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Fix Terrapin attack

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Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
This commit is contained in:
Dmitry Belyavskiy 2023-12-20 11:26:41 +01:00
parent 5838d35972
commit 54fc8050ff
2 changed files with 445 additions and 0 deletions
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438
openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
described at:
http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
+
+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
+
+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
+the the protocol:
+
+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
+ out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
+ connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
+ Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
+ that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
+ SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
+ packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
+ duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
+ SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
+
2. Connection protocol changes
2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
#endif
/* prototype */
-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
return 1;
}
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ free(cp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
- free(m);
+ if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
- }
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
- error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+ /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
+ "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
+ }
+ error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
+ if (ninfo >= 1024) {
+ error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
+ "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
+ return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
error_f("no kex");
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
- if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
return (1);
}
-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
static int
-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
{
- char *cp;
-
- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- free(cp);
- return 1;
+ return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
}
static int
-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
sprop=peer;
}
- /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
- if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
- char *ext;
-
- ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
- kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
- free(ext);
+ /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
+ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ if (kex->server) {
+ kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
+ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+ "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
+ } else {
+ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+ }
+ if (kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
+ if (seq != 0)
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ "strict KEX violation: "
+ "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
+ }
}
/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
u_int kex_type;
char *server_sig_algs;
int ext_info_c;
+ int kex_strict;
struct sshbuf *my;
struct sshbuf *peer;
struct sshbuf *client_version;
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
- if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
+ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+ }
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+ }
if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
state->p_send.bytes += len;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
+ state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
+ }
+
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
- r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
- if (r != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
+
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
- if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
+ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+ }
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+ }
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
+ state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
+ }
if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
- if (*typep) {
- state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+ if (*typep == 0) {
+ /* no message ready */
+ return 0;
}
+ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+
+ /* Always process disconnect messages */
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+ free(msg);
+ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
+ * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
+ * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
+ * protocol errors.
+ */
+ if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
+ (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
+ return 0;
+ /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- return r;
- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
- do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
- "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
- "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
- free(msg);
- return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
+ debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
free(all_key);
- if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+ "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
};
static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
-}
-
void
userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
{
@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
return 0;
}
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict 2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c 2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
struct kex *kex;
char *hostkey_types = NULL;
char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ char *cp;
int r;
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
- options.kex_algorithms);
+ if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
#endif
free(prop_kex);
free(prop_enc);
+ free(cp);
free(prop_hostkey);
debug("KEX done");
}

7
openssh.spec
View File

@ -284,6 +284,8 @@ Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec
Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
License: BSD
Requires: /sbin/nologin
@ -505,6 +507,7 @@ popd
%patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
%patch1016 -p1 -b .openssl3compat
%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay
%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
autoreconf
pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
@ -792,6 +795,10 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
%endif
%changelog
* Wed Dec 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-36
- Fix Terrapin attack
Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
* Mon Oct 23 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-35
- Relax OpenSSH checks for OpenSSL version
Resolves: RHEL-4734