diff --git a/COPYING-6.12.0-211.39.1.el10 b/COPYING-6.12.0-211.40.1.el10 similarity index 100% rename from COPYING-6.12.0-211.39.1.el10 rename to COPYING-6.12.0-211.40.1.el10 diff --git a/Makefile.rhelver b/Makefile.rhelver index 028e2bbe0b..e03f8e4e71 100644 --- a/Makefile.rhelver +++ b/Makefile.rhelver @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ RHEL_MINOR = 2 # # Use this spot to avoid future merge conflicts. # Do not trim this comment. -RHEL_RELEASE = 211.39.1 +RHEL_RELEASE = 211.40.1 # # RHEL_REBASE_NUM diff --git a/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c b/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c index 2b20284fa0..03395b89cc 100644 --- a/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c +++ b/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c @@ -134,27 +134,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_krb5_how_much_data); * Find the offset and size of the data in a secure message so that this * information can be used in the metadata buffer which will get added to the * digest by crypto_krb5_verify_mic(). + * + * Return: 0 if successful, -EBADMSG if the message is too short or -EINVAL if + * the mode is unsupported. */ -void crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, - enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, - size_t *_offset, size_t *_len) +int crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, + size_t *_offset, size_t *_len) { switch (mode) { case KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE: + if (*_len < krb5->cksum_len) + return -EBADMSG; *_offset += krb5->cksum_len; *_len -= krb5->cksum_len; - return; + return 0; case KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE: + if (*_len < krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len) + return -EBADMSG; *_offset += krb5->conf_len; *_len -= krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len; - return; + return 0; default: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return; + return -EINVAL; } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data); +/** + * crypto_krb5_check_data_len - Check a message is big enough + * @krb5: The encoding to use. + * @mode: Mode of operation. + * @len: The length of the secure blob. + * @min_content: Minimum length of the content inside the blob. + * + * Check that a message is large enough to hold whatever bits the encryption + * type wants to glue on (nonce, checksum) plus a minimum amount of content. + * + * Return: 0 if successful, -EBADMSG if the message is too short or -EINVAL if + * the mode is unsupported. + */ +int crypto_krb5_check_data_len(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, + size_t len, size_t min_content) +{ + switch (mode) { + case KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE: + if (len < krb5->cksum_len || + len - krb5->cksum_len < min_content) + return -EBADMSG; + return 0; + case KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE: + if (len < krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len || + len - (krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len) < min_content) + return -EBADMSG; + return 0; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return -EINVAL; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_krb5_check_data_len); + /* * Prepare the encryption with derived key data. */ diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c index dff2d895b8..3d4148d349 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c @@ -4066,8 +4066,8 @@ void domain_remove_dev_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, if (!domain) return; - /* Identity domain has no meta data for pasid. */ - if (domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY) + /* Identity domain and blocked domain have no meta data for pasid. */ + if (domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY || domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) return; dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); @@ -4081,12 +4081,13 @@ void domain_remove_dev_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dmar_domain->lock, flags); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dev_pasid)) + return; + cache_tag_unassign_domain(dmar_domain, dev, pasid); domain_detach_iommu(dmar_domain, iommu); - if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!dev_pasid)) { - intel_iommu_debugfs_remove_dev_pasid(dev_pasid); - kfree(dev_pasid); - } + intel_iommu_debugfs_remove_dev_pasid(dev_pasid); + kfree(dev_pasid); } static int blocking_domain_set_dev_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, diff --git a/include/crypto/krb5.h b/include/crypto/krb5.h index 71dd38f59b..aac3ecf884 100644 --- a/include/crypto/krb5.h +++ b/include/crypto/krb5.h @@ -121,9 +121,12 @@ size_t crypto_krb5_how_much_buffer(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, size_t crypto_krb5_how_much_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, size_t *_buffer_size, size_t *_offset); -void crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, - enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, - size_t *_offset, size_t *_len); +int crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, + size_t *_offset, size_t *_len); +int crypto_krb5_check_data_len(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + enum krb5_crypto_mode mode, + size_t len, size_t min_content); struct crypto_aead *crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, const struct krb5_buffer *TK, u32 usage, gfp_t gfp); diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h index 863956a7f5..04b6acc0dd 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata, "rxkad1-short-encdata") \ EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_header, "rxkad1-short-hdr") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_check, "rxkad2-short-check") \ + EM(rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned, "rxkad2-crypto-unaligned") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_data, "rxkad2-short-data") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_header, "rxkad2-short-hdr") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_len, "rxkad2-short-len") \ @@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ EM(rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt, "rxkad-resp-unknown-tkt") \ EM(rxkad_abort_resp_version, "rxkad-resp-version") \ /* RxGK security errors */ \ + EM(rxgk_abort_1_short_header, "rxgk1-short-hdr") \ EM(rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto, "rxgk1-vfy-mic-eproto") \ EM(rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto, "rxgk2-dec-eproto") \ EM(rxgk_abort_2_short_data, "rxgk2-short-data") \ diff --git a/kernel.sbat b/kernel.sbat index 548c9fc048..3b3faa3c79 100644 --- a/kernel.sbat +++ b/kernel.sbat @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md -kernel.almalinux,1,AlmaLinux,kernel-core,6.12.0-211.39.1.el10.x86_64,mailto:security@almalinux.org +kernel.almalinux,1,AlmaLinux,kernel-core,6.12.0-211.40.1.el10.x86_64,mailto:security@almalinux.org diff --git a/net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c b/net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c index 1e2b51769e..1f37b8cff0 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c @@ -202,11 +202,12 @@ void br_do_proxy_suppress_arp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_bridge *br, f = br_fdb_find_rcu(br, n->ha, vid); if (f) { + const struct net_bridge_port *dst = READ_ONCE(f->dst); bool replied = false; if ((p && (p->flags & BR_PROXYARP)) || - (f->dst && (f->dst->flags & BR_PROXYARP_WIFI)) || - br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled(f->dst, vid)) { + (dst && (dst->flags & BR_PROXYARP_WIFI)) || + br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled(dst, vid)) { if (!vid) br_arp_send(br, p, skb->dev, sip, tip, sha, n->ha, sha, 0, 0); @@ -466,9 +467,10 @@ void br_do_suppress_nd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_bridge *br, f = br_fdb_find_rcu(br, n->ha, vid); if (f) { + const struct net_bridge_port *dst = READ_ONCE(f->dst); bool replied = false; - if (br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled(f->dst, vid)) { + if (br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled(dst, vid)) { if (vid != 0) br_nd_send(br, p, skb, n, skb->vlan_proto, diff --git a/net/bridge/br_fdb.c b/net/bridge/br_fdb.c index d769cf3522..976c75736a 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_fdb.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_fdb.c @@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ struct net_device *br_fdb_find_port(const struct net_device *br_dev, const unsigned char *addr, __u16 vid) { + const struct net_bridge_port *dst; struct net_bridge_fdb_entry *f; struct net_device *dev = NULL; struct net_bridge *br; @@ -248,8 +249,11 @@ struct net_device *br_fdb_find_port(const struct net_device *br_dev, br = netdev_priv(br_dev); rcu_read_lock(); f = br_fdb_find_rcu(br, addr, vid); - if (f && f->dst) - dev = f->dst->dev; + if (f) { + dst = READ_ONCE(f->dst); + if (dst) + dev = dst->dev; + } rcu_read_unlock(); return dev; @@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static void fdb_delete_local(struct net_bridge *br, vg = nbp_vlan_group(op); if (op != p && ether_addr_equal(op->dev->dev_addr, addr) && (!vid || br_vlan_find(vg, vid))) { - f->dst = op; + WRITE_ONCE(f->dst, op); clear_bit(BR_FDB_ADDED_BY_USER, &f->flags); return; } @@ -357,7 +361,7 @@ static void fdb_delete_local(struct net_bridge *br, /* Maybe bridge device has same hw addr? */ if (p && ether_addr_equal(br->dev->dev_addr, addr) && (!vid || (v && br_vlan_should_use(v)))) { - f->dst = NULL; + WRITE_ONCE(f->dst, NULL); clear_bit(BR_FDB_ADDED_BY_USER, &f->flags); return; } @@ -922,6 +926,7 @@ int br_fdb_test_addr(struct net_device *dev, unsigned char *addr) int br_fdb_fillbuf(struct net_bridge *br, void *buf, unsigned long maxnum, unsigned long skip) { + const struct net_bridge_port *dst; struct net_bridge_fdb_entry *f; struct __fdb_entry *fe = buf; unsigned long delta; @@ -938,7 +943,8 @@ int br_fdb_fillbuf(struct net_bridge *br, void *buf, continue; /* ignore pseudo entry for local MAC address */ - if (!f->dst) + dst = READ_ONCE(f->dst); + if (!dst) continue; if (skip) { @@ -950,8 +956,8 @@ int br_fdb_fillbuf(struct net_bridge *br, void *buf, memcpy(fe->mac_addr, f->key.addr.addr, ETH_ALEN); /* due to ABI compat need to split into hi/lo */ - fe->port_no = f->dst->port_no; - fe->port_hi = f->dst->port_no >> 8; + fe->port_no = dst->port_no; + fe->port_hi = dst->port_no >> 8; fe->is_local = test_bit(BR_FDB_LOCAL, &f->flags); if (!test_bit(BR_FDB_STATIC, &f->flags)) { @@ -1076,9 +1082,11 @@ int br_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, rcu_read_lock(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(f, &br->fdb_list, fdb_node) { + const struct net_bridge_port *dst = READ_ONCE(f->dst); + if (*idx < cb->args[2]) goto skip; - if (filter_dev && (!f->dst || f->dst->dev != filter_dev)) { + if (filter_dev && (!dst || dst->dev != filter_dev)) { if (filter_dev != dev) goto skip; /* !f->dst is a special case for bridge @@ -1086,10 +1094,10 @@ int br_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, * Therefore need a little more filtering * we only want to dump the !f->dst case */ - if (f->dst) + if (dst) goto skip; } - if (!filter_dev && f->dst) + if (!filter_dev && dst) goto skip; err = fdb_fill_info(skb, br, f, diff --git a/net/ipv6/icmp.c b/net/ipv6/icmp.c index 8b383f31e2..003cf42f7a 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/icmp.c @@ -901,7 +901,6 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) struct net *net = dev_net_rcu(skb->dev); struct net_device *dev = icmp6_dev(skb); struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev); - const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr; struct icmp6hdr *hdr; u8 type; @@ -932,12 +931,10 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) __ICMP6_INC_STATS(dev_net_rcu(dev), idev, ICMP6_MIB_INMSGS); - saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; - daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; - if (skb_checksum_validate(skb, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip6_compute_pseudo)) { net_dbg_ratelimited("ICMPv6 checksum failed [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n", - saddr, daddr); + &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, + &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); goto csum_error; } @@ -1020,7 +1017,8 @@ static int icmpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) break; net_dbg_ratelimited("icmpv6: msg of unknown type [%pI6c > %pI6c]\n", - saddr, daddr); + &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, + &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr); /* * error of unknown type. diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index 2baa99b76f..fceee2e513 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ struct rxrpc_skb_priv { struct { u16 offset; /* Offset of data */ u16 len; /* Length of data */ - u8 flags; -#define RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED 0x01 }; struct { rxrpc_seq_t first_ack; /* First packet in acks table */ @@ -309,15 +307,16 @@ struct rxrpc_security { struct sk_buff *challenge); /* verify a response */ - int (*verify_response)(struct rxrpc_connection *, - struct sk_buff *); + int (*verify_response)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *response_skb, + void *response, unsigned int len); /* clear connection security */ void (*clear)(struct rxrpc_connection *); /* Default ticket -> key decoder */ int (*default_decode_ticket)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len, + void *ticket, unsigned int ticket_len, struct key **_key); }; @@ -774,6 +773,11 @@ struct rxrpc_call { struct sk_buff_head recvmsg_queue; /* Queue of packets ready for recvmsg() */ struct sk_buff_head rx_queue; /* Queue of packets for this call to receive */ struct sk_buff_head rx_oos_queue; /* Queue of out of sequence packets */ + void *rx_dec_buffer; /* Decryption buffer */ + unsigned short rx_dec_bsize; /* rx_dec_buffer size */ + unsigned short rx_dec_offset; /* Decrypted packet data offset */ + unsigned short rx_dec_len; /* Decrypted packet data len */ + rxrpc_seq_t rx_dec_seq; /* Packet in decryption buffer */ rxrpc_seq_t rx_highest_seq; /* Higest sequence number received */ rxrpc_seq_t rx_consumed; /* Highest packet consumed */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c index fdd6832612..fec59d9338 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c @@ -332,25 +332,7 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc_call *call) saw_ack |= sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK; - if (sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA && - sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0 && - skb_cloned(skb)) { - /* Unshare the packet so that it can be - * modified by in-place decryption. - */ - struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - - if (nskb) { - rxrpc_new_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared); - rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, nskb); - rxrpc_free_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx); - } else { - /* OOM - Drop the packet. */ - rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem); - } - } else { - rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb); - } + rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb); rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx); did_receive = true; } diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c index 918f41d97a..ffe0a89af2 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, gfp_t gfp, spin_lock_init(&call->notify_lock); refcount_set(&call->ref, 1); call->debug_id = debug_id; + call->rx_pkt_offset = USHRT_MAX; call->tx_total_len = -1; call->tx_jumbo_max = 1; call->next_rx_timo = 20 * HZ; @@ -553,6 +554,7 @@ static void rxrpc_cleanup_rx_buffers(struct rxrpc_call *call) rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->recvmsg_queue); rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->rx_queue); rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->rx_oos_queue); + kfree(call->rx_dec_buffer); } /* diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c index 232b6986da..7140364ace 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c @@ -240,6 +240,28 @@ static void rxrpc_call_is_secure(struct rxrpc_call *call) rxrpc_notify_socket(call); } +static int rxrpc_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + unsigned int len = skb->len - sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header); + void *buffer; + int ret; + + buffer = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buffer) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), buffer, len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb, buffer, len); + +out: + kfree(buffer); + return ret; +} + /* * connection-level Rx packet processor */ @@ -247,6 +269,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + bool secured = false; int ret; if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED) @@ -262,7 +285,14 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, return ret; case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE: - ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb); + spin_lock_irq(&conn->state_lock); + if (conn->state != RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) { + spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock); + return 0; + } + spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock); + + ret = rxrpc_verify_response(conn, skb); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -272,11 +302,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, return ret; spin_lock_irq(&conn->state_lock); - if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) + if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) { conn->state = RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE; + secured = true; + } spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock); - if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE) { + if (secured) { /* Offload call state flipping to the I/O thread. As * we've already received the packet, put it on the * front of the queue. diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c index 24aceb183c..ce761466b0 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c @@ -963,23 +963,34 @@ static void rxrpc_input_soft_acks(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); struct rxrpc_txqueue *tq = call->tx_queue; unsigned long extracted = ~0UL; - unsigned int nr = 0; + unsigned int nr = 0, nsack; rxrpc_seq_t seq = call->acks_hard_ack + 1; rxrpc_seq_t lowest_nak = seq + sp->ack.nr_acks; - u8 *acks = skb->data + sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(struct rxrpc_ackpacket); + u8 sack[256] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); + u8 *acks = sack; _enter("%x,%x,%u", tq->qbase, seq, sp->ack.nr_acks); while (after(seq, tq->qbase + RXRPC_NR_TXQUEUE - 1)) tq = tq->next; + /* Extract an individual SACK table. A normal SACK table is up to 255 + * bytes with 1 ACK flag per byte, but an extended SACK table can be up + * to 256 bytes with up to 8 ACK/NACK flags per byte. The ACK flags go + * across all bit 0's then all bit 1's, then all bit 2's, ... + */ + memset(sack, 0, sizeof(sack)); + nsack = umin(sp->ack.nr_acks, 256); + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, + sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(struct rxrpc_ackpacket), + sack, nsack) < 0) + return; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sp->ack.nr_acks; i++) { /* Decant ACKs until we hit a txqueue boundary. */ + if ((i & 255) == 0) + acks = sack; shiftr_adv_rotr(acks, extracted); - if (i == 256) { - acks -= i; - i = 0; - } seq++; nr++; if ((seq & RXRPC_TXQ_MASK) != 0) @@ -1117,9 +1128,6 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) skb_copy_bits(skb, ioffset, &trailer, sizeof(trailer)) < 0) return rxrpc_proto_abort(call, 0, rxrpc_badmsg_short_ack_trailer); - if (nr_acks > 0) - skb_condense(skb); - call->acks_latest_ts = ktime_get_real(); call->acks_hard_ack = hard_ack; call->acks_prev_seq = prev_pkt; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c index 0a260df45d..0b39046bdc 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c @@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) static int none_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); - - sp->flags |= RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED; return 0; } @@ -57,9 +54,10 @@ static int none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, } static int none_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct sk_buff *skb) + struct sk_buff *response_skb, + void *response, unsigned int len) { - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO, + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, response_skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO, rxrpc_eproto_rxnull_response); } diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c index 7fa7e77f6b..8f08b4ca19 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c @@ -147,15 +147,52 @@ static void rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(struct rxrpc_call *call) } /* - * Decrypt and verify a DATA packet. + * Decrypt and verify a DATA packet. The content of the packet is pulled out + * into a flat buffer rather than decrypting in place in the skbuff. This also + * has the advantage of aligning the buffer correctly for the crypto routines. + * + * We keep track of the sequence number of the packet currently decrypted into + * the buffer in ->rx_dec_seq. If MSG_PEEK is used and steps onto a new + * packet, subsequent recvmsg() calls will have to go back and re-decrypt the + * current packet. */ static int rxrpc_verify_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); + int ret; - if (sp->flags & RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED) - return 0; - return call->security->verify_packet(call, skb); + if (sp->len > call->rx_dec_bsize || !call->rx_dec_buffer) { + /* Make sure we can hold a 1412-byte jumbo subpacket and make + * sure that the buffer size is aligned to a crypto blocksize. + */ + size_t size = clamp(round_up(sp->len, 32), 2048, 65535); + void *buffer = krealloc(call->rx_dec_buffer, size, GFP_NOFS); + + if (!buffer) + return -ENOMEM; + call->rx_dec_buffer = buffer; + call->rx_dec_bsize = size; + } + + ret = -EFAULT; + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, call->rx_dec_buffer, sp->len) < 0) + goto err; + + call->rx_dec_offset = 0; + call->rx_dec_len = sp->len; + call->rx_dec_seq = sp->hdr.seq; + ret = call->security->verify_packet(call, skb); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + return 0; + +err: + kfree(call->rx_dec_buffer); + call->rx_dec_buffer = NULL; + call->rx_dec_bsize = 0; + call->rx_dec_offset = 0; + call->rx_dec_len = 0; + return ret; } /* @@ -283,16 +320,21 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, if (msg) sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sock->sk, skb); - if (rx_pkt_offset == 0) { + if (call->rx_dec_seq != sp->hdr.seq || + !call->rx_dec_buffer) { ret2 = rxrpc_verify_data(call, skb); trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_next, seq, - sp->offset, sp->len, ret2); + call->rx_dec_offset, + call->rx_dec_len, ret2); if (ret2 < 0) { ret = ret2; goto out; } - rx_pkt_offset = sp->offset; - rx_pkt_len = sp->len; + } + + if (rx_pkt_offset == USHRT_MAX) { + rx_pkt_offset = call->rx_dec_offset; + rx_pkt_len = call->rx_dec_len; } else { trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_cont, seq, rx_pkt_offset, rx_pkt_len, 0); @@ -304,10 +346,10 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, if (copy > remain) copy = remain; if (copy > 0) { - ret2 = skb_copy_datagram_iter(skb, rx_pkt_offset, iter, - copy); - if (ret2 < 0) { - ret = ret2; + ret2 = copy_to_iter(call->rx_dec_buffer + rx_pkt_offset, + copy, iter); + if (ret2 != copy) { + ret = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -328,7 +370,7 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call, /* The whole packet has been transferred. */ if (sp->hdr.flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET) ret = 1; - rx_pkt_offset = 0; + rx_pkt_offset = USHRT_MAX; rx_pkt_len = 0; skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &call->recvmsg_queue); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c index 8d17b49e4f..8dc6d77868 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c @@ -473,15 +473,20 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); struct rxgk_header *hdr; struct krb5_buffer metadata; - unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len; + unsigned int len = call->rx_dec_len; size_t data_offset = 0, data_len = len; + void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer, *p = data; u32 ac = 0; int ret = -ENOMEM; _enter(""); - crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(gk->krb5, KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE, - &data_offset, &data_len); + if (crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(gk->krb5, KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE, + &data_offset, &data_len) < 0) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, + rxgk_abort_1_short_header); + goto put_gk; + } hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_NOFS); if (!hdr) @@ -496,16 +501,15 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call, metadata.len = sizeof(*hdr); metadata.data = hdr; - ret = rxgk_verify_mic_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata, - skb, &offset, &len, &ac); + ret = rxgk_verify_mic(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata, &p, &len, &ac); kfree(hdr); if (ret < 0) { if (ret != -ENOMEM) rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac, rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto); } else { - sp->offset = offset; - sp->len = len; + call->rx_dec_offset = p - data; + call->rx_dec_len = len; } put_gk: @@ -522,49 +526,53 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); - struct rxgk_header hdr; - unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len; + struct rxgk_header *hdr; + unsigned int offset = 0, len = call->rx_dec_len; + void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer, *p = data; int ret; u32 ac = 0; _enter(""); - ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, skb, &offset, &len, &ac); + if (crypto_krb5_check_data_len(gk->krb5, KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE, + len, sizeof(*hdr)) < 0) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, + rxgk_abort_2_short_header); + goto error; + } + + ret = rxgk_decrypt(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, &p, &len, &ac); if (ret < 0) { if (ret != -ENOMEM) rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac, rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto); goto error; } + offset = p - data; - if (len < sizeof(hdr)) { + if (len < sizeof(*hdr)) { ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, rxgk_abort_2_short_header); goto error; } /* Extract the header from the skb */ - ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)); - if (ret < 0) { - ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, - rxgk_abort_2_short_encdata); - goto error; - } - offset += sizeof(hdr); - len -= sizeof(hdr); + hdr = data + offset; + offset += sizeof(*hdr); + len -= sizeof(*hdr); - if (ntohl(hdr.epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch || - ntohl(hdr.cid) != call->cid || - ntohl(hdr.call_number) != call->call_id || - ntohl(hdr.seq) != sp->hdr.seq || - ntohl(hdr.sec_index) != call->security_ix || - ntohl(hdr.data_len) > len) { + if (ntohl(hdr->epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch || + ntohl(hdr->cid) != call->cid || + ntohl(hdr->call_number) != call->call_id || + ntohl(hdr->seq) != sp->hdr.seq || + ntohl(hdr->sec_index) != call->security_ix || + ntohl(hdr->data_len) > len) { ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_SEALEDINCON, rxgk_abort_2_short_data); goto error; } - sp->offset = offset; - sp->len = ntohl(hdr.data_len); + call->rx_dec_offset = offset; + call->rx_dec_len = ntohl(hdr->data_len); ret = 0; error: rxgk_put(gk); @@ -1076,15 +1084,19 @@ static int rxgk_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge, * unsigned int call_numbers<>; * }; */ -static int rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, - struct sk_buff *skb, - __be32 *p, __be32 *end) +static int rxgk_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct sk_buff *skb, + void *auth, unsigned int auth_len) { + __be32 *p = auth, *end = auth + auth_len; u32 app_len, call_count, level, epoch, cid, i; _enter(""); + if ((end - p) * sizeof(__be32) < 24) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, + rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth); if (memcmp(p, conn->rxgk.nonce, 20) != 0) return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, rxgk_abort_resp_bad_nonce); @@ -1098,7 +1110,7 @@ static int rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, p += xdr_round_up(app_len) / sizeof(__be32); if (end - p < 4) return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, - rxgk_abort_resp_short_applen); + rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth); level = ntohl(*p++); epoch = ntohl(*p++); @@ -1140,37 +1152,6 @@ static int rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, return 0; } -/* - * Extract the authenticator and verify it. - */ -static int rxgk_verify_authenticator(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, - struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int auth_offset, unsigned int auth_len) -{ - void *auth; - __be32 *p; - int ret; - - auth = kmalloc(auth_len, GFP_NOFS); - if (!auth) - return -ENOMEM; - - ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, auth_offset, auth, auth_len); - if (ret < 0) { - ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EPROTO, - rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth); - goto error; - } - - p = auth; - ret = rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(conn, krb5, skb, p, - p + auth_len / sizeof(*p)); -error: - kfree(auth); - return ret; -} - /* * Verify a response. * @@ -1181,50 +1162,47 @@ error: * }; */ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct sk_buff *skb) + struct sk_buff *skb, + void *buffer, unsigned int len) { const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; struct rxrpc_key_token *token; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); - struct rxgk_response rhdr; + struct rxgk_response *rhdr; struct rxgk_context *gk; struct key *key = NULL; - unsigned int offset = sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header); - unsigned int len = skb->len - sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header); - unsigned int token_offset, token_len; - unsigned int auth_offset, auth_len; + unsigned int resp_token_len, auth_len; + void *resp_token, *auth; __be32 xauth_len; int ret, ec; _enter("{%d}", conn->debug_id); /* Parse the RXGK_Response object */ - if (sizeof(rhdr) + sizeof(__be32) > len) + if (len < sizeof(*rhdr) + sizeof(__be32)) + goto short_packet; + rhdr = buffer; + buffer += sizeof(*rhdr); + len -= sizeof(*rhdr); + + resp_token = buffer; + resp_token_len = ntohl(rhdr->token_len); + if (resp_token_len > len || + xdr_round_up(resp_token_len) + sizeof(__be32) > len) goto short_packet; - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &rhdr, sizeof(rhdr)) < 0) - goto short_packet; - offset += sizeof(rhdr); - len -= sizeof(rhdr); + trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, 0, sp->hdr.cksum, resp_token_len); - token_offset = offset; - token_len = ntohl(rhdr.token_len); - if (xdr_round_up(token_len) + sizeof(__be32) > len) - goto short_packet; + buffer += xdr_round_up(resp_token_len); + len -= xdr_round_up(resp_token_len); - trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, 0, sp->hdr.cksum, token_len); - - offset += xdr_round_up(token_len); - len -= xdr_round_up(token_len); - - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &xauth_len, sizeof(xauth_len)) < 0) - goto short_packet; - offset += sizeof(xauth_len); + xauth_len = *(__be32 *)buffer; + buffer += sizeof(xauth_len); len -= sizeof(xauth_len); - auth_offset = offset; + auth = buffer; auth_len = ntohl(xauth_len); - if (auth_len < len) + if (auth_len > len) goto short_packet; if (auth_len & 3) goto inconsistent; @@ -1237,7 +1215,7 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, * to the app to deal with - which might mean a round trip to * userspace. */ - ret = rxgk_extract_token(conn, skb, token_offset, token_len, &key); + ret = rxgk_extract_token(conn, skb, resp_token, resp_token_len, &key); if (ret < 0) goto out; @@ -1251,7 +1229,7 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, */ token = key->payload.data[0]; conn->security_level = token->rxgk->level; - conn->rxgk.start_time = __be64_to_cpu(rhdr.start_time); + conn->rxgk.start_time = __be64_to_cpu(rhdr->start_time); gk = rxgk_generate_transport_key(conn, token->rxgk, sp->hdr.cksum, GFP_NOFS); if (IS_ERR(gk)) { @@ -1261,24 +1239,26 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, krb5 = gk->krb5; - trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, krb5->etype, sp->hdr.cksum, token_len); + trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, krb5->etype, sp->hdr.cksum, + resp_token_len); /* Decrypt, parse and verify the authenticator. */ - ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(krb5, gk->resp_enc, skb, - &auth_offset, &auth_len, &ec); + ret = rxgk_decrypt(krb5, gk->resp_enc, &auth, &auth_len, &ec); if (ret < 0) { rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_SEALEDINCON, ret, rxgk_abort_resp_auth_dec); - goto out; + goto out_gk; } - ret = rxgk_verify_authenticator(conn, krb5, skb, auth_offset, auth_len); + ret = rxgk_verify_authenticator(conn, krb5, skb, auth, auth_len); if (ret < 0) - goto out; + goto out_gk; conn->key = key; key = NULL; ret = 0; +out_gk: + rxgk_put(gk); out: key_put(key); _leave(" = %d", ret); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c index 30275cb5ba..aa9542a950 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ * }; */ int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len, + void *buffer, unsigned int ticket_len, struct key **_key) { struct rxrpc_key_token *token; @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, size_t pre_ticket_len, payload_len; unsigned int klen, enctype; void *payload, *ticket; - __be32 *t, *p, *q, tmp[2]; + __be32 *t, *p, *q, *tmp; int ret; _enter(""); @@ -59,10 +59,7 @@ int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_tkt); /* Get the session key length */ - ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, ticket_offset, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - if (ret < 0) - return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, - rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_klen); + tmp = buffer; enctype = ntohl(tmp[0]); klen = ntohl(tmp[1]); @@ -84,12 +81,7 @@ int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, * it. */ ticket = payload + pre_ticket_len; - ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, ticket_offset, ticket, ticket_len); - if (ret < 0) { - ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, - rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_tkt); - goto error; - } + memcpy(ticket, buffer, ticket_len); /* Fill out the form header. */ p = payload; @@ -131,7 +123,7 @@ int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, goto error; } - /* Ticket read in with skb_copy_bits above */ + /* Ticket appended above. */ q += xdr_round_up(ticket_len) / 4; if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)q - (unsigned long)payload != payload_len)) { ret = -EIO; @@ -182,14 +174,15 @@ error: * [tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-afs-08 sec 6.1] */ int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int token_offset, unsigned int token_len, + void *token, unsigned int token_len, struct key **_key) { const struct krb5_enctype *krb5; const struct krb5_buffer *server_secret; struct crypto_aead *token_enc = NULL; struct key *server_key; - unsigned int ticket_offset, ticket_len; + unsigned int ticket_len; + void *ticket; u32 kvno, enctype; int ret, ec = 0; @@ -197,24 +190,23 @@ int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 kvno; __be32 enctype; __be32 token_len; - } container; + } *container; - if (token_len < sizeof(container)) + if (token_len < sizeof(*container)) goto short_packet; /* Decode the RXGK_TokenContainer object. This tells us which server * key we should be using. We can then fetch the key, get the secret * and set up the crypto to extract the token. */ - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, token_offset, &container, sizeof(container)) < 0) - goto short_packet; + container = token; + token += sizeof(*container); - kvno = ntohl(container.kvno); - enctype = ntohl(container.enctype); - ticket_len = ntohl(container.token_len); - ticket_offset = token_offset + sizeof(container); + kvno = ntohl(container->kvno); + enctype = ntohl(container->enctype); + ticket_len = ntohl(container->token_len); - if (xdr_round_up(ticket_len) > token_len - sizeof(container)) + if (ticket_len > xdr_round_down(token_len - sizeof(*container))) goto short_packet; _debug("KVNO %u", kvno); @@ -237,8 +229,8 @@ int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, * gain access to K0, from which we can derive the transport key and * thence decode the authenticator. */ - ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(krb5, token_enc, skb, - &ticket_offset, &ticket_len, &ec); + ticket = token; + ret = rxgk_decrypt(krb5, token_enc, &ticket, &ticket_len, &ec); crypto_free_aead(token_enc); token_enc = NULL; if (ret < 0) { @@ -247,7 +239,7 @@ int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, rxgk_abort_resp_tok_dec); } - ret = conn->security->default_decode_ticket(conn, skb, ticket_offset, + ret = conn->security->default_decode_ticket(conn, skb, ticket, ticket_len, _key); if (ret < 0) goto cant_get_token; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h index 80164d89e1..3deed5863f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h @@ -34,16 +34,17 @@ struct rxgk_context { }; #define xdr_round_up(x) (round_up((x), sizeof(__be32))) +#define xdr_round_down(x) (round_down((x), sizeof(__be32))) #define xdr_object_len(x) (4 + xdr_round_up(x)) /* * rxgk_app.c */ int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len, + void *ticket, unsigned int ticket_len, struct key **_key); int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int token_offset, unsigned int token_len, + void *token, unsigned int token_len, struct key **_key); /* @@ -61,31 +62,30 @@ int rxgk_set_up_token_cipher(const struct krb5_buffer *server_key, gfp_t gfp); /* - * Apply decryption and checksumming functions to part of an skbuff. The - * offset and length are updated to reflect the actual content of the encrypted + * Apply decryption and checksumming functions a flat data buffer. The data + * point and length are updated to reflect the actual content of the encrypted * region. */ -static inline -int rxgk_decrypt_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, - struct crypto_aead *aead, - struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len, - int *_error_code) +static inline int rxgk_decrypt(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct crypto_aead *aead, + void **_data, unsigned int *_len, + int *_error_code) { - struct scatterlist sg[16]; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; size_t offset = 0, len = *_len; - int nr_sg, ret; + int ret; - sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); - nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, *_offset, len); - if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0)) - return nr_sg; + sg_init_one(sg, *_data, len); - ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(krb5, aead, sg, nr_sg, - &offset, &len); + ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(krb5, aead, sg, 1, &offset, &len); switch (ret) { case 0: - *_offset += offset; + if (offset & 3) { + *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY; + ret = -EPROTO; + break; + } + *_data += offset; *_len = len; break; case -EBADMSG: /* Checksum mismatch. */ @@ -105,31 +105,26 @@ int rxgk_decrypt_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, } /* - * Check the MIC on a region of an skbuff. The offset and length are updated - * to reflect the actual content of the secure region. + * Check the MIC on a flat buffer. The data pointer and length are updated to + * reflect the actual content of the secure region. */ static inline -int rxgk_verify_mic_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, - struct crypto_shash *shash, - const struct krb5_buffer *metadata, - struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len, - u32 *_error_code) +int rxgk_verify_mic(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, + struct crypto_shash *shash, + const struct krb5_buffer *metadata, + void **_data, unsigned int *_len, + u32 *_error_code) { - struct scatterlist sg[16]; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; size_t offset = 0, len = *_len; - int nr_sg, ret; + int ret; - sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); - nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, *_offset, len); - if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0)) - return nr_sg; + sg_init_one(sg, *_data, len); - ret = crypto_krb5_verify_mic(krb5, shash, metadata, sg, nr_sg, - &offset, &len); + ret = crypto_krb5_verify_mic(krb5, shash, metadata, sg, 1, &offset, &len); switch (ret) { case 0: - *_offset += offset; + *_data += offset; *_len = len; break; case -EBADMSG: /* Checksum mismatch */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index 3657c0661c..7a96dd8dfd 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct rxrpc_crypt iv; __be32 *tmpbuf; size_t tmpsize = 4 * sizeof(__be32); + int ret; _enter(""); @@ -225,13 +226,13 @@ static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, ci); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, tmpsize, iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); skcipher_request_free(req); memcpy(&conn->rxkad.csum_iv, tmpbuf + 2, sizeof(conn->rxkad.csum_iv)); kfree(tmpbuf); - _leave(" = 0"); - return 0; + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; } /* @@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(const struct rxrpc_call *call, struct scatterlist sg; size_t pad; u16 check; + int ret; _enter(""); @@ -286,11 +288,11 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(const struct rxrpc_call *call, skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); skcipher_request_zero(req); - _leave(" = 0"); - return 0; + _leave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; } /* @@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) union { __be32 buf[2]; } crypto __aligned(8); - u32 x, y; + u32 x, y = 0; int ret; _enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u},%u,", @@ -376,8 +378,10 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); skcipher_request_zero(req); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; y = ntohl(crypto.buf[1]); y = (y >> 16) & 0xffff; @@ -413,6 +417,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) memset(p + txb->pkt_len, 0, gap); } +out: skcipher_request_free(req); _leave(" = %d [set %x]", ret, y); return ret; @@ -425,27 +430,25 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, rxrpc_seq_t seq, struct skcipher_request *req) { - struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr; + struct rxkad_level1_hdr *sechdr; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); struct rxrpc_crypt iv; - struct scatterlist sg[16]; - u32 data_size, buf; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer; + u32 len = sp->len, data_size, buf; u16 check; int ret; _enter(""); - if (sp->len < 8) + if (len < 8) return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, rxkad_abort_1_short_header); /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt * directly into the target buffer. */ - sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg)); - ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sp->offset, 8); - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) - return ret; + sg_init_one(sg, data, len); /* start the decryption afresh */ memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); @@ -453,17 +456,17 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, 8, iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); skcipher_request_zero(req); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; /* Extract the decrypted packet length */ - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) - return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN, - rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata); - sp->offset += sizeof(sechdr); - sp->len -= sizeof(sechdr); + sechdr = data; + call->rx_dec_offset = sizeof(*sechdr); + len -= sizeof(*sechdr); - buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size); + buf = ntohl(sechdr->data_size); data_size = buf & 0xffff; check = buf >> 16; @@ -472,10 +475,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, if (check != 0) return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, rxkad_abort_1_short_check); - if (data_size > sp->len) + if (data_size > len) return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN, rxkad_abort_1_short_data); - sp->len = data_size; + call->rx_dec_len = data_size; _leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size); return 0; @@ -489,40 +492,28 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, struct skcipher_request *req) { const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; - struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr; + struct rxkad_level2_hdr *sechdr; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); struct rxrpc_crypt iv; - struct scatterlist _sg[4], *sg; - u32 data_size, buf; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer; + u32 len = sp->len, data_size, buf; u16 check; - int nsg, ret; + int ret; - _enter(",{%d}", sp->len); + _enter(",{%d}", len); - if (sp->len < 8) + if (len < 8) return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, rxkad_abort_2_short_header); - /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt - * directly into the target buffer. - */ - sg = _sg; - nsg = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1; - if (nsg <= 4) { - nsg = 4; - } else { - sg = kmalloc_array(nsg, sizeof(*sg), GFP_NOIO); - if (!sg) - return -ENOMEM; - } + /* Don't let the crypto algo see a misaligned length. */ + len = round_down(len, 8); - sg_init_table(sg, nsg); - ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sp->offset, sp->len); - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { - if (sg != _sg) - kfree(sg); - return ret; - } + /* Decrypt in place in the call's decryption buffer. TODO: We really + * want to decrypt directly into the target buffer. + */ + sg_init_one(sg, data, len); /* decrypt from the session key */ token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0]; @@ -530,20 +521,22 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sp->len, iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x); + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); skcipher_request_zero(req); - if (sg != _sg) - kfree(sg); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENOMEM) + return ret; + return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, + rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned); + } /* Extract the decrypted packet length */ - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) - return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN, - rxkad_abort_2_short_len); - sp->offset += sizeof(sechdr); - sp->len -= sizeof(sechdr); + sechdr = data; + call->rx_dec_offset = sizeof(*sechdr); + len -= sizeof(*sechdr); - buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size); + buf = ntohl(sechdr->data_size); data_size = buf & 0xffff; check = buf >> 16; @@ -553,17 +546,18 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb, return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, rxkad_abort_2_short_check); - if (data_size > sp->len) + if (data_size > len) return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN, rxkad_abort_2_short_data); - sp->len = data_size; + call->rx_dec_len = data_size; _leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size); return 0; } /* - * Verify the security on a received packet and the subpackets therein. + * Verify the security on a received (sub)packet. If the packet needs + * modifying (e.g. decrypting), it must be copied. */ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -602,8 +596,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb) skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); skcipher_request_zero(req); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; y = ntohl(crypto.buf[1]); cksum = (y >> 16) & 0xffff; @@ -966,7 +962,6 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, *_expiry = 0; ASSERT(server_key->payload.data[0] != NULL); - ASSERTCMP((unsigned long) ticket & 7UL, ==, 0); memcpy(&iv, &server_key->payload.data[2], sizeof(iv)); @@ -1073,21 +1068,23 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, /* * decrypt the response packet */ -static void rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct rxkad_response *resp, - const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key) +static int rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, + struct rxkad_response *resp, + const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key) { struct skcipher_request *req = rxkad_ci_req; struct scatterlist sg[1]; struct rxrpc_crypt iv; + int ret; _enter(",,%08x%08x", ntohl(session_key->n[0]), ntohl(session_key->n[1])); mutex_lock(&rxkad_ci_mutex); - if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(rxkad_ci, session_key->x, - sizeof(*session_key)) < 0) - BUG(); + ret = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(rxkad_ci, session_key->x, + sizeof(*session_key)); + if (ret < 0) + goto unlock; memcpy(&iv, session_key, sizeof(iv)); @@ -1096,19 +1093,22 @@ static void rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, rxkad_ci); skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x); - crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); skcipher_request_zero(req); +unlock: mutex_unlock(&rxkad_ci_mutex); _leave(""); + return ret; } /* * verify a response */ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, - struct sk_buff *skb) + struct sk_buff *skb, + void *buffer, unsigned int len) { struct rxkad_response *response; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); @@ -1138,16 +1138,11 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, } } - ret = -ENOMEM; - response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS); - if (!response) - goto temporary_error; - - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), - response, sizeof(*response)) < 0) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_short); - goto protocol_error; + response = buffer; + if (len < sizeof(*response)) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_short); + goto error; } version = ntohl(response->version); @@ -1156,61 +1151,61 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len); + buffer += sizeof(*response); + len -= sizeof(*response); + if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_version); - goto protocol_error; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_version); + goto error; } if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len); - goto protocol_error; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len); + goto error; } if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt); - goto protocol_error; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt); + goto error; } /* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */ - ret = -ENOMEM; - ticket = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS); - if (!ticket) - goto temporary_error_free_resp; - - if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(*response), - ticket, ticket_len) < 0) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt); - goto protocol_error; + ticket = buffer; + if (ticket_len > len) { + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt); + goto error; } ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, server_key, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key, &expiry); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; + goto error; /* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the * response */ - rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key); + ret = rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch || ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid || ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param); + goto error; } csum = response->encrypted.checksum; response->encrypted.checksum = 0; rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response); if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum); + goto error; } for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) { @@ -1218,38 +1213,38 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, u32 counter = READ_ONCE(conn->channels[i].call_counter); if (call_id > INT_MAX) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid); + goto error; } if (call_id < counter) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr); + goto error; } if (call_id > counter) { if (conn->channels[i].call) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, rxkad_abort_resp_call_state); - goto protocol_error_free; + goto error; } conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id; } } if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->rxkad.nonce + 1) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq); + goto error; } level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level); if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_level); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_level); + goto error; } conn->security_level = level; @@ -1257,31 +1252,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, * this the connection security can be handled in exactly the same way * as for a client connection */ ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno); - if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; - kfree(ticket); - kfree(response); - _leave(" = 0"); - return 0; - -protocol_error_free: - kfree(ticket); -protocol_error: - kfree(response); - key_put(server_key); - return -EPROTO; - -temporary_error_free_ticket: - kfree(ticket); -temporary_error_free_resp: - kfree(response); -temporary_error: - /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as - * ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we - * also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails. - */ +error: key_put(server_key); + _leave(" = %d", ret); return ret; } diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c index 76284fc538..b0bba0feef 100644 --- a/net/tipc/msg.c +++ b/net/tipc/msg.c @@ -177,8 +177,20 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) if (fragid == LAST_FRAGMENT) { TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->validated = 0; - if (unlikely(!tipc_msg_validate(&head))) + + /* If the reassembled skb has been freed in + * tipc_msg_validate() because of an invalid truesize, + * then head will point to a newly allocated reassembled + * skb, while *headbuf points to freed reassembled skb. + * In such cases, correct *headbuf for freeing the newly + * allocated reassembled skb later. + */ + if (unlikely(!tipc_msg_validate(&head))) { + if (head != *headbuf) + *headbuf = head; goto err; + } + *buf = head; TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->tail = NULL; *headbuf = NULL; diff --git a/redhat/kernel.changelog-10.2 b/redhat/kernel.changelog-10.2 index f4c4260a8b..e79b369b68 100644 --- a/redhat/kernel.changelog-10.2 +++ b/redhat/kernel.changelog-10.2 @@ -1,3 +1,27 @@ +* Mon Jul 27 2026 CKI KWF Bot [6.12.0-211.40.1.el10_2] +- ipv6: fix possible UAF in icmpv6_rcv() (CKI Backport Bot) [RHEL-192215] {CVE-2026-53006} +- tipc: fix double-free in tipc_buf_append() (CKI Backport Bot) [RHEL-192181] {CVE-2026-52993} +- iommu/vt-d: Avoid NULL pointer dereference or refcount corruption (Eder Zulian) [RHEL-190344] {CVE-2026-53281} +- iommu/vt-d: Fix oops due to out of scope access (Eder Zulian) [RHEL-190344] +- net: bridge: use a stable FDB dst snapshot in RCU readers (Mohammad Heib) [RHEL-179338] {CVE-2026-46086} +- rxrpc: rxrpc_verify_data ensure rx_dec_buffer alloc (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Fix the ACK parser to extract the SACK table for parsing (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Fix RESPONSE packet verification to extract skb to a linear buffer (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- crypto/krb5, rxrpc: Fix lack of pre-decrypt/pre-verify length checks (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] {CVE-2026-31635} +- rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response() (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] {CVE-2026-31633} +- rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context in rxgk_verify_response() (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] {CVE-2026-31632} +- rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] {CVE-2026-31631} +- rxgk: Fix potential integer overflow in length check (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response() (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] {CVE-2026-43500} +- rxrpc: Fix conn-level packet handling to unshare RESPONSE packets (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] +- rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge (Marc Dionne) [RHEL-178254] {CVE-2026-31676} +Resolves: RHEL-178254, RHEL-179338, RHEL-190344, RHEL-192181, RHEL-192215 + * Thu Jul 23 2026 CKI KWF Bot [6.12.0-211.39.1.el10_2] - futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc (Audra Mitchell) [RHEL-193518] {CVE-2026-52973} - net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels (Antoine Tenart) [RHEL-179299] {CVE-2026-46099} diff --git a/uki-addons.sbat b/uki-addons.sbat index 07f56dcdd8..a51df09e7f 100644 --- a/uki-addons.sbat +++ b/uki-addons.sbat @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md -kernel-uki-virt-addons.almalinux,1,AlmaLinux,kernel-uki-virt-addons,6.12.0-211.39.1.el10.x86_64,mailto:security@almalinux.org +kernel-uki-virt-addons.almalinux,1,AlmaLinux,kernel-uki-virt-addons,6.12.0-211.40.1.el10.x86_64,mailto:security@almalinux.org diff --git a/uki.sbat b/uki.sbat index 531be0aad2..aade8ff523 100644 --- a/uki.sbat +++ b/uki.sbat @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md -kernel-uki-virt.almalinux,1,AlmaLinux,kernel-uki-virt,6.12.0-211.39.1.el10.x86_64,mailto:security@almalinux.org +kernel-uki-virt.almalinux,1,AlmaLinux,kernel-uki-virt,6.12.0-211.40.1.el10.x86_64,mailto:security@almalinux.org