238 lines
7.0 KiB
C
238 lines
7.0 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
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/*
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* Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2006
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* Author(s): Robert Burroughs
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* Eric Rossman (edrossma@us.ibm.com)
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*
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* Hotplug & misc device support: Jochen Roehrig (roehrig@de.ibm.com)
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* Major cleanup & driver split: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
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*/
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#ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_
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#define _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_
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struct t6_keyblock_hdr {
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unsigned short blen;
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unsigned short ulen;
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unsigned short flags;
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};
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/**
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* mapping for the cca private ME key token.
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* Three parts of interest here: the header, the private section and
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* the public section.
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*
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* mapping for the cca key token header
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*/
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struct cca_token_hdr {
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unsigned char token_identifier;
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unsigned char version;
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unsigned short token_length;
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unsigned char reserved[4];
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} __packed;
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#define CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT 0x1E
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#define CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL 0x80
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/**
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* mapping for the cca public section
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* In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public
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* section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be
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* used, for a section length of 0x0F always.
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*/
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struct cca_public_sec {
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unsigned char section_identifier;
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unsigned char version;
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unsigned short section_length;
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unsigned char reserved[2];
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unsigned short exponent_len;
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unsigned short modulus_bit_len;
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unsigned short modulus_byte_len; /* In a private key, this is 0 */
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} __packed;
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/**
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* mapping for the cca private CRT key 'token'
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* The first three parts (the only parts considered in this release)
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* are: the header, the private section and the public section.
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* The header and public section are the same as for the
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* struct cca_private_ext_ME
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*
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* Following the structure are the quantities p, q, dp, dq, u, pad,
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* and modulus, in that order, where pad_len is the modulo 8
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* complement of the residue modulo 8 of the sum of
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* (p_len + q_len + dp_len + dq_len + u_len).
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*/
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struct cca_pvt_ext_crt_sec {
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unsigned char section_identifier;
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unsigned char version;
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unsigned short section_length;
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unsigned char private_key_hash[20];
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unsigned char reserved1[4];
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unsigned char key_format;
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unsigned char reserved2;
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unsigned char key_name_hash[20];
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unsigned char key_use_flags[4];
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unsigned short p_len;
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unsigned short q_len;
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unsigned short dp_len;
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unsigned short dq_len;
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unsigned short u_len;
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unsigned short mod_len;
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unsigned char reserved3[4];
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unsigned short pad_len;
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unsigned char reserved4[52];
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unsigned char confounder[8];
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} __packed;
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#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT 0x08
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#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL 0x40
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/**
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* Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message.
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*
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* @mex: pointer to user input data
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* @p: pointer to memory area for the key
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*
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* Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value.
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*/
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static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p)
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{
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static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr = {
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.token_identifier = 0x1E,
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};
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static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec = {
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.section_identifier = 0x04,
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};
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struct {
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struct t6_keyblock_hdr t6_hdr;
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struct cca_token_hdr pubhdr;
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struct cca_public_sec pubsec;
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char exponent[];
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} __packed *key = p;
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unsigned char *ptr;
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/*
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* The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
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* function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check
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* here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
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* to compromise the system.
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*/
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex->inputdatalength > 512))
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return -EINVAL;
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memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
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key->pubhdr = static_pub_hdr;
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key->pubsec = static_pub_sec;
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/* key parameter block */
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ptr = key->exponent;
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if (copy_from_user(ptr, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength))
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return -EFAULT;
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ptr += mex->inputdatalength;
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/* modulus */
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if (copy_from_user(ptr, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength))
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return -EFAULT;
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key->pubsec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength;
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key->pubsec.modulus_byte_len = mex->inputdatalength;
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key->pubsec.exponent_len = mex->inputdatalength;
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key->pubsec.section_length = sizeof(key->pubsec) +
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2 * mex->inputdatalength;
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key->pubhdr.token_length =
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key->pubsec.section_length + sizeof(key->pubhdr);
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key->t6_hdr.ulen = key->pubhdr.token_length + 4;
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key->t6_hdr.blen = key->pubhdr.token_length + 6;
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return sizeof(*key) + 2 * mex->inputdatalength;
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}
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/**
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* Set up private key fields of a type6 CRT message.
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*
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* @mex: pointer to user input data
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* @p: pointer to memory area for the key
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*
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* Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT
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*/
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static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, void *p)
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{
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static struct cca_public_sec static_cca_pub_sec = {
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.section_identifier = 4,
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.section_length = 0x000f,
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.exponent_len = 0x0003,
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};
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static char pk_exponent[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
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struct {
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struct t6_keyblock_hdr t6_hdr;
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struct cca_token_hdr token;
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struct cca_pvt_ext_crt_sec pvt;
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char key_parts[];
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} __packed *key = p;
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struct cca_public_sec *pub;
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int short_len, long_len, pad_len, key_len, size;
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/*
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* The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
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* function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check
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* here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
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* to compromise the system.
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*/
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt->inputdatalength > 512))
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return -EINVAL;
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memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
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short_len = (crt->inputdatalength + 1) / 2;
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long_len = short_len + 8;
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pad_len = -(3 * long_len + 2 * short_len) & 7;
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key_len = 3 * long_len + 2 * short_len + pad_len + crt->inputdatalength;
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size = sizeof(*key) + key_len + sizeof(*pub) + 3;
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/* parameter block.key block */
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key->t6_hdr.blen = size;
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key->t6_hdr.ulen = size - 2;
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/* key token header */
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key->token.token_identifier = CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT;
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key->token.token_length = size - 6;
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/* private section */
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key->pvt.section_identifier = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT;
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key->pvt.section_length = sizeof(key->pvt) + key_len;
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key->pvt.key_format = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL;
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key->pvt.key_use_flags[0] = CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL;
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key->pvt.p_len = key->pvt.dp_len = key->pvt.u_len = long_len;
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key->pvt.q_len = key->pvt.dq_len = short_len;
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key->pvt.mod_len = crt->inputdatalength;
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key->pvt.pad_len = pad_len;
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/* key parts */
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if (copy_from_user(key->key_parts, crt->np_prime, long_len) ||
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copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len,
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crt->nq_prime, short_len) ||
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copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len + short_len,
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crt->bp_key, long_len) ||
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copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2 * long_len + short_len,
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crt->bq_key, short_len) ||
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copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2 * long_len + 2 * short_len,
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crt->u_mult_inv, long_len))
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return -EFAULT;
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memset(key->key_parts + 3 * long_len + 2 * short_len + pad_len,
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0xff, crt->inputdatalength);
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pub = (struct cca_public_sec *)(key->key_parts + key_len);
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*pub = static_cca_pub_sec;
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pub->modulus_bit_len = 8 * crt->inputdatalength;
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/*
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* In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public
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* section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be
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* used.
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*/
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memcpy((char *)(pub + 1), pk_exponent, 3);
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return size;
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}
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#endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ */
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