From 729d2d0e11358df28a8cd6700e1da7b13f2d5a9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tomas Mraz Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 18:08:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Multiple security issues fixed. - fix CVE-2015-0209 - potential use after free in d2i_ECPrivateKey() - fix CVE-2015-0286 - improper handling of ASN.1 boolean comparison - fix CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse decoding memory corruption - fix CVE-2015-0289 - NULL dereference decoding invalid PKCS#7 data - fix CVE-2015-0293 - triggerable assert in SSLv2 server --- openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch | 13 +++ openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch | 46 ++++++++ openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch | 12 +++ openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch | 102 ++++++++++++++++++ openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch | 27 +++++ openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch | 163 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ openssl.spec | 21 +++- 7 files changed, 383 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch create mode 100644 openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch create mode 100644 openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch create mode 100644 openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch create mode 100644 openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch create mode 100644 openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64ec2b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.bool-cmp openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c.bool-cmp 2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/a_type.c 2015-03-18 14:38:07.111401390 +0100 +@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, co + case V_ASN1_OBJECT: + result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); + break; ++ case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: ++ result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean; ++ break; + case V_ASN1_NULL: + result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ + break; diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f77b099 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.item-reuse openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.item-reuse 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c 2015-03-19 15:46:51.097022616 +0100 +@@ -310,9 +310,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, + case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: + if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) + goto auxerr; +- +- /* Allocate structure */ +- if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) ++ if (*pval) ++ { ++ /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */ ++ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it); ++ if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) ++ { ++ tt = it->templates + i; ++ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); ++ ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt); ++ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it); ++ } ++ } ++ else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, + ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); +@@ -407,6 +417,19 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, + if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL)) + goto auxerr; + ++ /* Free up and zero any ADB found */ ++ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) ++ { ++ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) ++ { ++ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ++ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; ++ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); ++ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); ++ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); ++ } ++ } ++ + /* Get each field entry */ + for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) + { diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8dc6b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c.req-null-deref openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c.req-null-deref 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/x509/x509_req.c 2015-03-18 18:34:35.732448017 +0100 +@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ X509_REQ *X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_ + goto err; + + pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x); ++ if (pktmp == NULL) ++ goto err; + i=X509_REQ_set_pubkey(ret,pktmp); + EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); + if (!i) goto err; diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ca78b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.ssl2-assert 2015-03-18 13:02:36.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c 2015-03-18 18:22:20.195322489 +0100 +@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s) + + OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0 + && s->session->master_key_length +- < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); ++ <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key)); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1); + c++; +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c.ssl2-assert 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_srvr.c 2015-03-18 18:30:11.403974038 +0100 +@@ -446,9 +446,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY); + return(-1); + } +- i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc, +- &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), +- (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + + is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher); + +@@ -467,21 +464,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) + else + ek=5; + ++ /* ++ * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is ++ * 1 byte message type ++ * 3 bytes cipher ++ * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear) ++ * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc) ++ * 2-byte key args length (IV etc) ++ * clear key ++ * encrypted key ++ * key args ++ * ++ * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes ++ * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of ++ * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher, ++ * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length ++ * must be zero). ++ */ ++ if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) || ++ (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) ++ { ++ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ /* ++ * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key. ++ * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted ++ * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now. ++ */ ++ if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) || ++ (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) ++ { ++ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR); ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc, ++ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), ++ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]), ++ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING : RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ++ + /* bad decrypt */ + #if 1 + /* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a + * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */ +- if ((i < 0) || +- ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) +- || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i != +- (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))) ++ if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)) ++ || (is_export && i != ek))) + { + ERR_clear_error(); + if (is_export) + i=ek; + else + i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); +- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0) ++ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear],i) <= 0) + return 0; + } + #else +@@ -505,7 +542,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s) + } + #endif + +- if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear; ++ if (is_export) ++ i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); + + if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..994f963 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.use-after-free 2014-10-15 15:49:54.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c 2015-03-19 17:28:03.349627040 +0100 +@@ -1142,8 +1142,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } +- if (a) +- *a = ret; + } + else + ret = *a; +@@ -1225,11 +1223,13 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, con + ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY; + } + ++ if (a) ++ *a = ret; + ok = 1; + err: + if (!ok) + { +- if (ret) ++ if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret)) + EC_KEY_free(ret); + ret = NULL; + } diff --git a/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef95c7c --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs7-null-deref openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c +--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c.pkcs7-null-deref 2015-01-08 15:00:36.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c 2015-03-19 17:30:36.797650980 +0100 +@@ -272,6 +272,27 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) + PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ /* ++ * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really ++ * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures). ++ * ++ * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an ++ * error. ++ * ++ * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before ++ * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error. ++ */ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); + p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; + +@@ -433,6 +454,18 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE + unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL; + int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); + p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; + +@@ -752,6 +785,18 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) + STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); + i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type); + p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER; +@@ -796,6 +841,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) + /* If detached data then the content is excluded */ + if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) { + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); ++ os = NULL; + p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL; + } + break; +@@ -806,6 +852,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) + if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) + { + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os); ++ os = NULL; + p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL; + } + break; +@@ -878,23 +925,32 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio) + M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len); + } + +- if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) ++ if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) + { +- char *cont; +- long contlen; +- btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM); +- if (btmp == NULL) +- { +- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); ++ /* ++ * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached ++ * digested data support is broken. ++ */ ++ if (os == NULL) + goto err; ++ if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) ++ { ++ char *cont; ++ long contlen; ++ btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM); ++ if (btmp == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL,PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); ++ /* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data ++ * instead of making an extra copy. ++ */ ++ BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); ++ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); ++ ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); + } +- contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont); +- /* Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data +- * instead of making an extra copy. +- */ +- BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); +- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0); +- ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen); + } + ret=1; + err: +@@ -971,6 +1027,18 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_st + STACK_OF(X509) *cert; + X509 *x509; + ++ if (p7 == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) ++ { ++ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) + { + cert=p7->d.sign->cert; +diff -up openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.pkcs7-null-deref openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c.pkcs7-null-deref 2014-10-15 15:49:15.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1k/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c 2015-03-19 17:30:36.797650980 +0100 +@@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EV + + STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7) + { ++ if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL) ++ return NULL; + if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) + { + return(p7->d.sign->signer_info); diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec index d638755..71e568b 100644 --- a/openssl.spec +++ b/openssl.spec @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation Name: openssl Version: 1.0.1k -Release: 5%{?dist} +Release: 6%{?dist} Epoch: 1 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below. @@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ Patch84: openssl-1.0.1k-trusted-first.patch Patch85: openssl-1.0.1e-arm-use-elf-auxv-caps.patch Patch86: openssl-1.0.1k-ephemeral-key-size.patch Patch87: openssl-1.0.1e-cc-reqs.patch +Patch101: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0209.patch +Patch102: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0286.patch +Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0287.patch +Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch +Patch105: openssl-1.0.1k-cve-2015-0289.patch +Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch License: OpenSSL Group: System Environment/Libraries @@ -213,6 +219,12 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/ %patch85 -p1 -b .armcap %patch86 -p1 -b .ephemeral %patch87 -p1 -b .cc-reqs +%patch101 -p1 -b .use-after-free +%patch102 -p1 -b .bool-cmp +%patch103 -p1 -b .item-reuse +%patch104 -p1 -b .req-null-deref +%patch105 -p1 -b .pkcs7-null-deref +%patch106 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h @@ -480,6 +492,13 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.* %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig %changelog +* Thu Mar 19 2015 Tomáš Mráz 1.0.1k-6 +- fix CVE-2015-0209 - potential use after free in d2i_ECPrivateKey() +- fix CVE-2015-0286 - improper handling of ASN.1 boolean comparison +- fix CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse decoding memory corruption +- fix CVE-2015-0289 - NULL dereference decoding invalid PKCS#7 data +- fix CVE-2015-0293 - triggerable assert in SSLv2 server + * Mon Mar 16 2015 Tomáš Mráz 1.0.1k-5 - fix bug in the CRYPTO_128_unwrap()