forked from rpms/openssh
e01ed66930
- sshd should prevent login if audit call fails
54 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
54 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
--- openssh-3.9p1/log.h.log-chroot 2006-02-22 10:54:04.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-3.9p1/log.h 2006-02-22 10:53:29.000000000 +0100
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@@ -63,4 +63,6 @@
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void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list);
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void cleanup_exit(int) __dead;
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+
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+void open_log(void);
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#endif
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--- openssh-3.9p1/log.c.log-chroot 2006-02-22 13:29:48.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-3.9p1/log.c 2006-02-22 10:56:01.000000000 +0100
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@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
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static int log_on_stderr = 1;
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static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
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static char *argv0;
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+static int log_fd_keep;
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extern char *__progname;
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@@ -330,9 +331,20 @@
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syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
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closelog_r(&sdata);
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#else
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+ if (!log_fd_keep) {
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openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
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+ }
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syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
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+ if (!log_fd_keep) {
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closelog();
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+ }
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#endif
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}
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}
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+
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+void
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+open_log(void)
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+{
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+ openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID|LOG_NDELAY, log_facility);
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+ log_fd_keep = 1;
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+}
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--- openssh-3.9p1/sshd.c.log-chroot 2006-01-11 13:42:32.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssh-3.9p1/sshd.c 2006-02-22 18:58:24.000000000 +0100
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@@ -565,6 +565,10 @@
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memset(pw->pw_passwd, 0, strlen(pw->pw_passwd));
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endpwent();
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+ /* Open the syslog permanently so the chrooted process still
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+ can write to syslog. */
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+ open_log();
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+
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/* Change our root directory */
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if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
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fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
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