret;
 +}
-diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-index 9f91a4a811..ba3a46d5b9 100644
---- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--# Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-+# Copyright 1999-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- #
- # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
-@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ BN_F_BN_RSHIFT:146:BN_rshift
- BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS:144:bn_set_words
- BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH:148:BN_STACK_push
- BN_F_BN_USUB:115:BN_usub
-+BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND:151:ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW:100:BUF_MEM_grow
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN:105:BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- BUF_F_BUF_MEM_NEW:101:BUF_MEM_new
 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
+index 381c659352..7e8b791fba 100644
 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
 +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-@@ -465,11 +465,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+@@ -469,13 +469,20 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
          BN_free(d);
      }
  
@@ -765,6 +720,8 @@ index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
              goto err;
 -
 -    j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
+-    if (j < 0)
+-        goto err;
 +    } else {
 +        j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
 +        if (j < 0)
@@ -774,32 +731,20 @@ index b52a66f6a6..6c3c0cf78d 100644
      switch (padding) {
      case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
-index 60afda1dad..b5f36fb25a 100644
+index cf69bea848..cd45654210 100644
 --- a/include/crypto/bn.h
 +++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
-@@ -86,5 +86,10 @@ int bn_lshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- int bn_rshift_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
- int bn_div_fixed_top(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
-                      const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
+@@ -114,4 +114,10 @@ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_bn_get_libctx(BN_CTX *ctx);
+ 
+ extern const BIGNUM ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2;
+ 
 +int ossl_bn_rsa_do_unblind(const BIGNUM *intermediate,
 +                           const BN_BLINDING *blinding,
 +                           const BIGNUM *possible_arg2,
 +                           const BIGNUM *to_mod, BN_CTX *ctx,
 +                           unsigned char *buf, int num);
- 
++
  #endif
-diff --git a/include/openssl/bnerr.h b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-index 9f3c7cfaab..a0752cea52 100644
---- a/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/bnerr.h
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ int ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
- # define BN_F_BN_SET_WORDS                                144
- # define BN_F_BN_STACK_PUSH                               148
- # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
-+# define BN_F_OSSL_BN_RSA_DO_UNBLIND                      151
- 
- /*
-  * BN reason codes.
 -- 
 2.39.1
 

SOURCES/0103-CVE-2022-4450-pem-read-bio.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From bbcf509bd046b34cca19c766bbddc31683d0858b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 63bcf189be73a9cc1264059bed6f57974be74a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:54:55 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
+Subject: [PATCH 04/18] Avoid dangling ptrs in header and data params for
  PEM_read_bio_ex
 
 In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
@@ -23,26 +23,26 @@ Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-index d416d939ea..328c30cdbb 100644
+index f9ff80162a..85c47fb627 100644
 --- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
 +++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
-@@ -957,7 +957,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
-     *data = pem_malloc(len, flags);
-     if (*header == NULL || *data == NULL) {
-         pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
-+        *header = NULL;
-         pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
-+        *data = NULL;
-         goto end;
-     }
-     BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen);
+@@ -989,7 +989,9 @@ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header,
+ 
+ out_free:
+     pem_free(*header, flags, 0);
++    *header = NULL;
+     pem_free(*data, flags, 0);
++    *data = NULL;
+ end:
+     EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx);
+     pem_free(name, flags, 0);
 -- 
 2.39.1
 
-From 2bd611267868a008afa576846ba71566bd0d4d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From cbafa34b5a057794c5c08cd4657038e1f643c1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 15:02:26 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
+Subject: [PATCH 05/18] Add a test for CVE-2022-4450
 
 Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
 ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
  1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/test/pemtest.c b/test/pemtest.c
-index 3203d976be..edeb0a1205 100644
+index a8d2d49bb5..a5d28cb256 100644
 --- a/test/pemtest.c
 +++ b/test/pemtest.c
-@@ -83,9 +83,39 @@ static int test_invalid(void)
+@@ -96,6 +96,35 @@ static int test_cert_key_cert(void)
      return 1;
  }
  
@@ -93,8 +93,11 @@ index 3203d976be..edeb0a1205 100644
 +
  int setup_tests(void)
  {
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pemfile = test_get_argument(0)))
+@@ -103,5 +132,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
      ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_b64, OSSL_NELEM(b64_pem_data));
      ADD_TEST(test_invalid);
+     ADD_TEST(test_cert_key_cert);
 +    ADD_TEST(test_empty_payload);
      return 1;
  }

SOURCES/0104-CVE-2023-0215-UAF-bio.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-From c3829dd8825c654652201e16f8a0a0c46ee3f344 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 8818064ce3c3c0f1b740a5aaba2a987e75bfbafd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 16:18:14 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Fix a UAF resulting from a bug in BIO_new_NDEF
+Subject: [PATCH 06/18] Fix a UAF resulting from a bug in BIO_new_NDEF
 
 If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
 be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
@@ -15,17 +15,18 @@ Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
- crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
-index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
+index d94e3a3644..b9df3a7a47 100644
 --- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
 +++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
-@@ -49,12 +49,19 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
+@@ -49,13 +49,19 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg);
  static int ndef_suffix_free(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen,
                              void *parg);
  
+-/* unfortunately cannot constify this due to CMS_stream() and PKCS7_stream() */
 +/*
 + * On success, the returned BIO owns the input BIO as part of its BIO chain.
 + * On failure, NULL is returned and the input BIO is owned by the caller.
@@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
 +    BIO *pop_bio = NULL;
  
      if (!aux || !aux->asn1_cb) {
-         ASN1err(ASN1_F_BIO_NEW_NDEF, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-@@ -69,21 +76,39 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+@@ -70,21 +76,39 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
      out = BIO_push(asn_bio, out);
      if (out == NULL)
          goto err;
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
  
      ndef_aux->val = val;
      ndef_aux->it = it;
-@@ -91,11 +116,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+@@ -92,11 +116,11 @@ BIO *BIO_new_NDEF(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
      ndef_aux->boundary = sarg.boundary;
      ndef_aux->out = out;
  
@@ -104,10 +105,10 @@ index 760e4846a4..f8d4b1b9aa 100644
 -- 
 2.39.1
 
-From f040f2577891d2bdb7610566c172233844cf673a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f596ec8a6f9f5fcfa8e46a73b60f78a609725294 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
 Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:15:18 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is
+Subject: [PATCH 07/18] Check CMS failure during BIO setup with -stream is
  handled correctly
 
 Test for the issue fixed in the previous commit
@@ -121,28 +122,28 @@ Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
  create mode 100644 test/smime-certs/badrsa.pem
 
 diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
-index 5dc6a3aebe..ec11bfc253 100644
+index 610f1cbc51..fd53683e6b 100644
 --- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 +++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
 @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
  use POSIX;
  use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
- use File::Compare qw/compare_text/;
--use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file/;
-+use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file with/;
+ use File::Compare qw/compare_text compare/;
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with/;
+ 
  use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
  
- setup("test_cms");
-@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ my $smcont   = srctop_file("test", "smcont.txt");
- my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
-     = disabled qw/des dh dsa ec ec2m rc2 zlib/;
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
  
--plan tests => 6;
-+plan tests => 7;
+ $no_rc2 = 1 if disabled("legacy");
  
- my @smime_pkcs7_tests = (
+-plan tests => 12;
++plan tests => 13;
  
-@@ -584,3 +584,14 @@ sub check_availability {
+ ok(run(test(["pkcs7_test"])), "test pkcs7");
+ 
+@@ -972,3 +972,14 @@ ok(!run(app(['openssl', 'cms', '-verify',
  
      return "";
  }

SOURCES/0105-CVE-2023-0216-pkcs7-deref.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From 934a04f0e775309cadbef0aa6b9692e1b12a76c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 19:45:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 08/18] Do not dereference PKCS7 object data if not set
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-0216
+
+Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+index 753f1276e6..936e50da54 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
+@@ -414,6 +414,8 @@ PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *PKCS7_add_signature(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ 
+ static STACK_OF(X509) *pkcs7_get_signer_certs(const PKCS7 *p7)
+ {
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++        return NULL;
+     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
+         return p7->d.sign->cert;
+     if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7))
+@@ -423,6 +425,8 @@ static STACK_OF(X509) *pkcs7_get_signer_certs(const PKCS7 *p7)
+ 
+ static STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *pkcs7_get_recipient_info(const PKCS7 *p7)
+ {
++    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL)
++        return NULL;
+     if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7))
+         return p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
+     if (PKCS7_type_is_enveloped(p7))
+@@ -440,13 +444,17 @@ void ossl_pkcs7_resolve_libctx(PKCS7 *p7)
+     const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
+     OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_pkcs7_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx);
+     const char *propq = ossl_pkcs7_ctx_get0_propq(ctx);
+-    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rinfos = pkcs7_get_recipient_info(p7);
+-    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
+-    STACK_OF(X509) *certs = pkcs7_get_signer_certs(p7);
++    STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rinfos;
++    STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos;
++    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ 
+-    if (ctx == NULL)
++    if (ctx == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+         return;
+ 
++    rinfos = pkcs7_get_recipient_info(p7);
++    sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
++    certs = pkcs7_get_signer_certs(p7);
++
+     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+         ossl_x509_set0_libctx(sk_X509_value(certs, i), libctx, propq);
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 67813d8a4d110f4174bbd2fee8a2f15388e324b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 19:56:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 09/18] Add test for d2i_PKCS7 NULL dereference
+
+Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t                    | 7 +++++--
+ test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7 | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
+index 37cd43dc6b..d61cd6abad 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7.t
+@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+ 
+ use File::Spec;
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file data_file/;
+ 
+ setup("test_pkcs7");
+ 
+-plan tests => 3;
++plan tests => 4;
+ 
+ require_ok(srctop_file('test','recipes','tconversion.pl'));
+ 
+@@ -27,3 +27,6 @@ subtest 'pkcs7 conversions -- pkcs7d' => sub {
+     tconversion( -type => 'p7d', -in => srctop_file("test", "pkcs7-1.pem"),
+                  -args => ["pkcs7"] );
+ };
++
++my $malformed = data_file('malformed.pkcs7');
++ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs7", "-in", $malformed])));
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7 b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..e30d1b582c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_pkcs7_data/malformed.pkcs7
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
++MAsGCSqGSIb3DQEHAg==
++-----END PKCS7-----
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0106-CVE-2023-0217-dsa.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+From 23985bac83fd50c8e29431009302b5442f985096 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: slontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 11:05:04 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH 10/18] Fix NULL deference when validating FFC public key.
+
+Fixes CVE-2023-0217
+
+When attempting to do a BN_Copy of params->p there was no NULL check.
+Since BN_copy does not check for NULL this is a NULL reference.
+
+As an aside BN_cmp() does do a NULL check, so there are other checks
+that fail because a NULL is passed. A more general check for NULL params
+has been added for both FFC public and private key validation instead.
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c |  9 +++++++++
+ include/internal/ffc.h        |  1 +
+ test/ffc_internal_test.c      | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c b/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
+index 9f6525a2c8..442303e4b3 100644
+--- a/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
++++ b/crypto/ffc/ffc_key_validate.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ int ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(const FFC_PARAMS *params,
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
++    if (params == NULL || pub_key == NULL || params->p == NULL) {
++        *ret = FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM;
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(NULL);
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+         goto err;
+@@ -107,6 +112,10 @@ int ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(const BIGNUM *upper, const BIGNUM *priv,
+ 
+     *ret = 0;
+ 
++    if (priv == NULL || upper == NULL) {
++        *ret = FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM;
++        goto err;
++    }
+     if (BN_cmp(priv, BN_value_one()) < 0) {
+         *ret |= FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_SMALL;
+         goto err;
+diff --git a/include/internal/ffc.h b/include/internal/ffc.h
+index 732514a6c2..b8b7140857 100644
+--- a/include/internal/ffc.h
++++ b/include/internal/ffc.h
+@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
+ # define FFC_ERROR_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR 0x08
+ # define FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_SMALL      0x10
+ # define FFC_ERROR_PRIVKEY_TOO_LARGE      0x20
++# define FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM      0x40
+ 
+ /*
+  * Finite field cryptography (FFC) domain parameters are used by DH and DSA.
+diff --git a/test/ffc_internal_test.c b/test/ffc_internal_test.c
+index 2c97293573..9f67bd29b9 100644
+--- a/test/ffc_internal_test.c
++++ b/test/ffc_internal_test.c
+@@ -510,6 +510,27 @@ static int ffc_public_validate_test(void)
+     if (!TEST_true(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, pub, &res)))
+         goto err;
+ 
++    /* Fail if params is NULL */
++    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(NULL, pub, &res)))
++        goto err;
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
++        goto err;
++    res = -1;
++    /* Fail if pubkey is NULL */
++    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, NULL, &res)))
++        goto err;
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
++        goto err;
++    res = -1;
++
++    BN_free(params->p);
++    params->p = NULL;
++    /* Fail if params->p is NULL */
++    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(params, pub, &res)))
++        goto err;
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
++        goto err;
++
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     DH_free(dh);
+@@ -567,6 +588,16 @@ static int ffc_private_validate_test(void)
+     if (!TEST_true(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(params->q, priv, &res)))
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(NULL, priv, &res)))
++        goto err;
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
++        goto err;
++    res = -1;
++    if (!TEST_false(ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(params->q, NULL, &res)))
++        goto err;
++    if (!TEST_int_eq(FFC_ERROR_PASSED_NULL_PARAM, res))
++        goto err;
++
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     DH_free(dh);
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From c1b4467a7cc129a74fc5205b80a5c47556b99416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:57:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 11/18] Prevent creating DSA and DH keys without parameters
+ through import
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+---
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c  | 4 ++--
+ providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c | 5 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+index 58a5fd009f..c2d87b4a7f 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ static int dh_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
+-        ok = ok && ossl_dh_params_fromdata(dh, params);
++    /* a key without parameters is meaningless */
++    ok = ok && ossl_dh_params_fromdata(dh, params);
+ 
+     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
+         int include_private =
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
+index 100e917167..881680c085 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
+@@ -199,8 +199,9 @@ static int dsa_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
+-        ok = ok && ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params);
++    /* a key without parameters is meaningless */
++    ok = ok && ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params);
++
+     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
+         int include_private =
+             selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY ? 1 : 0;
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From fab4973801bdc11c29c4c8ccf65cf39cbc63ce9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:59:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 12/18] Do not create DSA keys without parameters by decoder
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c                        | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
+ include/crypto/x509.h                         |  3 +++
+ .../encode_decode/decode_der2key.c            |  2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
+index bc90ddd89b..77790faa1f 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c
+@@ -745,6 +745,30 @@ DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
+     return key;
+ }
+ 
++/* Called from decoders; disallows provided DSA keys without parameters. */
++DSA *ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
++{
++    DSA *key = NULL;
++    const unsigned char *data;
++    const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g;
++
++    data = *pp;
++    key = d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(NULL, &data, length);
++    if (key == NULL)
++        return NULL;
++    DSA_get0_pqg(key, &p, &q, &g);
++    if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL) {
++        DSA_free(key);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++    *pp = data;
++    if (a != NULL) {
++        DSA_free(*a);
++        *a = key;
++    }
++    return key;
++}
++
+ int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp)
+ {
+     EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+diff --git a/include/crypto/x509.h b/include/crypto/x509.h
+index 1f00178e89..0c42730ee9 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/x509.h
++++ b/include/crypto/x509.h
+@@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ void ossl_X509_PUBKEY_INTERNAL_free(X509_PUBKEY *xpub);
+ 
+ RSA *ossl_d2i_RSA_PSS_PUBKEY(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int ossl_i2d_RSA_PSS_PUBKEY(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++DSA *ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
++# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *ossl_d2i_DH_PUBKEY(DH **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int ossl_i2d_DH_PUBKEY(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c b/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
+index ebc2d24833..d6ad738ef3 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_der2key.c
+@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void *dsa_d2i_PKCS8(void **key, const unsigned char **der, long der_len,
+                              (key_from_pkcs8_t *)ossl_dsa_key_from_pkcs8);
+ }
+ 
+-# define dsa_d2i_PUBKEY                 (d2i_of_void *)d2i_DSA_PUBKEY
++# define dsa_d2i_PUBKEY                 (d2i_of_void *)ossl_d2i_DSA_PUBKEY
+ # define dsa_free                       (free_key_fn *)DSA_free
+ # define dsa_check                      NULL
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 7e37185582995b35f885fec9dcc3670af9ffcbef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 18:46:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 13/18] Add test for DSA pubkey without param import and check
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+---
+ test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t             |  48 ++++++++++++++----
+ .../91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem        |  12 +++++
+ .../dsapub_noparam.der                        | Bin 0 -> 108 bytes
+ 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
+ create mode 100644 test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+index 612a3e3d6c..015d7805db 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
++++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+@@ -11,19 +11,24 @@ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+ 
+ use File::Spec;
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT data_file with/;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+ sub pkey_check {
+     my $f = shift;
++    my $pubcheck = shift;
++    my @checkopt = ('-check');
+ 
+-    return run(app(['openssl', 'pkey', '-check', '-text',
++    @checkopt = ('-pubcheck', '-pubin') if $pubcheck;
++
++    return run(app(['openssl', 'pkey', @checkopt, '-text',
+                     '-in', $f]));
+ }
+ 
+ sub check_key {
+     my $f = shift;
+     my $should_fail = shift;
++    my $pubcheck = shift;
+     my $str;
+ 
+ 
+@@ -33,11 +38,10 @@ sub check_key {
+     $f = data_file($f);
+ 
+     if ( -s $f ) {
+-        if ($should_fail) {
+-            ok(!pkey_check($f), $str);
+-        } else {
+-            ok(pkey_check($f), $str);
+-        }
++        with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == $should_fail; } },
++            sub {
++                ok(pkey_check($f, $pubcheck), $str);
++            });
+     } else {
+         fail("Missing file $f");
+     }
+@@ -66,15 +70,37 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
+     "dhpkey.pem"
+     )) unless disabled("dh");
+ 
++my @negative_pubtests = ();
++
++push(@negative_pubtests, (
++    "dsapub_noparam.der"
++    )) unless disabled("dsa");
++
++my @positive_pubtests = ();
++
++push(@positive_pubtests, (
++    "dsapub.pem"
++    )) unless disabled("dsa");
++
+ plan skip_all => "No tests within the current enabled feature set"
+-    unless @negative_tests && @positive_tests;
++    unless @negative_tests && @positive_tests
++           && @negative_pubtests && @positive_pubtests;
+ 
+-plan tests => scalar(@negative_tests) + scalar(@positive_tests);
++plan tests => scalar(@negative_tests) + scalar(@positive_tests)
++              + scalar(@negative_pubtests) + scalar(@positive_pubtests);
+ 
+ foreach my $t (@negative_tests) {
+-    check_key($t, 1);
++    check_key($t, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ foreach my $t (@positive_tests) {
+-    check_key($t, 0);
++    check_key($t, 0, 0);
++}
++
++foreach my $t (@negative_pubtests) {
++    check_key($t, 1, 1);
++}
++
++foreach my $t (@positive_pubtests) {
++    check_key($t, 0, 1);
+ }
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..0ff4bd83ed
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/dsapub_noparam.der
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8135f1ca94da914b6829421e0c13f6daa731862
+GIT binary patch
+literal 108
+zcmXpIGT>xm*J|@PXTieE%*wz71<Xv0AT}3_&&0^YB*etj0OvEYF$n`XLd*y;pgagL
+U3o&W4F|x9<gY>|F5F-Nv0Bz9(=Kufz
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From 2ad9928170768653d19d81881deabc5f9c1665c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 14:57:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 18/18] Internaly declare the DSA type for no-deprecated builds
+
+Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 7a21a1b5fa2dac438892cf3292d1f9c445d870d9)
+---
+ include/crypto/types.h | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/crypto/types.h b/include/crypto/types.h
+index 0d81404091..0a75f03a3f 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/types.h
++++ b/include/crypto/types.h
+@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ typedef struct rsa_meth_st RSA_METHOD;
+ typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
+ typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD;
+ #  endif
++#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++typedef struct dsa_st DSA;
++#  endif
+ # endif
+ 
+ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0107-CVE-2023-0286-X400.patch

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
-From 2c6c9d439b484e1ba9830d8454a34fa4f80fdfe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2f7530077e0ef79d98718138716bc51ca0cad658 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
 Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2023 17:45:42 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] CVE-2023-0286: Fix GENERAL_NAME_cmp for x400Address
- (1.1.1)
+Subject: [PATCH 14/18] CVE-2023-0286: Fix GENERAL_NAME_cmp for x400Address
+ (3.0)
 
 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
 ---
- CHANGES                  | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
- crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c  |  2 +-
- include/openssl/x509v3.h |  2 +-
- test/v3nametest.c        |  8 ++++++++
- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+ CHANGES.md                  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ crypto/x509/v3_genn.c       |  2 +-
+ include/openssl/x509v3.h.in |  2 +-
+ test/v3nametest.c           |  8 ++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 
-diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-index 87a5eff47c..e54ddc55c9 100644
---- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c b/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c
+index c0a7166cd0..1741c2d2f6 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/v3_genn.c
 @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
          return -1;
      switch (a->type) {
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ index 87a5eff47c..e54ddc55c9 100644
          break;
  
      case GEN_EDIPARTY:
-diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
-index 90fa3592ce..e61c0f29d4 100644
---- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h
-+++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
-@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
+diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in b/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in
+index d00a66a343..c087e3cf92 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in
++++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h.in
+@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ typedef struct GENERAL_NAME_st {
          OTHERNAME *otherName;   /* otherName */
          ASN1_IA5STRING *rfc822Name;
          ASN1_IA5STRING *dNSName;
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ index 90fa3592ce..e61c0f29d4 100644
          EDIPARTYNAME *ediPartyName;
          ASN1_IA5STRING *uniformResourceIdentifier;
 diff --git a/test/v3nametest.c b/test/v3nametest.c
-index d1852190b8..37819da8fd 100644
+index 6d2e2f8e27..0341995dde 100644
 --- a/test/v3nametest.c
 +++ b/test/v3nametest.c
-@@ -646,6 +646,14 @@ static struct gennamedata {
+@@ -644,6 +644,14 @@ static struct gennamedata {
              0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02
          },
          15

SOURCES/0108-CVE-2023-0401-pkcs7-md.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From d3b6dfd70db844c4499bec6ad6601623a565e674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 09:27:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 15/18] pk7_doit.c: Check return of BIO_set_md() calls
+
+These calls invoke EVP_DigestInit() which can fail for digests
+with implicit fetches. Subsequent EVP_DigestUpdate() from BIO_write()
+or EVP_DigestFinal() from BIO_read() will segfault on NULL
+dereference. This can be triggered by an attacker providing
+PKCS7 data digested with MD4 for example if the legacy provider
+is not loaded.
+
+If BIO_set_md() fails the md BIO cannot be used.
+
+CVE-2023-0401
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+---
+ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+index bde9ac4787..5e562fbea5 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,11 @@ static int pkcs7_bio_add_digest(BIO **pbio, X509_ALGOR *alg,
+     }
+     (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ 
+-    BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
++    if (BIO_set_md(btmp, md) <= 0) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
++        EVP_MD_free(fetched);
++        goto err;
++    }
+     EVP_MD_free(fetched);
+     if (*pbio == NULL)
+         *pbio = btmp;
+@@ -522,7 +526,11 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
+             }
+             (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ 
+-            BIO_set_md(btmp, md);
++            if (BIO_set_md(btmp, md) <= 0) {
++                EVP_MD_free(evp_md);
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
++                goto err;
++            }
+             EVP_MD_free(evp_md);
+             if (out == NULL)
+                 out = btmp;
+-- 
+2.39.1
+
+From a0f2359613f50b5ca6b74b78bf4b54d7dc925fd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 17:07:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 16/18] Add testcase for missing return check of BIO_set_md()
+ calls
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+---
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms.t                  | 15 ++++++++--
+ test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+index fd53683e6b..d45789de70 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use warnings;
+ use POSIX;
+ use File::Spec::Functions qw/catfile/;
+ use File::Compare qw/compare_text compare/;
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_dir srctop_file bldtop_dir bldtop_file with data_file/;
+ 
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ my ($no_des, $no_dh, $no_dsa, $no_ec, $no_ec2m, $no_rc2, $no_zlib)
+ 
+ $no_rc2 = 1 if disabled("legacy");
+ 
+-plan tests => 13;
++plan tests => 14;
+ 
+ ok(run(test(["pkcs7_test"])), "test pkcs7");
+ 
+@@ -941,6 +941,17 @@ subtest "CMS binary input tests\n" => sub {
+        "verify binary input with -binary missing -crlfeol");
+ };
+ 
++# Test case for missing MD algorithm (must not segfault)
++
++with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 4; } },
++    sub {
++        ok(run(app(['openssl', 'smime', '-verify', '-noverify',
++                    '-inform', 'PEM',
++                    '-in', data_file("pkcs7-md4.pem"),
++                   ])),
++            "Check failure of EVP_DigestInit is handled correctly");
++    });
++
+ sub check_availability {
+     my $tnam = shift;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem b/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..ecff611deb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_cms_data/pkcs7-md4.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
++-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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++-----END PKCS7-----
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0109-fips-Zeroize-out-in-fips-selftest.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 9dbc6069665690bd238caa7622647ea8ac94124f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 11:01:44 +0100
+Subject: fips: Zeroize `out` in fips selftest
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Resolves: rhbz#2169314
+---
+ providers/fips/self_test.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test.c b/providers/fips/self_test.c
+index 80d048a847..11a989209c 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test.c
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test.c
+@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex
+         goto err;
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
++    OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
+     OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(ev, ret);
+     EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+     EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0110-GCM-Implement-explicit-FIPS-indicator-for-IV-gen.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From 589eb3898896c1ac916bc20069ecd5adb8534850 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2023 15:31:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] GCM: Implement explicit FIPS indicator for IV gen
+
+Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
+Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
+uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
+this. Provide an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be generated
+internally at its entirety randomly."
+
+Resolves: rhbz#2168289
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  1 +
+ include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
+ .../implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c    |  4 +++
+ .../ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c                | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 680bfbc7cc..832502a034 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_CTS_MODE             "cts_mode"     /* utf8_string */
+ /* For passing the AlgorithmIdentifier parameter in DER form */
+ #define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMS  "alg_id_param" /* octet_string */
++#define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
+ 
+ #define OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT                    \
+     "tls1multi_maxsndfrag" /* uint */
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index 49e8e1df78..ec2ba46fbd 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -746,6 +746,10 @@ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+ void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int flags);
+ 
++# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ __owur int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                            const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv);
+ /*__owur*/ int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
+index fa383165d8..716add7339 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon.c
+@@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM cipher_aead_known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_GET_IV_GEN, NULL, 0),
++    /* normally we would hide this under an #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but that does
++     * not work in ciphercommon.c because it is compiled only once into
++     * libcommon.a */
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ const OSSL_PARAM *ossl_cipher_aead_gettable_ctx_params(
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
+index ed95c97ff4..db7910eb0e 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c
+@@ -224,6 +224,31 @@ int ossl_gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+             || !getivgen(ctx, p->data, p->data_size))
+             return 0;
+     }
++
++    /* We would usually hide this under #ifdef FIPS_MODULE, but
++     * ciphercommon_gcm.c is only compiled once into libcommon.a, so ifdefs do
++     * not work here. */
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        /* Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
++         * Verification Program, Section C.H requires guarantees about the
++         * uniqueness of key/iv pairs, and proposes a few approaches to ensure
++         * this. This provides an indicator for option 2 "The IV may be
++         * generated internally at its entirety randomly." Note that one of the
++         * conditions of this option is that "The IV length shall be at least
++         * 96 bits (per SP 800-38D)." We do not specically check for this
++         * condition here, because gcm_iv_generate will fail in this case. */
++        if (ctx->enc && !ctx->iv_gen_rand)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_CIPHER_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator)) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.1
+

SOURCES/0111-fips-Use-salt-16-bytes-in-PBKDF2-selftest.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 56090fca0a0c8b6cf1782aced0a02349358aae7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 12:22:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] fips: Use salt >= 16 bytes in PBKDF2 selftest
+
+NIST SP 800-132 [1] section 5.1 says "[t]he length of the
+randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least
+128 bits", which implies that the salt for PBKDF2 must be at least 16
+bytes long (see also Appendix A.2.1).
+
+The FIPS 140-3 IG [2] section 10.3.A requires that "the lengths and the
+properties of the Password and Salt parameters, as well as the desired
+length of the Master Key used in a CAST shall be among those supported
+by the module in the approved mode."
+
+As a consequence, the salt length in the self test must be at least 16
+bytes long for FIPS 140-3 compliance. Switch the self test to use the
+only test vector from RFC 6070 that uses salt that is long enough to
+fulfil this requirement. Since RFC 6070 does not provide expected
+results for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256, use the output from [3], which was
+generated with python cryptography, which was tested against the RFC
+6070 vectors with HMAC-SHA1.
+
+ [1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-132
+ [2]: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
+ [3]: https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20429)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 451cb23c41c90d5a02902b3a77551aa9ee1c6956)
+---
+ providers/fips/self_test_data.inc | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+index 8ae8cd6f4a..03adf28f3c 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
++++ b/providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
+@@ -361,19 +361,29 @@ static const ST_KAT_PARAM x963kdf_params[] = {
+ };
+ 
+ static const char pbkdf2_digest[] = "SHA256";
++/*
++ * Input parameters from RFC 6070, vector 5 (because it is the only one with
++ * a salt >= 16 bytes, which NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1 requires). The
++ * expected output is taken from
++ *   https://github.com/brycx/Test-Vector-Generation/blob/master/PBKDF2/pbkdf2-hmac-sha2-test-vectors.md,
++ * which ran these test vectors with SHA-256.
++ */
+ static const unsigned char pbkdf2_password[] = {
+-    0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x00, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72,
+-    0x64
++    0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64, 0x50, 0x41, 0x53, 0x53,
++    0x57, 0x4f, 0x52, 0x44, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x77, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x64
+ };
+ static const unsigned char pbkdf2_salt[] = {
+-    0x73, 0x61, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x74
++    0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74,
++    0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54,
++    0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x53, 0x41, 0x4c, 0x54, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x74
+ };
+ static const unsigned char pbkdf2_expected[] = {
+-    0x89, 0xb6, 0x9d, 0x05, 0x16, 0xf8, 0x29, 0x89,
+-    0x3c, 0x69, 0x62, 0x26, 0x65, 0x0a, 0x86, 0x87,
++    0x34, 0x8c, 0x89, 0xdb, 0xcb, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0x2f, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x14, 0xb8,
++    0x11, 0x6e, 0x84, 0xcf, 0x2b, 0x17, 0x34, 0x7e, 0xbc, 0x18, 0x00, 0x18,
++    0x1c
+ };
+ static int pbkdf2_iterations = 4096;
+-static int pbkdf2_pkcs5 = 1;
++static int pbkdf2_pkcs5 = 0;
+ static const ST_KAT_PARAM pbkdf2_params[] = {
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_UTF8STRING(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, pbkdf2_digest),
+     ST_KAT_PARAM_OCTET(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, pbkdf2_password),
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

SOURCES/0112-pbdkf2-Set-indicator-if-pkcs5-param-disabled-checks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From fa96a2f493276e7a57512e8c3d535052586f1525 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:32:04 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] pbdkf2: Set indicator if pkcs5 param disabled checks
+
+The pbkdf2 implementation in the FIPS provider supports the checks
+required by NIST, but allows disabling these checks by setting the
+OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5 parameter to 1. The implementation must indicate
+that the use of this configuration is not approved in FIPS mode. Add an
+explicit indicator to provide this indication.
+
+Resolves: rhbz#2175145
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+index aa0adce5e6..6df8c6d321 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+@@ -251,11 +251,42 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ 
+ static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     OSSL_PARAM *p;
++    int any_valid = 0; /* set to 1 when at least one parameter was valid */
++
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
++        any_valid = 1;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX))
++            return 0;
++    }
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR))
++            != NULL) {
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        /* The lower_bound_checks parameter enables checks required by FIPS. If
++         * those checks are disabled, the PBKDF2 implementation will also
++         * support non-approved parameters (e.g., salt lengths < 16 bytes, see
++         * NIST SP 800-132 section 5.1). */
++        if (!ctx->lower_bound_checks)
++            fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ 
+-    if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
+-        return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
+-    return -2;
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++
++        any_valid = 1;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
++    if (!any_valid)
++        return -2;
++
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+@@ -263,6 +294,9 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ {
+     static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+         OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++        OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+         OSSL_PARAM_END
+     };
+     return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

SOURCES/0113-asymciphers-kem-Add-explicit-FIPS-indicator.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From ee6e381e4140efd5365ddf27a12055859103cf59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2023 15:39:15 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] asymciphers, kem: Add explicit FIPS indicator
+
+NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
+confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
+party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme and key
+agreement schemes, but explicit key confirmation is not implemented and
+cannot be implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider
+does not implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on
+its callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST did clarify
+that OpenSSL can claim KTS-OAEP and RSASVE as approved, but we did add
+an indicator to mark them as unapproved previously and should thus keep
+the indicator available.
+
+This does not affect RSA-OAEP decryption, because it is approved as
+a component according to the FIPS 140-3 IG, section 2.4.G.
+
+Resolves: rhbz#2179331
+Resolves: RHEL-14083
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+---
+ include/openssl/core_names.h                  |  2 ++
+ include/openssl/evp.h                         |  4 +++
+ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c     | 19 ++++++++++++
+ providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c       | 29 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 832502a034..e15d208421 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED     "redhat-kat-oaep-seed"
+ #endif
++#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR    "redhat-fips-indicator"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Encoder / decoder parameters
+@@ -511,6 +512,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ 
+ /* KEM parameters */
+ #define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION            "operation"
++#define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR "redhat-fips-indicator" /* int */
+ 
+ /* OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION values */
+ #define OSSL_KEM_PARAM_OPERATION_RSASVE     "RSASVE"
+diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
+index ec2ba46fbd..3803b03422 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
++++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
+@@ -1764,6 +1764,10 @@ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 size_t EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count(void);
+ OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *EVP_PKEY_meth_get0(size_t idx);
+ # endif
+ 
++# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_UNDETERMINED 0
++# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED     1
++# define EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED 2
++
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
+                                const char *properties);
+ int EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+index 568452ec56..2e7ea632d7 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c
+@@ -452,6 +452,24 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version))
+         return 0;
+ 
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
++         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
++         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for the KTS-OAEP key transport scheme, but
++         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
++         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
++         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
++         * callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST resulted in
++         * further clarification which allows OpenSSL to claim RSA-OAEP. */
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -465,6 +483,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL),
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_KAT_OEAP_SEED, NULL, 0),
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
+ #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+index 882cf16125..b4cc0f9237 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kem/rsa_kem.c
+@@ -151,11 +151,38 @@ static int rsakem_decapsulate_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa,
+ static int rsakem_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+ {
+     PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM *p;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++
++    if (ctx == NULL)
++        return 0;
++
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR);
++    if (p != NULL) {
++        /* NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 6.4.2.1 requires either explicit key
++         * confirmation (section 6.4.2.3.2), or assurance from a trusted third
++         * party (section 6.4.2.3.1) for key agreement or key transport, but
++         * explicit key confirmation is not implemented here and cannot be
++         * implemented without protocol changes, and the FIPS provider does not
++         * implement trusted third party validation, since it relies on its
++         * callers to do that. A request for guidance sent to NIST resulted in
++         * further clarification which allows OpenSSL to claim RSASVE. */
++        int fips_indicator = EVP_PKEY_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_APPROVED;
++
++        if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fips_indicator))
++            return 0;
++    }
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
+-    return ctx != NULL;
++    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_rsakem_ctx_params[] = {
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KEM_PARAM_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR, NULL),
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

SOURCES/0114-FIPS-enforce-EMS-support.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index e90e5dc03339..f391e756475c 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ PROV_R_BN_ERROR:160:bn error
+ PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED:102:cipher operation failed
+ PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED:205:derivation function init failed
+ PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED:174:digest not allowed
++PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED:233:ems not enabled
+ PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK:186:entropy source strength too weak
+ PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG:188:error instantiating drbg
+ PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY:189:error retrieving entropy
+diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+index 173a81d28bbe..5e5be567a578 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
+@@ -21,11 +21,12 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME "module-filename" /* utf8_ptr */
+ 
+ /* Well known parameter names that Providers can define */
+-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME            "name"                /* utf8_ptr */
+-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION         "version"             /* utf8_ptr */
+-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO       "buildinfo"           /* utf8_ptr */
+-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS          "status"              /* uint */
+-#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks"     /* uint */
++#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_NAME               "name"                /* utf8_ptr */
++#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_VERSION            "version"             /* utf8_ptr */
++#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO          "buildinfo"           /* utf8_ptr */
++#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS             "status"              /* uint */
++#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS    "security-checks"     /* uint */
++#define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"  /* uint */
+ 
+ /* Self test callback parameters */
+ #define OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SELF_TEST_PHASE  "st-phase" /* utf8_string */
+diff --git a/include/openssl/fips_names.h b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
+index 0fdf5440c7cb..3f29369b3f92 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/fips_names.h
++++ b/include/openssl/fips_names.h
+@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ extern "C" {
+  */
+ # define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS "security-checks"
+ 
++/*
++ * A boolean that determines if the runtime FIPS check for TLS1_PRF EMS is performed.
++ * This is disabled by default.
++ *
++ * Type: OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
++ */
++# define OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK "tls1-prf-ems-check"
++
+ # ifdef __cplusplus
+ }
+ # endif
+diff --git a/include/openssl/proverr.h b/include/openssl/proverr.h
+index 3685430f5d3e..bf4dc135f592 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/proverr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/proverr.h
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ # define PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED                   102
+ # define PROV_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_INIT_FAILED           205
+ # define PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED                        174
++# define PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED                           233
+ # define PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK          186
+ # define PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG                  188
+ # define PROV_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY                  189
+diff --git a/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h b/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
+index 4a7f85f71186..62e60cc0103f 100644
+--- a/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
++++ b/providers/common/include/prov/securitycheck.h
+@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int ossl_digest_get_approved_nid(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                     int sha1_allowed);
+ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
++int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+diff --git a/providers/common/provider_err.c b/providers/common/provider_err.c
+index f6144072aa04..954aabe80cfc 100644
+--- a/providers/common/provider_err.c
++++ b/providers/common/provider_err.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA PROV_str_reasons[] = {
+     "derivation function init failed"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
+     "digest not allowed"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED), "ems not enabled"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK),
+     "entropy source strength too weak"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG),
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+index de7f0d3a0a57..63c875ecd0b7 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++/* Disable the ems check in the default provider */
++int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
++{
++    return 0;
++}
++
+ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                     int sha1_allowed)
+ {
+diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
+index b7659bd395c3..2bc8a5992685 100644
+--- a/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
++++ b/providers/common/securitycheck_fips.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ 
+ int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
++int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ 
+ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ {
+@@ -30,6 +31,11 @@ int ossl_securitycheck_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
+ }
+ 
++int ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
++{
++    return FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(libctx);
++}
++
+ int ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                     int sha1_allowed)
+ {
+diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+index b86b27d236f3..b881f46f36ad 100644
+--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
++++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_provider_query_operation_fn fips_query;
+ #define ALG(NAMES, FUNC) ALGC(NAMES, FUNC, NULL)
+ extern OSSL_FUNC_core_thread_start_fn *c_thread_start;
+ int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
++int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Should these function pointers be stored in the provider side provctx? Could
+@@ -82,7 +83,9 @@ typedef struct fips_global_st {
+     const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle;
+     SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS selftest_params;
+     int fips_security_checks;
++    int fips_tls1_prf_ems_check;
+     const char *fips_security_check_option;
++    const char *fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option;
+ } FIPS_GLOBAL;
+ 
+ static void *fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+@@ -94,6 +97,9 @@ void *ossl_fips_prov_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     fgbl->fips_security_checks = 1;
+     fgbl->fips_security_check_option = "1";
+ 
++    fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check = 1; /* Enabled by default */
++    fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option = "1";
++
+     return fgbl;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -109,6 +115,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM fips_param_types[] = {
+     OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_BUILDINFO, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_PTR, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_STATUS, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
++    OSSL_PARAM_DEFN(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK, OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER, NULL, 0),
+     OSSL_PARAM_END
+ };
+ 
+@@ -119,9 +126,10 @@ static int fips_get_params_from_core(FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl)
+     * NOTE: inside core_get_params() these will be loaded from config items
+     * stored inside prov->parameters (except for
+     * OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME).
+-    * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS is not a self test parameter.
++    * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS and
++    * OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK are not self test parameters.
+     */
+-    OSSL_PARAM core_params[8], *p = core_params;
++    OSSL_PARAM core_params[9], *p = core_params;
+ 
+     *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(
+             OSSL_PROV_PARAM_CORE_MODULE_FILENAME,
+@@ -151,6 +159,10 @@ static int fips_get_params_from_core(FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl)
+             OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS,
+             (char **)&fgbl->fips_security_check_option,
+             sizeof(fgbl->fips_security_check_option));
++    *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(
++            OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK,
++            (char **)&fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option,
++            sizeof(fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option));
+     *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ 
+     if (!c_get_params(fgbl->handle, core_params)) {
+@@ -187,6 +199,9 @@ static int fips_get_params(void *provctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+     p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_SECURITY_CHECKS);
+     if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fgbl->fips_security_checks))
+         return 0;
++    p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK);
++    if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check))
++        return 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -703,6 +718,11 @@ int OSSL_provider_init_int(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
+         && strcmp(fgbl->fips_security_check_option, "0") == 0)
+         fgbl->fips_security_checks = 0;
+ 
++    /* Disable the ems check if it's disabled in the fips config file. */
++    if (fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option != NULL
++        && strcmp(fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check_option, "0") == 0)
++        fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check = 0;
++
+     ossl_prov_cache_exported_algorithms(fips_ciphers, exported_fips_ciphers);
+ 
+     if (!SELF_TEST_post(&fgbl->selftest_params, 0)) {
+@@ -898,6 +918,15 @@ int FIPS_security_check_enabled(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     return fgbl->fips_security_checks;
+ }
+ 
++int FIPS_tls_prf_ems_check(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
++{
++    FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx,
++                                              OSSL_LIB_CTX_FIPS_PROV_INDEX,
++                                              &fips_prov_ossl_ctx_method);
++
++    return fgbl->fips_tls1_prf_ems_check;
++}
++
+ void OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_CALLBACK **cb,
+                                  void **cbarg)
+ {
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+index 8a3807308408..2c2dbf31cc0b 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@
+  *     A(0) = seed
+  *     A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
+  */
++
++/*
++ * Low level APIs (such as DH) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
++ * internal use.
++ */
++#include "internal/deprecated.h"
++
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -60,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include "prov/providercommon.h"
+ #include "prov/implementations.h"
+ #include "prov/provider_util.h"
++#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+ #include "e_os.h"
+ 
+ static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
+@@ -78,6 +86,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
+                         unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
+ 
+ #define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
++#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST        "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
++#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE   13
+ 
+ /* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+                                const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+ {
+     TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
++    OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ 
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
+         return 0;
+@@ -181,6 +192,27 @@ static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+         ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
+ #endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
+ 
++    /*
++     * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
++     * If EMS mode is enforced then the label "master secret" is not allowed,
++     * We do the check this way since the PRF is used for other purposes, as well
++     * as "extended master secret".
++     */
++#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
++    if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
++            && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
++                      TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
++    ctx->fips_indicator = EVP_KDF_REDHAT_FIPS_INDICATOR_NOT_APPROVED;
++#endif /* defined(FIPS_MODULE) */
++    if (ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(libctx)) {
++        if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
++                && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
++                          TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED);
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++
+     return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
+                         ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
+                         ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 3a8242d2d8c8..b0fbb504689e 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static char *tmpfilename = NULL;
+ static char *dhfile = NULL;
+ 
+ static int is_fips = 0;
++static int fips_ems_check = 0;
+ 
+ #define LOG_BUFFER_SIZE 2048
+ static char server_log_buffer[LOG_BUFFER_SIZE + 1] = {0};
+@@ -796,7 +797,7 @@ static int test_no_ems(void)
+ {
+     SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL;
+     SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+-    int testresult = 0;
++    int testresult = 0, status;
+ 
+     if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+                              TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION,
+@@ -812,19 +813,25 @@ static int test_no_ems(void)
+         goto end;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (!create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)) {
+-        printf("Creating SSL connection failed\n");
+-        goto end;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (SSL_get_extms_support(serverssl)) {
+-        printf("Server reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
+-        goto end;
+-    }
+-
+-    if (SSL_get_extms_support(clientssl)) {
+-        printf("Client reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
+-        goto end;
++    status = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
++    if (fips_ems_check) {
++        if (status == 1) {
++            printf("When FIPS uses the EMS check a connection that doesnt use EMS should fail\n");
++            goto end;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (!status) {
++            printf("Creating SSL connection failed\n");
++            goto end;
++        }
++        if (SSL_get_extms_support(serverssl)) {
++            printf("Server reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
++            goto end;
++        }
++        if (SSL_get_extms_support(clientssl)) {
++            printf("Client reports Extended Master Secret support\n");
++            goto end;
++        }
+     }
+     testresult = 1;
+ 
+@@ -10740,9 +10747,24 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+             && !TEST_false(OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "default")))
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if (strcmp(modulename, "fips") == 0)
++    if (strcmp(modulename, "fips") == 0) {
++        OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL;
++        OSSL_PARAM params[2];
++
+         is_fips = 1;
+ 
++        prov = OSSL_PROVIDER_load(libctx, "fips");
++        if (prov != NULL) {
++            /* Query the fips provider to check if the check ems option is enabled */
++            params[0] =
++                OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PROV_PARAM_TLS1_PRF_EMS_CHECK,
++                                         &fips_ems_check);
++            params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
++            OSSL_PROVIDER_get_params(prov, params);
++            OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(prov);
++        }
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * We add, but don't load the test "tls-provider". We'll load it when we
+      * need it.
+@@ -10816,6 +10838,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+     if (privkey8192 == NULL)
+         goto err;
+ 
++    if (fips_ems_check) {
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
++        ADD_TEST(test_no_ems);
++#endif
++        return 1;
++    }
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
+ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2) || !defined(OSSL_NO_USABLE_TLS1_3)
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ktls, NUM_KTLS_TEST_CIPHERS * 4);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt.xxx openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt
+--- openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt.xxx	2023-04-17 13:04:21.078501747 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpkdf_tls12_prf.txt	2023-04-17 13:11:03.189059638 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ 
+ Title = TLS12 PRF tests (from NIST test vectors)
+ 
++Availablein = default
+ KDF = TLS1-PRF
+ Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
+ Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
+@@ -21,6 +22,16 @@ Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3
+ Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
+ Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+ 
++Availablein = fips
++KDF = TLS1-PRF
++Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
++Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:f8938ecc9edebc5030c0c6a441e213cd24e6f770a50dda07876f8d55da062bcadb386b411fd4fe4313a604fce6c17fbc
++Ctrl.label = seed:master secret
++Ctrl.client_random = hexseed:36c129d01a3200894b9179faac589d9835d58775f9b5ea3587cb8fd0364cae8c
++Ctrl.server_random = hexseed:f6c9575ed7ddd73e1f7d16eca115415812a43c2b747daaaae043abfb50053fce
++Output = 202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
++Result = KDF_DERIVE_ERROR
++
+ KDF = TLS1-PRF
+ Ctrl.digest = digest:SHA256
+ Ctrl.Secret = hexsecret:202c88c00f84a17a20027079604787461176455539e705be730890602c289a5001e34eeb3a043e5d52a65e66125188bf
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c.noems	2023-05-05 11:15:57.934415272 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/t1_enc.c	2023-05-05 11:39:03.578163778 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/trace.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ /* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */
+ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+@@ -75,8 +76,14 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s,
+     }
+ 
+  err:
+-    if (fatal)
+-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    if (fatal) {
++        /* The calls to this function are local so it's safe to implement the check */
++        if (FIPS_mode() && seed1_len >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
++            && memcmp(seed1, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
++	else
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++    }
+     else
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+     EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c.noems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c.noems	2023-05-05 17:14:04.663800271 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c	2023-05-05 17:20:33.764599507 +0200
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #include "../ssl_local.h"
+ #include "statem_local.h"
+ #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION     1
+ 
+@@ -1552,8 +1553,13 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s
+ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+ {
+-    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
++    if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) {
++        if (FIPS_mode() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS) ) {
++            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
++            return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
++        }
+         return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
++    }
+ 
+     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+             || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+--- openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in.fipsems	2023-07-11 12:35:27.951610366 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/include/openssl/ssl.h.in	2023-07-11 12:36:25.234754680 +0200
+@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ typedef int (*SSL_async_callback_fn)(SSL
+      * interoperability with CryptoPro CSP 3.x
+      */
+ # define SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG                     SSL_OP_BIT(31)
++# define SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS                     SSL_OP_BIT(48)
+ 
+ /*
+  * Option "collections."
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c.fipsems	2023-07-11 12:36:51.465278672 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/ssl/ssl_conf.c	2023-07-11 12:44:53.365675720 +0200
+@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_c
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("ClientRenegotiation",
+                      SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("EncryptThenMac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC),
++        SSL_FLAG_TBL("RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS", SSL_OP_RH_PERMIT_NOEMS_FIPS),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("NoRenegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("AllowNoDHEKEX", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX),
+         SSL_FLAG_TBL("PrioritizeChaCha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA),
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod.fipsems	2023-07-12 13:54:22.508235187 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod	2023-07-12 13:56:51.089613902 +0200
+@@ -524,6 +524,9 @@ B<ExtendedMasterSecret>: use extended ma
+ default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>: that is,
+ B<-ExtendedMasterSecret> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET>.
+ 
++B<RHNoEnforceEMSinFIPS>: allow establishing connections without EMS in FIPS mode.
++This is a RedHat-based OS specific option, and normally it should be set up via crypto policies.
++
+ B<CANames>: use CA names extension, enabled by
+ default. Inverse of B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>: that is,
+ B<-CANames> is the same as setting B<SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES>.
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.fipsems openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
+--- openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.fipsems	2023-07-12 15:39:57.732206731 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/doc/man5/fips_config.pod	2023-07-12 15:53:45.722885419 +0200
+@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ automatically loaded when the system is
+ environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
+ for more information.
+ 
++Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses a supplementary config for FIPS module located in
++OpenSSL configuration directory and managed by crypto policies. If present, it
++should have format
++
++ [fips_sect]
++ tls1-prf-ems-check = 0
++ activate = 1
++
++The B<tls1-prf-ems-check> option specifies whether FIPS module will require the
++presence of extended master secret or not.
++
++The B<activate> option enforces FIPS provider activation.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

SOURCES/0115-CVE-2023-0464.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+index 18b53cc09e..cba107ca03 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_local.h
+@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
+ };
+ 
+ struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
++    /* The number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_count;
++    /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
++    size_t node_maximum;
++
+     /* This is the tree 'level' data */
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
+     int nlevel;
+@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                              X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                              X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
++                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                             int extra_data);
+ void ossl_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
+ int ossl_policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
+                            const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+index 9d9a7ea179..450f95a655 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_node.c
+@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                              X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
+                                              X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
+-                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
++                                             X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
++                                             int extra_data)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+ 
++    /* Verify that the tree isn't too large.  This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */
++    if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
++        return NULL;
++
+     node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
+     if (node == NULL) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+     }
+     node->data = data;
+     node->parent = parent;
+-    if (level) {
++    if (level != NULL) {
+         if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
+             if (level->anyPolicy)
+                 goto node_error;
+@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    if (tree) {
++    if (extra_data) {
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
+             tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
+         if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
+@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *ossl_policy_level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+         }
+     }
+ 
++    tree->node_count++;
+     if (parent)
+         parent->nchild++;
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+index fa45da5117..f953a05a41 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/pcy_tree.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@
+ 
+ #include "pcy_local.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to
++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
++ *
++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the
++ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
++ */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
++#endif
++
+ static void expected_print(BIO *channel,
+                            X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, X509_POLICY_NODE *node,
+                            int indent)
+@@ -163,6 +174,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+         return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
++    tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
++
+     /*
+      * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
+      *
+@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+     if ((data = ossl_policy_data_new(NULL,
+                                      OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
+         goto bad_tree;
+-    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         ossl_policy_data_free(data);
+         goto bad_tree;
+     }
+@@ -239,7 +253,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
+  */
+ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
++                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
++                                    X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+     int i, matched = 0;
+@@ -249,13 +264,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
+ 
+         if (ossl_policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
+-            if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
++            if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
+                 return 0;
+             matched = 1;
+         }
+     }
+     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
+-        if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++        if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -268,7 +283,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+  * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+  */
+ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+-                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
++                           const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
++                           X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ {
+     int i;
+ 
+@@ -276,7 +292,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+         X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+ 
+         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
+-        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
++        if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
+             return 0;
+     }
+     return 1;
+@@ -307,7 +323,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+-    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
++    if (ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
+         ossl_policy_data_free(data);
+         return 0;
+     }
+@@ -370,7 +386,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
+     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
+     if (last->anyPolicy &&
+             ossl_policy_level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy,
+-                                       last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
++                                       last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
+         return 0;
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -553,7 +569,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
+             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
+                 | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
+             node = ossl_policy_level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent,
+-                                              tree);
++                                              tree, 1);
+         }
+         if (!tree->user_policies) {
+             tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+@@ -580,7 +596,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
+ 
+     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
+         cache = ossl_policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
+-        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
++        if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
+             return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+ 
+         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)

SOURCES/0116-CVE-2023-0465.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+index 9384f1da9b..a0282c3ef1 100644
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -1654,15 +1654,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+         goto memerr;
+     /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
+-        int i;
++        int i, cbcalled = 0;
+ 
+         /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
+-        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
++        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+             X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ 
++            if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0)
++                cbcalled = 1;
+             CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
+                        ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+         }
++        if (!cbcalled) {
++            /* Should not be able to get here */
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++            return 0;
++        }
++        /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
+         return 1;
+     }
+     if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
+diff --git a/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem b/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..244af3292b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/ca-pol-cert.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..0fcd6372b3
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies-bad.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..2f06d7433f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-policies.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
++MIIDPTCCAiWgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
++Fw0yMzAzMDgxMjIzMjNaGA8yMTIzMDMwOTEyMjMyM1owGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
++dmVyLmV4YW1wbGUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCo/4lY
++YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT
++5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l
++Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1
++U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5
++ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn
++iIQPYf55NB9KiR+3AgMBAAGjgZkwgZYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOeb4iqtimw6y3ZR5Y4H
++mCKX4XOiMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMAkGA1UdEwQC
++MAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwGQYDVR0RBBIwEIIOc2VydmVyLmV4YW1w
++bGUwGQYDVR0gBBIwEDAOBgwrBgEEAYGBXLz7RwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEB
++AGbWslmAAdMX3+5ChcnFrX+NqDGoyhb3PTgWdtlQB5qtWdIt4rSxN50OcQxFTX0D
++QOBabSzR0DDKrgfBe4waL19WsdEvR9GyO4M7ASze/A3IEZue9C9k0n7Vq8zDaAZl
++CiR/Zqo9nAOuhKHMgmC/NjUlX7STv5pJVgc4SH8VEKmSRZDmNihaOalUtK5X8/Oa
++dawKxsZcaP5IKnOEPPKjtVNJxBu5CXywJHsO0GcoDEnEx1/NLdFoJ6WFw8NuTyDK
++NGLq2MHEdyKaigHQlptEs9bXyu9McJjzbx0uXj3BenRULASreccFej0L1RU6jDlk
++D3brBn24UISaFRZoB7jsjok=
++-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+diff --git a/test/certs/mkcert.sh b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
+index c3f7ac14b5..a57d9f38dc 100755
+--- a/test/certs/mkcert.sh
++++ b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
+@@ -119,11 +119,12 @@ genca() {
+     local OPTIND=1
+     local purpose=
+ 
+-    while getopts p: o
++    while getopts p:c: o
+     do
+         case $o in
+         p) purpose="$OPTARG";;
+-        *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
++        c) certpol="$OPTARG";;
++        *) echo "Usage: $0 genca [-p EKU][-c policyoid] cn keyname certname cakeyname cacertname" >&2
+            return 1;;
+         esac
+     done
+@@ -146,6 +147,10 @@ genca() {
+     if [ -n "$NC" ]; then
+         exts=$(printf "%s\nnameConstraints = %s\n" "$exts" "$NC")
+     fi
++    if [ -n "$certpol" ]; then
++        exts=$(printf "%s\ncertificatePolicies = %s\n" "$exts" "$certpol")
++    fi
++
+     csr=$(req "$key" "CN = $cn") || return 1
+     echo "$csr" |
+         cert "$cert" "$exts" -CA "${cacert}.pem" -CAkey "${cakey}.pem" \
+diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
+index 2240cd9df0..76ceadc7d8 100755
+--- a/test/certs/setup.sh
++++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
+@@ -440,3 +440,9 @@ OPENSSL_SIGALG=ED448 OPENSSL_KEYALG=ed448 ./mkcert.sh genee ed448 \
+ 
+ # critical id-pkix-ocsp-no-check extension
+ ./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-ocsp-nocheck ca-key ca-cert "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5=critical,DER:05:00"
++
++# certificatePolicies extension
++./mkcert.sh genca -c "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1" "CA" ca-key ca-pol-cert root-key root-cert
++./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-policies ca-key ca-cert "certificatePolicies=1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1"
++# We can create a cert with a duplicate policy oid - but its actually invalid!
++./mkcert.sh geneeextra server.example ee-key ee-cert-policies-bad ca-key ca-cert "certificatePolicies=1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1,1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1"
+diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+index 2a4c36e86d..818c9ac50d 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
++++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sub verify {
+     run(app([@args]));
+ }
+ 
+-plan tests => 163;
++plan tests => 165;
+ 
+ # Canonical success
+ ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+@@ -516,3 +516,14 @@ SKIP: {
+     ok(run(app([ qw(openssl verify -trusted), $rsapluscert_file, $cert_file ])),
+        'Mixed key + cert file test');
+ }
++
++# Certificate Policies
++ok(verify("ee-cert-policies", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
++          "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
++          "-explicit_policy"),
++   "Certificate policy");
++
++ok(!verify("ee-cert-policies-bad", "", ["root-cert"], ["ca-pol-cert"],
++           "-policy_check", "-policy", "1.3.6.1.4.1.16604.998855.1",
++           "-explicit_policy"),
++   "Bad certificate policy");

SOURCES/0117-CVE-2023-0466.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+index 75a1677022..43c1900bca 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ B<trust>.
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
+ B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
+ 
+-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
++X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
++Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
++policy checking.
+ 
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
+ by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
+@@ -400,6 +401,10 @@ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
+ The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_host(), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_email(),
+ and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get1_ip_asc() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+ 
++The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
++enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
++The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
++
+ =head1 COPYRIGHT
+ 
+ Copyright 2009-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

SOURCES/0118-CVE-2023-1255.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
++++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+@@ -3353,7 +3353,7 @@ $code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+ .align	4
+ .Lxts_dec_tail4x:
+ 	add	$inp,$inp,#16
+-	vld1.32	{$dat0},[$inp],#16
++	tst	$tailcnt,#0xf
+ 	veor	$tmp1,$dat1,$tmp0
+ 	vst1.8	{$tmp1},[$out],#16
+ 	veor	$tmp2,$dat2,$tmp2
+@@ -3362,6 +3362,8 @@ $code.=<<___	if ($flavour =~ /64/);
+ 	veor	$tmp4,$dat4,$tmp4
+ 	vst1.8	{$tmp3-$tmp4},[$out],#32
+ 
++	b.eq	.Lxts_dec_abort
++	vld1.32	{$dat0},[$inp],#16
+ 	b	.Lxts_done
+ .align	4
+ .Lxts_outer_dec_tail:

SOURCES/0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c.fips_cms	2023-05-18 14:03:56.360555106 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/apps/cms.c	2023-05-18 14:13:33.765183185 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ static int save_certs(char *signerfile, STACK_OF(X509) *signers);
+ static int cms_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+@@ -810,12 +811,16 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+     if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+         if (!cipher) {
++            if (FIPS_mode()) {
++                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_aes_128_cbc();
++            } else {
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+-            cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
++                cipher = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+ #else
+-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
+-            goto end;
++                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
++                goto end;
+ #endif
++           }
+         }
+ 
+         if (secret_key && !secret_keyid) {
+diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+--- openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c.fips_cms	2023-05-22 10:06:50.276528155 +0200
++++ openssl-3.0.7/crypto/cms/cms_env.c	2023-05-22 10:08:58.406073945 +0200
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/cms.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "internal/sizes.h"
+ #include "crypto/asn1.h"
+ #include "crypto/evp.h"
+@@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(C
+             return 0;
+         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
+             return 0;
++        if (FIPS_mode()) {
++            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
++                return 0;
++        }
+     } else if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+         return 0;
+     return 1;
+@@ -484,6 +489,11 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encryp
+ 
+         if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
+             goto err;
++
++        if (FIPS_mode()) {
++            if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_padding_mode", "oaep") <= 0)
++                goto err;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0)

SOURCES/0122-CVE-2023-2650.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+index 01cde00e98..c0e55197a0 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+@@ -443,6 +443,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+     first = 1;
+     bl = NULL;
+ 
++    /*
++     * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
++     *
++     * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
++     * >
++     * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
++     * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
++     * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
++     * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
++     * > decimal).
++     *
++     * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
++     * i.e. 586 bytes long.
++     *
++     * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
++     */
++    if (len > 586)
++        goto err;
++
+     while (len > 0) {
+         l = 0;
+         use_bn = 0;

SOURCES/0123-ibmca-atexit-crash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/context.c b/crypto/context.c
+index bdfc4d02a3f0..548665fba265 100644
+--- a/crypto/context.c
++++ b/crypto/context.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include "internal/bio.h"
+ #include "internal/provider.h"
+ #include "crypto/ctype.h"
++#include "crypto/rand.h"
+ 
+ # include <sys/types.h>
+ # include <sys/stat.h>
+@@ -271,6 +272,20 @@ OSSL_LIB_CTX *OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+ 
+     return NULL;
+ }
++
++void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void)
++{
++    int dynidx = default_context_int.dyn_indexes[OSSL_LIB_CTX_DRBG_INDEX];
++
++    /* early release of the DRBG in global default libctx, no locking */
++    if (dynidx != -1) {
++        void *data;
++
++        data = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&default_context_int.data, dynidx);
++        ossl_rand_ctx_free(data);
++        CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&default_context_int.data, dynidx, NULL);
++    }
++}
+ #endif
+ 
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
+diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+index c453d3226133..f341d915db76 100644
+--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void)
+     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+     rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+ # endif
++    ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx();
+     rand_inited = 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ static void *rand_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+     return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
++void ossl_rand_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+ {
+     RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
+ 
+@@ -494,7 +495,7 @@ static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+ static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD rand_drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
+     OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD_PRIORITY_2,
+     rand_ossl_ctx_new,
+-    rand_ossl_ctx_free,
++    ossl_rand_ctx_free,
+ };
+ 
+ static RAND_GLOBAL *rand_get_global(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+diff --git a/engines/e_dasync.c b/engines/e_dasync.c
+index 5a303a9f8528..7974106ae219 100644
+--- a/engines/e_dasync.c
++++ b/engines/e_dasync.c
+@@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+                                     const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+ 
++static int dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
++                                  void *ptr);
++static int dasync_aes256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++                                  const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
++static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++                                    const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
++static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
++
+ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type,
+                                              int arg, void *ptr);
+ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+@@ -171,6 +179,12 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc(void)
+     return _hidden_aes_128_cbc;
+ }
+ 
++static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
++static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_256_ctr(void)
++{
++    return _hidden_aes_256_ctr;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 in this engine. Set up
+  * once only during engine bind and can then be reused many times.
+@@ -192,8 +206,10 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void)
+ static void destroy_ciphers(void)
+ {
+     EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc);
++    EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_256_ctr);
+     EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1);
+     _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
++    _hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
+     _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -202,6 +218,7 @@ static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+ 
+ static int dasync_cipher_nids[] = {
+     NID_aes_128_cbc,
++    NID_aes_256_ctr,
+     NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+     0
+ };
+@@ -284,6 +301,30 @@ static int bind_dasync(ENGINE *e)
+         _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL;
+     }
+ 
++    _hidden_aes_256_ctr = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_256_ctr,
++                                              1  /* block size */,
++                                              32 /* key len */);
++    if (_hidden_aes_256_ctr == NULL
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,16)
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
++                                          EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1
++                                          | EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE
++                                          | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
++                                          | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
++                                         dasync_aes256_init_key)
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
++                                              dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher)
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
++                                            dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup)
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
++                                         dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl)
++            || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_256_ctr,
++                                sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) {
++        EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_256_ctr);
++        _hidden_aes_256_ctr = NULL;
++    }
++
+     _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(
+                                                 NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+                                                 16 /* block size */,
+@@ -445,6 +486,9 @@ static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+     case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+         *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc();
+         break;
++    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
++        *cipher = dasync_aes_256_ctr();
++        break;
+     case NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1:
+         *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1();
+         break;
+@@ -779,6 +823,29 @@ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+     return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc());
+ }
+ 
++static int dasync_aes256_ctr_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
++                                  void *ptr)
++{
++    return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
++}
++
++static int dasync_aes256_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++                             const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
++{
++    return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
++}
++
++static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++                               const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
++{
++    return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
++}
++
++static int dasync_aes256_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ctr());
++}
++
+ 
+ /*
+  * AES128 CBC HMAC SHA1 Implementation
+diff --git a/include/crypto/rand.h b/include/crypto/rand.h
+index 6a71a339c812..165deaf95c5e 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/rand.h
++++ b/include/crypto/rand.h
+@@ -125,4 +125,5 @@ void ossl_rand_cleanup_nonce(ossl_unused const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
+ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
+ int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
+ 
++void ossl_rand_ctx_free(void *vdgbl);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/include/internal/cryptlib.h b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+index 1291299b6e50..934d4b089c20 100644
+--- a/include/internal/cryptlib.h
++++ b/include/internal/cryptlib.h
+@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ int ossl_lib_ctx_run_once(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned int idx,
+ int ossl_lib_ctx_onfree(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn onfreefn);
+ const char *ossl_lib_ctx_get_descriptor(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
+ 
++void ossl_release_default_drbg_ctx(void);
++
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_crypto_ex_data_get_ossl_lib_ctx(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
+ int ossl_crypto_new_ex_data_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, int class_index, void *obj,
+                                CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
+diff --git a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
+index 4da1e64cb6da..3f352db9df3a 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
++++ b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
+@@ -11,9 +11,30 @@ use warnings;
+ use OpenSSL::Test;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+-plan tests => 3;
++plan tests => 5;
+ setup("test_rand");
+ 
+ ok(run(test(["rand_test"])));
+ ok(run(test(["drbgtest"])));
+ ok(run(test(["rand_status_test"])));
++
++SKIP: {
++    skip "engine is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2
++        if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
++
++    my $success;
++    my @randdata;
++    my $expected = '0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10';
++
++    @randdata = run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-engine', 'ossltest', '-hex', '16' ]),
++                    capture => 1, statusvar => \$success);
++    chomp(@randdata);
++    ok($success and $randdata[0] eq $expected,
++       "rand with ossltest: Check rand output is as expected");
++
++    @randdata = run(app(['openssl', 'rand', '-engine', 'dasync', '-hex', '16' ]),
++                    capture => 1, statusvar => \$success);
++    chomp(@randdata);
++    ok($success and length($randdata[0]) == 32,
++       "rand with dasync: Check rand output is of expected length");
++}

SOURCES/0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+index 45010b90db..b396c8651a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if (inl == 0) {
+-        *outl = 0;
+-        return 1;
+-    }
++    /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
++    if (out != NULL) {
++        if (inl == 0) {
++            if (outl != NULL)
++                *outl = 0;
++            return 1;
++        }
+ 
+-    if (outsize < inl) {
+-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+-        return 0;
++        if (outsize < inl) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
++            return 0;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)

SOURCES/0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 0b391910d6..84a926998e 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     if (nid != NID_undef)
+         return 1;
+ 
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+         return 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index b97871eca7..36420f51d8 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
+ #  include <openssl/dherr.h>
+ 
+ #  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+-#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
++#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS        10000
++#  endif
++
++#  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++#   define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
+ #  endif
+ 
+ #  define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
+index 7b587f3cfa..f8dd8f3aa7 100644
+--- a/test/dhtest.c
++++ b/test/dhtest.c
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+         goto err1;
+ 
+     /* check fails, because p is way too small */
+-    if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+         goto err2;
+     i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
+     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+     ERR_clear_error();
+ 
++    /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
++    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
++            || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
++        goto err3;
++
++    /*
++     * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
++     */
++    if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
++        goto err3;
++
+     /*
+      * II) key generation
+      */
+@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+         goto err3;
+ 
+     /* ... and check whether it is valid */
+-    if (!DH_check(a, &i))
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
+         goto err3;
+     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+             || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)

SOURCES/0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index aef6f9b1b7..fbe2797569 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
+ #else
+-    int ok = 0, r;
++    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+     int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
+@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
++        if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
++            q_good = 1;
++        else
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
++    }
++
++    if (q_good) {
+         if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+         else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
+diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
+index f8dd8f3aa7..d02b3b7c58 100644
+--- a/test/dhtest.c
++++ b/test/dhtest.c
+@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+     ERR_clear_error();
+ 
++    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(q, p)) || !TEST_true(BN_add(q, q, BN_value_one())))
++        goto err3;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
++        goto err3;
++    if (!TEST_true(i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
++        || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME))
++        goto err3;
++
+     /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
+     if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
+             || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
+@@ -135,6 +144,9 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+         goto err3;
+ 
++    /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
++    ERR_clear_error();
++
+     /*
+      * II) key generation
+      */

SOURCES/0128-CVE-2023-5363.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+index d2ed3fd378..6a819590e6 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+@@ -223,6 +223,42 @@ static int evp_cipher_init_internal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+             return 0;
+     }
+ 
++#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++    /*
++     * Fix for CVE-2023-5363
++     * Passing in a size as part of the init call takes effect late
++     * so, force such to occur before the initialisation.
++     *
++     * The FIPS provider's internal library context is used in a manner
++     * such that this is not an issue.
++     */
++    if (params != NULL) {
++        OSSL_PARAM param_lens[3] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END,
++                                     OSSL_PARAM_END };
++        OSSL_PARAM *q = param_lens;
++        const OSSL_PARAM *p;
++
++        p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); 
++        if (p != NULL)
++            memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q));
++
++        /*
++         * Note that OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN is a synomym for
++         * OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN so both are covered here.
++         */
++        p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN);
++        if (p != NULL)
++            memcpy(q++, p, sizeof(*q));
++
++        if (q != param_lens) {
++            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, param_lens)) {
++                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
++                return 0;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++#endif
++
+     if (enc) {
+         if (ctx->cipher->einit == NULL) {
+             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+diff --git a/test/evp_extra_test.c b/test/evp_extra_test.c
+index cfffa21350..2318bf6a68 100644
+--- a/test/evp_extra_test.c
++++ b/test/evp_extra_test.c
+@@ -4851,6 +4851,253 @@ static int test_ecx_not_private_key(int tst)
+     return options;
+ }
+ 
++static int aes_gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
++    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int outlen, tmplen;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    unsigned char outtag[16];
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
++        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
++    };
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
++            || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")))
++        goto err;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN,
++                                            &gcm_ivlen);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params))
++            || (gcm_aad != NULL
++                && !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen,
++                                                gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s)))
++            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
++                                            gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s))
++            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen)))
++        goto err;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG,
++                                                  outtag, sizeof(outtag));
++
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ctx, params))
++            || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s)
++            || !TEST_mem_eq(outtag, gcm_tag_s, gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s))
++        goto err;
++
++    ret = 1;
++err:
++    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int aes_gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *gcm_key, size_t gcm_key_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_iv, size_t gcm_ivlen,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_pt, size_t gcm_pt_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_aad, size_t gcm_aad_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_ct, size_t gcm_ct_s,
++                           const unsigned char *gcm_tag, size_t gcm_tag_s)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
++    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int outlen;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
++        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
++    };
++
++    if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "AES-256-GCM", "")) == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN,
++                                            &gcm_ivlen);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, gcm_key, gcm_iv, params))
++            || (gcm_aad != NULL
++                && !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen,
++                                                gcm_aad, gcm_aad_s)))
++            || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
++                                            gcm_ct, gcm_ct_s))
++            || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, gcm_pt, gcm_pt_s))
++        goto err;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG,
++                                                  (void*)gcm_tag, gcm_tag_s);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
++            ||!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen)))
++        goto err;
++
++    ret = 1;
++err:
++    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363(void)
++{
++    /* AES-GCM test data obtained from NIST public test vectors */
++    static const unsigned char gcm_key[] = {
++        0xd0, 0xc2, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x9f, 0x30, 0xd8, 0x0b, 0x89, 0x14, 0xbb, 0xbf,
++        0xb7, 0x2f, 0x73, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x5f, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x70, 0x15, 0x84,
++        0x8a, 0x7b, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0x16, 0xf1, 0x8b,
++    };
++    static const unsigned char gcm_iv[] = {
++        0xb6, 0xdc, 0xda, 0x95, 0xac, 0x99, 0x77, 0x76, 0x25, 0xae, 0x87, 0xf8,
++        0xa3, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xbd, 0x5f, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0x54, 0xca,
++        0x1a, 0x9f, 0xa2, 0xe3, 0xf4, 0x5f, 0x5f, 0xc2, 0xce, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0x14,
++        0x12, 0x6f, 0xf0, 0xaf, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x17, 0x35, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0x16, 0x09,
++        0xdd, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xd8, 0xdd, 0xf3, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x49, 0xb8,
++        0xb3, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x5d, 0x4f, 0xad, 0x30, 0x91, 0x08, 0xbc, 0xbe, 0x24,
++        0x01, 0x0f, 0xbe, 0x9c, 0xfb, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x4c, 0x53, 0xb0,
++        0x95, 0x90, 0xac, 0x7b, 0x1f, 0x7b, 0xa0, 0x99, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x54,
++        0xd0, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0xcc, 0x91, 0xf8, 0x1f, 0x9b, 0x6c, 0x9a, 0xe0, 0xdc,
++        0x63, 0xea, 0x7d, 0x2a, 0x4a, 0x7d, 0xa5, 0xed, 0x68, 0x57, 0x27, 0x6b,
++        0x68, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0xb8, 0x51, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x3d,
++    };
++    static const unsigned char gcm_pt[] = {
++        0xb8, 0xb6, 0x88, 0x36, 0x44, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xdf, 0x24, 0x32, 0x91, 0x07,
++        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x81,
++    };
++    static const unsigned char gcm_ct[] = {
++        0xff, 0x4f, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0x51, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xf3,
++        0xe2, 0xd0, 0xec, 0xed,
++    };
++    static const unsigned char gcm_tag[] = {
++        0xbd, 0x06, 0x38, 0x09, 0xf7, 0xe1, 0xc4, 0x72, 0x0e, 0xf2, 0xea, 0x63,
++        0xdb, 0x99, 0x6c, 0x21,
++    };
++
++    return aes_gcm_encrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv),
++                           gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0,
++                           gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag))
++        && aes_gcm_decrypt(gcm_key, sizeof(gcm_key), gcm_iv, sizeof(gcm_iv),
++                           gcm_pt, sizeof(gcm_pt), NULL, 0,
++                           gcm_ct, sizeof(gcm_ct), gcm_tag, sizeof(gcm_tag));
++}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
++static int rc4_encrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s,
++                       const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s,
++                       const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
++    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int outlen, tmplen;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
++        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
++    };
++
++    if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
++            || !TEST_ptr(cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")))
++        goto err;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN,
++                                            &rc4_key_s);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params))
++            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
++                                            rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s))
++            || !TEST_true(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &tmplen)))
++        goto err;
++
++    if (!TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s))
++        goto err;
++
++    ret = 1;
++err:
++    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int rc4_decrypt(const unsigned char *rc4_key, size_t rc4_key_s,
++                       const unsigned char *rc4_pt, size_t rc4_pt_s,
++                       const unsigned char *rc4_ct, size_t rc4_ct_s)
++{
++    int ret = 0;
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
++    EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int outlen;
++    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
++    OSSL_PARAM params[2] = {
++        OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END
++    };
++
++    if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(testctx, "RC4", "")) == NULL)
++        goto err;
++
++    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN,
++                                            &rc4_key_s);
++
++    if (!TEST_true(EVP_DecryptInit_ex2(ctx, cipher, rc4_key, NULL, params))
++            || !TEST_true(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
++                                            rc4_ct, rc4_ct_s))
++            || !TEST_mem_eq(outbuf, outlen, rc4_pt, rc4_pt_s))
++        goto err;
++
++    ret = 1;
++err:
++    EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
++    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363(void)
++{
++    /* RC4 test data obtained from RFC 6229 */
++    static const struct {
++        unsigned char key[5];
++        unsigned char padding[11];
++    } rc4_key = {
++        {   /* Five bytes of key material */
++            0x83, 0x32, 0x22, 0x77, 0x2a,
++        },
++        {   /* Random padding to 16 bytes */
++            0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x32, 0x91
++        }
++    };
++    static const unsigned char rc4_pt[] = {
++        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
++        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
++    };
++    static const unsigned char rc4_ct[] = {
++        0x80, 0xad, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xc9, 0x73, 0xdf, 0x8a,
++        0x2e, 0x87, 0x9e, 0x92, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xef, 0xda
++    };
++
++    if (lgcyprov == NULL)
++        return TEST_skip("Test requires legacy provider to be loaded");
++
++    return rc4_encrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key),
++                       rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct))
++        && rc4_decrypt(rc4_key.key, sizeof(rc4_key.key),
++                       rc4_pt, sizeof(rc4_pt), rc4_ct, sizeof(rc4_ct));
++}
++#endif
++
+ int setup_tests(void)
+ {
+     OPTION_CHOICE o;
+@@ -4994,6 +5241,12 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+ 
+     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ecx_short_keys, OSSL_NELEM(ecxnids));
+ 
++    /* Test cases for CVE-2023-5363 */
++    ADD_TEST(test_aes_gcm_ivlen_change_cve_2023_5363);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
++    ADD_TEST(test_aes_rc4_keylen_change_cve_2023_5363);
++#endif
++
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/0129-rsa-Add-SP800-56Br2-6.4.1.2.1-3.c-check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 0d873f9f647764df147d818a6e998b1c318bac31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 15:30:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Add SP800-56Br2 6.4.1.2.1 (3.c) check
+
+The code did not yet check that the length of the RSA key is positive
+and even.
+
+Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [8b268541d9aabee51699aef22963407362830ef9]
+---
+ crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c | 5 +++++
+ test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c        | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+index fc8f19b487..e6b79e953d 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+@@ -403,6 +403,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed,
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
+         return 0;
+     }
++    /* (Step 3.c): check that the modulus length is a positive even integer */
++    if (nbits <= 0 || (nbits & 0x1)) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
++        return 0;
++    }
+ 
+     ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
+     if (ctx == NULL)
+diff --git a/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c b/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
+index 7660019f47..aa58bbbe6c 100644
+--- a/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
++++ b/test/rsa_sp800_56b_test.c
+@@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ static int test_invalid_keypair(void)
+           && TEST_true(BN_add_word(n, 1))
+           && TEST_false(ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, 2048))
+           && TEST_true(BN_sub_word(n, 1))
++          /* check that validation fails if len(n) is not even */
++          && TEST_true(BN_lshift1(n, n))
++          && TEST_false(ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(key, NULL, -1, 2049))
++          && TEST_true(BN_rshift1(n, n))
+           /* check p  */
+           && TEST_true(BN_sub_word(p, 2))
+           && TEST_true(BN_mul(n, p, q, ctx))
+-- 
+2.41.0
+

SOURCES/0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 7ba2beae7f..e20eb62081 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -249,6 +249,18 @@ int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
+  */
+ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+ {
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
++        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        return 1;
++    }
++
+     return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 4152397426..f76ac0dd14 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+     "parameter encoding error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
+     "unable to check generator"},
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index d84ea99241..afc49f5cdc 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (dh->params.q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+         return 0;
+@@ -267,6 +273,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (dh->params.q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+         return 0;
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index e51504b7ab..36de321b74 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
+ DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
+ DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
+ DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
++DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
+ DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
+ DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
+ DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS:114:bad ffc parameters
+diff --git a/include/crypto/dherr.h b/include/crypto/dherr.h
+index bb24d131eb..519327f795 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/dherr.h
++++ b/include/crypto/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 6533260f20..50e0cf54be 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ #   define DH_GENERATOR_3          3
+ #   define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+ 
+-/* DH_check error codes */
++/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
+ /*
+  * NB: These values must align with the equivalently named macros in
+  * internal/ffc.h.
+@@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ #   define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+ #   define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+ #   define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+-#   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
++#   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ #   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
+ #   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL            0x80
+-#   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100
++#   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ 
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ #   define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 5d2a762a96..074a70145f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #  define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            100
+ #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+ #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
++#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
+ #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+ #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
+ 

SOURCES/0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 51c2283db915d..0928a30c2d37b 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+     tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
+     if (tmparr == NULL)
+         goto end;
++    OPENSSL_free(*pext);
+     *pext = tmparr;
+     *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
+     ret = 1;

SOURCES/0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+index 9f86134d923fb..2e601bb9c24be 100755
+--- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
++++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
+ my $LOCALS= 6*$SIZE_T;
+ my $VSXFRAME = $LOCALS + 6*$SIZE_T;
+    $VSXFRAME += 128;	# local variables
+-   $VSXFRAME += 13*16;	# v20-v31 offload
++   $VSXFRAME += 12*16;	# v20-v31 offload
+ 
+ my $BIG_ENDIAN = ($flavour !~ /le/) ? 4 : 0;
+ 
+@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v23,r10,$sp
+-	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v24,r11,$sp
++	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	stvx	v25,r10,$sp
++	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
++	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
++	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+ 	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+@@ -1153,12 +1153,12 @@
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v23,r10,$sp
+-	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v24,r11,$sp
++	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	stvx	v25,r10,$sp
++	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
++	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
++	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+ 	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+@@ -1899,26 +1899,26 @@
+ 	mtspr	256,r12				# restore vrsave
+ 	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v21,r10,$sp
+-	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v22,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v23,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v24,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v25,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v26,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v27,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v28,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v29,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v30,r11,$sp
+-	lvx	v31,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
++	addi	r11,r11,32
++	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+ 	$POP	r27,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+ 	$POP	r28,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+ 	$POP	r29,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)

SOURCES/0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+index fc8f19b48770b..bcbdd24fb8199 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+@@ -289,6 +289,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
+         return 0;
+ 
+     nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
++    if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     /*
+      * (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)
+@@ -324,7 +329,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
++    /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */
++    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {
+ #else
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+index dc7cc64533af2..f8088df14d36c 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
++++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
+     "dhpkey.pem"
+     )) unless disabled("dh");
+ 
+-my @negative_pubtests = ();
++my @negative_pubtests = ("rsapub_17k.pem");  # Too big RSA public key
+ 
+ push(@negative_pubtests, (
+     "dsapub_noparam.der"
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..9a2eaedaf1b22
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----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++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

SOURCES/0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+index 448a3c3043c1c..9010fa6c4638c 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+@@ -1134,6 +1134,7 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
+                                      const struct translation_st *translation,
+                                      struct translation_ctx_st *ctx)
+ {
++    char *p2 = NULL;
+     int ret;
+ 
+     if ((ret = default_check(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
+@@ -1146,13 +1147,25 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
+     if (state == PRE_CTRL_TO_PARAMS) {
+         ctx->p2 = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(ctx->p1);
+         ctx->p1 = 0;
++    } else if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
++        /*
++         * We're translating from params to ctrl and setting the curve name.
++         * The ctrl function needs it to be a NID, but meanwhile, we need
++         * space to get the curve name from the param.  |ctx->name_buf| is
++         * sufficient for that.
++         * The double indirection is necessary for default_fixup_args()'s
++         * call of OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string() to be done correctly.
++         */
++        p2 = ctx->name_buf;
++        ctx->p2 = &p2;
++        ctx->sz = sizeof(ctx->name_buf);
+     }
+ 
+     if ((ret = default_fixup_args(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
+         return ret;
+ 
+     if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
+-        ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(ctx->p2);
++        ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(p2);
+         ctx->p2 = NULL;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -2789,6 +2802,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_setget_params_to_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+             if (translation->fixup_args != NULL)
+                 fixup = translation->fixup_args;
+             ctx.action_type = translation->action_type;
++            ctx.ctrl_cmd = translation->ctrl_num;
+         }
+         ctx.pctx = pctx;
+         ctx.params = params;

SOURCES/0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+index 6fd4184af5a52..80ce31b3bca66 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
+ }
+ 
+@@ -150,6 +156,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
+ {
+     if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
+         return NULL;
++
++    if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+                                    ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+                                    pass, passlen,
+@@ -188,6 +200,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     p7s = ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
+     if (p7s != NULL) {
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+index 67a885a45f89e..68ff54d0e90ee 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
+     saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
+     if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+index 62230bc6187ff..1e5b5495991a4 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+         } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
+-            if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+-                         &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
++            if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
++                    || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
++                                &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+                 goto err;
+         } else {
+             continue;
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+index 49a0da5f819c4..8228315eeaa3a 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
+     int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+     const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
+ 
+-    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
++    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
++        if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
++            return 0;
+         mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+-    else
++    } else {
+         mdalgs = NULL;
++    }
+ 
+     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
+index 1f0cb4d501488..b2c376249646d 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
+ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+ 
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file with/;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+ use Encode;
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) {
+ }
+ $ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1;
+ 
+-plan tests => 13;
++plan tests => 17;
+ 
+ # Test different PKCS#12 formats
+ ok(run(test(["pkcs12_format_test"])), "test pkcs12 formats");
+@@ -148,4 +148,25 @@ ok(grep(/subject=CN = server.example/, @pkcs12info) == 1,
+ # Test that the expected friendly name is present in the output
+ ok(grep(/testname/, @pkcs12info) == 1, "test friendly name in output");
+ 
++# Test some bad pkcs12 files
++my $bad1 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad1.p12");
++my $bad2 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad2.p12");
++my $bad3 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad3.p12");
++
++with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } },
++     sub {
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 1");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:",
++                    "-nomacver"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 1 (nomacver)");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad2, "-password", "pass:"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 2");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad3, "-password", "pass:"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 3");
++     });
++
+ SetConsoleOutputCP($savedcp) if (defined($savedcp));
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f3387c7e356e4aa374729f3f3939343557b9c09
+GIT binary patch
+literal 85
+zcmV-b0IL5mQvv}4Fbf6=Duzgg_YDCD0Wd)@F)$4V31Egu0c8UO0s#d81R(r{)waiY
+rfR=Py6XX<mRyon58xHv)BAVy}k(l(hJwF5pk-=q7<yb@T0s;sC$etR(
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..113cb6f1cd523e880db869f518e60142dc875115
+GIT binary patch
+literal 104
+zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8zIDI;AmiIz{|#&(B{FI%FM#V$jZQ?
+z@Tpc|>#<$m7-wj)xrauuD`}hF=<J_T`^8$QMBK7d>Ng9=0`~S~)@=J%OiUaM0Oze6
+AD*ylh
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef86a1d86fb0bc09471ca2596d82e7d521d973a4
+GIT binary patch
+literal 104
+zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8%fB((ZJAvmyI)_&4V$OnT3gwm4QWp
+zJ2GXlSm>oA$5$MVJL*60=F*5iN*C_e&wD%dwCM*q{=+OBX|Z+F7XSHN#>B+I003La
+BAqM~e
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+

SOURCES/README.FIPS

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-User guide for the FIPS Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OpenSSL Module
-=================================================================
-
-This package contains libraries which comprise the FIPS 140-2
-Red Hat Enterprise Linux - OPENSSL Module.
-
-The module files
-================
-/usr/lib[64]/libcrypto.so.1.1.0
-/usr/lib[64]/libssl.so.1.1.0
-/usr/lib[64]/.libcrypto.so.1.1.0.hmac
-/usr/lib[64]/.libssl.so.1.1.0.hmac
-
-Dependencies
-============
-
-The approved mode of operation requires kernel with /dev/urandom RNG running
-with properties as defined in the security policy of the module. This is
-provided by kernel packages with validated Red Hat Enterprise Linux Kernel
-Crytographic Module.
-
-Installation
-============
-
-The RPM package of the module can be installed by standard tools recommended
-for installation of RPM packages on the Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (yum,
-rpm, RHN remote management tool).
-
-The RPM package dracut-fips must be installed for the approved mode of
-operation.
-
-Usage and API
-=============
-
-The module respects kernel command line FIPS setting. If the kernel command
-line contains option fips=1 the module will initialize in the FIPS approved
-mode of operation automatically. To allow for the automatic initialization the
-application using the module has to call one of the following API calls:
-
-- void OPENSSL_init_library(void) - this will do only a basic initialization
-of the library and does initialization of the FIPS approved mode without setting
-up EVP API with supported algorithms.
-
-- void OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) - this API function calls
-OPENSSL_init() implicitly and also adds all approved algorithms to the EVP API
-in the approved mode 
-
-- void SSL_library_init(void) - it calls OPENSSL_init() implicitly and also
-adds algorithms which are necessary for TLS protocol support and initializes
-the SSL library.
-
-To explicitely put the library to the approved mode the application can call
-the following function:
-
-- int FIPS_mode_set(int on) - if called with 1 as a parameter it will switch
-the library from the non-approved to the approved mode. If any of the selftests
-and integrity verification tests fail, the library is put into the error state
-and 0 is returned. If they succeed the return value is 1.
-
-To query the module whether it is in the approved mode or not:
-
-- int FIPS_mode(void) - returns 1 if the module is in the approved mode,
-0 otherwise.
-
-To query whether the module is in the error state:
-
-- int FIPS_selftest_failed(void) - returns 1 if the module is in the error
-state, 0 otherwise.
-
-To zeroize the FIPS RNG key and internal state the application calls:
-
-- void RAND_cleanup(void)

SOURCES/configuration-prefix.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* Prepended at openssl package build-time.  Don't include this file directly,
  * use <openssl/opensslconf.h> instead. */
 
-#ifndef openssl_opensslconf_multilib_redirection_h
+#ifndef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
 #error "Don't include this file directly, use <openssl/opensslconf.h> instead!"
 #endif
 

SOURCES/configuration-switch.h

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* This file is here to prevent a file conflict on multiarch systems.  A
+ * conflict will frequently occur because arch-specific build-time
+ * configuration options are stored (and used, so they can't just be stripped
+ * out) in configuration.h.  The original configuration.h has been renamed.
+ * DO NOT INCLUDE THE NEW FILE DIRECTLY -- ALWAYS INCLUDE THIS ONE INSTEAD. */
+
+#ifdef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
+#error "Do not define openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h!"
+#endif
+#define openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h
+
+#if defined(__i386__)
+#include "configuration-i386.h"
+#elif defined(__ia64__)
+#include "configuration-ia64.h"
+#elif defined(__mips64) && defined(__MIPSEL__)
+#include "configuration-mips64el.h"
+#elif defined(__mips64)
+#include "configuration-mips64.h"
+#elif defined(__mips) && defined(__MIPSEL__)
+#include "configuration-mipsel.h"
+#elif defined(__mips)
+#include "configuration-mips.h"
+#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
+#include <endian.h>
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+#include "configuration-ppc64.h"
+#else
+#include "configuration-ppc64le.h"
+#endif
+#elif defined(__powerpc__)
+#include "configuration-ppc.h"
+#elif defined(__s390x__)
+#include "configuration-s390x.h"
+#elif defined(__s390__)
+#include "configuration-s390.h"
+#elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__)
+#include "configuration-sparc64.h"
+#elif defined(__sparc__)
+#include "configuration-sparc.h"
+#elif defined(__x86_64__)
+#include "configuration-x86_64.h"
+#else
+#error "The openssl-devel package does not work your architecture?"
+#endif
+
+#undef openssl_conf_multilib_redirection_h

SOURCES/ec_curve.c

@@ -1,582 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include "ec_local.h"
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "internal/nelem.h"
-
-typedef struct {
-    int field_type,             /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
-                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-     seed_len, param_len;
-    unsigned int cofactor;      /* promoted to BN_ULONG */
-} EC_CURVE_DATA;
-
-/* the nist prime curves */
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F,
-        0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5,
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
-        /* a */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
-        /* b */
-        0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56,
-        0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
-        0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4,
-        /* x */
-        0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9,
-        0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
-        0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21,
-        /* y */
-        0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6,
-        0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99,
-        0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
-        0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A,
-        0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73,
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        /* a */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
-        /* b */
-        0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B,
-        0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
-        0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D,
-        0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF,
-        /* x */
-        0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E,
-        0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
-        0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D,
-        0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7,
-        /* y */
-        0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf,
-        0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c,
-        0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce,
-        0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2,
-        0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6];
-} _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17,
-        0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA,
-        /* p */
-        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        /* a */
-        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
-        /* b */
-        0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A,
-        0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
-        0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19,
-        0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
-        0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45,
-        0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00,
-        /* x */
-        0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E,
-        0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
-        0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B,
-        0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
-        0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E,
-        0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66,
-        /* y */
-        0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a,
-        0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b,
-        0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee,
-        0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad,
-        0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe,
-        0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50,
-        /* order */
-        0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86,
-        0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
-        0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F,
-        0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6];
-} _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* seed */
-        0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1,
-        0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90,
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        /* a */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
-        /* b */
-        0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
-        0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
-        0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B,
-        /* x */
-        0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5,
-        0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
-        0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96,
-        /* y */
-        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a,
-        0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce,
-        0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
-        0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
-    }
-};
-
-static const struct {
-    EC_CURVE_DATA h;
-    unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6];
-} _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = {
-    {
-        NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1
-    },
-    {
-        /* no seed */
-        /* p */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F,
-        /* a */
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        /* b */
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-        0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07,
-        /* x */
-        0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95,
-        0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9,
-        0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98,
-        /* y */
-        0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc,
-        0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19,
-        0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8,
-        /* order */
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
-        0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B,
-        0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41
-    }
-};
-
-typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
-    int nid;
-    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-    const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void);
-    const char *comment;
-} ec_list_element;
-
-static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
-    /* prime field curves */
-    /* secg curves */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
-#else
-    {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
-#endif
-    {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
-     "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
-    /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
-    {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
-    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
-#else
-    {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
-     "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
-#endif
-    /* X9.62 curves */
-    {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
-#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
-     EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
-     EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
-#else
-     0,
-#endif
-     "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
-};
-
-#define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list)
-
-static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
-{
-    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
-    EC_POINT *P = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order =
-        NULL;
-    int ok = 0;
-    int seed_len, param_len;
-    const EC_METHOD *meth;
-    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-    const unsigned char *params;
-
-    /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */
-    if (curve.data == NULL)
-        return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL);
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    data = curve.data;
-    seed_len = data->seed_len;
-    param_len = data->param_len;
-    params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
-    params += seed_len;         /* skip seed */
-
-    if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (curve.meth != 0) {
-        meth = curve.meth();
-        if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) ||
-            (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
-        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-    else {                      /* field_type ==
-                                 * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */
-
-        if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-#endif
-
-    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid);
-
-    if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group, P, x, y, ctx)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL
-        || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (seed_len) {
-        if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) {
-            ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-    ok = 1;
- err:
-    if (!ok) {
-        EC_GROUP_free(group);
-        group = NULL;
-    }
-    EC_POINT_free(P);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    BN_free(p);
-    BN_free(a);
-    BN_free(b);
-    BN_free(order);
-    BN_free(x);
-    BN_free(y);
-    return group;
-}
-
-EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
-
-    if (nid <= 0)
-        return NULL;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
-        if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
-            ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
-            break;
-        }
-
-    if (ret == NULL) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems)
-{
-    size_t i, min;
-
-    if (r == NULL || nitems == 0)
-        return curve_list_length;
-
-    min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < min; i++) {
-        r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid;
-        r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment;
-    }
-
-    return curve_list_length;
-}
-
-/* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */
-
-typedef struct {
-    const char *name;           /* NIST Name of curve */
-    int nid;                    /* Curve NID */
-} EC_NIST_NAME;
-
-static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = {
-    {"B-163", NID_sect163r2},
-    {"B-233", NID_sect233r1},
-    {"B-283", NID_sect283r1},
-    {"B-409", NID_sect409r1},
-    {"B-571", NID_sect571r1},
-    {"K-163", NID_sect163k1},
-    {"K-233", NID_sect233k1},
-    {"K-283", NID_sect283k1},
-    {"K-409", NID_sect409k1},
-    {"K-571", NID_sect571k1},
-    {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1},
-    {"P-224", NID_secp224r1},
-    {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
-    {"P-384", NID_secp384r1},
-    {"P-521", NID_secp521r1}
-};
-
-const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
-        if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid)
-            return nist_curves[i].name;
-    }
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) {
-        if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0)
-            return nist_curves[i].nid;
-    }
-    return NID_undef;
-}
-
-#define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
-/*
- * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
- * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
- * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
- *
- * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
- *          if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
- */
-int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
-    size_t i, seed_len;
-    const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
-    unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
-    const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
-    const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
-    const EC_METHOD *meth;
-    const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
-    /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
-    BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
-    meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
-    if (meth == NULL)
-        return -1;
-    /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
-    nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
-    field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
-    seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
-    seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
-    cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
-
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-    /*
-     * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
-     * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
-     * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
-     * EC group order, whichever is larger.
-     */
-    param_len = BN_num_bytes(group->order);
-    len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
-    if (len > param_len)
-        param_len = len;
-
-    /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order)  */
-    param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
-    if (param_bytes == NULL)
-        goto end;
-
-    /* Create the bignums */
-    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
-        if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-            goto end;
-    }
-    /*
-     * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
-     * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
-     */
-    /* Get p, a & b */
-    if (!(EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
-        && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
-        /* Get x & y */
-        && EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
-        /* Get order */
-        && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
-        goto end;
-
-   /*
-     * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
-     * a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
-     * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
-        if (BN_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
-            goto end;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
-        const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
-
-        data = curve.data;
-        /* Get the raw order byte data */
-        params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
-        params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
-
-        /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
-        if (data->field_type == field_type
-            && param_len == data->param_len
-            && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
-            /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
-            && (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
-                || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
-            /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
-            && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
-                || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
-                     && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
-            /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
-            && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
-                             == 0) {
-            ret = curve.nid;
-            goto end;
-        }
-    }
-    /* Gets here if the group was not found */
-    ret = NID_undef;
-end:
-    OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    return ret;
-}

SOURCES/genpatches

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+if [ $# -ne 2 ] ; then
+    echo "Usage:"
+    echo "   $0 <git-dir> <base-tag>"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+git_dir="$1"
+base_tag="$2"
+
+target_dir="$(pwd)"
+
+pushd "$git_dir" >/dev/null
+git format-patch -k -o "$target_dir" "$base_tag" >/dev/null
+popd >/dev/null
+
+echo "# Patches exported from source git"
+
+i=1
+for p in *.patch ; do
+    printf "# "
+    sed '/^Subject:/{s/^Subject: //;p};d' "$p"
+    printf "Patch%s: %s\n" $i "$p"
+    i=$(($i + 1))
+done

SOURCES/hobble-openssl

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-# Quit out if anything fails.
-set -e
-
-# Clean out patent-or-otherwise-encumbered code.
-# MDC-2: 4,908,861 13/03/2007 - expired, we do not remove it but do not enable it anyway
-# IDEA:  5,214,703 07/01/2012 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
-# RC5:   5,724,428 01/11/2015 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
-# EC:    ????????? ??/??/2020
-# SRP:   ????????? ??/??/2017 - expired, we do not remove it anymore
-
-# Remove assembler portions of IDEA, MDC2, and RC5.
-# (find crypto/rc5/asm -type f | xargs -r rm -fv)
-
-for c in `find crypto/bn -name "*gf2m.c"`; do
-	echo Destroying $c
-	> $c
-done
-
-for c in `find crypto/ec -name "ec2*.c" -o -name "ec_curve.c"`; do
-	echo Destroying $c
-	> $c
-done
-
-for c in `find test -name "ectest.c"`; do
-	echo Destroying $c
-	> $c
-done
-
-for h in `find crypto ssl apps test -name "*.h"` ; do
-	echo Removing EC2M references from $h
-	cat $h | \
-	awk    'BEGIN {ech=1;} \
-		/^#[ \t]*ifndef.*NO_EC2M/ {ech--; next;} \
-                /^#[ \t]*if/ {if(ech < 1) ech--;} \
-		{if(ech>0) {;print $0};} \
-		/^#[ \t]*endif/ {if(ech < 1) ech++;}' > $h.hobbled && \
-	mv $h.hobbled $h
-done

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-addrconfig.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From a3f4cd5019b60649f6eb216ebe99caa43cd96f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 14:40:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] BIO_lookup_ex: use AI_ADDRCONFIG only if explicit host name
- is given
-
-The flag only affects which record types are queried (A or AAAA, or
-both), and when node is NULL, it prevents getaddrinfo returning the
-right address associated with the loopback interface.
-
-Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
----
- crypto/bio/b_addr.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
-index b023bbda40..ea15601f3d 100644
---- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
-+++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c
-@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
-         hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
- # ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
- #  ifdef AF_UNSPEC
--        if (family == AF_UNSPEC)
-+        if (host != NULL && family == AF_UNSPEC)
- #  endif
-             hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
- # endif
--- 
-2.30.2
-

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-alpn-cb.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-commit 9e885a707d604e9528b5491b78fb9c00f41193fc
-Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
-Date:   Thu Mar 26 15:59:00 2020 +0100
-
-    s_server: Properly indicate ALPN protocol mismatch
-    
-    Return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL from alpn_select_cb so that
-    an alert is sent to the client on ALPN protocol mismatch.
-    
-    Fixes: #2708
-    
-    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11415)
-
-diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
-index bcc83e562c..591c6c19c5 100644
---- a/apps/s_server.c
-+++ b/apps/s_server.c
-@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
-     if (SSL_select_next_proto
-         ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in,
-          inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
--        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-     }
- 
-     if (!s_quiet) {

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-apps-dgst.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c
---- openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c.dgst	2019-02-26 15:15:30.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1b/apps/ca.c	2019-03-15 15:53:46.622267688 +0100
-@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ const OPTIONS ca_options[] = {
-     {"enddate", OPT_ENDDATE, 's',
-      "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ cert notAfter (overrides -days)"},
-     {"days", OPT_DAYS, 'p', "Number of days to certify the cert for"},
--    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; one of md2, md5, sha or sha1"},
-+    {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "md to use; see openssl help for list"},
-     {"policy", OPT_POLICY, 's', "The CA 'policy' to support"},
-     {"keyfile", OPT_KEYFILE, 's', "Private key"},
-     {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Private key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"},

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-build.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf
---- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf.build	2020-03-31 14:17:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/10-main.conf	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
-@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ my %targets = (
-         cxxflags         => add("-m64"),
-         lib_cppflags     => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
-         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64le",
-+        multilib         => "64",
-     },
- 
-     "linux-armv4" => {
-@@ -718,6 +719,7 @@ my %targets = (
-     "linux-aarch64" => {
-         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic64", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
-         perlasm_scheme   => "linux64",
-+        multilib         => "64",
-     },
-     "linux-arm64ilp32" => {  # https://wiki.linaro.org/Platform/arm64-ilp32
-         inherit_from     => [ "linux-generic32", asm("aarch64_asm") ],
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
---- openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl.build	2020-04-07 16:42:10.920546387 +0200
-+++ openssl-1.1.1f/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl	2020-04-07 16:44:23.539142108 +0200
-@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ uninstall_runtime_libs:
- install_man_docs:
- 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
- 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing manpages"
--	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
-+	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
- 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)" --type=man --suffix=$(MANSUFFIX)
- 
- uninstall_man_docs:
-@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ uninstall_man_docs:
- install_html_docs:
- 	@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] || (echo INSTALLTOP should not be empty; exit 1)
- 	@$(ECHO) "*** Installing HTML manpages"
--	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
-+	TZ=UTC $(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/process_docs.pl \
- 		"--destdir=$(DESTDIR)$(HTMLDIR)" --type=html
- 
- uninstall_html_docs:

SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
---- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg	2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- #endif
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-+static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-+#endif
- static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
- static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
-@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_de
-         TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
-         SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
-         | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
--        NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
-+        init_ec_point_formats, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
-         tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
-         final_ec_pt_formats
-     },
-@@ -1164,6 +1165,17 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
- }
- #endif
- 
-+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-+static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
-+{
-+	    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
-+	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = NULL;
-+	    s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
-+
-+	    return 1;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
- {
-     s->ext.use_etm = 0;