import UBI openssl-3.0.7-27.el9

SOURCES/0004-Override-default-paths-for-the-CA-directory-tree.patch

@@ -30,12 +30,17 @@ index c0afb96716..d6a5fabd16 100644
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf.default-tls	2021-07-06 13:41:39.204978272 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0-alpha16/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-07-06 13:49:50.362857683 +0200
-@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
+@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
  
  [openssl_init]
  providers = provider_sect
 +# Load default TLS policy configuration
 +ssl_conf = ssl_module
++alg_section = evp_properties
++
++[ evp_properties ]
++#This section is intentionally added empty here
++#to be tuned on particular systems
  
  # List of providers to load
  [provider_sect]

SOURCES/0012-Disable-explicit-ec.patch

@@ -26,6 +26,94 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/cry
      ret->version = priv_key->version;
  
      if (priv_key->privateKey) {
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+index a84e088c19..6c37bf78ae 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+@@ -1724,6 +1724,11 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+         goto err;
+     }
+     if (named_group == group) {
++        if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0, NULL) == NID_undef) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP);
++            goto err;
++        }
++#if 0
+         /*
+          * If we did not find a named group then the encoding should be explicit
+          * if it was specified
+@@ -1739,6 +1744,7 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_params(const OSSL_PARAM params[],
+             goto err;
+         }
+         EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE);
++#endif
+     } else {
+         EC_GROUP_free(group);
+         group = named_group;
+diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
+index 4890b0555e..e11aec5b3b 100644
+--- a/test/ectest.c
++++ b/test/ectest.c
+@@ -2301,10 +2301,11 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
+     if (!TEST_ptr(params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld))
+         || !TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL))
+         || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx), 0)
+-        || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
++        || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &pkeyparam,
+                                           EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params), 0))
+         goto err;
+-
++/* As creating the key should fail, the rest of the test is pointless */
++# if 0
+     /*- Check that all the set values are retrievable -*/
+ 
+     /* There should be no match to a group name since the generator changed */
+@@ -2433,6 +2434,7 @@ static int do_test_custom_explicit_fromdata(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ #endif
+         )
+         goto err;
++#endif
+     ret = 1;
+ err:
+     BN_free(order_out);
+@@ -2714,21 +2716,21 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
+ 
+     /* Compute keyexchange in both directions */
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx1 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey1, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 1)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
++            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx1), 0)
++/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx1, pkey2), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, NULL, &sslen), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, sslen)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1))
++            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx1, buf1, &sslen), 1)*/)
+         goto err;
+     if (!TEST_ptr(pctx2 = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey2, NULL))
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
++            || !TEST_int_le(EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx2), 1)
++/*          || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx2, pkey1), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, NULL, &t), 1)
+             || !TEST_int_gt(bsize, t)
+             || !TEST_int_le(sslen, t)
+-            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1))
++            || !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx2, buf2, &t), 1) */)
+         goto err;
+-
++#if 0
+     /* Both sides should expect the same shared secret */
+     if (!TEST_mem_eq(buf1, sslen, buf2, t))
+         goto err;
+@@ -2780,7 +2782,7 @@ static int custom_params_test(int id)
+             /* compare with previous result */
+             || !TEST_mem_eq(buf1, t, buf2, sslen))
+         goto err;
+-
++#endif
+     ret = 1;
+ 
+  err:
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c.disable_explicit_ec	2022-03-21 16:55:46.005558779 +0100
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/test/endecode_test.c	2022-03-21 16:56:12.636792762 +0100

SOURCES/0024-load-legacy-prov.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf
 --- openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov	2021-09-09 12:06:40.895793297 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf	2021-09-09 12:12:33.947482500 +0200
-@@ -42,36 +42,29 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
+@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ tsa_policy1 = 1.2.3.4.1
  tsa_policy2 = 1.2.3.4.5.6
  tsa_policy3 = 1.2.3.4.5.7
  
@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.c
  [openssl_init]
  providers = provider_sect
  # Load default TLS policy configuration
- ssl_conf = ssl_module
+@@ -42,23 +42,27 @@ [ evp_properties ]
+ #This section is intentionally added empty here
+ #to be tuned on particular systems
  
 -# List of providers to load
 -[provider_sect]
@@ -52,6 +54,9 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.cnf.legacy-prov openssl-3.0.0/apps/openssl.c
 +
 +##[legacy_sect]
 +##activate = 1
++
++#Place the third party provider configuration files into this folder
++.include /etc/pki/tls/openssl.d
  
  [ ssl_module ]
  

SOURCES/0032-Force-fips.patch

@@ -7,10 +7,11 @@
 diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c
 --- openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact	2022-05-12 12:44:31.199034948 +0200
 +++ openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c	2022-05-12 12:49:17.468318373 +0200
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static int prov_already_activated(const
  #include <string.h>
  #include <openssl/trace.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
  #include <openssl/conf.h>
  #include <openssl/safestack.h>
@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provi
      } else {
          OSSL_PROVIDER_INFO entry;
  
-@@ -306,6 +317,30 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODU
+@@ -306,6 +317,33 @@ static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODU
              return 0;
      }
  
@@ -173,6 +174,9 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provider_conf.c.fipsact openssl-3.0.1/crypto/provi
 +            if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "fips", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
 +                return 0;
 +        }
++        /* provider_conf_load can return 1 even wwhen the test is failed so check explicitly */
++        if (OSSL_PROVIDER_available(libctx, "fips") != 1)
++            return 0;
 +        if (provider_conf_activate(libctx, "base", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) != 1)
 +            return 0;
 +        if (EVP_default_properties_enable_fips(libctx, 1) != 1)

SOURCES/0049-Selectively-disallow-SHA1-signatures.patch

@@ -287,22 +287,6 @@ index 699ada7c52..e534ad0a5f 100644
      return mdnid;
  }
  
-@@ -244,5 +254,15 @@ int ossl_digest_is_allowed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
-     if (ossl_securitycheck_enabled(ctx))
-         return ossl_digest_get_approved_nid(md) != NID_undef;
- # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_SECURITYCHECKS */
-+
-+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-+    {
-+        int mdnid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
-+        if ((mdnid == NID_sha1 || mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
-+                && !ossl_ctx_legacy_digest_signatures_allowed(ctx, 0))
-+            return 0;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-     return 1;
- }
 diff --git a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c b/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c
 index de7f0d3a0a..ce54a94fbc 100644
 --- a/providers/common/securitycheck_default.c

SOURCES/0056-strcasecmp.patch

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c
  
 -int OPENSSL_strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
 +int
-+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
 +                    symver ("OPENSSL_strcasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
 +#endif
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ diff -up openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c.cmp openssl-3.0.7/crypto/o_str.c
  
 -int OPENSSL_strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
 +int
-+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
++#if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 +__attribute__ ((symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@@OPENSSL_3.0.3"),
 +                    symver ("OPENSSL_strncasecmp@OPENSSL_3.0.1")))
 +#endif

SOURCES/0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+diff --git a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+index 45010b90db..b396c8651a 100644
+--- a/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
++++ b/providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
+@@ -120,14 +120,18 @@ static int siv_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
+     if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+         return 0;
+ 
+-    if (inl == 0) {
+-        *outl = 0;
+-        return 1;
+-    }
++    /* Ignore just empty encryption/decryption call and not AAD. */
++    if (out != NULL) {
++        if (inl == 0) {
++            if (outl != NULL)
++                *outl = 0;
++            return 1;
++        }
+ 
+-    if (outsize < inl) {
+-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+-        return 0;
++        if (outsize < inl) {
++            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
++            return 0;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     if (ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) <= 0)

SOURCES/0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 0b391910d6..84a926998e 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+     if (nid != NID_undef)
+         return 1;
+ 
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+         return 0;
+ 
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index b97871eca7..36420f51d8 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -89,7 +89,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_dh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **ukm);
+ #  include <openssl/dherr.h>
+ 
+ #  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+-#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS    10000
++#   define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS        10000
++#  endif
++
++#  ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++#   define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  32768
+ #  endif
+ 
+ #  define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024
+diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
+index 7b587f3cfa..f8dd8f3aa7 100644
+--- a/test/dhtest.c
++++ b/test/dhtest.c
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+         goto err1;
+ 
+     /* check fails, because p is way too small */
+-    if (!DH_check(dh, &i))
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+         goto err2;
+     i ^= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
+     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+@@ -124,6 +124,17 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+     ERR_clear_error();
+ 
++    /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
++    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
++            || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
++        goto err3;
++
++    /*
++     * We expect no checks at all for an excessively large modulus
++     */
++    if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
++        goto err3;
++
+     /*
+      * II) key generation
+      */
+@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+         goto err3;
+ 
+     /* ... and check whether it is valid */
+-    if (!DH_check(a, &i))
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(a, &i)))
+         goto err3;
+     if (!TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+             || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME)

SOURCES/0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index aef6f9b1b7..fbe2797569 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
+ #else
+-    int ok = 0, r;
++    int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
+     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+     BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+     int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
+@@ -172,6 +172,13 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+         goto err;
+ 
+     if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
++        if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
++            q_good = 1;
++        else
++            *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
++    }
++
++    if (q_good) {
+         if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+             *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+         else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
+diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
+index f8dd8f3aa7..d02b3b7c58 100644
+--- a/test/dhtest.c
++++ b/test/dhtest.c
+@@ -124,6 +124,15 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+     ERR_clear_error();
+ 
++    if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(q, p)) || !TEST_true(BN_add(q, q, BN_value_one())))
++        goto err3;
++
++    if (!TEST_true(DH_check(dh, &i)))
++        goto err3;
++    if (!TEST_true(i & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE)
++        || !TEST_false(i & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME))
++        goto err3;
++
+     /* Modulus of size: dh check max modulus bits + 1 */
+     if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 1))
+             || !TEST_true(BN_lshift(p, p, OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)))
+@@ -135,6 +144,9 @@ static int dh_test(void)
+     if (!TEST_false(DH_check(dh, &i)))
+         goto err3;
+ 
++    /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
++    ERR_clear_error();
++
+     /*
+      * II) key generation
+      */

SOURCES/0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+index 7ba2beae7f..e20eb62081 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+@@ -249,6 +249,18 @@ int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
+  */
+ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+ {
++    /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
++    if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
++        *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
++        return 1;
++    }
++
+     return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+index 4152397426..f76ac0dd14 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR),
+     "parameter encoding error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR), "peer key error"},
++    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE), "q too large"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR), "shared info error"},
+     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR),
+     "unable to check generator"},
+diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+index d84ea99241..afc49f5cdc 100644
+--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
++++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (dh->params.q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        goto err;
++    }
++
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+         return 0;
+@@ -267,6 +273,12 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (dh->params.q != NULL
++        && BN_num_bits(dh->params.q) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+         return 0;
+diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+index e51504b7ab..36de321b74 100644
+--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
++++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET:107:no parameters set
+ DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE:100:no private value
+ DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR:105:parameter encoding error
+ DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR:111:peer key error
++DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE:130:q too large
+ DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR:113:shared info error
+ DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR:121:unable to check generator
+ DSA_R_BAD_FFC_PARAMETERS:114:bad ffc parameters
+diff --git a/include/crypto/dherr.h b/include/crypto/dherr.h
+index bb24d131eb..519327f795 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/dherr.h
++++ b/include/crypto/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 2020-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
+index 6533260f20..50e0cf54be 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
+@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ #   define DH_GENERATOR_3          3
+ #   define DH_GENERATOR_5          5
+ 
+-/* DH_check error codes */
++/* DH_check error codes, some of them shared with DH_check_pub_key */
+ /*
+  * NB: These values must align with the equivalently named macros in
+  * internal/ffc.h.
+@@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(DHparams)
+ #   define DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR    0x04
+ #   define DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR       0x08
+ #   define DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME            0x10
+-#   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20
++#   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE        0x20 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ #   define DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE        0x40
+ #   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL            0x80
+-#   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100
++#   define DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE            0x100 /* +DH_check_pub_key */
+ 
+ /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
+ #   define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
+diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+index 5d2a762a96..074a70145f 100644
+--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
++++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /*
+  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+  *
+  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #  define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE                            100
+ #  define DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR                    105
+ #  define DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR                              111
++#  define DH_R_Q_TOO_LARGE                                 130
+ #  define DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR                           113
+ #  define DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR                   121
+ 

SOURCES/0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 51c2283db915d..0928a30c2d37b 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+     tmparr = OPENSSL_memdup(gcb.gid_arr, gcb.gidcnt * sizeof(*tmparr));
+     if (tmparr == NULL)
+         goto end;
++    OPENSSL_free(*pext);
+     *pext = tmparr;
+     *pextlen = gcb.gidcnt;
+     ret = 1;

SOURCES/0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+index 9f86134d923fb..2e601bb9c24be 100755
+--- a/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
++++ b/crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-ppc.pl
+@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
+ my $LOCALS= 6*$SIZE_T;
+ my $VSXFRAME = $LOCALS + 6*$SIZE_T;
+    $VSXFRAME += 128;	# local variables
+-   $VSXFRAME += 13*16;	# v20-v31 offload
++   $VSXFRAME += 12*16;	# v20-v31 offload
+ 
+ my $BIG_ENDIAN = ($flavour !~ /le/) ? 4 : 0;
+ 
+@@ -919,12 +919,12 @@
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v23,r10,$sp
+-	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v24,r11,$sp
++	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	stvx	v25,r10,$sp
++	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
++	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
++	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+ 	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+@@ -1153,12 +1153,12 @@
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v22,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v23,r10,$sp
+-	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	stvx	v24,r11,$sp
++	stvx	v23,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	stvx	v25,r10,$sp
++	stvx	v24,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
++	stvx	v25,r11,$sp
++	addi	r11,r11,32
+ 	stvx	v26,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+ 	stvx	v27,r11,$sp
+@@ -1899,26 +1899,26 @@
+ 	mtspr	256,r12				# restore vrsave
+ 	lvx	v20,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v21,r10,$sp
+-	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v22,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v21,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v23,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v22,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v24,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v23,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v25,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v24,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v26,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v25,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v27,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v26,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v28,r11,$sp
++	lvx	v27,r11,$sp
+ 	addi	r11,r11,32
+-	lvx	v29,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v28,r10,$sp
+ 	addi	r10,r10,32
+-	lvx	v30,r11,$sp
+-	lvx	v31,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v29,r11,$sp
++	addi	r11,r11,32
++	lvx	v30,r10,$sp
++	lvx	v31,r11,$sp
+ 	$POP	r27,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*5`($sp)
+ 	$POP	r28,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*4`($sp)
+ 	$POP	r29,`$VSXFRAME-$SIZE_T*3`($sp)

SOURCES/0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+index fc8f19b48770b..bcbdd24fb8199 100644
+--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
++++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c
+@@ -289,6 +289,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
+         return 0;
+ 
+     nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
++    if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     /*
+      * (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)
+@@ -324,7 +329,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
++    /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */
++    ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
+ #ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+     if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {
+ #else
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+index dc7cc64533af2..f8088df14d36c 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
++++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check.t
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ push(@positive_tests, (
+     "dhpkey.pem"
+     )) unless disabled("dh");
+ 
+-my @negative_pubtests = ();
++my @negative_pubtests = ("rsapub_17k.pem");  # Too big RSA public key
+ 
+ push(@negative_pubtests, (
+     "dsapub_noparam.der"
+diff --git a/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..9a2eaedaf1b22
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/recipes/91-test_pkey_check_data/rsapub_17k.pem
+@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
++-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
++MIIIbzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCCFwAMIIIVwKCCE4Ang+cE5H+hg3RbapDAHqR
++B9lUnp2MlAwsZxQ/FhYepaR60bFQeumbu7817Eo5YLMObVI99hF1C4u/qcpD4Jph
++gZt87/JAYDbP+DIh/5gUXCL9m5Fp4u7mvZaZdnlcftBvR1uKUTCAwc9pZ/Cfr8W2
++GzrRODzsNYnk2DcZMfe2vRDuDZRopE+Y+I72rom2SZLxoN547N1daM/M/CL9KVQ/
++XMI/YOpJrBI0jI3brMRhLkvLckwies9joufydlGbJkeil9H7/grj3fQZtFkZ2Pkj
++b87XDzRVX7wsEpAgPJxskL3jApokCp1kQYKG+Uc3dKM9Ade6IAPK7VKcmbAQTYw2
++gZxsc28dtstazmfGz0ACCTSMrmbgWAM3oPL7RRzhrXDWgmYQ0jHefGh8SNTIgtPq
++TuHxPYkDMQNaf0LmDGCxqlnf4b5ld3YaU8zZ/RqIRx5v/+w0rJUvU53qY1bYSnL1
++vbqKSnN2mip0GYyQ4AUgkS1NBV4rGYU/VTvzEjLfkg02KOtHKandvEoUjmZPzCT0
++V2ZhGc8K1UJNGYlIiHqCdwCBoghvly/pYajTkDXyd6BsukzA5H3IkZB1xDgl035j
++/0Cr7QeZLEOdi9fPdSSaBT6OmD0WFuZfJF0wMr7ucRhWzPXvSensD9v7MBE7tNfH
++SLeTSx8tLt8UeWriiM+0CnkPR1IOqMOxubOyf1eV8NQqEWm5wEQG/0IskbOKnaHa
++PqLFJZn/bvyL3XK5OxVIJG3z6bnRDOMS9SzkjqgPdIO8tkySEHVSi/6iuGUltx3Y
++Fmq6ye/r34ekyHPbfn6UuTON7joM6SIXb5bHM64x4iMVWx4hMvDjfy0UqfywAUyu
++C1o7BExSMxxFG8GJcqR0K8akpPp7EM588PC+YuItoxzXgfUJnP3BQ1Beev2Ve7/J
++xeGZH0N4ntfr+cuaLAakAER9zDglwChWflw3NNFgIdAgSxXv3XXx5xDXpdP4lxUo
++F5zAN4Mero3yV90FaJl7Vhq/UFVidbwFc15jUDwaE0mKRcsBeVd3GOhoECAgE0id
++aIPT20z8oVY0FyTJlRk7QSjo8WjJSrHY/Fn14gctX07ZdfkufyL6w+NijBdYluvB
++nIrgHEvpkDEWoIa8qcx0EppoIcmqgMV2mTShfFYSybsO33Pm8WXec2FXjwhzs1Pi
++R/BuIW8rHPI67xqWm0h8dEw11vtfi9a/BBBikFHe59KBjMTG+lW/gADNvRoTzGh7
++kN4+UVDS3jlSisRZZOn1XoeQtpubNYWgUsecjKy45IwIj8h1SHgn3wkmUesY0woN
++mOdoNtq+NezN4RFtbCOHhxFVpKKDi/HQP2ro0ykkXMDjwEIVf2Lii1Mg9UP8m+Ux
++AOqkTrIkdogkRx+70h7/wUOfDIFUq2JbKzqxJYamyEphcdAko7/B8efQKc61Z93O
++f2SHa4++4WI7wIIx18v5KV4M/cRmrfc8w9WRkQN3gBT5AJMuqwcSHVXBWvNQeGmi
++ScMh7X6cCZ0daEujqb8svq4WgsJ8UT4GaGBRIYtt7QUKEh+JQwNJzneRYZ3pzpaH
++UJeeoYobMlkp3rM9cYzdq90nBQiI9Jsbim9m9ggb2dMOS5CsI9S/IuG2O5uTjfxx
++wkwsd5nLDFtNXHYZ7W6XlVJ1Rc6zShnEmdCn3mmibb6OaMUmun2yl9ryEjVSoXLP
++fSA8W9K9yNhKTRkzdXJfqlC+s/ovX2xBGxsuOoUDaXhRVz0qmpKIHeSFjIP4iXq4
++y8gDiwvM3HbZfvVonbg6siPwpn4uvw3hesojk1DKAENS52i6U3uK2fs1ALVxsFNS
++Yh914rDu0Q3e4RXVhURaYzoEbLCot6WGYeCCfQOK0rkETMv+sTYYscC8/THuW7SL
++HG5zy9Ed95N1Xmf8J+My7gM7ZFodGdHsWvdzEmqsdOFh6IVx/VfHFX0MDBq0t6lZ
++eRvVgVCfu3gkYLwPScn/04E02vOom51ISKHsF/I11erC66jjNYV9BSpH8O7sAHxZ
++EmPT2ZVVRSgivOHdQW/FZ3UZQQhVaVSympo2Eb4yWEMFn84Q8T+9Honj6gnB5PXz
++chmeCsOMlcg1mwWwhn0k+OAWEZy7VRUk5Ahp0fBAGJgwBdqrZ3kM356DjUkVBiYq
++4eHyvafNKmjf2mnFsI3g2NKRNyl1Lh63wyCFx60yYvBUfXF/W9PFJbD9CiP83kEW
++gV36gxTsbOSfhpO1OXR90ODy0kx06XzWmJCUugK8u9bx4F/CjV+LIHExuNJiethC
++A8sIup/MT0fWp4RO/SsVblGqfoqJTaPnhptQzeH2N07pbWkxeMuL6ppPuwFmfVjK
++FJndqCVrAukcPEOQ16iVURuloJMudqYRc9QKkJFsnv0W/iMNbqQGmXe8Q/5qFiys
++26NIQBiE2ad9hNLnoccEnmYSRgnW3ZPSKuq5TDdYyDqTZH2r8cam65pr3beKw2XC
++xw4cc7VaxiwGC2Mg2wRmwwPaTjrcEt6sMa3RjwFEVBxBFyM26wnTEZsTBquCxV0J
++pgERaeplkixP2Q0m7XAdlDaob973SM2vOoUgypzDchWmpx7u775bnOfU5CihwXl+
++k0i09WZuT8bPmhEAiGCw5sNzMkz1BC2cCZFfJIkE2vc/wXYOrGxBTJo0EKaUFswa
++2dnP/u0bn+VksBUM7ywW9LJSXh4mN+tpzdeJtxEObKwX1I0dQxSPWmjd2++wMr9q
++Unre5fCrDToy2H7C2VKSpuOCT2/Kv4JDQRWwI4KxQOpn0UknAGNmfBoTtpIZ3LEb
++77oBUJdMQD7tQBBLL0a6f1TdK0dHVprWWawJ+gGFMiMQXqAqblHcxFKWuHv9bQID
++AQAB
++-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

SOURCES/0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+index 448a3c3043c1c..9010fa6c4638c 100644
+--- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c
+@@ -1134,6 +1134,7 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
+                                      const struct translation_st *translation,
+                                      struct translation_ctx_st *ctx)
+ {
++    char *p2 = NULL;
+     int ret;
+ 
+     if ((ret = default_check(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
+@@ -1146,13 +1147,25 @@ static int fix_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(enum state state,
+     if (state == PRE_CTRL_TO_PARAMS) {
+         ctx->p2 = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(ctx->p1);
+         ctx->p1 = 0;
++    } else if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
++        /*
++         * We're translating from params to ctrl and setting the curve name.
++         * The ctrl function needs it to be a NID, but meanwhile, we need
++         * space to get the curve name from the param.  |ctx->name_buf| is
++         * sufficient for that.
++         * The double indirection is necessary for default_fixup_args()'s
++         * call of OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string() to be done correctly.
++         */
++        p2 = ctx->name_buf;
++        ctx->p2 = &p2;
++        ctx->sz = sizeof(ctx->name_buf);
+     }
+ 
+     if ((ret = default_fixup_args(state, translation, ctx)) <= 0)
+         return ret;
+ 
+     if (state == PRE_PARAMS_TO_CTRL) {
+-        ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(ctx->p2);
++        ctx->p1 = OBJ_sn2nid(p2);
+         ctx->p2 = NULL;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -2789,6 +2802,7 @@ static int evp_pkey_ctx_setget_params_to_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
+             if (translation->fixup_args != NULL)
+                 fixup = translation->fixup_args;
+             ctx.action_type = translation->action_type;
++            ctx.ctrl_cmd = translation->ctrl_num;
+         }
+         ctx.pctx = pctx;
+         ctx.params = params;

SOURCES/0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+index 6fd4184af5a52..80ce31b3bca66 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7)
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p7->d.data == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
+ }
+ 
+@@ -150,6 +156,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
+ {
+     if (!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7))
+         return NULL;
++
++    if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i_ex(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+                                    ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
+                                    pass, passlen,
+@@ -188,6 +200,12 @@ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(const PKCS12 *p12)
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
+         return NULL;
+     }
++
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return NULL;
++    }
++
+     p7s = ASN1_item_unpack(p12->authsafes->d.data,
+                            ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES));
+     if (p7s != NULL) {
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+index 67a885a45f89e..68ff54d0e90ee 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
++        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
++        return 0;
++    }
++
+     salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
+     saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
+     if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+index 62230bc6187ff..1e5b5495991a4 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c
+@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ static int newpass_p12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+         } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+             bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
+-            if (!alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
+-                         &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
++            if (p7->d.encrypted == NULL
++                    || !alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
++                                &pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen))
+                 goto err;
+         } else {
+             continue;
+diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+index 49a0da5f819c4..8228315eeaa3a 100644
+--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
++++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_mime.c
+@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags)
+     int ctype_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+     const PKCS7_CTX *ctx = ossl_pkcs7_get0_ctx(p7);
+ 
+-    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
++    if (ctype_nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
++        if (p7->d.sign == NULL)
++            return 0;
+         mdalgs = p7->d.sign->md_algs;
+-    else
++    } else {
+         mdalgs = NULL;
++    }
+ 
+     flags ^= SMIME_OLDMIME;
+ 
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
+index 1f0cb4d501488..b2c376249646d 100644
+--- a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
++++ b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
+@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
+ use strict;
+ use warnings;
+ 
+-use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file/;
++use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT srctop_file with/;
+ use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
+ 
+ use Encode;
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) {
+ }
+ $ENV{OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8}=1;
+ 
+-plan tests => 13;
++plan tests => 17;
+ 
+ # Test different PKCS#12 formats
+ ok(run(test(["pkcs12_format_test"])), "test pkcs12 formats");
+@@ -148,4 +148,25 @@ ok(grep(/subject=CN = server.example/, @pkcs12info) == 1,
+ # Test that the expected friendly name is present in the output
+ ok(grep(/testname/, @pkcs12info) == 1, "test friendly name in output");
+ 
++# Test some bad pkcs12 files
++my $bad1 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad1.p12");
++my $bad2 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad2.p12");
++my $bad3 = srctop_file("test", "recipes", "80-test_pkcs12_data", "bad3.p12");
++
++with({ exit_checker => sub { return shift == 1; } },
++     sub {
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 1");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad1, "-password", "pass:",
++                    "-nomacver"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 1 (nomacver)");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad2, "-password", "pass:"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 2");
++
++        ok(run(app(["openssl", "pkcs12", "-in", $bad3, "-password", "pass:"])),
++           "test bad pkcs12 file 3");
++     });
++
+ SetConsoleOutputCP($savedcp) if (defined($savedcp));
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad1.p12
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f3387c7e356e4aa374729f3f3939343557b9c09
+GIT binary patch
+literal 85
+zcmV-b0IL5mQvv}4Fbf6=Duzgg_YDCD0Wd)@F)$4V31Egu0c8UO0s#d81R(r{)waiY
+rfR=Py6XX<mRyon58xHv)BAVy}k(l(hJwF5pk-=q7<yb@T0s;sC$etR(
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..113cb6f1cd523e880db869f518e60142dc875115
+GIT binary patch
+literal 104
+zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8zIDI;AmiIz{|#&(B{FI%FM#V$jZQ?
+z@Tpc|>#<$m7-wj)xrauuD`}hF=<J_T`^8$QMBK7d>Ng9=0`~S~)@=J%OiUaM0Oze6
+AD*ylh
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+
+diff --git a/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12 b/test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad3.p12
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef86a1d86fb0bc09471ca2596d82e7d521d973a4
+GIT binary patch
+literal 104
+zcmXp=V`5}BkYnT2YV&CO&dbQoxImDF-+<SE8%fB((ZJAvmyI)_&4V$OnT3gwm4QWp
+zJ2GXlSm>oA$5$MVJL*60=F*5iN*C_e&wD%dwCM*q{=+OBX|Z+F7XSHN#>B+I003La
+BAqM~e
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+

SPECS/openssl.spec

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ print(string.sub(hash, 0, 16))
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 3.0.7
-Release: 25%{?dist}
+Release: 27%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -197,9 +197,23 @@ Patch121: 0121-FIPS-cms-defaults.patch
 Patch122: 0122-CVE-2023-2650.patch
 # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19386
 Patch123: 0123-ibmca-atexit-crash.patch
+Patch125: 0125-CVE-2023-2975.patch
+Patch126: 0126-CVE-2023-3446.patch
+Patch127: 0127-CVE-2023-3817.patch
 Patch128: 0128-CVE-2023-5363.patch
 # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22403
 Patch129: 0129-rsa-Add-SP800-56Br2-6.4.1.2.1-3.c-check.patch
+Patch130: 0130-CVE-2023-5678.patch
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20317
+Patch131: 0131-sslgroups-memleak.patch
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/050d26383d4e264966fb83428e72d5d48f402d35
+Patch132: 0132-CVE-2023-6129.patch
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/18c02492138d1eb8b6548cb26e7b625fb2414a2a
+Patch133: 0133-CVE-2023-6237.patch
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20780
+Patch134: 0134-engine-based-ECDHE-kex.patch
+# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23362
+Patch135: 0135-CVE-2024-0727.patch
 
 License: ASL 2.0
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -227,6 +241,9 @@ protocols.
 Summary: A general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Requires: ca-certificates >= 2008-5
 Requires: crypto-policies >= 20180730
+%if ( %{defined rhel} && (! %{defined centos}) )
+Requires: openssl-fips-provider
+%endif
 
 %description libs
 OpenSSL is a toolkit for supporting cryptography. The openssl-libs
@@ -379,6 +396,14 @@ make test HARNESS_JOBS=8
 # Add generation of HMAC checksum of the final stripped library
 # We manually copy standard definition of __spec_install_post
 # and add hmac calculation/embedding to fips.so
+%if ( %{defined rhel} && (! %{defined centos}) )
+%define __spec_install_post \
+    rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so \
+    %{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \
+    %{__arch_install_post} \
+    %{__os_install_post} \
+%{nil}
+%else
 %define __spec_install_post \
     %{?__debug_package:%{__debug_install_post}} \
     %{__arch_install_post} \
@@ -388,6 +413,7 @@ make test HARNESS_JOBS=8
     mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.mac $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so \
     rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/ossl-modules/fips.so.hmac \
 %{nil}
+%endif
 
 %define __provides_exclude_from %{_libdir}/openssl
 
@@ -411,6 +437,7 @@ done
 # Install a makefile for generating keys and self-signed certs, and a script
 # for generating them on the fly.
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/certs
+mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/openssl.d
 install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pkgdocdir}/Makefile.certificate
 install -m755 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/make-dummy-cert
 install -m755 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/renew-dummy-cert
@@ -493,6 +520,7 @@ ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssl_fips.config $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysco
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/certs
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/misc
 %dir %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/private
+%dir %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/openssl.d
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/openssl.cnf
 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/ct_log_list.cnf
 %config %{_sysconfdir}/pki/tls/fips_local.cnf
@@ -525,18 +553,59 @@ ln -s /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssl_fips.config $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysco
 %ldconfig_scriptlets libs
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Oct 25 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.7-25
+* Wed Feb 21 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.7-27
+- Use certified FIPS module instead of freshly built one in Red Hat distribution
+  Related: RHEL-23474
+
+* Tue Nov 21 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.7-26
+- Avoid implicit function declaration when building openssl
+  Related: RHEL-1780
+- In FIPS mode, prevent any other operations when rsa_keygen_pairwise_test fails
+  Resolves: RHEL-17104
+- Add a directory for OpenSSL providers configuration
+  Resolves: RHEL-17193
+- Eliminate memory leak in OpenSSL when setting elliptic curves on SSL context
+  Resolves: RHEL-19515
+- POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupts vector registers on PowerPC (CVE-2023-6129)
+  Resolves: RHEL-21151
+- Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys (CVE-2023-6237)
+  Resolves: RHEL-21654
+- SSL ECDHE Kex fails when pkcs11 engine is set in config file
+  Resolves: RHEL-20249
+- Denial of service via null dereference in PKCS#12
+  Resolves: RHEL-22486
+- Use certified FIPS module instead of freshly built one in Red Hat distribution
+  Resolves: RHEL-23474
+
+* Mon Oct 16 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.7-25
+- Provide relevant diagnostics when FIPS checksum is corrupted
+  Resolves: RHEL-5317
+- Don't limit using SHA1 in KDFs in non-FIPS mode.
+  Resolves: RHEL-5295
+- Provide empty evp_properties section in main OpenSSL configuration file
+  Resolves: RHEL-11439
+- Avoid implicit function declaration when building openssl
+  Resolves: RHEL-1780
+- Forbid explicit curves when created via EVP_PKEY_fromdata
+  Resolves: RHEL-5304
+- AES-SIV cipher implementation contains a bug that causes it to ignore empty
+  associated data entries (CVE-2023-2975)
+  Resolves: RHEL-5302
+- Excessive time spent checking DH keys and parameters (CVE-2023-3446)
+  Resolves: RHEL-5306
+- Excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value (CVE-2023-3817)
+  Resolves: RHEL-5308
 - Fix incorrect cipher key and IV length processing (CVE-2023-5363)
-  Resolves: RHEL-13249
+  Resolves: RHEL-13251
 - Switch explicit FIPS indicator for RSA-OAEP to approved following
   clarification with CMVP
-  Resolves: RHEL-14614
+  Resolves: RHEL-14083
 - Backport the check required by SP800-56Br2 6.4.1.2.1 (3.c)
-  Resolves: RHEL-14614
+  Resolves: RHEL-14083
 - Add missing ECDH Public Key Check in FIPS mode
-  Resolves: RHEL-15993
+  Resolves: RHEL-15990
-- In FIPS mode, prevent any other operations when rsa_keygen_pairwise_test fails
+- Excessive time spent in DH check/generation with large Q parameter value (CVE-2023-5678)
-  Resolves: RHEL-17111
+  Resolves: RHEL-15954
 
 * Wed Jul 12 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 1:3.0.7-24
 - Make FIPS module configuration more crypto-policies friendly