forked from rpms/libvirt
128 lines
4.5 KiB
Diff
128 lines
4.5 KiB
Diff
From 0b90fc0c5d4bd3eecbf8b51ff996116bc137d199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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Message-Id: <0b90fc0c5d4bd3eecbf8b51ff996116bc137d199@dist-git>
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From: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 17:21:58 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] qemu: caps: Use CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for probing to avoid
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permission issues
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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This is mainly about /dev/sev and its default permissions 0600. Of
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course, rule of 'tinfoil' would be that we can't trust anything, but the
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probing code in QEMU is considered safe from security's perspective + we
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can't create an udev rule for this at the moment, because ioctls and
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file system permissions aren't cross-checked in kernel and therefore a
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user with read permissions could issue a 'privileged' operation on SEV
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which is currently only limited to root.
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1665400
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Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
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(cherry picked from commit a2d3dea9d41dba313d9566120a8ec9d358567bd0)
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Signed-off-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
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---
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src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 11 +++++++++++
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src/util/virutil.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
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2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
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index ba8c717e22..f71cd08f4d 100644
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--- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
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+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c
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@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <sys/utsname.h>
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+#if WITH_CAPNG
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+# include <cap-ng.h>
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+#endif
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+
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#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU
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VIR_LOG_INIT("qemu.qemu_capabilities");
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@@ -4474,6 +4478,13 @@ virQEMUCapsInitQMPCommandRun(virQEMUCapsInitQMPCommandPtr cmd,
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NULL);
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virCommandAddEnvPassCommon(cmd->cmd);
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virCommandClearCaps(cmd->cmd);
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+
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+#if WITH_CAPNG
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+ /* QEMU might run into permission issues, e.g. /dev/sev (0600), override
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+ * them just for the purpose of probing */
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+ virCommandAllowCap(cmd->cmd, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
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+#endif
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+
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virCommandSetGID(cmd->cmd, cmd->runGid);
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virCommandSetUID(cmd->cmd, cmd->runUid);
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diff --git a/src/util/virutil.c b/src/util/virutil.c
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index a908422feb..88e17e2c0f 100644
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--- a/src/util/virutil.c
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+++ b/src/util/virutil.c
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@@ -1474,8 +1474,10 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups,
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{
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size_t i;
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int capng_ret, ret = -1;
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- bool need_setgid = false, need_setuid = false;
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+ bool need_setgid = false;
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+ bool need_setuid = false;
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bool need_setpcap = false;
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+ const char *capstr = NULL;
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/* First drop all caps (unless the requested uid is "unchanged" or
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* root and clearExistingCaps wasn't requested), then add back
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@@ -1484,14 +1486,18 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups,
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*/
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if (clearExistingCaps || (uid != (uid_t)-1 && uid != 0))
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- capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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+ capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
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for (i = 0; i <= CAP_LAST_CAP; i++) {
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+ capstr = capng_capability_to_name(i);
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+
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if (capBits & (1ULL << i)) {
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capng_update(CAPNG_ADD,
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CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_INHERITABLE|
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CAPNG_PERMITTED|CAPNG_BOUNDING_SET,
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i);
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+
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+ VIR_DEBUG("Added '%s' to child capabilities' set", capstr);
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}
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}
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@@ -1551,6 +1557,27 @@ virSetUIDGIDWithCaps(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, gid_t *groups, int ngroups,
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goto cleanup;
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}
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+# ifdef PR_CAP_AMBIENT
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+ /* we couldn't do this in the loop earlier above, because the capabilities
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+ * were not applied yet, since in order to add a capability into the AMBIENT
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+ * set, it has to be present in both the PERMITTED and INHERITABLE sets
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+ * (capabilities(7))
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+ */
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+ for (i = 0; i <= CAP_LAST_CAP; i++) {
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+ capstr = capng_capability_to_name(i);
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+
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+ if (capBits & (1ULL << i)) {
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+ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, i, 0, 0) < 0) {
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+ virReportSystemError(errno,
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+ _("prctl failed to enable '%s' in the "
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+ "AMBIENT set"),
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+ capstr);
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+ goto cleanup;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+# endif
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+
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/* Set bounding set while we have CAP_SETPCAP. Unfortunately we cannot
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* do this if we failed to get the capability above, so ignore the
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* return value.
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--
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2.20.1
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