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import openssl-3.0.0-4.el9

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This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2021-12-07 13:44:58 -05:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent fbde049751
commit c60058c17a
17 changed files with 1013 additions and 246 deletions
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2
.openssl.metadata
View File

@ -1 +1 @@
cf283f0e3bdfd2c7480797583c78efe4cabf600e SOURCES/openssl-3.0.0-hobbled.tar.xz 68bab87c3606ad903a4b74e2cd79bf3bb30fd6b3 SOURCES/openssl-3.0.0-hobbled.tar.xz

2
SOURCES/0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
View File

@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure.sys-default openssl-3.0.0-beta1/Configure
+# +#
# --banner=".." Output specified text instead of default completion banner # --banner=".." Output specified text instead of default completion banner
# #
# --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components. # -w Don't wait after showing a Configure warning
@@ -385,6 +389,7 @@ $config{prefix}=""; @@ -385,6 +389,7 @@ $config{prefix}="";
$config{openssldir}=""; $config{openssldir}="";
$config{processor}=""; $config{processor}="";

71
SOURCES/0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c
--- openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c.kernel-fips 2021-03-16 00:09:55.814826432 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha13/crypto/context.c 2021-03-16 00:15:55.129043811 +0100
@@ -12,11 +12,46 @@
#include "internal/bio.h"
#include "internal/provider.h"
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+
struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st {
ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_fn *fn;
struct ossl_lib_ctx_onfree_list_st *next;
};
+# define FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled"
+
+static int kernel_fips_flag;
+
+static void read_kernel_fips_flag(void)
+{
+ char buf[2] = "0";
+ int fd;
+
+ if (ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE") != NULL) {
+ buf[0] = '1';
+ } else if ((fd = open(FIPS_MODE_SWITCH_FILE, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
+ while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) ;
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (buf[0] == '1') {
+ kernel_fips_flag = 1;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag()
+{
+ return kernel_fips_flag;
+}
+
+
struct ossl_lib_ctx_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA data;
@@ -121,6 +170,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL default_conte
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(default_context_do_init)
{
+ read_kernel_fips_flag();
return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&default_context_thread_local, NULL)
&& context_init(&default_context_int);
}
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips openssl-3.0.0/include/internal/provider.h
--- openssl-3.0.0/include/internal/provider.h.embed-fips 2021-11-12 12:18:36.215333452 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/include/internal/provider.h 2021-11-12 12:22:41.298409269 +0100
@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ int ossl_provider_init_as_child(OSSL_LIB
const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *in);
+/* FIPS flag access */
+int ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag(void);
+
# ifdef __cplusplus
}
# endif

22
SOURCES/0020-sigalgs-fix-alerts.patch
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@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 3579202c22..134c948bcb 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -3302,7 +3302,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
@@ -3317,7 +3317,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
if (i == sent_sigslen) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}

38
SOURCES/0021-fix-core-dump-req.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c.req-segfault openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c.req-segfault 2021-08-10 16:24:58.784384336 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c 2021-08-10 16:26:38.347688172 +0200
@@ -996,8 +996,8 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(tpubkey, "RSA")) {
BIGNUM *n = NULL;
- /* Every RSA key has an 'n' */
- EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, "n", &n);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(tpubkey, "n", &n))
+ goto end;
BN_print(out, n);
BN_free(n);
} else {
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/test/recipes/25-test_req.t.req-segfault openssl-3.0.0-beta2/test/recipes/25-test_req.t
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/test/recipes/25-test_req.t.req-segfault 2021-08-10 16:26:53.305884053 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/test/recipes/25-test_req.t 2021-08-10 16:28:33.674221058 +0200
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ subtest "generating alt certificate requ
subtest "generating certificate requests with RSA" => sub {
- plan tests => 7;
+ plan tests => 8;
SKIP: {
skip "RSA is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 2
@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ subtest "generating certificate requests
ok(run(app(["openssl", "req",
"-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
+ "-modulus", "-in", "testreq-rsa.pem", "-noout"])),
+ "Printing a modulus of the request key");
+
+ ok(run(app(["openssl", "req",
+ "-config", srctop_file("test", "test.cnf"),
"-new", "-out", "testreq_withattrs_pem.pem", "-utf8",
"-key", srctop_file("test", "testrsa_withattrs.pem")])),
"Generating request from a key with extra attributes - PEM");

33
SOURCES/0022-fix-openssl-req-password.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c.req-password openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c.req-password 2021-08-10 16:31:04.726233653 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/req.c 2021-08-10 16:31:58.286947297 +0200
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(genctx);
genctx = NULL;
}
- if (keyout == NULL) {
+ if (keyout == NULL && keyfile == NULL) {
keyout = NCONF_get_string(req_conf, section, KEYFILE);
if (keyout == NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man1/openssl-req.pod.in.req-password openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man1/openssl-req.pod.in
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man1/openssl-req.pod.in.req-password 2021-08-10 16:32:21.863261416 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man1/openssl-req.pod.in 2021-08-10 16:33:19.173025012 +0200
@@ -205,11 +205,12 @@ See L<openssl-format-options(1)> for det
=item B<-keyout> I<filename>
This gives the filename to write any private key to that has been newly created
-or read from B<-key>.
-If the B<-keyout> option is not given the filename specified in the
-configuration file with the B<default_keyfile> option is used, if present.
-If a new key is generated and no filename is specified
-the key is written to standard output.
+or read from B<-key>. If neither the B<-keyout> option nor the B<-key> option
+are given then the filename specified in the configuration file with the
+B<default_keyfile> option is used, if present. Thus, if you want to write the
+private key and the B<-key> option is provided, you should provide the
+B<-keyout> option explicitly. If a new key is generated and no filename is
+specified the key is written to standard output.
=item B<-noenc>

38
SOURCES/0023-cms-stdin.patch
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@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/cms.c.cms-stdin openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/cms.c
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/cms.c.cms-stdin 2021-08-10 16:20:07.787573587 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/cms.c 2021-08-10 16:23:08.500940124 +0200
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ static void warn_binary(const char *file
unsigned char linebuf[1024], *cur, *end;
int len;
+ if (file == NULL)
+ return; /* cannot give a warning for stdin input */
if ((bio = bio_open_default(file, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY)) == NULL)
return; /* cannot give a proper warning since there is an error */
while ((len = BIO_read(bio, linebuf, sizeof(linebuf))) > 0) {
@@ -482,13 +484,9 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
rr_allorfirst = 1;
break;
case OPT_RCTFORM:
- if (rctformat == FORMAT_ASN1) {
- if (!opt_format(opt_arg(),
- OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME, &rctformat))
- goto opthelp;
- } else {
- rcms = load_content_info(rctformat, rctin, 0, NULL, "recipient");
- }
+ if (!opt_format(opt_arg(),
+ OPT_FMT_PEMDER | OPT_FMT_SMIME, &rctformat))
+ goto opthelp;
break;
case OPT_CERTFILE:
certfile = opt_arg();
@@ -954,7 +952,7 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
- rcms = load_content_info(rctformat, rctin, 0, NULL, "recipient");
+ rcms = load_content_info(rctformat, rctin, 0, NULL, "receipt");
if (rcms == NULL)
goto end;
}

50
SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/openssl.cnf diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov 2021-08-16 14:02:48.029645419 +0200 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov 2021-09-09 12:06:40.895793297 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/openssl.cnf 2021-08-16 14:14:48.006409467 +0200 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf 2021-09-09 12:12:33.947482500 +0200
@@ -43,28 +43,29 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1 @@ -42,36 +42,29 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6 tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7 tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0-beta2/ap
ssl_conf = ssl_module ssl_conf = ssl_module
-# List of providers to load -# List of providers to load
-[provider_sect]
-default = default_sect
-# The fips section name should match the section name inside the
-# included fipsmodule.cnf.
-# fips = fips_sect
+# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider. +# Uncomment the sections that start with ## below to enable the legacy provider.
+# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms: +# Loading the legacy provider enables support for the following algorithms:
+# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160 +# Hashing Algorithms / Message Digests: MD2, MD4, MDC2, WHIRLPOOL, RIPEMD160
@ -27,30 +32,33 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0-beta2/ap
+# In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for +# In general it is not recommended to use the above mentioned algorithms for
+# security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable +# security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
+# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated. +# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
+
[provider_sect] -# If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.
-default = default_sect -# See man 7 OSSL_PROVIDER-default for more details.
-# The fips section name should match the section name inside the -#
-# included fipsmodule.cnf. -# If you add a section explicitly activating any other provider(s), you most
-# fips = fips_sect -# probably need to explicitly activate the default provider, otherwise it
- -# becomes unavailable in openssl. As a consequence applications depending on
-# OpenSSL may not work correctly which could lead to significant system
-# problems including inability to remotely access the system.
-[default_sect] -[default_sect]
-# activate = 1 -# activate = 1
+##default = default_sect +[provider_sect]
+default = default_sect
+##legacy = legacy_sect +##legacy = legacy_sect
+## +##
+##[default_sect] +[default_sect]
+##activate = 1 +activate = 1
+## +
+##[legacy_sect] +##[legacy_sect]
+##activate = 1 +##activate = 1
[ ssl_module ] [ ssl_module ]
diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man5/config.pod diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov 2021-08-16 14:12:35.021606001 +0200 --- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov 2021-09-09 12:09:38.079040853 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man5/config.pod 2021-08-16 14:14:47.077396867 +0200 +++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod 2021-09-09 12:11:56.646224876 +0200
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ significant. @@ -273,6 +273,14 @@ significant.
All parameters in the section as well as sub-sections are made All parameters in the section as well as sub-sections are made
available to the provider. available to the provider.
@ -62,6 +70,6 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0-beta2/doc/man5/config.pod.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0-beta2
+security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable +security critical operations, as they are cryptographically weak or vulnerable
+to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated. +to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
+ +
=head2 EVP Configuration =head3 Default provider and its activation
The name B<alg_section> in the initialization section names the section If no providers are activated explicitly, the default one is activated implicitly.

70
SOURCES/0025-cms-stdin2.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
From 9bdf6bb619543248c1bee1d8207b455c1ee40ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 16:45:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Get rid of warn_binary
Current implementation of warn_binary introduces a regression
when the content is passed in /dev/stdin as an explicit file name
and reads the file to be processed twice otherwise.
I suggest to reimplement this functionality after 3.0 if necessary.
Fixes #16359
---
apps/cms.c | 29 -----------------------------
1 file changed, 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/cms.c b/apps/cms.c
index c22027e3b198..b30273f1710d 100644
--- a/apps/cms.c
+++ b/apps/cms.c
@@ -272,31 +272,6 @@ static CMS_ContentInfo *load_content_info(int informat, BIO *in, int flags,
return NULL;
}
-static void warn_binary(const char *file)
-{
- BIO *bio;
- unsigned char linebuf[1024], *cur, *end;
- int len;
-
- if (file == NULL)
- return; /* cannot give a warning for stdin input */
- if ((bio = bio_open_default(file, 'r', FORMAT_BINARY)) == NULL)
- return; /* cannot give a proper warning since there is an error */
- while ((len = BIO_read(bio, linebuf, sizeof(linebuf))) > 0) {
- end = linebuf + len;
- for (cur = linebuf; cur < end; cur++) {
- if (*cur == '\0' || *cur >= 0x80) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: input file '%s' contains %s"
- " character; better use -binary option\n",
- file, *cur == '\0' ? "NUL" : "8-bit");
- goto end;
- }
- }
- }
- end:
- BIO_free(bio);
-}
-
int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
CONF *conf = NULL;
@@ -911,8 +886,6 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
- if ((flags & CMS_BINARY) == 0)
- warn_binary(infile);
in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r',
binary_files ? FORMAT_BINARY : informat);
if (in == NULL)
@@ -924,8 +897,6 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
if (contfile != NULL) {
BIO_free(indata);
- if ((flags & CMS_BINARY) == 0)
- warn_binary(contfile);
if ((indata = BIO_new_file(contfile, "rb")) == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read content file %s\n", contfile);
goto end;

18
SOURCES/0025-for-tests.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.xxx 2021-11-23 16:29:50.618691603 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf 2021-11-23 16:28:16.872882099 +0100
@@ -55,11 +55,11 @@ providers = provider_sect
# to side-channel attacks and as such have been deprecated.
[provider_sect]
-default = default_sect
+##default = default_sect
##legacy = legacy_sect
##
-[default_sect]
-activate = 1
+##[default_sect]
+##activate = 1
##[legacy_sect]
##activate = 1

18
SOURCES/0030-tmp-Fix-rng-seed-double-free.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
index 173c99ce1732..7a4b780bb469 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
@@ -201,10 +201,11 @@ static size_t seed_get_seed(void *vseed, unsigned char **pout,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- *pout = p;
if (seed_src_generate(vseed, p, bytes_needed, 0, prediction_resistance,
- adin, adin_len) != 0)
+ adin, adin_len) != 0) {
+ *pout = p;
return bytes_needed;
+ }
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(p, bytes_needed);
return 0;
}

40
SOURCES/0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t.beldmit 2021-09-22 11:56:49.452507975 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t 2021-09-22 11:57:19.371764742 +0200
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ unless ($no_fips) {
srctop_file("test", "recipes", "90-test_sslapi_data",
"passwd.txt"), $tmpfilename, "fips",
srctop_file("test", "fips-and-base.cnf")])),
- "running sslapitest");
+ "running sslapitest - FIPS");
}
unlink $tmpfilename;
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index e95d2657f46c..7af0eab3fce0 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -1158,6 +1158,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls(int cis_ktls, int sis_ktls,
goto end;
}
+ if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
+ testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(),
@@ -1292,6 +1297,11 @@ static int execute_test_ktls_sendfile(int tls_version, const char *cipher)
goto end;
}
+ if (is_fips && strstr(cipher, "CHACHA") != NULL) {
+ testresult = TEST_skip("CHACHA is not supported in FIPS");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* Create a session based on SHA-256 */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(libctx, TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(),

155
SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/crypto/provider_conf.c.fips-force openssl-3.0.0/crypto/provider_conf.c
--- openssl-3.0.0/crypto/provider_conf.c.fips-force 2021-11-12 14:21:01.878339467 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/crypto/provider_conf.c 2021-11-12 16:13:19.301542866 +0100
@@ -136,13 +136,73 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
return 0;
}
+static int provider_conf_activate(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl,
+ const char *name, const char *value, const char *path,
+ int soft, const CONF *cnf)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(pcgbl->lock)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!prov_already_activated(name, pcgbl->activated_providers)) {
+ /*
+ * There is an attempt to activate a provider, so we should disable
+ * loading of fallbacks. Otherwise a misconfiguration could mean the
+ * intended provider does not get loaded. Subsequent fetches could
+ * then fallback to the default provider - which may be the wrong
+ * thing.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_provider_disable_fallback_loading(libctx)) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prov = ossl_provider_find(libctx, name, 1);
+ if (prov == NULL)
+ prov = ossl_provider_new(libctx, name, NULL, 1);
+ if (prov == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
+ if (soft)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (path != NULL)
+ ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
+
+ ok = cnf ? provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf) : 1;
+
+ if (ok) {
+ if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
+ ok = 0;
+ } else if (!ossl_provider_add_to_store(prov, &actual, 0)) {
+ ossl_provider_deactivate(prov);
+ ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (pcgbl->activated_providers == NULL)
+ pcgbl->activated_providers = sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_new_null();
+ sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_push(pcgbl->activated_providers, actual);
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ok)
+ ossl_provider_free(prov);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+
+
static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
{
int i;
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
int soft = 0;
- OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL, *actual = NULL;
const char *path = NULL;
long activate = 0;
int ok = 0;
@@ -185,55 +245,7 @@ static int provider_conf_load(OSSL_LIB_C
}
if (activate) {
- if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(pcgbl->lock)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!prov_already_activated(name, pcgbl->activated_providers)) {
- /*
- * There is an attempt to activate a provider, so we should disable
- * loading of fallbacks. Otherwise a misconfiguration could mean the
- * intended provider does not get loaded. Subsequent fetches could
- * then fallback to the default provider - which may be the wrong
- * thing.
- */
- if (!ossl_provider_disable_fallback_loading(libctx)) {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- prov = ossl_provider_find(libctx, name, 1);
- if (prov == NULL)
- prov = ossl_provider_new(libctx, name, NULL, 1);
- if (prov == NULL) {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
- if (soft)
- ERR_clear_error();
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (path != NULL)
- ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
-
- ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, NULL, value, cnf);
-
- if (ok) {
- if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov, 1, 0)) {
- ok = 0;
- } else if (!ossl_provider_add_to_store(prov, &actual, 0)) {
- ossl_provider_deactivate(prov);
- ok = 0;
- } else {
- if (pcgbl->activated_providers == NULL)
- pcgbl->activated_providers = sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_new_null();
- sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_push(pcgbl->activated_providers, actual);
- ok = 1;
- }
- }
- if (!ok)
- ossl_provider_free(prov);
- }
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pcgbl->lock);
+ ok = provider_conf_activate(libctx, pcgbl, name, value, path, soft, cnf);
} else {
OSSL_PROVIDER_INFO entry;
@@ -294,6 +306,19 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODU
return 0;
}
+ if (ossl_get_kernel_fips_flag() != 0) { /* XXX from provider_conf_load */
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NCONF_get0_libctx((CONF *)cnf);
+ PROVIDER_CONF_GLOBAL *pcgbl
+ = ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_PROVIDER_CONF_INDEX,
+ &provider_conf_ossl_ctx_method);
+ if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, pcgbl, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, pcgbl, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(libctx, 1) != 1)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}

223
SOURCES/0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac openssl-3.0.0/providers/fips/self_test.c
--- openssl-3.0.0/providers/fips/self_test.c.embed-hmac 2021-11-16 13:57:05.127171056 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/providers/fips/self_test.c 2021-11-16 14:07:21.963412455 +0100
@@ -171,11 +171,27 @@ DEP_FINI_ATTRIBUTE void cleanup(void)
}
#endif
+#define HMAC_LEN 32
+/*
+ * The __attribute__ ensures we've created the .rodata1 section
+ * static ensures it's zero filled
+*/
+static const volatile unsigned char __attribute__ ((section (".rodata1"))) fips_hmac_container[HMAC_LEN] = {0};
+
/*
* Calculate the HMAC SHA256 of data read using a BIO and read_cb, and verify
* the result matches the expected value.
* Return 1 if verified, or 0 if it fails.
*/
+#ifndef __USE_GNU
+#define __USE_GNU
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#undef __USE_GNU
+#else
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#endif
+#include <link.h>
+
static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BIO *bio, OSSL_FUNC_BIO_read_ex_fn read_ex_cb,
unsigned char *expected, size_t expected_len,
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, OSSL_SELF_TEST *ev,
@@ -183,14 +199,26 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
{
int ret = 0, status;
unsigned char out[MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char buf[INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf[INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE+HMAC_LEN];
size_t bytes_read = 0, out_len = 0;
EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ Dl_info info;
+ void *extra_info = NULL;
+ struct link_map *lm = NULL;
+ unsigned long paddr;
+ unsigned long off = 0;
+ int have_rest = 0;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(ev, event_type, OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_INTEGRITY_HMAC);
+ if (!dladdr1 ((const void *)fips_hmac_container,
+ &info, &extra_info, RTLD_DL_LINKMAP))
+ goto err;
+ lm = extra_info;
+ paddr = (unsigned long)fips_hmac_container - lm->l_addr;
+
mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, MAC_NAME, NULL);
if (mac == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -204,12 +233,53 @@ static int verify_integrity(OSSL_CORE_BI
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, fixed_key, sizeof(fixed_key), params))
goto err;
+ status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, HMAC_LEN, &bytes_read);
+ if (status != 1 || bytes_read != HMAC_LEN)
+ goto err;
+ off += HMAC_LEN;
+
while (1) {
- status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf, sizeof(buf), &bytes_read);
- if (status != 1)
+ status = read_ex_cb(bio, buf+HMAC_LEN, INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, &bytes_read);
+ if (status != 1) {
+ have_rest = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (bytes_read == INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE) { /* Full block */
+ /* Logic:
+ * We have HMAC_LEN (read before) + INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE (read now) in buffer
+ * We calculate HMAC from first INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE bytes
+ * and move last HMAC_LEN bytes to the beginning of the buffer
+ *
+ * If we have read (a part of) buffer fips_hmac_container
+ * we should replace it with zeros.
+ * If it is inside our current buffer, we will update now.
+ * If it intersects the upper bound, we will clean up on the next step.
+ */
+ if (off - HMAC_LEN <= paddr && paddr <= off + bytes_read)
+ memset (buf + HMAC_LEN + paddr - off, 0, HMAC_LEN);
+ off += bytes_read;
+
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy (buf, buf+INTEGRITY_BUF_SIZE, HMAC_LEN);
+ } else { /* Final block */
+ /* Logic is basically the same as in previous branch
+ * but we calculate HMAC from HMAC_LEN (rest of previous step)
+ * and bytes_read read on this step
+ * */
+ if (off - HMAC_LEN <= paddr && paddr <= off + bytes_read)
+ memset (buf + HMAC_LEN + paddr - off, 0, HMAC_LEN);
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read+HMAC_LEN))
+ goto err;
+ off += bytes_read;
break;
- if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, bytes_read))
+ }
+ }
+ if (have_rest) {
+ if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, buf, HMAC_LEN))
goto err;
+ off += HMAC_LEN;
}
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out)))
goto err;
@@ -284,8 +358,7 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(fips_state_lock);
}
- if (st == NULL
- || st->module_checksum_data == NULL) {
+ if (st == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONFIG_DATA);
goto end;
}
@@ -294,8 +367,9 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
if (ev == NULL)
goto end;
- module_checksum = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(st->module_checksum_data,
- &checksum_len);
+ module_checksum = fips_hmac_container;
+ checksum_len = sizeof(fips_hmac_container);
+
if (module_checksum == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONFIG_DATA);
goto end;
@@ -357,7 +431,6 @@ int SELF_TEST_post(SELF_TEST_POST_PARAMS
ok = 1;
end:
OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(ev);
- OPENSSL_free(module_checksum);
OPENSSL_free(indicator_checksum);
if (st != NULL) {
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/00-prep_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-11-18 09:39:53.386817874 +0100
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
use platform;
-my $no_check = disabled("fips");
+my $no_check = 1;
plan skip_all => "FIPS module config file only supported in a fips build"
if $no_check;
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/01-test_fipsmodule_cnf.t 2021-11-18 09:59:02.315619486 +0100
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
use platform;
-my $no_check = disabled("fips");
+my $no_check = 1;
plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build"
if $no_check;
plan tests => 1;
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/03-test_fipsinstall.t 2021-11-18 09:59:55.365072074 +0100
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
use platform;
-plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if disabled("fips");
+plan skip_all => "Test only supported in a fips build" if 1;
plan tests => 29;
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/30-test_defltfips.t 2021-11-18 10:22:54.179659682 +0100
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
plan tests =>
($no_fips ? 1 : 5);
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t 2021-09-07 13:46:32.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/80-test_ssl_new.t 2021-11-18 10:18:53.391721164 +0100
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
$ENV{TEST_CERTS_DIR} = srctop_dir("test", "certs");
diff -ruN openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t
--- openssl-3.0.0/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t 2021-11-18 10:32:17.734196705 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0-xxx/test/recipes/90-test_sslapi.t 2021-11-18 10:18:30.695538445 +0100
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
-my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_fips = 1; #disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
plan skip_all => "No TLS/SSL protocols are supported by this OpenSSL build"
if alldisabled(grep { $_ ne "ssl3" } available_protocols("tls"));
--- /dev/null 2021-11-16 15:27:32.915000000 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/test/fipsmodule.cnf 2021-11-18 11:15:34.538060408 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[fips_sect]
+activate = 1

392
SOURCES/0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c
--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c.xxx 2021-11-22 13:09:28.232560235 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/fipsinstall.c 2021-11-22 13:12:22.272058910 +0100
@@ -311,6 +311,9 @@ int fipsinstall_main(int argc, char **ar
EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
CONF *conf = NULL;
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "This command is not enabled in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL build, please consult Red Hat documentation to learn how to enable FIPS mode\n");
+ return 1;
+
if ((opts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
goto end;
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in.xxx 2021-11-22 13:19:55.192959061 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl-fipsinstall.pod.in 2021-11-22 13:20:56.978491104 +0100
@@ -8,224 +8,10 @@ openssl-fipsinstall - perform FIPS confi
=head1 SYNOPSIS
B<openssl fipsinstall>
-[B<-help>]
-[B<-in> I<configfilename>]
-[B<-out> I<configfilename>]
-[B<-module> I<modulefilename>]
-[B<-provider_name> I<providername>]
-[B<-section_name> I<sectionname>]
-[B<-verify>]
-[B<-mac_name> I<macname>]
-[B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>]
-[B<-noout>]
-[B<-quiet>]
-[B<-no_conditional_errors>]
-[B<-no_security_checks>]
-[B<-self_test_onload>]
-[B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>]
-[B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>]
-[B<-config> I<parent_config>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-This command is used to generate a FIPS module configuration file.
-This configuration file can be used each time a FIPS module is loaded
-in order to pass data to the FIPS module self tests. The FIPS module always
-verifies its MAC, but optionally only needs to run the KAT's once,
-at installation.
-
-The generated configuration file consists of:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item - A MAC of the FIPS module file.
-
-=item - A test status indicator.
-
-This indicates if the Known Answer Self Tests (KAT's) have successfully run.
-
-=item - A MAC of the status indicator.
-
-=item - A control for conditional self tests errors.
-
-By default if a continuous test (e.g a key pair test) fails then the FIPS module
-will enter an error state, and no services or cryptographic algorithms will be
-able to be accessed after this point.
-The default value of '1' will cause the fips module error state to be entered.
-If the value is '0' then the module error state will not be entered.
-Regardless of whether the error state is entered or not, the current operation
-(e.g. key generation) will return an error. The user is responsible for retrying
-the operation if the module error state is not entered.
-
-=item - A control to indicate whether run-time security checks are done.
-
-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
-The default value of '1' will perform the checks.
-If the value is '0' the checks are not performed and FIPS compliance must
-be done by procedures documented in the relevant Security Policy.
-
-=back
-
-This file is described in L<fips_config(5)>.
-
-=head1 OPTIONS
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<-help>
-
-Print a usage message.
-
-=item B<-module> I<filename>
-
-Filename of the FIPS module to perform an integrity check on.
-The path provided in the filename is used to load the module when it is
-activated, and this overrides the environment variable B<OPENSSL_MODULES>.
-
-=item B<-out> I<configfilename>
-
-Filename to output the configuration data to; the default is standard output.
-
-=item B<-in> I<configfilename>
-
-Input filename to load configuration data from.
-Must be used if the B<-verify> option is specified.
-
-=item B<-verify>
-
-Verify that the input configuration file contains the correct information.
-
-=item B<-provider_name> I<providername>
-
-Name of the provider inside the configuration file.
-The default value is C<fips>.
-
-=item B<-section_name> I<sectionname>
-
-Name of the section inside the configuration file.
-The default value is C<fips_sect>.
-
-=item B<-mac_name> I<name>
-
-Specifies the name of a supported MAC algorithm which will be used.
-The MAC mechanisms that are available will depend on the options
-used when building OpenSSL.
-To see the list of supported MAC's use the command
-C<openssl list -mac-algorithms>. The default is B<HMAC>.
-
-=item B<-macopt> I<nm>:I<v>
-
-Passes options to the MAC algorithm.
-A comprehensive list of controls can be found in the EVP_MAC implementation
-documentation.
-Common control strings used for this command are:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<key>:I<string>
-
-Specifies the MAC key as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains
-printable characters only).
-The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
-A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
-If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
-configured is used.
-
-=item B<hexkey>:I<string>
-
-Specifies the MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
-The key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
-A key must be specified for every MAC algorithm.
-If no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was
-configured is used.
-
-=item B<digest>:I<string>
-
-Used by HMAC as an alphanumeric string (use if the key contains printable
-characters only).
-The string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm.
-To see the list of supported digests, use the command
-C<openssl list -digest-commands>.
-The default digest is SHA-256.
-
-=back
-
-=item B<-noout>
-
-Disable logging of the self tests.
-
-=item B<-no_conditional_errors>
-
-Configure the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test
-fails as described above.
-
-=item B<-no_security_checks>
-
-Configure the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
-
-=item B<-self_test_onload>
-
-Do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and
-"MAC status indicator" to the output configuration file. Without these fields
-the self tests KATS will run each time the module is loaded. This option could be
-used for cross compiling, since the self tests need to run at least once on each
-target machine. Once the self tests have run on the target machine the user
-could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other
-mechanism.
-
-=item B<-quiet>
-
-Do not output pass/fail messages. Implies B<-noout>.
-
-=item B<-corrupt_desc> I<selftest_description>,
-B<-corrupt_type> I<selftest_type>
-
-The corrupt options can be used to test failure of one or more self tests by
-name.
-Either option or both may be used to select the tests to corrupt.
-Refer to the entries for B<st-desc> and B<st-type> in L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)> for
-values that can be used.
-
-=item B<-config> I<parent_config>
-
-Test that a FIPS provider can be loaded from the specified configuration file.
-A previous call to this application needs to generate the extra configuration
-data that is included by the base C<parent_config> configuration file.
-See L<config(5)> for further information on how to set up a provider section.
-All other options are ignored if '-config' is used.
-
-=back
-
-=head1 EXAMPLES
-
-Calculate the mac of a FIPS module F<fips.so> and run a FIPS self test
-for the module, and save the F<fips.cnf> configuration file:
-
- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips
-
-Verify that the configuration file F<fips.cnf> contains the correct info:
-
- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -in fips.cnf -provider_name fips -verify
-
-Corrupt any self tests which have the description C<SHA1>:
-
- openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips \
- -corrupt_desc 'SHA1'
-
-Validate that the fips module can be loaded from a base configuration file:
-
- export OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE=<path of configuration files>
- export OPENSSL_MODULES=<provider-path>
- openssl fipsinstall -config' 'default.cnf'
-
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<config(5)>,
-L<fips_config(5)>,
-L<OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7)>,
-L<EVP_MAC(3)>
+This command is disabled. Please consult Red Hat Enterprise Linux documentation to learn how to correctly enable FIPS mode on Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:18:51.081406990 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man1/openssl.pod 2021-11-22 13:19:02.897508738 +0100
@@ -158,10 +158,6 @@ Engine (loadable module) information and
Error Number to Error String Conversion.
-=item B<fipsinstall>
-
-FIPS configuration installation.
-
=item B<gendsa>
Generation of DSA Private Key from Parameters. Superseded by
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:24:51.359509501 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/config.pod 2021-11-22 13:26:02.360121820 +0100
@@ -573,7 +573,6 @@ configuration files using that syntax wi
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<openssl-x509(1)>, L<openssl-req(1)>, L<openssl-ca(1)>,
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
L<ASN1_generate_nconf(3)>,
L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>,
L<CONF_modules_load(3)>,
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:21:13.812636065 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man5/fips_config.pod 2021-11-22 13:24:12.278172847 +0100
@@ -6,106 +6,10 @@ fips_config - OpenSSL FIPS configuration
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-A separate configuration file, using the OpenSSL L<config(5)> syntax,
-is used to hold information about the FIPS module. This includes a digest
-of the shared library file, and status about the self-testing.
-This data is used automatically by the module itself for two
-purposes:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item - Run the startup FIPS self-test known answer tests (KATS).
-
-This is normally done once, at installation time, but may also be set up to
-run each time the module is used.
-
-=item - Verify the module's checksum.
-
-This is done each time the module is used.
-
-=back
-
-This file is generated by the L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)> program, and
-used internally by the FIPS module during its initialization.
-
-The following options are supported. They should all appear in a section
-whose name is identified by the B<fips> option in the B<providers>
-section, as described in L<config(5)/Provider Configuration Module>.
-
-=over 4
-
-=item B<activate>
-
-If present, the module is activated. The value assigned to this name is not
-significant.
-
-=item B<install-version>
-
-A version number for the fips install process. Should be 1.
-
-=item B<conditional-errors>
-
-The FIPS module normally enters an internal error mode if any self test fails.
-Once this error mode is active, no services or cryptographic algorithms are
-accessible from this point on.
-Continuous tests are a subset of the self tests (e.g., a key pair test during key
-generation, or the CRNG output test).
-Setting this value to C<0> allows the error mode to not be triggered if any
-continuous test fails. The default value of C<1> will trigger the error mode.
-Regardless of the value, the operation (e.g., key generation) that called the
-continuous test will return an error code if its continuous test fails. The
-operation may then be retried if the error mode has not been triggered.
-
-=item B<security-checks>
-
-This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters
-such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used.
-A value of '1' will perform the checks, otherwise if the value is '0' the checks
-are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in
-the relevant Security Policy.
-
-=item B<module-mac>
-
-The calculated MAC of the FIPS provider file.
-
-=item B<install-status>
-
-An indicator that the self-tests were successfully run.
-This should only be written after the module has
-successfully passed its self tests during installation.
-If this field is not present, then the self tests will run when the module
-loads.
-
-=item B<install-mac>
-
-A MAC of the value of the B<install-status> option, to prevent accidental
-changes to that value.
-It is written-to at the same time as B<install-status> is updated.
-
-=back
-
-For example:
-
- [fips_sect]
- activate = 1
- install-version = 1
- conditional-errors = 1
- security-checks = 1
- module-mac = 41:D0:FA:C2:5D:41:75:CD:7D:C3:90:55:6F:A4:DC
- install-mac = FE:10:13:5A:D3:B4:C7:82:1B:1E:17:4C:AC:84:0C
- install-status = INSTALL_SELF_TEST_KATS_RUN
-
-=head1 NOTES
-
-When using the FIPS provider, it is recommended that the
-B<config_diagnostics> option is enabled to prevent accidental use of
-non-FIPS validated algorithms via broken or mistaken configuration.
-See L<config(5)>.
-
-=head1 SEE ALSO
-
-L<config(5)>
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>
+This command is disabled in Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The FIPS provider is
+automatically loaded when the system is boots in FIPS mode, or when the
+environment variable B<OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE> is set. See the documentation
+for more information.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod
--- openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod.xxx 2021-11-22 13:18:13.850086386 +0100
+++ openssl-3.0.0/doc/man7/OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS.pod 2021-11-22 13:18:24.607179038 +0100
@@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ A simple self test callback is shown bel
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<openssl-fipsinstall(1)>,
L<fips_config(5)>,
L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_set_callback(3)>,
L<OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(3)>,

12
SOURCES/0100-coverity.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/s_client.c.coverity openssl-3.0.0/apps/s_client.c
--- openssl-3.0.0/apps/s_client.c.coverity 2021-10-07 16:59:37.938432118 +0200
+++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/s_client.c 2021-10-07 17:00:52.994075755 +0200
@@ -3040,6 +3040,8 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
OPENSSL_free(connectstr);
OPENSSL_free(bindstr);
+ OPENSSL_free(bindhost);
+ OPENSSL_free(bindport);
OPENSSL_free(host);
OPENSSL_free(port);
OPENSSL_free(thost);

75
SPECS/openssl.spec
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl Name: openssl
Version: 3.0.0 Version: 3.0.0
Release: 0.beta2.7%{?dist} Release: 4%{?dist}
Epoch: 1 Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below. # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Source9: configuration-switch.h
Source10: configuration-prefix.h Source10: configuration-prefix.h
Source12: ec_curve.c Source12: ec_curve.c
Source13: ectest.c Source13: ectest.c
Source14: 0025-for-tests.patch
# Patches exported from source git # Patches exported from source git
# Aarch64 and ppc64le use lib64 # Aarch64 and ppc64le use lib64
@ -49,21 +50,23 @@ Patch7: 0007-Add-support-for-PROFILE-SYSTEM-system-default-cipher.patch
# Add FIPS_mode() compatibility macro # Add FIPS_mode() compatibility macro
Patch8: 0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch Patch8: 0008-Add-FIPS_mode-compatibility-macro.patch
# Add check to see if fips flag is enabled in kernel # Add check to see if fips flag is enabled in kernel
#Patch9: 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch Patch9: 0009-Add-Kernel-FIPS-mode-flag-support.patch
# remove unsupported EC curves # remove unsupported EC curves
Patch11: 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch Patch11: 0011-Remove-EC-curves.patch
# Update alerts according to #1965017
Patch20: 0020-sigalgs-fix-alerts.patch
# Fixes core dump in openssl req -modulus
Patch21: 0021-fix-core-dump-req.patch
# Fixes 'openssl req' to not ask for password when non-encrypted key
Patch22: 0022-fix-openssl-req-password.patch
# cms: Do not try to check binary format on stdin and -rctform fix
Patch23: 0023-cms-stdin.patch
# Instructions to load legacy provider in openssl.cnf # Instructions to load legacy provider in openssl.cnf
Patch24: 0024-load-legacy-prov.patch Patch24: 0024-load-legacy-prov.patch
# cms: don't read /dev/stdin twice # Tmp: Upstream #16636
Patch25: 0025-cms-stdin2.patch Patch30: 0030-tmp-Fix-rng-seed-double-free.patch
# Tmp: test name change
Patch31: 0031-tmp-Fix-test-names.patch
# We load FIPS provider and set FIPS properties implicitly
Patch32: 0032-Force-fips.patch
# Embed HMAC into the fips.so
Patch33: 0033-FIPS-embed-hmac.patch
# Comment out fipsinstall command-line utility
Patch34: 0034.fipsinstall_disable.patch
# Tmp: coverity
Patch100: 0100-coverity.patch
License: ASL 2.0 License: ASL 2.0
URL: http://www.openssl.org/ URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@ -119,7 +122,7 @@ package provides Perl scripts for converting certificates and keys
from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit. from other formats to the formats used by the OpenSSL toolkit.
%prep %prep
%autosetup -S git -n %{name}-%{version}-beta2 %autosetup -S git -n %{name}-%{version}
# The hobble_openssl is called here redundantly, just to be sure. # The hobble_openssl is called here redundantly, just to be sure.
# The tarball has already the sources removed. # The tarball has already the sources removed.
@ -230,23 +233,34 @@ done
# We must revert patch4 before tests otherwise they will fail # We must revert patch4 before tests otherwise they will fail
patch -p1 -R < %{PATCH4} patch -p1 -R < %{PATCH4}
#We must disable default provider before tests otherwise they will fail
patch -p1 < %{SOURCE14}
OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY= OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY=
export OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY export OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY
OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE=xyz_nonexistent_file OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE=xyz_nonexistent_file
export OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE export OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CIPHERS_OVERRIDE
#embed HMAC into fips provider for test run
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=. apps/openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:f4556650ac31d35461610bac4ed81b1a181b2d8a43ea2854cbae22ca74560813 < providers/fips.so > providers/fips.so.hmac
cp providers/fips.so providers/fips.so.orig
objcopy --update-section .rodata1=providers/fips.so.hmac providers/fips.so providers/fips.so.mac
mv providers/fips.so.mac providers/fips.so
#run tests itself
make test HARNESS_JOBS=8 make test HARNESS_JOBS=8
# Add generation of HMAC checksum of the final stripped library # Add generation of HMAC checksum of the final stripped library
#%define __spec_install_post \ # We manually copy standard definition of __spec_install_post
# %{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \ # and add hmac calculation/embedding to fips.so
# %{__arch_install_post} \ %define __spec_install_post \
# %{__os_install_post} \ %{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \
# crypto/fips/fips_standalone_hmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/libcrypto.so.%{version} >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/.libcrypto.so.%{version}.hmac \ %{__arch_install_post} \
# ln -sf .libcrypto.so.%{version}.hmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/.libcrypto.so.%{soversion}.hmac \ %{__os_install_post} \
# crypto/fips/fips_standalone_hmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/libssl.so.%{version} >$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/.libssl.so.%{version}.hmac \ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=. apps/openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:f4556650ac31d35461610bac4ed81b1a181b2d8a43ea2854cbae22ca74560813 < $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so > $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.hmac \
# ln -sf .libssl.so.%{version}.hmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/.libssl.so.%{soversion}.hmac \ cp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.orig \
#%{nil} objcopy --update-section .rodata1=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.hmac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.mac \
mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.mac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so \
rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.hmac \
%{nil}
%define __provides_exclude_from %{_libdir}/openssl %define __provides_exclude_from %{_libdir}/openssl
@ -386,6 +400,23 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE9} \
%ldconfig_scriptlets libs %ldconfig_scriptlets libs
%changelog %changelog
* Thu Nov 18 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.0-4
- Embed FIPS HMAC in fips.so
- Enforce loading FIPS provider when FIPS kernel flag is on
* Thu Oct 07 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.0-3
- Fix memory leak in s_client
- Related: rhbz#1996092
* Mon Sep 20 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.0-2
- Avoid double-free on error seeding the RNG.
- KTLS and FIPS may interfere, so tests need to be tuned
- Resolves: rhbz#1952844, rhbz#1961643
* Thu Sep 09 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.0-1
- Rebase to upstream version 3.0.0
- Related: rhbz#1990814
* Wed Aug 25 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.0-0.beta2.7 * Wed Aug 25 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.0-0.beta2.7
- Removes the dual-abi build as it not required anymore. The mass rebuild - Removes the dual-abi build as it not required anymore. The mass rebuild
was completed and all packages are rebuilt against Beta version. was completed and all packages are rebuilt against Beta version.