openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-01-22 14:59:18.943919791 +0100
+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2016-01-22 15:16:12.534599318 +0100
@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "misc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 
 #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
 #include "identity.h"
 #include "get_command_line.h"
 extern char **environ;
 
+/* 
+ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
+ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
+ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
+ *
+ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
+ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
+ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
+ */
+
 static char *
 log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
 {
@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
 pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
 {
-    char *cookie = NULL;
+    u_char *cookie = NULL;
     uint8_t i = 0;
     uint32_t rnd = 0;
     uint8_t cookie_len;
@@ -110,7 +129,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
         if (i % 4 == 0) {
             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
         }
-        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
+        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
         rnd >>= 8;
     }
 
@@ -142,6 +161,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
 }
 
 int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	const char *authsocket;
+	int sock;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+	struct stat sock_st;
+
+	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+	if (!authsocket)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
+	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
+		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
+			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* 
+	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
+	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
+	 */
+	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
+		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* close on exec */
+	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	errno = 0; 
+	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
+		close(sock);
+        if(errno == EACCES)
+		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+
+	return sock;
+}
+
+AuthenticationConnection *
+ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
+	int sock;
+
+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
+
+	/*
+	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
+	 * exited due to a timeout.
+	 */
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
+	auth->fd = sock;
+	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
+	auth->howmany = 0;
+
+	return auth;
+}
+
+int
 pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
 {
     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
 
-    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
+    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
         {
diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/Makefile.in
--- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/Makefile.in	2016-01-22 15:20:16.479521651 +0100
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
 CC=@CC@
 LD=@LD@
 CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
 LIBS=@LIBS@
 AR=@AR@
 AWK=@AWK@
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
 PERL=@PERL@
 SED=@SED@
 ENT=@ENT@
-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
 LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
 EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
 
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
 
 SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o uidswap.o 
 
-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o
+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o secure_filename.o
 
 
 MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
 .c.o:
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
 
-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
 $(LIBCOMPAT): always
 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
 always:
 
-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3
 
 $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.2 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8