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import UBI openssl-1.1.1k-14.el8_6

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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-10-09 12:32:02 +00:00
parent 0c1547eaa0
commit d735cdb5ac
3 changed files with 278 additions and 20 deletions
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8
SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-cleanup-peer-point-reneg.patch
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@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c
--- openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg 2021-03-25 14:28:38.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c 2021-06-24 16:16:19.526181743 +0200
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static int tls_parse_certificate_authori
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+#endif
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
@ -20,11 +18,10 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl
tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
final_ec_pt_formats
},
@@ -1164,6 +1165,17 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int init_ec_point_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
@ -33,7 +30,6 @@ diff -up openssl-1.1.1k/ssl/statem/extensions.c.cleanup-reneg openssl-1.1.1k/ssl
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{

255
SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
From d1d4b56fe0c9a4200276d630f62108e1165e0990 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 10:53:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Backport openssl: SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread from 3.2
Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
same for the server list while we are about it.
CVE-2024-5535
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 11:14:33 +0100
Merged from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24717.
Backported-by: Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com>
we did't ported test changes because rely on internal testing framework.
---
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod | 28 +++++++----
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 64 +++++++++++++++----------
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c | 30 +++++++++++-
ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c | 3 +-
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
index e90caec..a3f8dfd 100644
--- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb.pod
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
const unsigned char *server,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client,
- unsigned int client_len)
+ unsigned int client_len);
void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
unsigned *len);
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ SSL_select_next_proto, SSL_get0_alpn_selected, SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos() and SSL_set_alpn_protos() are used by the client to
set the list of protocols available to be negotiated. The B<protos> must be in
protocol-list format, described below. The length of B<protos> is specified in
-B<protos_len>.
+B<protos_len>. Setting B<protos_len> to 0 clears any existing list of ALPN
+protocols and no ALPN extension will be sent to the server.
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb() sets the application callback B<cb> used by a
server to select which protocol to use for the incoming connection. When B<cb>
@@ -73,9 +74,16 @@ B<server_len> and B<client>, B<client_len> must be in the protocol-list format
described below. The first item in the B<server>, B<server_len> list that
matches an item in the B<client>, B<client_len> list is selected, and returned
in B<out>, B<outlen>. The B<out> value will point into either B<server> or
-B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. If no match is found, the first
-item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>. This
-function can also be used in the NPN callback.
+B<client>, so it should be copied immediately. The client list must include at
+least one valid (nonempty) protocol entry in the list.
+
+The SSL_select_next_proto() helper function can be useful from either the ALPN
+callback or the NPN callback (described below). If no match is found, the first
+item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in B<out>, B<outlen> and
+B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> is returned. This can be useful when implementating
+the NPN callback. In the ALPN case, the value returned in B<out> and B<outlen>
+must be ignored if B<OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP> has been returned from
+SSL_select_next_proto().
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called when a
client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list, and a
@@ -85,9 +93,10 @@ must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within B<in>).
The length of the protocol name must be written into B<outlen>. The
server's advertised protocols are provided in B<in> and B<inlen>. The
callback can assume that B<in> is syntactically valid. The client must
-select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
-a value other than B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK>. The B<arg> parameter is the pointer
-set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
+select a protocol (although it may be an empty, zero length protocol). It is
+fatal to the connection if this callback returns a value other than
+B<SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK> or if the zero length protocol is selected. The B<arg>
+parameter is the pointer set via SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb().
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb() sets a callback B<cb> that is called
when a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
@@ -149,7 +158,8 @@ A match was found and is returned in B<out>, B<outlen>.
=item OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP
No match was found. The first item in B<client>, B<client_len> is returned in
-B<out>, B<outlen>.
+B<out>, B<outlen> (or B<NULL> and 0 in the case where the first entry in
+B<client> is invalid).
=back
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index c71c686..21e6c45 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2739,38 +2739,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
unsigned int server_len,
const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
{
- unsigned int i, j;
- const unsigned char *result;
- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
+ *out = NULL;
+ *outlen = 0;
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
+ * a match.
+ */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
/*
* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
- /* We found a match */
- result = &server[i];
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
- goto found;
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
+ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
+ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
+ /* We found a match */
+ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
+ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
+ } else {
+ /* This should never happen */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
}
- j += client[j];
- j++;
}
- i += server[i];
- i++;
+ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
}
- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
- result = client;
- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
- *outlen = result[0];
- return status;
-}
+ /*
+ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
+ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
+ */
+ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index ce8a757..cfde733 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -1585,8 +1585,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
PACKET_data(pkt),
PACKET_remaining(pkt),
- s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ || selected_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
@@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
size_t len;
+ PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
+ int valid = 0;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
@@ -1637,6 +1639,30 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+
+ /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
+ /* Valid protocol found */
+ valid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!valid) {
+ /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
+ SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
index 3c7395c..4e3cbf8 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
@@ -1559,9 +1559,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
- return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
#endif
--
2.46.0

35
SPECS/openssl.spec
View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.1.1k
Release: 12%{?dist}
Release: 14%{?dist}
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ Patch107: openssl-1.1.1-cve-2023-5678.patch
# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2/RHEL 9
# Proper fix for CVE-2020-25659
Patch108: openssl-1.1.1-pkcs1-implicit-rejection.patch
# Backport from OpenSSL 3.2
# Fix for CVE-2024-5535
Patch109: openssl-1.1.1-fix-ssl-select-next-proto.patch
License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -232,6 +235,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
%patch106 -p1 -b .cve-2023-3817
%patch107 -p1 -b .cve-2023-5678
%patch108 -p1 -b .pkcs15imprejection
%patch109 -p1 -b .cve-2024-5535
%build
# Figure out which flags we want to use.
@ -515,49 +519,52 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
* Tue Sep 17 2024 Maurizio Barbaro <mbarbaro@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-14
- Backport fix SSL_select_next proto from OpenSSL 3.2
Fix CVE-2024-5535
Resolves: RHEL-45654
* Thu Nov 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-12
- Backport implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 to RHEL-8 series
(a proper fix for CVE-2020-25659)
Resolves: RHEL-17696
Resolves: RHEL-17694
* Wed Nov 15 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-11
- Fix CVE-2023-5678: Generating excessively long X9.42 DH keys or checking
excessively long X9.42 DH keys or parameters may be very slow
Resolves: RHEL-16538
Resolves: RHEL-16536
* Thu Oct 19 2023 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-10
- Fix CVE-2023-3446: Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters
Resolves: RHEL-14245
Resolves: RHEL-14243
- Fix CVE-2023-3817: Excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value
Resolves: RHEL-14239
Resolves: RHEL-14237
* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
* Thu May 04 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-9
- Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Resolves: CVE-2022-4304
- Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex
Resolves: CVE-2022-4450
- Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF
Resolves: CVE-2023-0215
* Wed Feb 08 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
- Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName
Resolves: CVE-2023-0286
* Thu Jul 21 2022 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-8
- Fix no-ec build
Resolves: rhbz#2071020
* Tue Jul 05 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-7
- Fix CVE-2022-2097: AES OCB fails to encrypt some bytes on 32-bit x86
Resolves: CVE-2022-2097
- Update expired certificates used in the testsuite
Resolves: rhbz#2092462
Resolves: rhbz#2100554
- Fix CVE-2022-1292: openssl: c_rehash script allows command injection
Resolves: rhbz#2090372
Resolves: rhbz#2090371
- Fix CVE-2022-2068: the c_rehash script allows command injection
Resolves: rhbz#2098279
Resolves: rhbz#2098278
* Wed Mar 23 2022 Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-6
- Fixes CVE-2022-0778 openssl: Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt() reachable when parsing certificates
- Resolves: rhbz#2067146
- Resolves: rhbz#2067145
* Tue Nov 16 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:1.1.1k-5
- Fixes CVE-2021-3712 openssl: Read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings