Import of kernel-5.14.0-570.62.1.el9_6

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -531,7 +531,9 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsa
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/admin-guide/RAS/main.rst

@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Architecture (MCA)\ [#f3]_.
   mode).
 
 .. [#f3] For more details about the Machine Check Architecture (MCA),
-  please read Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst at the Kernel tree.
+  please read Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst at the Kernel tree.
 
 EDAC - Error Detection And Correction
 *************************************

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -23,3 +23,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    gather_data_sampling
    reg-file-data-sampling
    indirect-target-selection
+   vmscape

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
 Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
 
 Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
-architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
 
 
 Attack scenarios

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst

@@ -157,9 +157,7 @@ This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
 combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
 buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
 
-Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
-
-	mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+Kernel does the buffer clearing with x86_clear_cpu_buffers().
 
 On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
 kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst

@@ -104,7 +104,20 @@ The possible values in this file are:
 
    (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit)
 
+ * 'Mitigation: Reduced Speculation':
 
+   This mitigation gets automatically enabled when the above one "IBPB on
+   VMEXIT" has been selected and the CPU supports the BpSpecReduce bit.
+
+   It gets automatically enabled on machines which have the
+   SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO=1 CPUID bit. In that case, the code logic is to switch
+   to the above =ibpb-vmexit mitigation because the user/kernel boundary is
+   not affected anymore and thus "safe RET" is not needed.
+
+   After enabling the IBPB on VMEXIT mitigation option, the BpSpecReduce bit
+   is detected (functionality present on all such machines) and that
+   practically overrides IBPB on VMEXIT as it has a lot less performance
+   impact and takes care of the guest->host attack vector too.
 
 In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to:
 
@@ -158,3 +171,72 @@ poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
 In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
 technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
 srso_safe_ret().
+
+Checking the safe RET mitigation actually works
+-----------------------------------------------
+
+In case one wants to validate whether the SRSO safe RET mitigation works
+on a kernel, one could use two performance counters
+
+* PMC_0xc8 - Count of RET/RET lw retired
+* PMC_0xc9 - Count of RET/RET lw retired mispredicted
+
+and compare the number of RETs retired properly vs those retired
+mispredicted, in kernel mode. Another way of specifying those events
+is::
+
+        # perf list ex_ret_near_ret
+
+        List of pre-defined events (to be used in -e or -M):
+
+        core:
+          ex_ret_near_ret
+               [Retired Near Returns]
+          ex_ret_near_ret_mispred
+               [Retired Near Returns Mispredicted]
+
+Either the command using the event mnemonics::
+
+        # perf stat -e ex_ret_near_ret:k -e ex_ret_near_ret_mispred:k sleep 10s
+
+or using the raw PMC numbers::
+
+        # perf stat -e cpu/event=0xc8,umask=0/k -e cpu/event=0xc9,umask=0/k sleep 10s
+
+should give the same amount. I.e., every RET retired should be
+mispredicted::
+
+        [root@brent: ~/kernel/linux/tools/perf> ./perf stat -e cpu/event=0xc8,umask=0/k -e cpu/event=0xc9,umask=0/k sleep 10s
+
+         Performance counter stats for 'sleep 10s':
+
+                   137,167      cpu/event=0xc8,umask=0/k
+                   137,173      cpu/event=0xc9,umask=0/k
+
+              10.004110303 seconds time elapsed
+
+               0.000000000 seconds user
+               0.004462000 seconds sys
+
+vs the case when the mitigation is disabled (spec_rstack_overflow=off)
+or not functioning properly, showing usually a lot smaller number of
+mispredicted retired RETs vs the overall count of retired RETs during
+a workload::
+
+       [root@brent: ~/kernel/linux/tools/perf> ./perf stat -e cpu/event=0xc8,umask=0/k -e cpu/event=0xc9,umask=0/k sleep 10s
+
+        Performance counter stats for 'sleep 10s':
+
+                  201,627      cpu/event=0xc8,umask=0/k
+                    4,074      cpu/event=0xc9,umask=0/k
+
+             10.003267252 seconds time elapsed
+
+              0.002729000 seconds user
+              0.000000000 seconds sys
+
+Also, there is a selftest which performs the above, go to
+tools/testing/selftests/x86/ and do::
+
+        make srso
+        ./srso

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
 which in turn potentially leaks data stored in the buffers.
 
 More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
-architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/arch/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
 
 
 Attack scenarios

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+VMSCAPE
+=======
+
+VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that may allow a guest to influence the branch
+prediction in host userspace. It particularly affects hypervisors like QEMU.
+
+Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk encryption keys,
+guest-userspace may be able to attack the guest-kernel using the hypervisor as
+a confused deputy.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+The following CPU families are affected by VMSCAPE:
+
+**Intel processors:**
+  - Skylake generation (Parts without Enhanced-IBRS)
+  - Cascade Lake generation - (Parts affected by ITS guest/host separation)
+  - Alder Lake and newer (Parts affected by BHI)
+
+Note that, BHI affected parts that use BHB clearing software mitigation e.g.
+Icelake are not vulnerable to VMSCAPE.
+
+**AMD processors:**
+  - Zen series (families 0x17, 0x19, 0x1a)
+
+** Hygon processors:**
+ - Family 0x18
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+
+Conditional IBPB
+----------------
+
+Kernel tracks when a CPU has run a potentially malicious guest and issues an
+IBPB before the first exit to userspace after VM-exit. If userspace did not run
+between VM-exit and the next VM-entry, no IBPB is issued.
+
+Note that the existing userspace mitigation against Spectre-v2 is effective in
+protecting the userspace. They are insufficient to protect the userspace VMMs
+from a malicious guest. This is because Spectre-v2 mitigations are applied at
+context switch time, while the userspace VMM can run after a VM-exit without a
+context switch.
+
+Vulnerability enumeration and mitigation is not applied inside a guest. This is
+because nested hypervisors should already be deploying IBPB to isolate
+themselves from nested guests.
+
+SMT considerations
+------------------
+
+When Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) is enabled, hypervisors can be
+vulnerable to cross-thread attacks. For complete protection against VMSCAPE
+attacks in SMT environments, STIBP should be enabled.
+
+The kernel will issue a warning if SMT is enabled without adequate STIBP
+protection. Warning is not issued when:
+
+- SMT is disabled
+- STIBP is enabled system-wide
+- Intel eIBRS is enabled (which implies STIBP protection)
+
+System information and options
+------------------------------
+
+The sysfs file showing VMSCAPE mitigation status is:
+
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ * 'Not affected':
+
+   The processor is not vulnerable to VMSCAPE attacks.
+
+ * 'Vulnerable':
+
+   The processor is vulnerable and no mitigation has been applied.
+
+ * 'Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace':
+
+   Conditional IBPB mitigation is enabled. The kernel tracks when a CPU has
+   run a potentially malicious guest and issues an IBPB before the first
+   exit to userspace after VM-exit.
+
+ * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT':
+
+   IBPB is issued on every VM-exit. This occurs when other mitigations like
+   RETBLEED or SRSO are already issuing IBPB on VM-exit.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+----------------------------------------------
+
+The mitigation can be controlled via the ``vmscape=`` command line parameter:
+
+ * ``vmscape=off``:
+
+   Disable the VMSCAPE mitigation.
+
+ * ``vmscape=ibpb``:
+
+   Enable conditional IBPB mitigation (default when CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE=y).
+
+ * ``vmscape=force``:
+
+   Force vulnerability detection and mitigation even on processors that are
+   not known to be affected.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ parameter is applicable::
 	X86-32	X86-32, aka i386 architecture is enabled.
 	X86-64	X86-64 architecture is enabled.
 			More X86-64 boot options can be found in
-			Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst.
+			Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst.
 	X86	Either 32-bit or 64-bit x86 (same as X86-32+X86-64)
 	X86_UV	SGI UV support is enabled.
 	XEN	Xen support is enabled
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Do not modify the syntax of boot loader parameters without extreme
 need or coordination with <Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst>.
 
 There are also arch-specific kernel-parameters not documented here.
-See for example <Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst>.
+See for example <Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst>.
 
 Note that ALL kernel parameters listed below are CASE SENSITIVE, and that
 a trailing = on the name of any parameter states that that parameter will

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3165,7 +3165,7 @@
 
 	mce		[X86-32] Machine Check Exception
 
-	mce=option	[X86-64] See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
+	mce=option	[X86-64] See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
 
 	md=		[HW] RAID subsystems devices and level
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/md.rst.
@@ -3427,6 +3427,7 @@
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       vmscape=off [X86]
 
 				Exceptions:
 					       This does not have any effect on
@@ -4628,7 +4629,7 @@
 			See Documentation/admin-guide/blockdev/paride.rst.
 
 	pirq=		[SMP,APIC] Manual mp-table setup
-			See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst.
+			See Documentation/arch/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst.
 
 	plip=		[PPT,NET] Parallel port network link
 			Format: { parport<nr> | timid | 0 }
@@ -5910,7 +5911,7 @@
 
 	serialnumber	[BUGS=X86-32]
 
-	sev=option[,option...] [X86-64] See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
+	sev=option[,option...] [X86-64] See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
 
 	shapers=	[NET]
 			Maximal number of shapers.
@@ -6663,6 +6664,19 @@
 			first trust source as a backend which is initialized
 			successfully during iteration.
 
+	tsa=		[X86] Control mitigation for Transient Scheduler
+			Attacks on AMD CPUs. Search the following in your
+			favourite search engine for more details:
+
+			"Technical guidance for mitigating transient scheduler
+			attacks".
+
+			off		- disable the mitigation
+			on		- enable the mitigation (default)
+			user		- mitigate only user/kernel transitions
+			vm		- mitigate only guest/host transitions
+
+
 	tsc=		Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC.
 			Format: <string>
 			[x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this
@@ -7091,6 +7105,16 @@
 	vmpoff=		[KNL,S390] Perform z/VM CP command after power off.
 			Format: <command>
 
+	vmscape=	[X86] Controls mitigation for VMscape attacks.
+			VMscape attacks can leak information from a userspace
+			hypervisor to a guest via speculative side-channels.
+
+			off		- disable the mitigation
+			ibpb		- use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
+					  (IBPB) mitigation (default)
+			force		- force vulnerability detection even on
+					  unaffected processors
+
 	vsyscall=	[X86-64]
 			Controls the behavior of vsyscalls (i.e. calls to
 			fixed addresses of 0xffffffffff600x00 from legacy

Documentation/arch/index.rst

@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ implementation.
    s390/index
    ../sh/index
    ../sparc/index
-   ../x86/index
+   x86/index
    ../xtensa/index

Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst

@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ follow::
 In addition to read/modify/write the setup header of the struct
 boot_params as that of 16-bit boot protocol, the boot loader should
 also fill the additional fields of the struct boot_params as
-described in chapter Documentation/x86/zero-page.rst.
+described in chapter Documentation/arch/x86/zero-page.rst.
 
 After setting up the struct boot_params, the boot loader can load the
 32/64-bit kernel in the same way as that of 16-bit boot protocol.
@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ can be calculated as follows::
 In addition to read/modify/write the setup header of the struct
 boot_params as that of 16-bit boot protocol, the boot loader should
 also fill the additional fields of the struct boot_params as described
-in chapter Documentation/x86/zero-page.rst.
+in chapter Documentation/arch/x86/zero-page.rst.
 
 After setting up the struct boot_params, the boot loader can load
 64-bit kernel in the same way as that of 16-bit boot protocol, but

Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ enters a C-state.
 
 The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
 
-    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+    x86_clear_cpu_buffers()
 
 Also macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS can be used in ASM late in exit-to-user path.
 Other than CFLAGS.ZF, this macro doesn't clobber any registers.
@@ -185,9 +185,9 @@ Mitigation points
    idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
    activated.
 
-   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
-   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
-   the system.
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key cpu_buf_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of the
+   system.
 
    The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
    that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread

Documentation/arch/x86/mtrr.rst

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ are aligned with platform MTRR setup. If MTRRs are only set up by the platform
 firmware code though and the OS does not make any specific MTRR mapping
 requests mtrr_type_lookup() should always return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID.
 
-For details refer to Documentation/x86/pat.rst.
+For details refer to Documentation/arch/x86/pat.rst.
 
 .. tip::
   On Intel P6 family processors (Pentium Pro, Pentium II and later)

Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ physical address space. This "ought to be enough for anybody" ©.
 QEMU 2.9 and later support 5-level paging.
 
 Virtual memory layout for 5-level paging is described in
-Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst
+Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst
 
 
 Enabling 5-level paging

Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ only the AMD64 specific ones are listed here.
 
 Machine check
 =============
-Please see Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst for sysfs runtime tunables.
+Please see Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst for sysfs runtime tunables.
 
    mce=off
 		Disable machine check
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ APICs
      Don't use the local APIC (alias for i386 compatibility)
 
    pirq=...
-	See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst
+	See Documentation/arch/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst
 
    noapictimer
 	Don't set up the APIC timer

Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets.rst

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ For more information on the features of cpusets, see
 Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/cpusets.rst.
 There are a number of different configurations you can use for your needs.  For
 more information on the numa=fake command line option and its various ways of
-configuring fake nodes, see Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst.
+configuring fake nodes, see Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst.
 
 For the purposes of this introduction, we'll assume a very primitive NUMA
 emulation setup of "numa=fake=4*512,".  This will split our system memory into

Documentation/driver-api/device-io.rst

@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ ioremap_uc()
 
 ioremap_uc() behaves like ioremap() except that on the x86 architecture without
 'PAT' mode, it marks memory as uncached even when the MTRR has designated
-it as cacheable, see Documentation/x86/pat.rst.
+it as cacheable, see Documentation/arch/x86/pat.rst.
 
 Portable drivers should avoid the use of ioremap_uc().
 

Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst

@@ -7658,7 +7658,7 @@ system fingerprint.  To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions
 by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by
 default.
 
-See Documentation/x86/sgx.rst for more details.
+See Documentation/arch/x86/sgx.rst for more details.
 
 7.26 KVM_CAP_PPC_RPT_INVALIDATE
 -------------------------------

MAINTAINERS

@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ M:	Naveen Krishna Chatradhi <naveenkrishna.chatradhi@amd.com>
 R:	Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
 L:	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
-F:	Documentation/x86/amd_hsmp.rst
+F:	Documentation/arch/x86/amd_hsmp.rst
 F:	arch/x86/include/asm/amd_hsmp.h
 F:	arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h
 F:	drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp.c
@@ -10029,7 +10029,7 @@ L:	tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
 S:	Supported
 W:	http://tboot.sourceforge.net
 T:	hg http://tboot.hg.sourceforge.net:8000/hgroot/tboot/tboot
-F:	Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst
+F:	Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst
 F:	arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
 F:	include/linux/tboot.h
 
@@ -10040,7 +10040,7 @@ L:	linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 Q:	https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/intel-sgx/list/
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86/sgx
-F:	Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
+F:	Documentation/arch/x86/sgx.rst
 F:	arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx.S
 F:	arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
 F:	arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -16428,7 +16428,7 @@ M:	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
 M:	Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
 L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
-F:	Documentation/x86/resctrl*
+F:	Documentation/arch/x86/resctrl*
 F:	arch/x86/include/asm/resctrl.h
 F:	arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/
 F:	tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/
@@ -21024,7 +21024,7 @@ L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86/core
 F:	Documentation/devicetree/bindings/x86/
-F:	Documentation/x86/
+F:	Documentation/arch/x86/
 F:	arch/x86/
 
 X86 ENTRY CODE
@@ -21040,7 +21040,7 @@ M:	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
 L:	linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-mce
-F:	Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst
+F:	Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst
 F:	arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/*
 
 X86 MICROCODE UPDATE SUPPORT

Makefile.rhelver

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ RHEL_MINOR = 6
 #
 # Use this spot to avoid future merge conflicts.
 # Do not trim this comment.
-RHEL_RELEASE = 570.60.1
+RHEL_RELEASE = 570.62.1
 
 #
 # ZSTREAM

arch/arm/Kconfig

@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ config SMP
 	  uniprocessor machines. On a uniprocessor machine, the kernel
 	  will run faster if you say N here.
 
-	  See also <file:Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst>,
+	  See also <file:Documentation/arch/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst>,
 	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/lockup-watchdogs.rst> and the SMP-HOWTO available at
 	  <http://tldp.org/HOWTO/SMP-HOWTO.html>.
 

arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c

@@ -53,17 +53,15 @@ static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
 	syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, 0, ret);
 
 	/*
-	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
-	 * but not enough for arm64 stack utilization comfort. To keep
-	 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 9 bits.
+	 * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10
+	 * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
+	 * when applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
+	 * 16-byte aligned SP at function boundaries, which will remove the
+	 * 4 low bits from any entropy chosen here.
 	 *
-	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
-	 * applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
-	 * 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned SP at function boundaries.
-	 *
-	 * The resulting 5 bits of entropy is seen in SP[8:4].
+	 * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4].
 	 */
-	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_int() & 0x1FF);
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16());
 }
 
 static inline bool has_syscall_work(unsigned long flags)

arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_dbfs.c

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * Author(s): Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
  */
 
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include "hypfs.h"
 
@@ -64,24 +65,29 @@ static long dbfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	long rc;
 
 	mutex_lock(&df->lock);
-	if (df->unlocked_ioctl)
 	rc = df->unlocked_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
-	else
-		rc = -ENOTTY;
 	mutex_unlock(&df->lock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static const struct file_operations dbfs_ops = {
+static const struct file_operations dbfs_ops_ioctl = {
 	.read		= dbfs_read,
 	.llseek		= no_llseek,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = dbfs_ioctl,
 };
 
+static const struct file_operations dbfs_ops = {
+	.read		= dbfs_read,
+	.llseek		= no_llseek,
+};
+
 void hypfs_dbfs_create_file(struct hypfs_dbfs_file *df)
 {
-	df->dentry = debugfs_create_file(df->name, 0400, dbfs_dir, df,
-					 &dbfs_ops);
+	const struct file_operations *fops = &dbfs_ops;
+
+	if (df->unlocked_ioctl && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS))
+		fops = &dbfs_ops_ioctl;
+	df->dentry = debugfs_create_file(df->name, 0400, dbfs_dir, df, fops);
 	mutex_init(&df->lock);
 }
 

arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
 static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 						  unsigned long ti_work)
 {
-	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_tod_clock_fast() & 0xff);
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_tod_clock_fast());
 }
 
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ config SMP
 	  Y to "Enhanced Real Time Clock Support", below. The "Advanced Power
 	  Management" code will be disabled if you say Y here.
 
-	  See also <file:Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst>,
+	  See also <file:Documentation/arch/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst>,
 	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/lockup-watchdogs.rst> and the SMP-HOWTO available at
 	  <http://www.tldp.org/docs.html#howto>.
 
@@ -1318,6 +1318,7 @@ config X86_REBOOTFIXUPS
 config MICROCODE
 	def_bool y
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD || CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 if CPU_SUP_AMD
 
 config MICROCODE_INITRD32
 	def_bool y
@@ -1503,7 +1504,7 @@ config X86_5LEVEL
 	  A kernel with the option enabled can be booted on machines that
 	  support 4- or 5-level paging.
 
-	  See Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst for more
+	  See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst for more
 	  information.
 
 	  Say N if unsure.
@@ -1757,7 +1758,7 @@ config MTRR
 	  You can safely say Y even if your machine doesn't have MTRRs, you'll
 	  just add about 9 KB to your kernel.
 
-	  See <file:Documentation/x86/mtrr.rst> for more information.
+	  See <file:Documentation/arch/x86/mtrr.rst> for more information.
 
 config MTRR_SANITIZER
 	def_bool y
@@ -2494,7 +2495,7 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	  ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
 	  into userspace.
 
-	  See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.
+	  See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
 
 config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
@@ -2560,7 +2561,8 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
 	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
 	default y
 	help
-	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
+	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
+	  spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.
 
 config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
 	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
@@ -2588,24 +2590,15 @@ config MITIGATION_SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
-config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
-	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
+config MITIGATION_GDS
+	bool "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling"
 	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
-	default n
+	default y
 	help
-	  Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
-	  unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
-	  vector registers.
-
-	  This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
-	  command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
-	  AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
-	  the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
-	  break with this option set.
-
-	  Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
-
-	  If in doubt, say N.
+	  Enable mitigation for Gather Data Sampling (GDS). GDS is a hardware
+	  vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  which was previously stored in vector registers. The attacker uses gather
+	  instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
 
 config MITIGATION_RFDS
 	bool "RFDS Mitigation"
@@ -2639,6 +2632,125 @@ config MITIGATION_ITS
 	  disabled, mitigation cannot be enabled via cmdline.
 	  See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst>
 
+config MITIGATION_MDS
+	bool "Mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is
+	  a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access
+	  to data which is available in various CPU internal buffers.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_TAA
+	bool "Mitigate TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). TAA is a hardware
+	  vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using
+	  asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA
+	bool "Mitigate MMIO Stale Data hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for MMIO Stale Data hardware bugs.  Processor MMIO
+	  Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O (MMIO)
+	  vulnerabilities that can expose data. The vulnerabilities require the
+	  attacker to have access to MMIO.
+	  See also
+	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_L1TF
+	bool "Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug. L1 Terminal Fault is a
+	  hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+	  available in the Level 1 Data Cache.
+	  See <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
+
+config MITIGATION_RETBLEED
+	bool "Mitigate RETBleed hardware bug"
+	depends on (CPU_SUP_INTEL && MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) || MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution
+	  with Return Instructions) vulnerability.  RETBleed is a speculative
+	  execution attack which takes advantage of microarchitectural behavior
+	  in many modern microprocessors, similar to Spectre v2. An
+	  unprivileged attacker can use these flaws to bypass conventional
+	  memory security restrictions to gain read access to privileged memory
+	  that would otherwise be inaccessible.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1
+	bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V1 hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Spectre V1 (Bounds Check Bypass). Spectre V1 is a
+	  class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of speculative
+	  execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions used for
+	  memory access bounds check.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
+	bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V2 hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Spectre V2 (Branch Target Injection). Spectre
+	  V2 is a class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of
+	  indirect branch predictors inside the processor. In Spectre variant 2
+	  attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect branches in the
+	  victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target buffer of a CPU
+	  used for predicting indirect branch addresses.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_SRBDS
+	bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
+	  SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows Microarchitectural Data
+	  Sampling (MDS) techniques to infer values returned from special
+	  register accesses. An unprivileged user can extract values returned
+	  from RDRAND and RDSEED executed on another core or sibling thread
+	  using MDS techniques.
+	  See also
+	  <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst>
+
+config MITIGATION_SSB
+	bool "Mitigate Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Speculative Store Bypass (SSB). SSB is a
+	  hardware security vulnerability and its exploitation takes advantage
+	  of speculative execution in a similar way to the Meltdown and Spectre
+	  security vulnerabilities.
+
+config MITIGATION_TSA
+	bool "Mitigate Transient Scheduler Attacks"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Transient Scheduler Attacks. TSA is a hardware
+	  security vulnerability on AMD CPUs which can lead to forwarding of
+	  invalid info to subsequent instructions and thus can affect their
+	  timing and thereby cause a leakage.
+
+config MITIGATION_VMSCAPE
+	bool "Mitigate VMSCAPE"
+	depends on KVM
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for VMSCAPE attacks. VMSCAPE is a hardware security
+	  vulnerability on Intel and AMD CPUs that may allow a guest to do
+	  Spectre v2 style attacks on userspace hypervisor.
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES

arch/x86/Kconfig.debug

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ config IOMMU_DEBUG
 	  code. When you use it make sure you have a big enough
 	  IOMMU/AGP aperture.  Most of the options enabled by this can
 	  be set more finegrained using the iommu= command line
-	  options. See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst for more
+	  options. See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst for more
 	  details.
 
 config IOMMU_LEAK

arch/x86/entry/entry.S

@@ -28,20 +28,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
 
 /*
  * Define the VERW operand that is disguised as entry code so that
- * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensure VERW can be
+ * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensures VERW can be
  * used late in exit-to-user path after page tables are switched.
  */
 .pushsection .entry.text, "ax"
 
 .align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
-SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(mds_verw_sel)
+SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(x86_verw_sel)
 	UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	.word __KERNEL_DS
 .align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc
-SYM_CODE_END(mds_verw_sel);
+SYM_CODE_END(x86_verw_sel);
 /* For KVM */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_verw_sel);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_verw_sel);
 
 .popsection
 

arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  *
  * entry.S contains the system-call and fault low-level handling routines.
  *
- * Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst
+ * Some of this is documented in Documentation/arch/x86/entry_64.rst
  *
  * A note on terminology:
  * - iret frame:	Architecture defined interrupt frame from SS to RIP

arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h

@@ -264,7 +264,16 @@ struct x86_cpu_desc {
 	.x86_microcode_rev	= (revision),			\
 }
 
+#define AMD_CPU_DESC(fam, model, stepping, revision) {		\
+	.x86_family		= (fam),			\
+	.x86_vendor		= X86_VENDOR_AMD,		\
+	.x86_model		= (model),			\
+	.x86_stepping		= (stepping),			\
+	.x86_microcode_rev	= (revision),			\
+}
+
 extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match);
 extern bool x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_desc *table);
+extern bool x86_match_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_id *table);
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPU_DEVICE_ID */

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -20,170 +20,170 @@
 
 /*
  * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used
- * in /proc/cpuinfo instead of the macro name.  If the string is "",
- * this feature bit is not displayed in /proc/cpuinfo at all.
+ * in /proc/cpuinfo instead of the macro name.  Otherwise, this feature
+ * bit is not displayed in /proc/cpuinfo at all.
  *
  * When adding new features here that depend on other features,
  * please update the table in kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c as well.
  */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (EDX), word 0 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FPU			( 0*32+ 0) /* Onboard FPU */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VME			( 0*32+ 1) /* Virtual Mode Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_DE			( 0*32+ 2) /* Debugging Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PSE			( 0*32+ 3) /* Page Size Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSC			( 0*32+ 4) /* Time Stamp Counter */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MSR			( 0*32+ 5) /* Model-Specific Registers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PAE			( 0*32+ 6) /* Physical Address Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MCE			( 0*32+ 7) /* Machine Check Exception */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CX8			( 0*32+ 8) /* CMPXCHG8 instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_APIC		( 0*32+ 9) /* Onboard APIC */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEP			( 0*32+11) /* SYSENTER/SYSEXIT */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MTRR		( 0*32+12) /* Memory Type Range Registers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PGE			( 0*32+13) /* Page Global Enable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MCA			( 0*32+14) /* Machine Check Architecture */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CMOV		( 0*32+15) /* CMOV instructions (plus FCMOVcc, FCOMI with FPU) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PAT			( 0*32+16) /* Page Attribute Table */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PSE36		( 0*32+17) /* 36-bit PSEs */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PN			( 0*32+18) /* Processor serial number */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH		( 0*32+19) /* CLFLUSH instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FPU			( 0*32+ 0) /* "fpu" Onboard FPU */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VME			( 0*32+ 1) /* "vme" Virtual Mode Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DE			( 0*32+ 2) /* "de" Debugging Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PSE			( 0*32+ 3) /* "pse" Page Size Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC			( 0*32+ 4) /* "tsc" Time Stamp Counter */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR			( 0*32+ 5) /* "msr" Model-Specific Registers */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PAE			( 0*32+ 6) /* "pae" Physical Address Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MCE			( 0*32+ 7) /* "mce" Machine Check Exception */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CX8			( 0*32+ 8) /* "cx8" CMPXCHG8 instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_APIC		( 0*32+ 9) /* "apic" Onboard APIC */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEP			( 0*32+11) /* "sep" SYSENTER/SYSEXIT */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MTRR		( 0*32+12) /* "mtrr" Memory Type Range Registers */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PGE			( 0*32+13) /* "pge" Page Global Enable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MCA			( 0*32+14) /* "mca" Machine Check Architecture */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CMOV		( 0*32+15) /* "cmov" CMOV instructions (plus FCMOVcc, FCOMI with FPU) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PAT			( 0*32+16) /* "pat" Page Attribute Table */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PSE36		( 0*32+17) /* "pse36" 36-bit PSEs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PN			( 0*32+18) /* "pn" Processor serial number */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH		( 0*32+19) /* "clflush" CLFLUSH instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DS			( 0*32+21) /* "dts" Debug Store */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ACPI		( 0*32+22) /* ACPI via MSR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MMX			( 0*32+23) /* Multimedia Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FXSR		( 0*32+24) /* FXSAVE/FXRSTOR, CR4.OSFXSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ACPI		( 0*32+22) /* "acpi" ACPI via MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MMX			( 0*32+23) /* "mmx" Multimedia Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FXSR		( 0*32+24) /* "fxsr" FXSAVE/FXRSTOR, CR4.OSFXSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XMM			( 0*32+25) /* "sse" */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XMM2		( 0*32+26) /* "sse2" */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP		( 0*32+27) /* "ss" CPU self snoop */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HT			( 0*32+28) /* Hyper-Threading */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HT			( 0*32+28) /* "ht" Hyper-Threading */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ACC			( 0*32+29) /* "tm" Automatic clock control */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IA64		( 0*32+30) /* IA-64 processor */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PBE			( 0*32+31) /* Pending Break Enable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IA64		( 0*32+30) /* "ia64" IA-64 processor */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PBE			( 0*32+31) /* "pbe" Pending Break Enable */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000001, word 1 */
 /* Don't duplicate feature flags which are redundant with Intel! */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL		( 1*32+11) /* SYSCALL/SYSRET */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MP			( 1*32+19) /* MP Capable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NX			( 1*32+20) /* Execute Disable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MMXEXT		( 1*32+22) /* AMD MMX extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT		( 1*32+25) /* FXSAVE/FXRSTOR optimizations */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL		( 1*32+11) /* "syscall" SYSCALL/SYSRET */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MP			( 1*32+19) /* "mp" MP Capable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NX			( 1*32+20) /* "nx" Execute Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MMXEXT		( 1*32+22) /* "mmxext" AMD MMX extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT		( 1*32+25) /* "fxsr_opt" FXSAVE/FXRSTOR optimizations */
 #define X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES		( 1*32+26) /* "pdpe1gb" GB pages */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP		( 1*32+27) /* RDTSCP */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LM			( 1*32+29) /* Long Mode (x86-64, 64-bit support) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWEXT		( 1*32+30) /* AMD 3DNow extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOW		( 1*32+31) /* 3DNow */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP		( 1*32+27) /* "rdtscp" RDTSCP */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LM			( 1*32+29) /* "lm" Long Mode (x86-64, 64-bit support) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWEXT		( 1*32+30) /* "3dnowext" AMD 3DNow extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOW		( 1*32+31) /* "3dnow" 3DNow */
 
 /* Transmeta-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80860001, word 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RECOVERY		( 2*32+ 0) /* CPU in recovery mode */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LONGRUN		( 2*32+ 1) /* Longrun power control */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LRTI		( 2*32+ 3) /* LongRun table interface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RECOVERY		( 2*32+ 0) /* "recovery" CPU in recovery mode */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LONGRUN		( 2*32+ 1) /* "longrun" Longrun power control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LRTI		( 2*32+ 3) /* "lrti" LongRun table interface */
 
 /* Other features, Linux-defined mapping, word 3 */
 /* This range is used for feature bits which conflict or are synthesized */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CXMMX		( 3*32+ 0) /* Cyrix MMX extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR		( 3*32+ 1) /* AMD K6 nonstandard MTRRs */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR		( 3*32+ 2) /* Cyrix ARRs (= MTRRs) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR		( 3*32+ 3) /* Centaur MCRs (= MTRRs) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_K8			( 3*32+ 4) /* "" Opteron, Athlon64 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN5		( 3*32+ 5) /* "" CPU based on Zen5 microarchitecture */
-#define X86_FEATURE_P3			( 3*32+ 6) /* "" P3 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_P4			( 3*32+ 7) /* "" P4 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC	( 3*32+ 8) /* TSC ticks at a constant rate */
-#define X86_FEATURE_UP			( 3*32+ 9) /* SMP kernel running on UP */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ART			( 3*32+10) /* Always running timer (ART) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON	( 3*32+11) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PEBS		( 3*32+12) /* Precise-Event Based Sampling */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BTS			( 3*32+13) /* Branch Trace Store */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32		( 3*32+14) /* "" syscall in IA32 userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32		( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD		( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2		( 3*32+17) /* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF	( 3*32+18) /* "" Clear CPU buffers using VERW */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER		( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NOPL		( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS		( 3*32+21) /* "" Always-present feature */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY		( 3*32+22) /* CPU topology enum extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE	( 3*32+23) /* TSC is known to be reliable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC		( 3*32+24) /* TSC does not stop in C states */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID		( 3*32+25) /* CPU has CPUID instruction itself */
-#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID		( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM		( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
-#define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF		( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RAPL		( 3*32+29) /* AMD/Hygon RAPL interface */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3	( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ	( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CXMMX		( 3*32+ 0) /* "cxmmx" Cyrix MMX extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR		( 3*32+ 1) /* "k6_mtrr" AMD K6 nonstandard MTRRs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR		( 3*32+ 2) /* "cyrix_arr" Cyrix ARRs (= MTRRs) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR		( 3*32+ 3) /* "centaur_mcr" Centaur MCRs (= MTRRs) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_K8			( 3*32+ 4) /* Opteron, Athlon64 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN5		( 3*32+ 5) /* CPU based on Zen5 microarchitecture */
+#define X86_FEATURE_P3			( 3*32+ 6) /* P3 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_P4			( 3*32+ 7) /* P4 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC	( 3*32+ 8) /* "constant_tsc" TSC ticks at a constant rate */
+#define X86_FEATURE_UP			( 3*32+ 9) /* "up" SMP kernel running on UP */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ART			( 3*32+10) /* "art" Always running timer (ART) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON	( 3*32+11) /* "arch_perfmon" Intel Architectural PerfMon */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PEBS		( 3*32+12) /* "pebs" Precise-Event Based Sampling */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTS			( 3*32+13) /* "bts" Branch Trace Store */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32		( 3*32+14) /* syscall in IA32 userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32		( 3*32+15) /* sysenter in IA32 userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD		( 3*32+16) /* "rep_good" REP microcode works well */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2		( 3*32+17) /* "amd_lbr_v2" AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF	( 3*32+18) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER		( 3*32+19) /* "acc_power" AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NOPL		( 3*32+20) /* "nopl" The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS		( 3*32+21) /* Always-present feature */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY		( 3*32+22) /* "xtopology" CPU topology enum extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE	( 3*32+23) /* "tsc_reliable" TSC is known to be reliable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC		( 3*32+24) /* "nonstop_tsc" TSC does not stop in C states */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID		( 3*32+25) /* "cpuid" CPU has CPUID instruction itself */
+#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID		( 3*32+26) /* "extd_apicid" Extended APICID (8 bits) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM		( 3*32+27) /* "amd_dcm" AMD multi-node processor */
+#define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF		( 3*32+28) /* "aperfmperf" P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RAPL		( 3*32+29) /* "rapl" AMD/Hygon RAPL interface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3	( 3*32+30) /* "nonstop_tsc_s3" TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ	( 3*32+31) /* "tsc_known_freq" TSC has known frequency */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000001 (ECX), word 4 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XMM3		( 4*32+ 0) /* "pni" SSE-3 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ		( 4*32+ 1) /* PCLMULQDQ instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_DTES64		( 4*32+ 2) /* 64-bit Debug Store */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ		( 4*32+ 1) /* "pclmulqdq" PCLMULQDQ instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DTES64		( 4*32+ 2) /* "dtes64" 64-bit Debug Store */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MWAIT		( 4*32+ 3) /* "monitor" MONITOR/MWAIT support */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DSCPL		( 4*32+ 4) /* "ds_cpl" CPL-qualified (filtered) Debug Store */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VMX			( 4*32+ 5) /* Hardware virtualization */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SMX			( 4*32+ 6) /* Safer Mode eXtensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_EST			( 4*32+ 7) /* Enhanced SpeedStep */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TM2			( 4*32+ 8) /* Thermal Monitor 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SSSE3		( 4*32+ 9) /* Supplemental SSE-3 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CID			( 4*32+10) /* Context ID */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SDBG		( 4*32+11) /* Silicon Debug */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FMA			( 4*32+12) /* Fused multiply-add */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CX16		( 4*32+13) /* CMPXCHG16B instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XTPR		( 4*32+14) /* Send Task Priority Messages */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PDCM		( 4*32+15) /* Perf/Debug Capabilities MSR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PCID		( 4*32+17) /* Process Context Identifiers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_DCA			( 4*32+18) /* Direct Cache Access */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VMX			( 4*32+ 5) /* "vmx" Hardware virtualization */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SMX			( 4*32+ 6) /* "smx" Safer Mode eXtensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_EST			( 4*32+ 7) /* "est" Enhanced SpeedStep */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TM2			( 4*32+ 8) /* "tm2" Thermal Monitor 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSSE3		( 4*32+ 9) /* "ssse3" Supplemental SSE-3 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CID			( 4*32+10) /* "cid" Context ID */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SDBG		( 4*32+11) /* "sdbg" Silicon Debug */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FMA			( 4*32+12) /* "fma" Fused multiply-add */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CX16		( 4*32+13) /* "cx16" CMPXCHG16B instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XTPR		( 4*32+14) /* "xtpr" Send Task Priority Messages */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PDCM		( 4*32+15) /* "pdcm" Perf/Debug Capabilities MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PCID		( 4*32+17) /* "pcid" Process Context Identifiers */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DCA			( 4*32+18) /* "dca" Direct Cache Access */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XMM4_1		( 4*32+19) /* "sse4_1" SSE-4.1 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XMM4_2		( 4*32+20) /* "sse4_2" SSE-4.2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_X2APIC		( 4*32+21) /* X2APIC */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MOVBE		( 4*32+22) /* MOVBE instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_POPCNT		( 4*32+23) /* POPCNT instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER	( 4*32+24) /* TSC deadline timer */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AES			( 4*32+25) /* AES instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVE		( 4*32+26) /* XSAVE/XRSTOR/XSETBV/XGETBV instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE		( 4*32+27) /* "" XSAVE instruction enabled in the OS */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX			( 4*32+28) /* Advanced Vector Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_F16C		( 4*32+29) /* 16-bit FP conversions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDRAND		( 4*32+30) /* RDRAND instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR		( 4*32+31) /* Running on a hypervisor */
+#define X86_FEATURE_X2APIC		( 4*32+21) /* "x2apic" X2APIC */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MOVBE		( 4*32+22) /* "movbe" MOVBE instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_POPCNT		( 4*32+23) /* "popcnt" POPCNT instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER	( 4*32+24) /* "tsc_deadline_timer" TSC deadline timer */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AES			( 4*32+25) /* "aes" AES instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVE		( 4*32+26) /* "xsave" XSAVE/XRSTOR/XSETBV/XGETBV instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE		( 4*32+27) /* XSAVE instruction enabled in the OS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX			( 4*32+28) /* "avx" Advanced Vector Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_F16C		( 4*32+29) /* "f16c" 16-bit FP conversions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDRAND		( 4*32+30) /* "rdrand" RDRAND instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR		( 4*32+31) /* "hypervisor" Running on a hypervisor */
 
 /* VIA/Cyrix/Centaur-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0xC0000001, word 5 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XSTORE		( 5*32+ 2) /* "rng" RNG present (xstore) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XSTORE_EN		( 5*32+ 3) /* "rng_en" RNG enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XCRYPT		( 5*32+ 6) /* "ace" on-CPU crypto (xcrypt) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XCRYPT_EN		( 5*32+ 7) /* "ace_en" on-CPU crypto enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ACE2		( 5*32+ 8) /* Advanced Cryptography Engine v2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ACE2_EN		( 5*32+ 9) /* ACE v2 enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PHE			( 5*32+10) /* PadLock Hash Engine */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PHE_EN		( 5*32+11) /* PHE enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PMM			( 5*32+12) /* PadLock Montgomery Multiplier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PMM_EN		( 5*32+13) /* PMM enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ACE2		( 5*32+ 8) /* "ace2" Advanced Cryptography Engine v2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ACE2_EN		( 5*32+ 9) /* "ace2_en" ACE v2 enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PHE			( 5*32+10) /* "phe" PadLock Hash Engine */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PHE_EN		( 5*32+11) /* "phe_en" PHE enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PMM			( 5*32+12) /* "pmm" PadLock Montgomery Multiplier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PMM_EN		( 5*32+13) /* "pmm_en" PMM enabled */
 
 /* More extended AMD flags: CPUID level 0x80000001, ECX, word 6 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM		( 6*32+ 0) /* LAHF/SAHF in long mode */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY		( 6*32+ 1) /* If yes HyperThreading not valid */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SVM			( 6*32+ 2) /* Secure Virtual Machine */
-#define X86_FEATURE_EXTAPIC		( 6*32+ 3) /* Extended APIC space */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CR8_LEGACY		( 6*32+ 4) /* CR8 in 32-bit mode */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ABM			( 6*32+ 5) /* Advanced bit manipulation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SSE4A		( 6*32+ 6) /* SSE-4A */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MISALIGNSSE		( 6*32+ 7) /* Misaligned SSE mode */
-#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH	( 6*32+ 8) /* 3DNow prefetch instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSVW		( 6*32+ 9) /* OS Visible Workaround */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBS			( 6*32+10) /* Instruction Based Sampling */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XOP			( 6*32+11) /* extended AVX instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SKINIT		( 6*32+12) /* SKINIT/STGI instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_WDT			( 6*32+13) /* Watchdog timer */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LWP			( 6*32+15) /* Light Weight Profiling */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FMA4		( 6*32+16) /* 4 operands MAC instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TCE			( 6*32+17) /* Translation Cache Extension */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR		( 6*32+19) /* NodeId MSR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TBM			( 6*32+21) /* Trailing Bit Manipulations */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT		( 6*32+22) /* Topology extensions CPUID leafs */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE	( 6*32+23) /* Core performance counter extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_NB		( 6*32+24) /* NB performance counter extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BPEXT		( 6*32+26) /* Data breakpoint extension */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PTSC		( 6*32+27) /* Performance time-stamp counter */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_LLC		( 6*32+28) /* Last Level Cache performance counter extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MWAITX		( 6*32+29) /* MWAIT extension (MONITORX/MWAITX instructions) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM		( 6*32+ 0) /* "lahf_lm" LAHF/SAHF in long mode */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY		( 6*32+ 1) /* "cmp_legacy" If yes HyperThreading not valid */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SVM			( 6*32+ 2) /* "svm" Secure Virtual Machine */
+#define X86_FEATURE_EXTAPIC		( 6*32+ 3) /* "extapic" Extended APIC space */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CR8_LEGACY		( 6*32+ 4) /* "cr8_legacy" CR8 in 32-bit mode */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ABM			( 6*32+ 5) /* "abm" Advanced bit manipulation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSE4A		( 6*32+ 6) /* "sse4a" SSE-4A */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MISALIGNSSE		( 6*32+ 7) /* "misalignsse" Misaligned SSE mode */
+#define X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH	( 6*32+ 8) /* "3dnowprefetch" 3DNow prefetch instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSVW		( 6*32+ 9) /* "osvw" OS Visible Workaround */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBS			( 6*32+10) /* "ibs" Instruction Based Sampling */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XOP			( 6*32+11) /* "xop" Extended AVX instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SKINIT		( 6*32+12) /* "skinit" SKINIT/STGI instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_WDT			( 6*32+13) /* "wdt" Watchdog timer */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LWP			( 6*32+15) /* "lwp" Light Weight Profiling */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FMA4		( 6*32+16) /* "fma4" 4 operands MAC instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TCE			( 6*32+17) /* "tce" Translation Cache Extension */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR		( 6*32+19) /* "nodeid_msr" NodeId MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TBM			( 6*32+21) /* "tbm" Trailing Bit Manipulations */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT		( 6*32+22) /* "topoext" Topology extensions CPUID leafs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE	( 6*32+23) /* "perfctr_core" Core performance counter extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_NB		( 6*32+24) /* "perfctr_nb" NB performance counter extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BPEXT		( 6*32+26) /* "bpext" Data breakpoint extension */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PTSC		( 6*32+27) /* "ptsc" Performance time-stamp counter */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_LLC		( 6*32+28) /* "perfctr_llc" Last Level Cache performance counter extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MWAITX		( 6*32+29) /* "mwaitx" MWAIT extension (MONITORX/MWAITX instructions) */
 
 /*
  * Auxiliary flags: Linux defined - For features scattered in various
@@ -191,93 +191,93 @@
  *
  * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags!
  */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RING3MWAIT		( 7*32+ 0) /* Ring 3 MONITOR/MWAIT instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT		( 7*32+ 1) /* Intel CPUID faulting */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CPB			( 7*32+ 2) /* AMD Core Performance Boost */
-#define X86_FEATURE_EPB			( 7*32+ 3) /* IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3		( 7*32+ 4) /* Cache Allocation Technology L3 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2		( 7*32+ 5) /* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3		( 7*32+ 6) /* Code and Data Prioritization L3 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM	( 7*32+ 7) /* Platform supports being a TDX host */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE		( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED		( 7*32+10) /* "" Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT		( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
-#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2		( 7*32+20) /* AMD Performance Monitoring Version 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD		( 7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS		( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN			( 7*32+28) /* "" Generic flag for all Zen and newer */
-#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV		( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED	( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL	( 7*32+31) /* "" MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL configured */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RING3MWAIT		( 7*32+ 0) /* "ring3mwait" Ring 3 MONITOR/MWAIT instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT		( 7*32+ 1) /* "cpuid_fault" Intel CPUID faulting */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CPB			( 7*32+ 2) /* "cpb" AMD Core Performance Boost */
+#define X86_FEATURE_EPB			( 7*32+ 3) /* "epb" IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3		( 7*32+ 4) /* "cat_l3" Cache Allocation Technology L3 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2		( 7*32+ 5) /* "cat_l2" Cache Allocation Technology L2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3		( 7*32+ 6) /* "cdp_l3" Code and Data Prioritization L3 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM	( 7*32+ 7) /* "tdx_host_platform" Platform supports being a TDX host */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE		( 7*32+ 8) /* "hw_pstate" AMD HW-PState */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* "proc_feedback" AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED		( 7*32+10) /* Use compacted XSTATE (XSAVES or XSAVEC) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* "pti" Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT		( 7*32+13) /* Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* "intel_ppin" Intel Processor Inventory Number */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* "cdp_l2" Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		( 7*32+17) /* "ssbd" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* "mba" Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2		( 7*32+20) /* "perfmon_v2" AMD Performance Monitoring Version 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB		( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW		( 7*32+22) /* Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE	( 7*32+23) /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD		( 7*32+24)  /* AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS		( 7*32+25) /* "ibrs" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+26) /* "ibpb" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier without a guaranteed RSB flush */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP		( 7*32+27) /* "stibp" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN			( 7*32+28) /* Generic flag for all Zen and newer */
+#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV		( 7*32+29) /* L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED	( 7*32+30) /* "ibrs_enhanced" Enhanced IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL	( 7*32+31) /* MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL configured */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY	( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel FlexPriority */
-#define X86_FEATURE_EPT			( 8*32+ 2) /* Intel Extended Page Table */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VPID		( 8*32+ 3) /* Intel Virtual Processor ID */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* "tpr_shadow" Intel TPR Shadow */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY	( 8*32+ 1) /* "flexpriority" Intel FlexPriority */
+#define X86_FEATURE_EPT			( 8*32+ 2) /* "ept" Intel Extended Page Table */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VPID		( 8*32+ 3) /* "vpid" Intel Virtual Processor ID */
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL		( 8*32+15) /* Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XENPV		( 8*32+16) /* "" Xen paravirtual guest */
-#define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD		( 8*32+17) /* Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL		( 8*32+18) /* "" Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL		( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PVUNLOCK		( 8*32+20) /* "" PV unlock function */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VCPUPREEMPT		( 8*32+21) /* "" PV vcpu_is_preempted function */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST		( 8*32+22) /* Intel Trust Domain Extensions Guest */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL		( 8*32+15) /* "vmmcall" Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XENPV		( 8*32+16) /* Xen paravirtual guest */
+#define X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD		( 8*32+17) /* "ept_ad" Intel Extended Page Table access-dirty bit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VMCALL		( 8*32+18) /* Hypervisor supports the VMCALL instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL		( 8*32+19) /* VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PVUNLOCK		( 8*32+20) /* PV unlock function */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VCPUPREEMPT		( 8*32+21) /* PV vcpu_is_preempted function */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST		( 8*32+22) /* "tdx_guest" Intel Trust Domain Extensions Guest */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST		( 9*32+ 1) /* TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SGX			( 9*32+ 2) /* Software Guard Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1		( 9*32+ 3) /* 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HLE			( 9*32+ 4) /* Hardware Lock Elision */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2		( 9*32+ 5) /* AVX2 instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY	( 9*32+ 6) /* "" FPU data pointer updated only on x87 exceptions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SMEP		( 9*32+ 7) /* Supervisor Mode Execution Protection */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BMI2		( 9*32+ 8) /* 2nd group bit manipulation extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ERMS		( 9*32+ 9) /* Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID		( 9*32+10) /* Invalidate Processor Context ID */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RTM			( 9*32+11) /* Restricted Transactional Memory */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM			( 9*32+12) /* Cache QoS Monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZERO_FCS_FDS	( 9*32+13) /* "" Zero out FPU CS and FPU DS */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MPX			( 9*32+14) /* Memory Protection Extension */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDT_A		( 9*32+15) /* Resource Director Technology Allocation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512F		( 9*32+16) /* AVX-512 Foundation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512DQ		( 9*32+17) /* AVX-512 DQ (Double/Quad granular) Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDSEED		( 9*32+18) /* RDSEED instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ADX			( 9*32+19) /* ADCX and ADOX instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP		( 9*32+20) /* Supervisor Mode Access Prevention */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA		( 9*32+21) /* AVX-512 Integer Fused Multiply-Add instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT		( 9*32+23) /* CLFLUSHOPT instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLWB		( 9*32+24) /* CLWB instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT		( 9*32+25) /* Intel Processor Trace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF		( 9*32+26) /* AVX-512 Prefetch */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER		( 9*32+27) /* AVX-512 Exponential and Reciprocal */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD		( 9*32+28) /* AVX-512 Conflict Detection */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SHA_NI		( 9*32+29) /* SHA1/SHA256 Instruction Extensions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW		( 9*32+30) /* AVX-512 BW (Byte/Word granular) Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL		( 9*32+31) /* AVX-512 VL (128/256 Vector Length) Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* "fsgsbase" RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST		( 9*32+ 1) /* "tsc_adjust" TSC adjustment MSR 0x3B */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX			( 9*32+ 2) /* "sgx" Software Guard Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BMI1		( 9*32+ 3) /* "bmi1" 1st group bit manipulation extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HLE			( 9*32+ 4) /* "hle" Hardware Lock Elision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX2		( 9*32+ 5) /* "avx2" AVX2 instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY	( 9*32+ 6) /* FPU data pointer updated only on x87 exceptions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SMEP		( 9*32+ 7) /* "smep" Supervisor Mode Execution Protection */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BMI2		( 9*32+ 8) /* "bmi2" 2nd group bit manipulation extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ERMS		( 9*32+ 9) /* "erms" Enhanced REP MOVSB/STOSB instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID		( 9*32+10) /* "invpcid" Invalidate Processor Context ID */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RTM			( 9*32+11) /* "rtm" Restricted Transactional Memory */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM			( 9*32+12) /* "cqm" Cache QoS Monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZERO_FCS_FDS	( 9*32+13) /* Zero out FPU CS and FPU DS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MPX			( 9*32+14) /* "mpx" Memory Protection Extension */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDT_A		( 9*32+15) /* "rdt_a" Resource Director Technology Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512F		( 9*32+16) /* "avx512f" AVX-512 Foundation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512DQ		( 9*32+17) /* "avx512dq" AVX-512 DQ (Double/Quad granular) Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDSEED		( 9*32+18) /* "rdseed" RDSEED instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ADX			( 9*32+19) /* "adx" ADCX and ADOX instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SMAP		( 9*32+20) /* "smap" Supervisor Mode Access Prevention */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA		( 9*32+21) /* "avx512ifma" AVX-512 Integer Fused Multiply-Add instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT		( 9*32+23) /* "clflushopt" CLFLUSHOPT instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLWB		( 9*32+24) /* "clwb" CLWB instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT		( 9*32+25) /* "intel_pt" Intel Processor Trace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF		( 9*32+26) /* "avx512pf" AVX-512 Prefetch */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER		( 9*32+27) /* "avx512er" AVX-512 Exponential and Reciprocal */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD		( 9*32+28) /* "avx512cd" AVX-512 Conflict Detection */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHA_NI		( 9*32+29) /* "sha_ni" SHA1/SHA256 Instruction Extensions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW		( 9*32+30) /* "avx512bw" AVX-512 BW (Byte/Word granular) Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL		( 9*32+31) /* "avx512vl" AVX-512 VL (128/256 Vector Length) Extensions */
 
 /* Extended state features, CPUID level 0x0000000d:1 (EAX), word 10 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT		(10*32+ 0) /* XSAVEOPT instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC		(10*32+ 1) /* XSAVEC instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1		(10*32+ 2) /* XGETBV with ECX = 1 instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVES		(10*32+ 3) /* XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XFD			(10*32+ 4) /* "" eXtended Feature Disabling */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT		(10*32+ 0) /* "xsaveopt" XSAVEOPT instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC		(10*32+ 1) /* "xsavec" XSAVEC instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1		(10*32+ 2) /* "xgetbv1" XGETBV with ECX = 1 instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVES		(10*32+ 3) /* "xsaves" XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XFD			(10*32+ 4) /* eXtended Feature Disabling */
 
 /*
  * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various
@@ -285,188 +285,192 @@
  *
  * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags!
  */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC		(11*32+ 0) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC	(11*32+ 1) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL	(11*32+ 2) /* LLC Total MBM monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT	(11*32+ 6) /* #AC for split lock */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA	(11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1		(11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2		(11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB		(11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL		(11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK		(11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
-#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET		(11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
-#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW		(11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA	(11*32+18) /* "" SGX EDECCSSA user leaf function */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH		(11*32+19) /* "" Call depth tracking for RSB stuffing */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SMBA		(11*32+21) /* "" Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BMEC		(11*32+22) /* "" Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */
-#define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK		(11*32+23) /* Shadow stack support for user mode applications */
-
-
-#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL	(11*32+20) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */
-
-#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO		(11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS		(11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT	(11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
-#define X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE	(11*32+27) /* "" IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and X2APIC MSRs need fencing */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN2		(11*32+28) /* "" CPU based on Zen2 microarchitecture */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN3		(11*32+29) /* "" CPU based on Zen3 microarchitecture */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN4		(11*32+30) /* "" CPU based on Zen4 microarchitecture */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN1		(11*32+31) /* "" CPU based on Zen1 microarchitecture */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC		(11*32+ 0) /* "cqm_llc" LLC QoS if 1 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC	(11*32+ 1) /* "cqm_occup_llc" LLC occupancy monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL	(11*32+ 2) /* "cqm_mbm_total" LLC Total MBM monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* "cqm_mbm_local" LLC Local MBM monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT	(11*32+ 6) /* "split_lock_detect" #AC for split lock */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA	(11*32+ 7) /* Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1		(11*32+ 8) /* Basic SGX */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2		(11*32+ 9) /* SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB		(11*32+10) /* Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL		(11*32+11) /* RET prediction control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK		(11*32+14) /* Use REturn THUNK */
+#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET		(11*32+15) /* AMD BTB untrain return */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW		(11*32+16) /* Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA	(11*32+18) /* SGX EDECCSSA user leaf function */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH		(11*32+19) /* Call depth tracking for RSB stuffing */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL	(11*32+20) /* MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SMBA		(11*32+21) /* Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BMEC		(11*32+22) /* Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */
+#define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK		(11*32+23) /* "user_shstk" Shadow stack support for user mode applications */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO		(11*32+24) /* AMD BTB untrain RETs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS		(11*32+25) /* AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT	(11*32+26) /* Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
+#define X86_FEATURE_APIC_MSRS_FENCE	(11*32+27) /* IA32_TSC_DEADLINE and X2APIC MSRs need fencing */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN2		(11*32+28) /* CPU based on Zen2 microarchitecture */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN3		(11*32+29) /* CPU based on Zen3 microarchitecture */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN4		(11*32+30) /* CPU based on Zen4 microarchitecture */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN1		(11*32+31) /* CPU based on Zen1 microarchitecture */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SHA512		(12*32+ 0) /* SHA512 instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SM3			(12*32+ 1) /* SM3 instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SM4			(12*32+ 2) /* SM4 instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD           (12*32+ 7) /* "" CMPccXADD instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT	(12*32+ 8) /* "" Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FZRM		(12*32+10) /* "" Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FSRS		(12*32+11) /* "" Fast short REP STOSB */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FSRC		(12*32+12) /* "" Fast short REP {CMPSB,SCASB} */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LKGS		(12*32+18) /* "" Load "kernel" (userspace) GS */
-#define X86_FEATURE_WRMSRNS		(12*32+19) /* "" Non-serializing WRMSR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_FP16		(12*32+21) /* "" AMX fp16 Support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_IFMA            (12*32+23) /* "" Support for VPMADD52[H,L]UQ */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LAM			(12*32+26) /* Linear Address Masking */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* "avx_vnni" AVX VNNI instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* "avx512_bf16" AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CMPCCXADD           (12*32+ 7) /* CMPccXADD instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON_EXT	(12*32+ 8) /* Intel Architectural PerfMon Extension */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FZRM		(12*32+10) /* Fast zero-length REP MOVSB */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FSRS		(12*32+11) /* Fast short REP STOSB */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FSRC		(12*32+12) /* Fast short REP {CMPSB,SCASB} */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LKGS		(12*32+18) /* Load "kernel" (userspace) GS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_WRMSRNS		(12*32+19) /* Non-serializing WRMSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_FP16		(12*32+21) /* AMX fp16 Support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_IFMA            (12*32+23) /* Support for VPMADD52[H,L]UQ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LAM			(12*32+26) /* "lam" Linear Address Masking */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF		(13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
-#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR		(13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDPRU		(13*32+ 4) /* Read processor register at user level */
-#define X86_FEATURE_WBNOINVD		(13*32+ 9) /* WBNOINVD instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB		(13*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS		(13*32+14) /* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON	(13*32+17) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors always-on preferred */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN		(13*32+23) /* Protected Processor Inventory Number */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		(13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO		(13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CPPC		(13*32+27) /* Collaborative Processor Performance Control */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PSFD            (13*32+28) /* "" Predictive Store Forwarding Disable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO		(13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BRS			(13*32+31) /* Branch Sampling available */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* "clzero" CLZERO instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF		(13*32+ 1) /* "irperf" Instructions Retired Count */
+#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR		(13*32+ 2) /* "xsaveerptr" Always save/restore FP error pointers */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDPRU		(13*32+ 4) /* "rdpru" Read processor register at user level */
+#define X86_FEATURE_WBNOINVD		(13*32+ 9) /* "wbnoinvd" WBNOINVD instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB		(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS		(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP		(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON	(13*32+17) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors always-on preferred */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN		(13*32+23) /* "amd_ppin" Protected Processor Inventory Number */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		(13*32+24) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* "virt_ssbd" Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO		(13*32+26) /* Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CPPC		(13*32+27) /* "cppc" Collaborative Processor Performance Control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PSFD            (13*32+28) /* Predictive Store Forwarding Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO		(13*32+29) /* Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET	(13*32+30) /* IBPB clears return address predictor */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BRS			(13*32+31) /* "brs" Branch Sampling available */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IDA			(14*32+ 1) /* Intel Dynamic Acceleration */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ARAT		(14*32+ 2) /* Always Running APIC Timer */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PLN			(14*32+ 4) /* Intel Power Limit Notification */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PTS			(14*32+ 6) /* Intel Package Thermal Status */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HWP			(14*32+ 7) /* Intel Hardware P-states */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_NOTIFY		(14*32+ 8) /* HWP Notification */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_ACT_WINDOW	(14*32+ 9) /* HWP Activity Window */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_EPP		(14*32+10) /* HWP Energy Perf. Preference */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_PKG_REQ		(14*32+11) /* HWP Package Level Request */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_HIGHEST_PERF_CHANGE (14*32+15) /* "" HWP Highest perf change */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HFI			(14*32+19) /* Hardware Feedback Interface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* "dtherm" Digital Thermal Sensor */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IDA			(14*32+ 1) /* "ida" Intel Dynamic Acceleration */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ARAT		(14*32+ 2) /* "arat" Always Running APIC Timer */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PLN			(14*32+ 4) /* "pln" Intel Power Limit Notification */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PTS			(14*32+ 6) /* "pts" Intel Package Thermal Status */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HWP			(14*32+ 7) /* "hwp" Intel Hardware P-states */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_NOTIFY		(14*32+ 8) /* "hwp_notify" HWP Notification */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_ACT_WINDOW	(14*32+ 9) /* "hwp_act_window" HWP Activity Window */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_EPP		(14*32+10) /* "hwp_epp" HWP Energy Perf. Preference */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_PKG_REQ		(14*32+11) /* "hwp_pkg_req" HWP Package Level Request */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HWP_HIGHEST_PERF_CHANGE (14*32+15) /* HWP Highest perf change */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HFI			(14*32+19) /* "hfi" Hardware Feedback Interface */
 
 /* AMD SVM Feature Identification, CPUID level 0x8000000a (EDX), word 15 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NPT			(15*32+ 0) /* Nested Page Table support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LBRV		(15*32+ 1) /* LBR Virtualization support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NPT			(15*32+ 0) /* "npt" Nested Page Table support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LBRV		(15*32+ 1) /* "lbrv" LBR Virtualization support */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SVML		(15*32+ 2) /* "svm_lock" SVM locking MSR */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NRIPS		(15*32+ 3) /* "nrip_save" SVM next_rip save */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR		(15*32+ 4) /* "tsc_scale" TSC scaling support */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN		(15*32+ 5) /* "vmcb_clean" VMCB clean bits support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID		(15*32+ 6) /* flush-by-ASID support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS	(15*32+ 7) /* Decode Assists support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER		(15*32+10) /* filtered pause intercept */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD		(15*32+12) /* pause filter threshold */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVIC		(15*32+13) /* Virtual Interrupt Controller */
-#define X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD	(15*32+15) /* Virtual VMSAVE VMLOAD */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VGIF		(15*32+16) /* Virtual GIF */
-#define X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC		(15*32+18) /* Virtual x2apic */
-#define X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL		(15*32+20) /* Virtual SPEC_CTRL */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VNMI		(15*32+25) /* Virtual NMI */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK	(15*32+28) /* "" SVME addr check */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID		(15*32+ 6) /* "flushbyasid" Flush-by-ASID support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS	(15*32+ 7) /* "decodeassists" Decode Assists support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER		(15*32+10) /* "pausefilter" Filtered pause intercept */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD		(15*32+12) /* "pfthreshold" Pause filter threshold */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVIC		(15*32+13) /* "avic" Virtual Interrupt Controller */
+#define X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD	(15*32+15) /* "v_vmsave_vmload" Virtual VMSAVE VMLOAD */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VGIF		(15*32+16) /* "vgif" Virtual GIF */
+#define X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC		(15*32+18) /* "x2avic" Virtual x2apic */
+#define X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL		(15*32+20) /* "v_spec_ctrl" Virtual SPEC_CTRL */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VNMI		(15*32+25) /* "vnmi" Virtual NMI */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK	(15*32+28) /* SVME addr check */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ECX), word 16 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI		(16*32+ 1) /* AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation instructions*/
-#define X86_FEATURE_UMIP		(16*32+ 2) /* User Mode Instruction Protection */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PKU			(16*32+ 3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE		(16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
-#define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG		(16*32+ 5) /* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2	(16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK		(16*32+ 7) /* "" Shadow stack */
-#define X86_FEATURE_GFNI		(16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VAES		(16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ		(16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VNNI		(16*32+11) /* Vector Neural Network Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BITALG	(16*32+12) /* Support for VPOPCNT[B,W] and VPSHUF-BITQMB instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TME			(16*32+13) /* Intel Total Memory Encryption */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ	(16*32+14) /* POPCNT for vectors of DW/QW */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LA57		(16*32+16) /* 5-level page tables */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDPID		(16*32+22) /* RDPID instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT	(16*32+24) /* Bus Lock detect */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE		(16*32+25) /* CLDEMOTE instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI		(16*32+27) /* MOVDIRI instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B		(16*32+28) /* MOVDIR64B instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD		(16*32+29) /* ENQCMD and ENQCMDS instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC		(16*32+30) /* Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI		(16*32+ 1) /* "avx512vbmi" AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation instructions*/
+#define X86_FEATURE_UMIP		(16*32+ 2) /* "umip" User Mode Instruction Protection */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PKU			(16*32+ 3) /* "pku" Protection Keys for Userspace */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE		(16*32+ 4) /* "ospke" OS Protection Keys Enable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG		(16*32+ 5) /* "waitpkg" UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2	(16*32+ 6) /* "avx512_vbmi2" Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK		(16*32+ 7) /* Shadow stack */
+#define X86_FEATURE_GFNI		(16*32+ 8) /* "gfni" Galois Field New Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VAES		(16*32+ 9) /* "vaes" Vector AES */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ		(16*32+10) /* "vpclmulqdq" Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VNNI		(16*32+11) /* "avx512_vnni" Vector Neural Network Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BITALG	(16*32+12) /* "avx512_bitalg" Support for VPOPCNT[B,W] and VPSHUF-BITQMB instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TME			(16*32+13) /* "tme" Intel Total Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ	(16*32+14) /* "avx512_vpopcntdq" POPCNT for vectors of DW/QW */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LA57		(16*32+16) /* "la57" 5-level page tables */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDPID		(16*32+22) /* "rdpid" RDPID instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT	(16*32+24) /* "bus_lock_detect" Bus Lock detect */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLDEMOTE		(16*32+25) /* "cldemote" CLDEMOTE instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIRI		(16*32+27) /* "movdiri" MOVDIRI instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B		(16*32+28) /* "movdir64b" MOVDIR64B instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD		(16*32+29) /* "enqcmd" ENQCMD and ENQCMDS instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC		(16*32+30) /* "sgx_lc" Software Guard Extensions Launch Control */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (EBX), word 17 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV	(17*32+ 0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR		(17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA		(17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */
+#define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV	(17*32+ 0) /* "overflow_recov" MCA overflow recovery support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR		(17*32+ 1) /* "succor" Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SMCA		(17*32+ 3) /* "smca" Scalable MCA */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FSRM		(18*32+ 4) /* Fast Short Rep Mov */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8) /* AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
-#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT	(18*32+11) /* "" RTM transaction always aborts */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SERIALIZE		(18*32+14) /* SERIALIZE instruction */
-#define X86_FEATURE_HYBRID_CPU		(18*32+15) /* "" This part has CPUs of more than one type */
-#define X86_FEATURE_TSXLDTRK		(18*32+16) /* TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking */
-#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR		(18*32+19) /* Intel ARCH LBR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBT			(18*32+20) /* Indirect Branch Tracking */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_BF16		(18*32+22) /* AMX bf16 Support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16		(18*32+23) /* AVX512 FP16 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE		(18*32+24) /* AMX tile Support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_INT8		(18*32+25) /* AMX int8 Support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D		(18*32+28) /* Flush L1D cache */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+30) /* "" IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* "avx512_4vnniw" AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* "avx512_4fmaps" AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FSRM		(18*32+ 4) /* "fsrm" Fast Short Rep Mov */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8) /* "avx512_vp2intersect" AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* "md_clear" VERW clears CPU buffers */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT	(18*32+11) /* RTM transaction always aborts */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SERIALIZE		(18*32+14) /* "serialize" SERIALIZE instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_HYBRID_CPU		(18*32+15) /* This part has CPUs of more than one type */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSXLDTRK		(18*32+16) /* "tsxldtrk" TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* "pconfig" Intel PCONFIG */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR		(18*32+19) /* "arch_lbr" Intel ARCH LBR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBT			(18*32+20) /* "ibt" Indirect Branch Tracking */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_BF16		(18*32+22) /* "amx_bf16" AMX bf16 Support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16		(18*32+23) /* "avx512_fp16" AVX512 FP16 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE		(18*32+24) /* "amx_tile" AMX tile Support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_INT8		(18*32+25) /* "amx_int8" AMX int8 Support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D		(18*32+28) /* "flush_l1d" Flush L1D cache */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* "arch_capabilities" IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+30) /* IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SME			(19*32+ 0) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV			(19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
-#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	(19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP		(19*32+ 4) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging */
-#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX		(19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
-#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP		(19*32+14) /* AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SVSM		(19*32+28) /* SVSM present */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME			(19*32+ 0) /* "sme" AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV			(19*32+ 1) /* "sev" AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	(19*32+ 2) /* VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* "sev_es" AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP		(19*32+ 4) /* "sev_snp" AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging */
+#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX		(19*32+ 9) /* Virtual TSC_AUX */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
+#define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP		(19*32+14) /* "debug_swap" AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SVSM		(19*32+28) /* "svsm" SVSM present */
 
 /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */
-#define X86_FEATURE_WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS	(20*32+ 1) /* "" WRMSR to {FS,GS,KERNEL_GS}_BASE is non-serializing */
-#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC	(20*32+ 2) /* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE	(20*32+ 6) /* "" Null Selector Clears Base */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS		(20*32+ 8) /* "" Automatic IBRS */
-#define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR	(20*32+ 9) /* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
+#define X86_FEATURE_WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS	(20*32+ 1) /* WRMSR to {FS,GS,KERNEL_GS}_BASE is non-serializing */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC	(20*32+ 2) /* LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR		(20*32+ 5) /* The memory form of VERW mitigates TSA */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE	(20*32+ 6) /* Null Selector Clears Base */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS		(20*32+ 8) /* Automatic IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR	(20*32+ 9) /* SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
 
-#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB		(20*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE		(20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO		(20*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB		(20*32+27) /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE		(20*32+28) /* MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO		(20*32+29) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO	(20*32+30) /* CPU is not affected by SRSO across user/kernel boundaries */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE	(20*32+31) /*
+						    * BP_CFG[BpSpecReduce] can be used to mitigate SRSO for VMs.
+						    * (SRSO_MSR_FIX in the official doc).
+						    */
 
 /*
  * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various
@@ -474,64 +478,72 @@
  *
  * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags!
  */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE	(21*32+ 0) /* AMD LBR and PMC Freeze */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP	(21*32+ 1) /* "" Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */
-#define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL		(21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW	(21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* "" Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_FAST_CPPC	(21*32 + 5) /* Fast CPPC */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_HETEROGENEOUS_CORES (21*32 + 6) /* Heterogeneous Core Topology */
-#define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS	(21*32 + 9) /* Use thunk for indirect branches in lower half of cacheline */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE	(21*32+ 0) /* "amd_lbr_pmc_freeze" AMD LBR and PMC Freeze */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP	(21*32+ 1) /* Clear branch history at syscall entry using SW loop */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL		(21*32+ 2) /* BHI_DIS_S HW control available */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW	(21*32+ 3) /* BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_FAST_CPPC	(21*32+ 5) /* Fast CPPC */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_HETEROGENEOUS_CORES (21*32+ 6) /* Heterogeneous Core Topology */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_WORKLOAD_CLASS	(21*32+ 7) /* Workload Classification */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS	(21*32+10) /* Use thunk for indirect branches in lower half of cacheline */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO		(21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO		(21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM	(21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER	(21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
 #define X86_BUG(x)			(NCAPINTS*32 + (x))
 
-#define X86_BUG_F00F			X86_BUG(0) /* Intel F00F */
-#define X86_BUG_FDIV			X86_BUG(1) /* FPU FDIV */
-#define X86_BUG_COMA			X86_BUG(2) /* Cyrix 6x86 coma */
+#define X86_BUG_F00F			X86_BUG(0) /* "f00f" Intel F00F */
+#define X86_BUG_FDIV			X86_BUG(1) /* "fdiv" FPU FDIV */
+#define X86_BUG_COMA			X86_BUG(2) /* "coma" Cyrix 6x86 coma */
 #define X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH		X86_BUG(3) /* "tlb_mmatch" AMD Erratum 383 */
 #define X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E		X86_BUG(4) /* "apic_c1e" AMD Erratum 400 */
-#define X86_BUG_11AP			X86_BUG(5) /* Bad local APIC aka 11AP */
-#define X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK		X86_BUG(6) /* FXSAVE leaks FOP/FIP/FOP */
-#define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR		X86_BUG(7) /* AAI65, CLFLUSH required before MONITOR */
-#define X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS		X86_BUG(8) /* SYSRET doesn't fix up SS attrs */
+#define X86_BUG_11AP			X86_BUG(5) /* "11ap" Bad local APIC aka 11AP */
+#define X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK		X86_BUG(6) /* "fxsave_leak" FXSAVE leaks FOP/FIP/FOP */
+#define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR		X86_BUG(7) /* "clflush_monitor" AAI65, CLFLUSH required before MONITOR */
+#define X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS		X86_BUG(8) /* "sysret_ss_attrs" SYSRET doesn't fix up SS attrs */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 /*
  * 64-bit kernels don't use X86_BUG_ESPFIX.  Make the define conditional
  * to avoid confusion.
  */
-#define X86_BUG_ESPFIX			X86_BUG(9) /* "" IRET to 16-bit SS corrupts ESP/RSP high bits */
+#define X86_BUG_ESPFIX			X86_BUG(9) /* IRET to 16-bit SS corrupts ESP/RSP high bits */
 #endif
-#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG		X86_BUG(10) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */
-#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE		X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
-#define X86_BUG_MONITOR			X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
-#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400		X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
-#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
-#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
-#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
-#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
-#define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
-#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
-#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
-#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
-#define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
-#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
-#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
-#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
-#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
-#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB			X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
-#define X86_BUG_GDS			X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */
-#define X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE		X86_BUG(31) /* CPU may incur #MC if non-TD software does partial write to TDX private memory */
+#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG		X86_BUG(10) /* "null_seg" Nulling a selector preserves the base */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE		X86_BUG(11) /* "swapgs_fence" SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
+#define X86_BUG_MONITOR			X86_BUG(12) /* "monitor" IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
+#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400		X86_BUG(13) /* "amd_e400" CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* "cpu_meltdown" CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* "spectre_v1" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* "spectre_v2" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* "spec_store_bypass" CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
+#define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* "l1tf" CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* "mds" CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* "msbds_only" CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* "swapgs" CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* "taa" CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* "itlb_multihit" CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* "srbds" CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* "mmio_stale_data" CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* "retbleed" CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* "eibrs_pbrsb" EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB			X86_BUG(29) /* "smt_rsb" CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_GDS			X86_BUG(30) /* "gds" CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE		X86_BUG(31) /* "tdx_pw_mce" CPU may incur #MC if non-TD software does partial write to TDX private memory */
 
 /* BUG word 2 */
-#define X86_BUG_SRSO			X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
-#define X86_BUG_DIV0			X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */
-#define X86_BUG_RFDS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
-#define X86_BUG_BHI			X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
-#define X86_BUG_ITS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
-#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY		X86_BUG(1*32 + 7) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
+#define X86_BUG_SRSO			X86_BUG( 1*32+ 0) /* "srso" AMD SRSO bug */
+#define X86_BUG_DIV0			X86_BUG( 1*32+ 1) /* "div0" AMD DIV0 speculation bug */
+#define X86_BUG_RFDS			X86_BUG( 1*32+ 2) /* "rfds" CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_BHI			X86_BUG( 1*32+ 3) /* "bhi" CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
+#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET	   	X86_BUG( 1*32+ 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_ITS			X86_BUG( 1*32+ 7) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
+#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY		X86_BUG( 1*32+ 8) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
+#define X86_BUG_TSA			X86_BUG( 1*32+ 9) /* "tsa" CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
+#define X86_BUG_VMSCAPE			X86_BUG( 1*32+10) /* "vmscape" CPU is affected by VMSCAPE attacks from guests */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h

@@ -73,19 +73,23 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 #endif
 
 	/*
-	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
-	 * but not enough for x86 stack utilization comfort. To keep
-	 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 8 bits.
-	 *
-	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
-	 * applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in
+	 * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10
+	 * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
+	 * when applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in
 	 * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32)
 	 * low bits from any entropy chosen here.
 	 *
-	 * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or
-	 * 6 (ia32) bits.
+	 * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 7 (x86_64) or
+	 * 8 (ia32) bits.
 	 */
-	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
+
+	/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_ibpb_exit_to_user' */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
+	    this_cpu_read(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user)) {
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+		this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, false);
+	}
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
 

arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h

@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ static __always_inline void native_irq_enable(void)
 
 static __always_inline void native_safe_halt(void)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
 static __always_inline void native_halt(void)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 

arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h

@@ -17,10 +17,12 @@ struct ucode_cpu_info {
 void load_ucode_bsp(void);
 void load_ucode_ap(void);
 void microcode_bsp_resume(void);
+bool __init microcode_loader_disabled(void);
 #else
 static inline void load_ucode_bsp(void)	{ }
 static inline void load_ucode_ap(void) { }
 static inline void microcode_bsp_resume(void) { }
+static inline bool __init microcode_loader_disabled(void) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 extern unsigned long initrd_start_early;

arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h

@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@
 
 /* Zen4 */
 #define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG                 0xc001102e
+#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT 4
 #define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT 5
 
 /* Fam 19h MSRs */

arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h

@@ -26,29 +26,29 @@
 #define TPAUSE_C01_STATE		1
 #define TPAUSE_C02_STATE		0
 
-static __always_inline void __monitor(const void *eax, unsigned long ecx,
-			     unsigned long edx)
+static __always_inline void __monitor(const void *eax, u32 ecx, u32 edx)
 {
-	/* "monitor %eax, %ecx, %edx;" */
-	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc8;"
+	/*
+	 * Use the instruction mnemonic with implicit operands, as the LLVM
+	 * assembler fails to assemble the mnemonic with explicit operands:
+	 */
+	asm volatile("monitor" :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
+}
+
+static __always_inline void __monitorx(const void *eax, u32 ecx, u32 edx)
+{
+	/* "monitorx %eax, %ecx, %edx" */
+	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfa"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d"(edx));
 }
 
-static __always_inline void __monitorx(const void *eax, unsigned long ecx,
-			      unsigned long edx)
+static __always_inline void __mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx)
 {
-	/* "monitorx %eax, %ecx, %edx;" */
-	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfa;"
-		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d"(edx));
-}
-
-static __always_inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
-{
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
-
-	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
-	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
-		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
+	/*
+	 * Use the instruction mnemonic with implicit operands, as the LLVM
+	 * assembler fails to assemble the mnemonic with explicit operands:
+	 */
+	asm volatile("mwait" :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -77,22 +77,28 @@ static __always_inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
  * EAX                     (logical) address to monitor
  * ECX                     #GP if not zero
  */
-static __always_inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
-				     unsigned long ecx)
+static __always_inline void __mwaitx(u32 eax, u32 ebx, u32 ecx)
 {
-	/* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */
+	/* No need for TSA buffer clearing on AMD */
 
-	/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx;" */
-	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb;"
+	/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx" */
+	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "b" (ebx), "c" (ecx));
 }
 
-static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
+/*
+ * Re-enable interrupts right upon calling mwait in such a way that
+ * no interrupt can fire _before_ the execution of mwait, ie: no
+ * instruction must be placed between "sti" and "mwait".
+ *
+ * This is necessary because if an interrupt queues a timer before
+ * executing mwait, it would otherwise go unnoticed and the next tick
+ * would not be reprogrammed accordingly before mwait ever wakes up.
+ */
+static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(u32 eax, u32 ecx)
 {
-	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
-	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
-	asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
-		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
+
+	asm volatile("sti; mwait" :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -107,16 +113,16 @@ static __always_inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
  */
 static __always_inline void mwait_idle_with_hints(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	if (need_resched())
+		return;
+
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	if (static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MONITOR) || !current_set_polling_and_test()) {
+		const void *addr = &current_thread_info()->flags;
 		bool ibrs_disabled = false;
 		u64 spec_ctrl;
 
-		if (static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR)) {
-			mb();
-			clflush((void *)&current_thread_info()->flags);
-			mb();
-		}
-
 		if (irqs_disabled() && (ecx & 1) &&
 		    cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) {
 			/* NMI always enable IBRS on exception entry */
@@ -126,16 +132,19 @@ static __always_inline void mwait_idle_with_hints(unsigned long eax, unsigned lo
 			native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
 		}
 
-		__monitor((void *)&current_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0);
+		alternative_input("", "clflush (%[addr])", X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR, [addr] "a" (addr));
+		__monitor(addr, 0, 0);
+
+		if (need_resched())
+			goto out;
 
-		if (!need_resched()) {
 		if (ecx & 1) {
 			__mwait(eax, ecx);
 		} else {
 			__sti_mwait(eax, ecx);
 			raw_local_irq_disable();
 		}
-		}
+out:
 		if (ibrs_disabled) {
 			native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, spec_ctrl);
 			__this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, spec_ctrl);
@@ -152,13 +161,13 @@ static __always_inline void mwait_idle_with_hints(unsigned long eax, unsigned lo
  */
 static inline void __tpause(u32 ecx, u32 edx, u32 eax)
 {
-	/* "tpause %ecx, %edx, %eax;" */
+	/* "tpause %ecx, %edx, %eax" */
 	#ifdef CONFIG_AS_TPAUSE
-	asm volatile("tpause %%ecx\n"
+	asm volatile("tpause %%ecx"
 		     :
 		     : "c"(ecx), "d"(edx), "a"(eax));
 	#else
-	asm volatile(".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0xae, 0xf1\t\n"
+	asm volatile(".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0xae, 0xf1"
 		     :
 		     : "c"(ecx), "d"(edx), "a"(eax));
 	#endif

arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

@@ -325,16 +325,31 @@
 .endm
 
 /*
- * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling
- * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
- * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
- *
+ * Macro to execute VERW insns that mitigate transient data sampling
+ * attacks such as MDS or TSA. On affected systems a microcode update
+ * overloaded VERW insns to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers
+ * CFLAGS.ZF.
  * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers.
  */
-.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
-	ALTERNATIVE __stringify(verw _ASM_RIP(mds_verw_sel)), "", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF)
+.macro __CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS feature
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "verw x86_verw_sel(%rip)", \feature
+#else
+	/*
+	 * In 32bit mode, the memory operand must be a %cs reference. The data
+	 * segments may not be usable (vm86 mode), and the stack segment may not
+	 * be flat (ESPFIX32).
+	 */
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "verw %cs:x86_verw_sel", \feature
+#endif
 .endm
 
+#define CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \
+	__CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+
+#define VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \
+	__CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 .macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
 	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP
@@ -541,6 +556,8 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
 
 extern u64 x86_pred_cmd;
 
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);
+
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
@@ -552,6 +569,13 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 extern void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val);
 extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
 
+/*
+ * RHEL kABI:
+ * Since mds_idle_clear is a kABI protected symbol, we will have to map
+ * cpu_buf_idle_clear back to mds_idle_clear.
+ */
+#define cpu_buf_idle_clear	mds_idle_clear
+
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
  * before calling into firmware.
@@ -580,24 +604,24 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 
-extern u16 mds_verw_sel;
+extern u16 x86_verw_sel;
 
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
 /**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
+ * x86_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support for different x86 CPU vulns
  *
  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
  * instruction is executed.
  */
-static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void x86_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 {
 	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
 
@@ -614,14 +638,15 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Buffer clearing support in idle for the MDS
+ * and TSA vulnerabilities.
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
  */
-static __always_inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 {
-	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+	if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_buf_idle_clear))
+		x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */

arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 
 #define __START_KERNEL_map	_AC(0xffffffff80000000, UL)
 
-/* See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for a description of the memory map. */
+/* See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for a description of the memory map. */
 
 #define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT	52
 

arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ extern unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d;
 #define PGDIR_MASK	(~(PGDIR_SIZE - 1))
 
 /*
- * See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for a description of the memory map.
+ * See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for a description of the memory map.
  *
  * Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
  * range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which

arch/x86/include/asm/tlb.h

@@ -34,4 +34,8 @@ static inline void __tlb_remove_table(void *table)
 	free_page_and_swap_cache(table);
 }
 
+static inline void invlpg(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	asm volatile("invlpg (%0)" ::"r" (addr) : "memory");
+}
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TLB_H */

arch/x86/include/asm/vmxfeatures.h

@@ -9,85 +9,85 @@
 
 /*
  * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used
- * in /proc/cpuinfo instead of the macro name.  If the string is "",
- * this feature bit is not displayed in /proc/cpuinfo at all.
+ * in /proc/cpuinfo instead of the macro name.  Otherwise, this feature bit
+ * is not displayed in /proc/cpuinfo at all.
  */
 
 /* Pin-Based VM-Execution Controls, EPT/VPID, APIC and VM-Functions, word 0 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_INTR_EXITING	( 0*32+  0) /* "" VM-Exit on vectored interrupts */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_NMI_EXITING		( 0*32+  3) /* "" VM-Exit on NMIs */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_INTR_EXITING	( 0*32+  0) /* VM-Exit on vectored interrupts */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_NMI_EXITING		( 0*32+  3) /* VM-Exit on NMIs */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_VIRTUAL_NMIS	( 0*32+  5) /* "vnmi" NMI virtualization */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_PREEMPTION_TIMER	( 0*32+  6) /* VMX Preemption Timer */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_POSTED_INTR		( 0*32+  7) /* Posted Interrupts */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_PREEMPTION_TIMER	( 0*32+  6) /* "preemption_timer" VMX Preemption Timer */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_POSTED_INTR		( 0*32+  7) /* "posted_intr" Posted Interrupts */
 
 /* EPT/VPID features, scattered to bits 16-23 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_INVVPID		( 0*32+ 16) /* INVVPID is supported */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_INVVPID		( 0*32+ 16) /* "invvpid" INVVPID is supported */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY	( 0*32+ 17) /* "ept_x_only" EPT entries can be execute only */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_AD		( 0*32+ 18) /* EPT Accessed/Dirty bits */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_1GB		( 0*32+ 19) /* 1GB EPT pages */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_5LEVEL		( 0*32+ 20) /* 5-level EPT paging */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_AD		( 0*32+ 18) /* "ept_ad" EPT Accessed/Dirty bits */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_1GB		( 0*32+ 19) /* "ept_1gb" 1GB EPT pages */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_5LEVEL		( 0*32+ 20) /* "ept_5level" 5-level EPT paging */
 
 /* Aggregated APIC features 24-27 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY	( 0*32+ 24) /* TPR shadow + virt APIC */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_APICV	        ( 0*32+ 25) /* TPR shadow + APIC reg virt + virt intr delivery + posted interrupts */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY	( 0*32+ 24) /* "flexpriority" TPR shadow + virt APIC */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_APICV	        ( 0*32+ 25) /* "apicv" TPR shadow + APIC reg virt + virt intr delivery + posted interrupts */
 
 /* VM-Functions, shifted to bits 28-31 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_EPTP_SWITCHING	( 0*32+ 28) /* EPTP switching (in guest) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_EPTP_SWITCHING	( 0*32+ 28) /* "eptp_switching" EPTP switching (in guest) */
 
 /* Primary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 1 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING ( 1*32+  2) /* "" VM-Exit if INTRs are unblocked in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING ( 1*32+  2) /* VM-Exit if INTRs are unblocked in guest */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING	( 1*32+  3) /* "tsc_offset" Offset hardware TSC when read in guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_HLT_EXITING		( 1*32+  7) /* "" VM-Exit on HLT */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_INVLPG_EXITING	( 1*32+  9) /* "" VM-Exit on INVLPG */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_MWAIT_EXITING	( 1*32+ 10) /* "" VM-Exit on MWAIT */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_RDPMC_EXITING	( 1*32+ 11) /* "" VM-Exit on RDPMC */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_RDTSC_EXITING	( 1*32+ 12) /* "" VM-Exit on RDTSC */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_LOAD_EXITING	( 1*32+ 15) /* "" VM-Exit on writes to CR3 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_STORE_EXITING	( 1*32+ 16) /* "" VM-Exit on reads from CR3 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS	( 1*32+ 17) /* "" Enable Tertiary VM-Execution Controls */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_LOAD_EXITING	( 1*32+ 19) /* "" VM-Exit on writes to CR8 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_STORE_EXITING	( 1*32+ 20) /* "" VM-Exit on reads from CR8 */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_HLT_EXITING		( 1*32+  7) /* VM-Exit on HLT */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_INVLPG_EXITING	( 1*32+  9) /* VM-Exit on INVLPG */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_MWAIT_EXITING	( 1*32+ 10) /* VM-Exit on MWAIT */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_RDPMC_EXITING	( 1*32+ 11) /* VM-Exit on RDPMC */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_RDTSC_EXITING	( 1*32+ 12) /* VM-Exit on RDTSC */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_LOAD_EXITING	( 1*32+ 15) /* VM-Exit on writes to CR3 */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_CR3_STORE_EXITING	( 1*32+ 16) /* VM-Exit on reads from CR3 */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS	( 1*32+ 17) /* Enable Tertiary VM-Execution Controls */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_LOAD_EXITING	( 1*32+ 19) /* VM-Exit on writes to CR8 */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_CR8_STORE_EXITING	( 1*32+ 20) /* VM-Exit on reads from CR8 */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_VIRTUAL_TPR		( 1*32+ 21) /* "vtpr" TPR virtualization, a.k.a. TPR shadow */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING	( 1*32+ 22) /* "" VM-Exit if NMIs are unblocked in guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_MOV_DR_EXITING	( 1*32+ 23) /* "" VM-Exit on accesses to debug registers */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_UNCOND_IO_EXITING	( 1*32+ 24) /* "" VM-Exit on *all* IN{S} and OUT{S}*/
-#define VMX_FEATURE_USE_IO_BITMAPS	( 1*32+ 25) /* "" VM-Exit based on I/O port */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING	( 1*32+ 22) /* VM-Exit if NMIs are unblocked in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_MOV_DR_EXITING	( 1*32+ 23) /* VM-Exit on accesses to debug registers */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_UNCOND_IO_EXITING	( 1*32+ 24) /* VM-Exit on *all* IN{S} and OUT{S}*/
+#define VMX_FEATURE_USE_IO_BITMAPS	( 1*32+ 25) /* VM-Exit based on I/O port */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG	( 1*32+ 27) /* "mtf" VMX single-step VM-Exits */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_USE_MSR_BITMAPS	( 1*32+ 28) /* "" VM-Exit based on MSR index */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_MONITOR_EXITING	( 1*32+ 29) /* "" VM-Exit on MONITOR (MWAIT's accomplice) */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_PAUSE_EXITING	( 1*32+ 30) /* "" VM-Exit on PAUSE (unconditionally) */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_SEC_CONTROLS	( 1*32+ 31) /* "" Enable Secondary VM-Execution Controls */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_USE_MSR_BITMAPS	( 1*32+ 28) /* VM-Exit based on MSR index */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_MONITOR_EXITING	( 1*32+ 29) /* VM-Exit on MONITOR (MWAIT's accomplice) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_PAUSE_EXITING	( 1*32+ 30) /* VM-Exit on PAUSE (unconditionally) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_SEC_CONTROLS	( 1*32+ 31) /* Enable Secondary VM-Execution Controls */
 
 /* Secondary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 2 */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_VIRT_APIC_ACCESSES	( 2*32+  0) /* "vapic" Virtualize memory mapped APIC accesses */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT			( 2*32+  1) /* Extended Page Tables, a.k.a. Two-Dimensional Paging */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_DESC_EXITING	( 2*32+  2) /* "" VM-Exit on {S,L}*DT instructions */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_RDTSCP		( 2*32+  3) /* "" Enable RDTSCP in guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_VIRTUAL_X2APIC	( 2*32+  4) /* "" Virtualize X2APIC for the guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_VPID		( 2*32+  5) /* Virtual Processor ID (TLB ASID modifier) */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_WBINVD_EXITING	( 2*32+  6) /* "" VM-Exit on WBINVD */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST	( 2*32+  7) /* Allow Big Real Mode and other "invalid" states */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT			( 2*32+  1) /* "ept" Extended Page Tables, a.k.a. Two-Dimensional Paging */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_DESC_EXITING	( 2*32+  2) /* VM-Exit on {S,L}*DT instructions */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_RDTSCP		( 2*32+  3) /* Enable RDTSCP in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_VIRTUAL_X2APIC	( 2*32+  4) /* Virtualize X2APIC for the guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_VPID		( 2*32+  5) /* "vpid" Virtual Processor ID (TLB ASID modifier) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_WBINVD_EXITING	( 2*32+  6) /* VM-Exit on WBINVD */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST	( 2*32+  7) /* "unrestricted_guest" Allow Big Real Mode and other "invalid" states */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT	( 2*32+  8) /* "vapic_reg" Hardware emulation of reads to the virtual-APIC */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_VIRT_INTR_DELIVERY	( 2*32+  9) /* "vid" Evaluation and delivery of pending virtual interrupts */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING	( 2*32+ 10) /* "ple" Conditionally VM-Exit on PAUSE at CPL0 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_RDRAND_EXITING	( 2*32+ 11) /* "" VM-Exit on RDRAND*/
-#define VMX_FEATURE_INVPCID		( 2*32+ 12) /* "" Enable INVPCID in guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_VMFUNC		( 2*32+ 13) /* "" Enable VM-Functions (leaf dependent) */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_SHADOW_VMCS		( 2*32+ 14) /* VMREAD/VMWRITE in guest can access shadow VMCS */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLS_EXITING	( 2*32+ 15) /* "" VM-Exit on ENCLS (leaf dependent) */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_RDSEED_EXITING	( 2*32+ 16) /* "" VM-Exit on RDSEED */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_RDRAND_EXITING	( 2*32+ 11) /* VM-Exit on RDRAND*/
+#define VMX_FEATURE_INVPCID		( 2*32+ 12) /* Enable INVPCID in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_VMFUNC		( 2*32+ 13) /* Enable VM-Functions (leaf dependent) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_SHADOW_VMCS		( 2*32+ 14) /* "shadow_vmcs" VMREAD/VMWRITE in guest can access shadow VMCS */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLS_EXITING	( 2*32+ 15) /* VM-Exit on ENCLS (leaf dependent) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_RDSEED_EXITING	( 2*32+ 16) /* VM-Exit on RDSEED */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_PAGE_MOD_LOGGING	( 2*32+ 17) /* "pml" Log dirty pages into buffer */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_VIOLATION_VE	( 2*32+ 18) /* Conditionally reflect EPT violations as #VE exceptions */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_PT_CONCEAL_VMX	( 2*32+ 19) /* "" Suppress VMX indicators in Processor Trace */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_XSAVES		( 2*32+ 20) /* "" Enable XSAVES and XRSTORS in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_EPT_VIOLATION_VE	( 2*32+ 18) /* "ept_violation_ve" Conditionally reflect EPT violations as #VE exceptions */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_PT_CONCEAL_VMX	( 2*32+ 19) /* Suppress VMX indicators in Processor Trace */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_XSAVES		( 2*32+ 20) /* Enable XSAVES and XRSTORS in guest */
 #define VMX_FEATURE_MODE_BASED_EPT_EXEC	( 2*32+ 22) /* "ept_mode_based_exec" Enable separate EPT EXEC bits for supervisor vs. user */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_PT_USE_GPA		( 2*32+ 24) /* "" Processor Trace logs GPAs */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_TSC_SCALING		( 2*32+ 25) /* Scale hardware TSC when read in guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE	( 2*32+ 26) /* Enable TPAUSE, UMONITOR, UMWAIT in guest */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLV_EXITING	( 2*32+ 28) /* "" VM-Exit on ENCLV (leaf dependent) */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION	( 2*32+ 30) /* "" VM-Exit when bus lock caused */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING	( 2*32+ 31) /* VM-Exit when no event windows after notify window */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_PT_USE_GPA		( 2*32+ 24) /* Processor Trace logs GPAs */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_TSC_SCALING		( 2*32+ 25) /* "tsc_scaling" Scale hardware TSC when read in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE	( 2*32+ 26) /* "usr_wait_pause" Enable TPAUSE, UMONITOR, UMWAIT in guest */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_ENCLV_EXITING	( 2*32+ 28) /* VM-Exit on ENCLV (leaf dependent) */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION	( 2*32+ 30) /* VM-Exit when bus lock caused */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING	( 2*32+ 31) /* "notify_vm_exiting" VM-Exit when no event windows after notify window */
 
 /* Tertiary Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls, word 3 */
-#define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT		( 3*32+  4) /* Enable IPI virtualization */
+#define VMX_FEATURE_IPI_VIRT		( 3*32+  4) /* "ipi_virt" Enable IPI virtualization */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_VMXFEATURES_H */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/numa.h>
@@ -367,6 +368,47 @@ static void bsp_determine_snp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #endif
 }
 
+#define ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(fam, model, step, ucode) \
+	X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(VFM_MAKE(X86_VENDOR_AMD, fam, model), \
+			    step, step, ucode)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id amd_tsa_microcode[] = {
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x01, 0x1, 0x0a0011d7),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x01, 0x2, 0x0a00123b),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x08, 0x2, 0x0a00820d),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x11, 0x1, 0x0a10114c),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x11, 0x2, 0x0a10124c),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x18, 0x1, 0x0a108109),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x21, 0x0, 0x0a20102e),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x21, 0x2, 0x0a201211),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x44, 0x1, 0x0a404108),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x50, 0x0, 0x0a500012),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x61, 0x2, 0x0a60120a),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x74, 0x1, 0x0a704108),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x75, 0x2, 0x0a705208),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x78, 0x0, 0x0a708008),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0x7c, 0x0, 0x0a70c008),
+	ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x19, 0xa0, 0x2, 0x0aa00216),
+	{},
+};
+
+static void tsa_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN3) ||
+	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN4)) {
+		if (x86_match_min_microcode_rev(amd_tsa_microcode))
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR);
+		else
+			pr_debug("%s: current revision: 0x%x\n", __func__, c->microcode);
+	} else {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
+	}
+}
+
 static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
@@ -474,6 +516,9 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 
 	bsp_determine_snp(c);
+
+	tsa_init(c);
+
 	return;
 
 warn:
@@ -794,6 +839,12 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
 }
 
+static const struct x86_cpu_desc erratum_1386_microcode[] = {
+	AMD_CPU_DESC(0x17,  0x1, 0x2, 0x0800126e),
+	AMD_CPU_DESC(0x17, 0x31, 0x0, 0x08301052),
+	{},
+};
+
 static void fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	/*
@@ -803,7 +854,13 @@ static void fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 *
 	 * Affected parts all have no supervisor XSAVE states, meaning that
 	 * the XSAVEC instruction (which works fine) is equivalent.
+	 *
+	 * Clear the feature flag only on microcode revisions which
+	 * don't have the fix.
 	 */
+	if (x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(erratum_1386_microcode))
+		return;
+
 	clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
 }
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
-#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init its_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void);
+static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -58,7 +63,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 /* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+/*
+ * Set when the CPU has run a potentially malicious guest. An IBPB will
+ * be needed to before running userspace. That IBPB will flush the branch
+ * predictor content.
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);
 
 u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
@@ -123,9 +136,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+/* Control CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 
 /*
  * Controls whether l1d flush based mitigations are enabled,
@@ -134,9 +147,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
  */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 
-/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+/*
+ * Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before VMenter. This is a subset of
+ * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
+ * mitigation is required.
+ */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 
 void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 {
@@ -186,6 +203,11 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	srso_select_mitigation();
 	gds_select_mitigation();
 	its_select_mitigation();
+	tsa_select_mitigation();
+	tsa_apply_mitigation();
+	vmscape_select_mitigation();
+	vmscape_update_mitigation();
+	vmscape_apply_mitigation();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -244,7 +266,8 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
-static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_FULL : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
 
 static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
@@ -304,7 +327,8 @@ enum taa_mitigations {
 };
 
 /* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
-static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
 
 static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -402,7 +426,8 @@ enum mmio_mitigations {
 };
 
 /* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
 
 static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
@@ -436,9 +461,9 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case.
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
-		static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+		static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 	else
-		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+		static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 
 	/*
 	 * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
@@ -446,7 +471,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * is required irrespective of SMT state.
 	 */
 	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+		static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check if the system has the right microcode.
@@ -565,7 +590,7 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		taa_select_mitigation();
 	}
 	/*
-	 * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear
+	 * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that cpu_buf_vm_clear
 	 * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state.
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
@@ -616,7 +641,8 @@ enum srbds_mitigations {
 	SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
 	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
@@ -742,11 +768,8 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
 };
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
-#else
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
-#endif
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FULL : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
@@ -882,7 +905,8 @@ enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
 };
 
 static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1) ?
+		SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
 
 static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
@@ -997,7 +1021,7 @@ static const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
 static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
 	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
 static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
-	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETBLEED) ? RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO : RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
 
 static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
 
@@ -1132,6 +1156,22 @@ do_cmd_auto:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
 		mitigate_smt = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
+		 * software-based untraining so clear those in case some
+		 * other mitigation like SRSO has selected them.
+		 */
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+		/*
+		 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+		 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+		 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+		 */
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+
 		break;
 
 	case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF:
@@ -1311,6 +1351,94 @@ out:
 	pr_info("%s\n", its_strings[its_mitigation]);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Transient Scheduler Attacks: " fmt
+
+enum tsa_mitigations {
+	TSA_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	TSA_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+	TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL,
+	TSA_MITIGATION_VM,
+	TSA_MITIGATION_FULL,
+};
+
+static const char * const tsa_strings[] = {
+	[TSA_MITIGATION_NONE]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+	[TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers: user/kernel boundary",
+	[TSA_MITIGATION_VM]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers: VM",
+	[TSA_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static enum tsa_mitigations tsa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TSA) ? TSA_MITIGATION_AUTO : TSA_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+static int __init tsa_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_NONE;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "user"))
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "vm"))
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_VM;
+	else
+		pr_err("Ignoring unknown tsa=%s option.\n", str);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsa", tsa_parse_cmdline);
+
+static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() || !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TSA)) {
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (tsa_mitigation == TSA_MITIGATION_NONE)
+		return;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR)) {
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tsa_mitigation == TSA_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		tsa_mitigation = TSA_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to set verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected - it
+	 * doesn't fit all cases here and it is not needed because this
+	 * is the only VERW-based mitigation on AMD.
+	 */
+out:
+	pr_info("%s\n", tsa_strings[tsa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+	switch (tsa_mitigation) {
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+		break;
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_VM:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
+		break;
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
@@ -1603,17 +1731,18 @@ static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
-	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
+	cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ?  SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
 	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		return cmd;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
 		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -1623,8 +1752,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	}
 
 	if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
-		pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
-		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+		return cmd;
 	}
 
 	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
@@ -2076,73 +2205,13 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 		return;
 
 	if (sched_smt_active()) {
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+		static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 	} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
 		   (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
-		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+		static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
 	}
 }
 
-#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
-#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
-#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
-
-void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
-{
-	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
-
-	if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
-	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
-		pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
-
-	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
-	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
-		break;
-	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
-	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
-		update_stibp_strict();
-		break;
-	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
-	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
-		update_indir_branch_cond();
-		break;
-	}
-
-	switch (mds_mitigation) {
-	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
-	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
-		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
-			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
-		update_mds_branch_idle();
-		break;
-	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
-		break;
-	}
-
-	switch (taa_mitigation) {
-	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
-	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
-		if (sched_smt_active())
-			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
-		break;
-	case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
-	case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
-		break;
-	}
-
-	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
-	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
-	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
-		if (sched_smt_active())
-			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
-		break;
-	case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
-		break;
-	}
-
-	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 /*
  * Provide a debugfs file to dump SPEC_CTRL MSRs of all the CPUs
@@ -2255,10 +2324,12 @@ static const struct {
 
 static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
-	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
+	cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SSB) ?
+		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
 	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
@@ -2266,7 +2337,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
 					  arg, sizeof(arg));
 		if (ret < 0)
-			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+			return cmd;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
 			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -2277,8 +2348,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 		}
 
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
-			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
-			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+			return cmd;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2605,7 +2676,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
 /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
-enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
 #endif
@@ -2631,20 +2703,20 @@ static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (c->x86 != 6)
 		return;
 
-	switch (c->x86_model) {
-	case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
-	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
+	switch (c->x86_vfm) {
+	case INTEL_NEHALEM:
+	case INTEL_WESTMERE:
+	case INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE:
+	case INTEL_IVYBRIDGE:
+	case INTEL_HASWELL:
+	case INTEL_HASWELL_L:
+	case INTEL_HASWELL_G:
+	case INTEL_BROADWELL:
+	case INTEL_BROADWELL_G:
+	case INTEL_SKYLAKE_L:
+	case INTEL_SKYLAKE:
+	case INTEL_KABYLAKE_L:
+	case INTEL_KABYLAKE:
 		if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
 			c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
 		break;
@@ -2734,6 +2806,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation {
 	SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
 	SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
 	SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE,
 };
 
 enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
@@ -2751,7 +2824,8 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
 	[SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE]		= "Vulnerable: Microcode, no safe RET",
 	[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET]		= "Mitigation: Safe RET",
 	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB]			= "Mitigation: IBPB",
-	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]	= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]	= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only",
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE]	= "Mitigation: Reduced Speculation"
 };
 
 static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
@@ -2785,13 +2859,12 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
 
-	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
-		return;
-
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO)) {
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off() ||
+	    srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) {
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
 			x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
-		return;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (has_microcode) {
@@ -2803,7 +2876,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		 */
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
-			return;
+			goto out;
 		}
 
 		if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
@@ -2819,11 +2892,6 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 	}
 
 	switch (srso_cmd) {
-	case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
-			x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
-		return;
-
 	case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
 		if (has_microcode) {
 			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE;
@@ -2832,6 +2900,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO))
+			goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
+
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
 			/*
 			 * Enable the return thunk for generated code
@@ -2860,32 +2931,245 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
 			if (has_microcode) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+
+				/*
+				 * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
+				 * software-based untraining so clear those in case some
+				 * other mitigation like Retbleed has selected them.
+				 */
+				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+				/*
+				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+				 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+				 */
+				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 			}
 		} else {
 			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 		}
 		break;
 
+ibpb_on_vmexit:
 	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
-			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
+			pr_notice("Reducing speculation to address VM/HV SRSO attack vector.\n");
+			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+			if (has_microcode) {
 				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+
+				/*
+				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+				 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+				 */
+				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 			}
 		} else {
-			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 		}
 		break;
+	default:
+		break;
 	}
 
 out:
+	/*
+	 * Clear the feature flag if this mitigation is not selected as that
+	 * feature flag controls the BpSpecReduce MSR bit toggling in KVM.
+	 */
+	if (srso_mitigation != SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE);
+
+	if (srso_mitigation != SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE)
 		pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"VMSCAPE: " fmt
+
+enum vmscape_mitigations {
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+};
+
+static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE]		= "Vulnerable",
+	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER]	= "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]	= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
+};
+
+static enum vmscape_mitigations vmscape_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE) ? VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO : VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+	} else {
+		pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("vmscape", vmscape_parse_cmdline);
+
+static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() ||
+	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE) ||
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
+}
+
+static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE))
+		return;
+
+	if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB ||
+	    srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT)
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", vmscape_strings[vmscape_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER);
+}
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
+#define VMSCAPE_MSG_SMT "VMSCAPE: SMT on, STIBP is required for full protection. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.html for more details.\n"
+
+void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+	if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+		pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+		update_stibp_strict();
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+		update_indir_branch_cond();
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (mds_mitigation) {
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
+		update_mds_branch_idle();
+		break;
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (taa_mitigation) {
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (tsa_mitigation) {
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_USER_KERNEL:
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_VM:
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		/*
+		 * TSA-SQ can potentially lead to info leakage between
+		 * SMT threads.
+		 */
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+		else
+			static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_idle_clear);
+		break;
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_NONE:
+	case TSA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+		break;
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
+		/*
+		 * Hypervisors can be attacked across-threads, warn for SMT when
+		 * STIBP is not already enabled system-wide.
+		 *
+		 * Intel eIBRS (!AUTOIBRS) implies STIBP on.
+		 */
+		if (!sched_smt_active() ||
+		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ||
+		    (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
+		     !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)))
+			break;
+		pr_warn_once(VMSCAPE_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
 #define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
@@ -3124,6 +3408,16 @@ static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t tsa_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", tsa_strings[tsa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static ssize_t vmscape_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", vmscape_strings[vmscape_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -3185,6 +3479,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_ITS:
 		return its_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_TSA:
+		return tsa_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_VMSCAPE:
+		return vmscape_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -3269,6 +3569,16 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_indirect_target_selection(struct device *dev, struct device_att
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITS);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsa(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TSA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_vmscape(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
+}
 #endif
 
 void __warn_thunk(void)

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

@@ -1209,8 +1209,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,	NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP,	NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
@@ -1278,54 +1278,73 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define ITS		BIT(8)
 /* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */
 #define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY	BIT(9)
+/* CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
+#define TSA		BIT(10)
+/* CPU is affected by VMSCAPE */
+#define VMSCAPE		BIT(11)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_G,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		      0x5,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,		      0xb,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		      0xc,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SANDYBRIDGE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_G,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_HASWELL_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,		      0x5,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,		      0xb,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,		      0xc,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RETBLEED | VMSCAPE),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,		      0x0,	MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,		      0x0,	MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT,     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,		     ATOM,	RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_METEORLAKE_L,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_H,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_U,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LUNARLAKE_M,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X,   X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_GRANITERAPIDS_X,    X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X,    X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT,     X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS | VMSCAPE),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT,	     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D,     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L,     X86_STEP_MAX,	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT,      X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,    X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEP_MAX,	RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_CRESTMONT_X,   X86_STEP_MAX,	VMSCAPE),
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
-	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
-	VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO | VMSCAPE),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1527,12 +1546,33 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI);
 
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
+
 	if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
 		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS_NATIVE_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY);
 	}
 
+	if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO) ||
+		    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO)) {
+			if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, TSA) ||
+			    /* Enable bug on Zen guests to allow for live migration. */
+			    (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN)))
+				setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TSA);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the bug only on bare-metal. A nested hypervisor should already be
+	 * deploying IBPB to isolate itself from nested guests.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, VMSCAPE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c

@@ -116,3 +116,14 @@ bool x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_desc *table)
 	return true;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev);
+
+bool x86_match_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_id *table)
+{
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *res = x86_match_cpu(table);
+
+	if (!res || res->driver_data > boot_cpu_data.microcode)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_match_min_microcode_rev);

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c

@@ -23,17 +23,22 @@
 
 #include <linux/earlycpio.h>
 #include <linux/firmware.h>
+#include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/initrd.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+
 #include <asm/microcode.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/tlb.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -89,6 +94,31 @@ static struct equiv_cpu_table {
 	struct equiv_cpu_entry *entry;
 } equiv_table;
 
+union zen_patch_rev {
+	struct {
+		__u32 rev	 : 8,
+		      stepping	 : 4,
+		      model	 : 4,
+		      __reserved : 4,
+		      ext_model	 : 4,
+		      ext_fam	 : 8;
+	};
+	__u32 ucode_rev;
+};
+
+union cpuid_1_eax {
+	struct {
+		__u32 stepping    : 4,
+		      model	  : 4,
+		      family	  : 4,
+		      __reserved0 : 4,
+		      ext_model   : 4,
+		      ext_fam     : 8,
+		      __reserved1 : 4;
+	};
+	__u32 full;
+};
+
 /*
  * This points to the current valid container of microcode patches which we will
  * save from the initrd/builtin before jettisoning its contents. @mc is the
@@ -96,7 +126,6 @@ static struct equiv_cpu_table {
  */
 struct cont_desc {
 	struct microcode_amd *mc;
-	u32		     cpuid_1_eax;
 	u32		     psize;
 	u8		     *data;
 	size_t		     size;
@@ -109,10 +138,149 @@ struct cont_desc {
 static const char
 ucode_path[] __maybe_unused = "kernel/x86/microcode/AuthenticAMD.bin";
 
+/*
+ * This is CPUID(1).EAX on the BSP. It is used in two ways:
+ *
+ * 1. To ignore the equivalence table on Zen1 and newer.
+ *
+ * 2. To match which patches to load because the patch revision ID
+ *    already contains the f/m/s for which the microcode is destined
+ *    for.
+ */
+static u32 bsp_cpuid_1_eax __ro_after_init;
+
+static bool sha_check = true;
+
+struct patch_digest {
+	u32 patch_id;
+	u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+};
+
+#include "amd_shas.c"
+
+static int cmp_id(const void *key, const void *elem)
+{
+	struct patch_digest *pd = (struct patch_digest *)elem;
+	u32 patch_id = *(u32 *)key;
+
+	if (patch_id == pd->patch_id)
+		return 0;
+	else if (patch_id < pd->patch_id)
+		return -1;
+	else
+		return 1;
+}
+
+static bool need_sha_check(u32 cur_rev)
+{
+	switch (cur_rev >> 8) {
+	case 0x80012: return cur_rev <= 0x800126f; break;
+	case 0x80082: return cur_rev <= 0x800820f; break;
+	case 0x83010: return cur_rev <= 0x830107c; break;
+	case 0x86001: return cur_rev <= 0x860010e; break;
+	case 0x86081: return cur_rev <= 0x8608108; break;
+	case 0x87010: return cur_rev <= 0x8701034; break;
+	case 0x8a000: return cur_rev <= 0x8a0000a; break;
+	case 0xa0010: return cur_rev <= 0xa00107a; break;
+	case 0xa0011: return cur_rev <= 0xa0011da; break;
+	case 0xa0012: return cur_rev <= 0xa001243; break;
+	case 0xa0082: return cur_rev <= 0xa00820e; break;
+	case 0xa1011: return cur_rev <= 0xa101153; break;
+	case 0xa1012: return cur_rev <= 0xa10124e; break;
+	case 0xa1081: return cur_rev <= 0xa108109; break;
+	case 0xa2010: return cur_rev <= 0xa20102f; break;
+	case 0xa2012: return cur_rev <= 0xa201212; break;
+	case 0xa4041: return cur_rev <= 0xa404109; break;
+	case 0xa5000: return cur_rev <= 0xa500013; break;
+	case 0xa6012: return cur_rev <= 0xa60120a; break;
+	case 0xa7041: return cur_rev <= 0xa704109; break;
+	case 0xa7052: return cur_rev <= 0xa705208; break;
+	case 0xa7080: return cur_rev <= 0xa708009; break;
+	case 0xa70c0: return cur_rev <= 0xa70C009; break;
+	case 0xaa001: return cur_rev <= 0xaa00116; break;
+	case 0xaa002: return cur_rev <= 0xaa00218; break;
+	default: break;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("You should not be seeing this. Please send the following couple of lines to x86-<at>-kernel.org\n");
+	pr_info("CPUID(1).EAX: 0x%x, current revision: 0x%x\n", bsp_cpuid_1_eax, cur_rev);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool verify_sha256_digest(u32 patch_id, u32 cur_rev, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct patch_digest *pd = NULL;
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct sha256_state s;
+	int i;
+
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) < 0x17 ||
+	    x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) > 0x19)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!need_sha_check(cur_rev))
+		return true;
+
+	if (!sha_check)
+		return true;
+
+	pd = bsearch(&patch_id, phashes, ARRAY_SIZE(phashes), sizeof(struct patch_digest), cmp_id);
+	if (!pd) {
+		pr_err("No sha256 digest for patch ID: 0x%x found\n", patch_id);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	sha256_init(&s);
+	sha256_update(&s, data, len);
+	sha256_final(&s, digest);
+
+	if (memcmp(digest, pd->sha256, sizeof(digest))) {
+		pr_err("Patch 0x%x SHA256 digest mismatch!\n", patch_id);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+			pr_cont("0x%x ", digest[i]);
+		pr_info("\n");
+
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static u32 get_patch_level(void)
+{
+	u32 rev, dummy __always_unused;
+
+	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
+
+	return rev;
+}
+
+static union cpuid_1_eax ucode_rev_to_cpuid(unsigned int val)
+{
+	union zen_patch_rev p;
+	union cpuid_1_eax c;
+
+	p.ucode_rev = val;
+	c.full = 0;
+
+	c.stepping  = p.stepping;
+	c.model     = p.model;
+	c.ext_model = p.ext_model;
+	c.family    = 0xf;
+	c.ext_fam   = p.ext_fam;
+
+	return c;
+}
+
 static u16 find_equiv_id(struct equiv_cpu_table *et, u32 sig)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
+	/* Zen and newer do not need an equivalence table. */
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!et || !et->num_entries)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -159,6 +327,10 @@ static bool verify_equivalence_table(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	if (!verify_container(buf, buf_size))
 		return false;
 
+	/* Zen and newer do not need an equivalence table. */
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17)
+		return true;
+
 	cont_type = hdr[1];
 	if (cont_type != UCODE_EQUIV_CPU_TABLE_TYPE) {
 		pr_debug("Wrong microcode container equivalence table type: %u.\n",
@@ -185,8 +357,7 @@ static bool verify_equivalence_table(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)
  * On success, @sh_psize returns the patch size according to the section header,
  * to the caller.
  */
-static bool
-__verify_patch_section(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *sh_psize)
+static bool __verify_patch_section(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *sh_psize)
 {
 	u32 p_type, p_size;
 	const u32 *hdr;
@@ -222,8 +393,9 @@ __verify_patch_section(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *sh_psize)
  * exceed the per-family maximum). @sh_psize is the size read from the section
  * header.
  */
-static unsigned int __verify_patch_size(u8 family, u32 sh_psize, size_t buf_size)
+static unsigned int __verify_patch_size(u32 sh_psize, size_t buf_size)
 {
+	u8 family = x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax);
 	u32 max_size;
 
 	if (family >= 0x15)
@@ -258,9 +430,9 @@ static unsigned int __verify_patch_size(u8 family, u32 sh_psize, size_t buf_size
  * positive: patch is not for this family, skip it
  * 0: success
  */
-static int
-verify_patch(u8 family, const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *patch_size)
+static int verify_patch(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *patch_size)
 {
+	u8 family = x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax);
 	struct microcode_header_amd *mc_hdr;
 	unsigned int ret;
 	u32 sh_psize;
@@ -286,7 +458,7 @@ verify_patch(u8 family, const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *patch_size)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	ret = __verify_patch_size(family, sh_psize, buf_size);
+	ret = __verify_patch_size(sh_psize, buf_size);
 	if (!ret) {
 		pr_debug("Per-family patch size mismatch.\n");
 		return -1;
@@ -308,6 +480,15 @@ verify_patch(u8 family, const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *patch_size)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool mc_patch_matches(struct microcode_amd *mc, u16 eq_id)
+{
+	/* Zen and newer do not need an equivalence table. */
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17)
+		return ucode_rev_to_cpuid(mc->hdr.patch_id).full == bsp_cpuid_1_eax;
+	else
+		return eq_id == mc->hdr.processor_rev_id;
+}
+
 /*
  * This scans the ucode blob for the proper container as we can have multiple
  * containers glued together. Returns the equivalence ID from the equivalence
@@ -336,7 +517,7 @@ static size_t parse_container(u8 *ucode, size_t size, struct cont_desc *desc)
 	 * doesn't contain a patch for the CPU, scan through the whole container
 	 * so that it can be skipped in case there are other containers appended.
 	 */
-	eq_id = find_equiv_id(&table, desc->cpuid_1_eax);
+	eq_id = find_equiv_id(&table, bsp_cpuid_1_eax);
 
 	buf  += hdr[2] + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
 	size -= hdr[2] + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
@@ -350,7 +531,7 @@ static size_t parse_container(u8 *ucode, size_t size, struct cont_desc *desc)
 		u32 patch_size;
 		int ret;
 
-		ret = verify_patch(x86_family(desc->cpuid_1_eax), buf, size, &patch_size);
+		ret = verify_patch(buf, size, &patch_size);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			/*
 			 * Patch verification failed, skip to the next container, if
@@ -363,7 +544,7 @@ static size_t parse_container(u8 *ucode, size_t size, struct cont_desc *desc)
 		}
 
 		mc = (struct microcode_amd *)(buf + SECTION_HDR_SIZE);
-		if (eq_id == mc->hdr.processor_rev_id) {
+		if (mc_patch_matches(mc, eq_id)) {
 			desc->psize = patch_size;
 			desc->mc = mc;
 		}
@@ -413,59 +594,41 @@ static void scan_containers(u8 *ucode, size_t size, struct cont_desc *desc)
 	}
 }
 
-static int __apply_microcode_amd(struct microcode_amd *mc)
+static bool __apply_microcode_amd(struct microcode_amd *mc, u32 *cur_rev,
+				  unsigned int psize)
 {
-	u32 rev, dummy;
+	unsigned long p_addr = (unsigned long)&mc->hdr.data_code;
 
-	native_wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER, (u64)(long)&mc->hdr.data_code);
+	if (!verify_sha256_digest(mc->hdr.patch_id, *cur_rev, (const u8 *)p_addr, psize))
+		return false;
 
-	/* verify patch application was successful */
-	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
-	if (rev != mc->hdr.patch_id)
-		return -1;
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER, p_addr);
 
-	return 0;
-}
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) == 0x17) {
+		unsigned long p_addr_end = p_addr + psize - 1;
 
-/*
- * Early load occurs before we can vmalloc(). So we look for the microcode
- * patch container file in initrd, traverse equivalent cpu table, look for a
- * matching microcode patch, and update, all in initrd memory in place.
- * When vmalloc() is available for use later -- on 64-bit during first AP load,
- * and on 32-bit during save_microcode_in_initrd_amd() -- we can call
- * load_microcode_amd() to save equivalent cpu table and microcode patches in
- * kernel heap memory.
- *
- * Returns true if container found (sets @desc), false otherwise.
- */
-static bool early_apply_microcode(u32 cpuid_1_eax, u32 old_rev, void *ucode, size_t size)
-{
-	struct cont_desc desc = { 0 };
-	struct microcode_amd *mc;
-	bool ret = false;
-
-	desc.cpuid_1_eax = cpuid_1_eax;
-
-	scan_containers(ucode, size, &desc);
-
-	mc = desc.mc;
-	if (!mc)
-		return ret;
+		invlpg(p_addr);
 
 		/*
-	 * Allow application of the same revision to pick up SMT-specific
-	 * changes even if the revision of the other SMT thread is already
-	 * up-to-date.
+		 * Flush next page too if patch image is crossing a page
+		 * boundary.
 		 */
-	if (old_rev > mc->hdr.patch_id)
-		return ret;
+		if (p_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT != p_addr_end >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+			invlpg(p_addr_end);
+	}
 
-	return !__apply_microcode_amd(mc);
+	/* verify patch application was successful */
+	*cur_rev = get_patch_level();
+	if (*cur_rev != mc->hdr.patch_id)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
 }
 
-static bool get_builtin_microcode(struct cpio_data *cp, u8 family)
+static bool get_builtin_microcode(struct cpio_data *cp)
 {
 	char fw_name[36] = "amd-ucode/microcode_amd.bin";
+	u8 family = x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax);
 	struct firmware fw;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
@@ -484,85 +647,144 @@ static bool get_builtin_microcode(struct cpio_data *cp, u8 family)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static void __init find_blobs_in_containers(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax, struct cpio_data *ret)
+static bool __init find_blobs_in_containers(struct cpio_data *ret)
 {
 	struct cpio_data cp;
+	bool found;
 
-	if (!get_builtin_microcode(&cp, x86_family(cpuid_1_eax)))
+	if (!get_builtin_microcode(&cp))
 		cp = find_microcode_in_initrd(ucode_path);
 
+	found = cp.data && cp.size;
+	if (found)
 		*ret = cp;
+
+	return found;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Early load occurs before we can vmalloc(). So we look for the microcode
+ * patch container file in initrd, traverse equivalent cpu table, look for a
+ * matching microcode patch, and update, all in initrd memory in place.
+ * When vmalloc() is available for use later -- on 64-bit during first AP load,
+ * and on 32-bit during save_microcode_in_initrd() -- we can call
+ * load_microcode_amd() to save equivalent cpu table and microcode patches in
+ * kernel heap memory.
+ */
 void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(struct early_load_data *ed, unsigned int cpuid_1_eax)
 {
+	struct cont_desc desc = { };
+	struct microcode_amd *mc;
 	struct cpio_data cp = { };
-	u32 dummy;
+	char buf[4];
+	u32 rev;
 
-	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, ed->old_rev, dummy);
+	if (cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "microcode.amd_sha_check", buf, 4)) {
+		if (!strncmp(buf, "off", 3)) {
+			sha_check = false;
+			pr_warn_once("It is a very very bad idea to disable the blobs SHA check!\n");
+			add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+		}
+	}
+
+	bsp_cpuid_1_eax = cpuid_1_eax;
+
+	rev = get_patch_level();
+	ed->old_rev = rev;
 
 	/* Needed in load_microcode_amd() */
 	ucode_cpu_info[0].cpu_sig.sig = cpuid_1_eax;
 
-	find_blobs_in_containers(cpuid_1_eax, &cp);
-	if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
+	if (!find_blobs_in_containers(&cp))
 		return;
 
-	if (early_apply_microcode(cpuid_1_eax, ed->old_rev, cp.data, cp.size))
-		native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, ed->new_rev, dummy);
-}
-
-static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size);
-
-static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
-{
-	unsigned int cpuid_1_eax = native_cpuid_eax(1);
-	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
-	struct cont_desc desc = { 0 };
-	enum ucode_state ret;
-	struct cpio_data cp;
-
-	if (dis_ucode_ldr || c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD || c->x86 < 0x10)
-		return 0;
-
-	find_blobs_in_containers(cpuid_1_eax, &cp);
-	if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	desc.cpuid_1_eax = cpuid_1_eax;
-
 	scan_containers(cp.data, cp.size, &desc);
-	if (!desc.mc)
-		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = load_microcode_amd(x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size);
-	if (ret > UCODE_UPDATED)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	mc = desc.mc;
+	if (!mc)
+		return;
 
-	return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Allow application of the same revision to pick up SMT-specific
+	 * changes even if the revision of the other SMT thread is already
+	 * up-to-date.
+	 */
+	if (ed->old_rev > mc->hdr.patch_id)
+		return;
+
+	if (__apply_microcode_amd(mc, &rev, desc.psize))
+		ed->new_rev = rev;
+}
+
+static inline bool patch_cpus_equivalent(struct ucode_patch *p,
+					 struct ucode_patch *n,
+					 bool ignore_stepping)
+{
+	/* Zen and newer hardcode the f/m/s in the patch ID */
+        if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17) {
+		union cpuid_1_eax p_cid = ucode_rev_to_cpuid(p->patch_id);
+		union cpuid_1_eax n_cid = ucode_rev_to_cpuid(n->patch_id);
+
+		if (ignore_stepping) {
+			p_cid.stepping = 0;
+			n_cid.stepping = 0;
+		}
+
+		return p_cid.full == n_cid.full;
+	} else {
+		return p->equiv_cpu == n->equiv_cpu;
+	}
 }
-early_initcall(save_microcode_in_initrd);
 
 /*
  * a small, trivial cache of per-family ucode patches
  */
-static struct ucode_patch *cache_find_patch(u16 equiv_cpu)
+static struct ucode_patch *cache_find_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u16 equiv_cpu)
 {
 	struct ucode_patch *p;
+	struct ucode_patch n;
+
+	n.equiv_cpu = equiv_cpu;
+	n.patch_id  = uci->cpu_sig.rev;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!n.patch_id);
 
 	list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist)
-		if (p->equiv_cpu == equiv_cpu)
+		if (patch_cpus_equivalent(p, &n, false))
 			return p;
+
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static inline int patch_newer(struct ucode_patch *p, struct ucode_patch *n)
+{
+	/* Zen and newer hardcode the f/m/s in the patch ID */
+        if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17) {
+		union zen_patch_rev zp, zn;
+
+		zp.ucode_rev = p->patch_id;
+		zn.ucode_rev = n->patch_id;
+
+		if (zn.stepping != zp.stepping)
+			return -1;
+
+		return zn.rev > zp.rev;
+	} else {
+		return n->patch_id > p->patch_id;
+	}
+}
+
 static void update_cache(struct ucode_patch *new_patch)
 {
 	struct ucode_patch *p;
+	int ret;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist) {
-		if (p->equiv_cpu == new_patch->equiv_cpu) {
-			if (p->patch_id >= new_patch->patch_id) {
+		if (patch_cpus_equivalent(p, new_patch, true)) {
+			ret = patch_newer(p, new_patch);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				continue;
+			else if (!ret) {
 				/* we already have the latest patch */
 				kfree(new_patch->data);
 				kfree(new_patch);
@@ -593,13 +815,17 @@ static void free_cache(void)
 static struct ucode_patch *find_patch(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
-	u16 equiv_id;
+	u16 equiv_id = 0;
 
+	uci->cpu_sig.rev = get_patch_level();
+
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) < 0x17) {
 		equiv_id = find_equiv_id(&equiv_table, uci->cpu_sig.sig);
 		if (!equiv_id)
 			return NULL;
+	}
 
-	return cache_find_patch(equiv_id);
+	return cache_find_patch(uci, equiv_id);
 }
 
 void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu)
@@ -614,22 +840,20 @@ void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu)
 
 	mc = p->data;
 
-	rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
-
+	rev = get_patch_level();
 	if (rev < mc->hdr.patch_id) {
-		if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc))
-			pr_info_once("reload revision: 0x%08x\n", mc->hdr.patch_id);
+		if (__apply_microcode_amd(mc, &rev, p->size))
+			pr_info_once("reload revision: 0x%08x\n", rev);
 	}
 }
 
 static int collect_cpu_info_amd(int cpu, struct cpu_signature *csig)
 {
-	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
 	struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
 	struct ucode_patch *p;
 
 	csig->sig = cpuid_eax(0x00000001);
-	csig->rev = c->microcode;
+	csig->rev = get_patch_level();
 
 	/*
 	 * a patch could have been loaded early, set uci->mc so that
@@ -649,7 +873,7 @@ static enum ucode_state apply_microcode_amd(int cpu)
 	struct ucode_cpu_info *uci;
 	struct ucode_patch *p;
 	enum ucode_state ret;
-	u32 rev, dummy __always_unused;
+	u32 rev;
 
 	BUG_ON(raw_smp_processor_id() != cpu);
 
@@ -659,18 +883,18 @@ static enum ucode_state apply_microcode_amd(int cpu)
 	if (!p)
 		return UCODE_NFOUND;
 
+	rev = uci->cpu_sig.rev;
+
 	mc_amd  = p->data;
 	uci->mc = p->data;
 
-	rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
-
 	/* need to apply patch? */
 	if (rev > mc_amd->hdr.patch_id) {
 		ret = UCODE_OK;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (__apply_microcode_amd(mc_amd)) {
+	if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc_amd, &rev, p->size)) {
 		pr_err("CPU%d: update failed for patch_level=0x%08x\n",
 			cpu, mc_amd->hdr.patch_id);
 		return UCODE_ERROR;
@@ -709,6 +933,10 @@ static size_t install_equiv_cpu_table(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	hdr = (const u32 *)buf;
 	equiv_tbl_len = hdr[2];
 
+	/* Zen and newer do not need an equivalence table. */
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17)
+		goto out;
+
 	equiv_table.entry = vmalloc(equiv_tbl_len);
 	if (!equiv_table.entry) {
 		pr_err("failed to allocate equivalent CPU table\n");
@@ -718,12 +946,16 @@ static size_t install_equiv_cpu_table(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)
 	memcpy(equiv_table.entry, buf + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ, equiv_tbl_len);
 	equiv_table.num_entries = equiv_tbl_len / sizeof(struct equiv_cpu_entry);
 
+out:
 	/* add header length */
 	return equiv_tbl_len + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
 }
 
 static void free_equiv_cpu_table(void)
 {
+	if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17)
+		return;
+
 	vfree(equiv_table.entry);
 	memset(&equiv_table, 0, sizeof(equiv_table));
 }
@@ -749,7 +981,7 @@ static int verify_and_add_patch(u8 family, u8 *fw, unsigned int leftover,
 	u16 proc_id;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = verify_patch(family, fw, leftover, patch_size);
+	ret = verify_patch(fw, leftover, patch_size);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -774,7 +1006,7 @@ static int verify_and_add_patch(u8 family, u8 *fw, unsigned int leftover,
 	patch->patch_id  = mc_hdr->patch_id;
 	patch->equiv_cpu = proc_id;
 
-	pr_debug("%s: Added patch_id: 0x%08x, proc_id: 0x%04x\n",
+	pr_debug("%s: Adding patch_id: 0x%08x, proc_id: 0x%04x\n",
 		 __func__, patch->patch_id, proc_id);
 
 	/* ... and add to cache. */
@@ -784,8 +1016,7 @@ static int verify_and_add_patch(u8 family, u8 *fw, unsigned int leftover,
 }
 
 /* Scan the blob in @data and add microcode patches to the cache. */
-static enum ucode_state __load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data,
-					     size_t size)
+static enum ucode_state __load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
 {
 	u8 *fw = (u8 *)data;
 	size_t offset;
@@ -818,6 +1049,20 @@ static enum ucode_state __load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data,
 	return UCODE_OK;
 }
 
+static enum ucode_state _load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
+{
+	enum ucode_state ret;
+
+	/* free old equiv table */
+	free_equiv_cpu_table();
+
+	ret = __load_microcode_amd(family, data, size);
+	if (ret != UCODE_OK)
+		cleanup();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
 {
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
@@ -825,14 +1070,9 @@ static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t siz
 	struct ucode_patch *p;
 	enum ucode_state ret;
 
-	/* free old equiv table */
-	free_equiv_cpu_table();
-
-	ret = __load_microcode_amd(family, data, size);
-	if (ret != UCODE_OK) {
-		cleanup();
+	ret = _load_microcode_amd(family, data, size);
+	if (ret != UCODE_OK)
 		return ret;
-	}
 
 	for_each_node_with_cpus(nid) {
 		cpu = cpumask_first(cpumask_of_node(nid));
@@ -851,6 +1091,34 @@ static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t siz
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
+{
+	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+	struct cont_desc desc = { 0 };
+	unsigned int cpuid_1_eax;
+	enum ucode_state ret;
+	struct cpio_data cp;
+
+	if (microcode_loader_disabled() || c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD || c->x86 < 0x10)
+		return 0;
+
+	cpuid_1_eax = native_cpuid_eax(1);
+
+	if (!find_blobs_in_containers(&cp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	scan_containers(cp.data, cp.size, &desc);
+	if (!desc.mc)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = _load_microcode_amd(x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size);
+	if (ret > UCODE_UPDATED)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_initcall(save_microcode_in_initrd);
+
 /*
  * AMD microcode firmware naming convention, up to family 15h they are in
  * the legacy file:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd_shas.c

@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
+/* Keep 'em sorted. */
+static const struct patch_digest phashes[] = {
+ { 0x8001227, {
+		0x99,0xc0,0x9b,0x2b,0xcc,0x9f,0x52,0x1b,
+		0x1a,0x5f,0x1d,0x83,0xa1,0x6c,0xc4,0x46,
+		0xe2,0x6c,0xda,0x73,0xfb,0x2d,0x23,0xa8,
+		0x77,0xdc,0x15,0x31,0x33,0x4a,0x46,0x18,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8001250, {
+		0xc0,0x0b,0x6b,0x19,0xfd,0x5c,0x39,0x60,
+		0xd5,0xc3,0x57,0x46,0x54,0xe4,0xd1,0xaa,
+		0xa8,0xf7,0x1f,0xa8,0x6a,0x60,0x3e,0xe3,
+		0x27,0x39,0x8e,0x53,0x30,0xf8,0x49,0x19,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x800126e, {
+		0xf3,0x8b,0x2b,0xb6,0x34,0xe3,0xc8,0x2c,
+		0xef,0xec,0x63,0x6d,0xc8,0x76,0x77,0xb3,
+		0x25,0x5a,0xb7,0x52,0x8c,0x83,0x26,0xe6,
+		0x4c,0xbe,0xbf,0xe9,0x7d,0x22,0x6a,0x43,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x800126f, {
+		0x2b,0x5a,0xf2,0x9c,0xdd,0xd2,0x7f,0xec,
+		0xec,0x96,0x09,0x57,0xb0,0x96,0x29,0x8b,
+		0x2e,0x26,0x91,0xf0,0x49,0x33,0x42,0x18,
+		0xdd,0x4b,0x65,0x5a,0xd4,0x15,0x3d,0x33,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x800820d, {
+		0x68,0x98,0x83,0xcd,0x22,0x0d,0xdd,0x59,
+		0x73,0x2c,0x5b,0x37,0x1f,0x84,0x0e,0x67,
+		0x96,0x43,0x83,0x0c,0x46,0x44,0xab,0x7c,
+		0x7b,0x65,0x9e,0x57,0xb5,0x90,0x4b,0x0e,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8301025, {
+		0xe4,0x7d,0xdb,0x1e,0x14,0xb4,0x5e,0x36,
+		0x8f,0x3e,0x48,0x88,0x3c,0x6d,0x76,0xa1,
+		0x59,0xc6,0xc0,0x72,0x42,0xdf,0x6c,0x30,
+		0x6f,0x0b,0x28,0x16,0x61,0xfc,0x79,0x77,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8301055, {
+		0x81,0x7b,0x99,0x1b,0xae,0x2d,0x4f,0x9a,
+		0xef,0x13,0xce,0xb5,0x10,0xaf,0x6a,0xea,
+		0xe5,0xb0,0x64,0x98,0x10,0x68,0x34,0x3b,
+		0x9d,0x7a,0xd6,0x22,0x77,0x5f,0xb3,0x5b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8301072, {
+		0xcf,0x76,0xa7,0x1a,0x49,0xdf,0x2a,0x5e,
+		0x9e,0x40,0x70,0xe5,0xdd,0x8a,0xa8,0x28,
+		0x20,0xdc,0x91,0xd8,0x2c,0xa6,0xa0,0xb1,
+		0x2d,0x22,0x26,0x94,0x4b,0x40,0x85,0x30,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x830107a, {
+		0x2a,0x65,0x8c,0x1a,0x5e,0x07,0x21,0x72,
+		0xdf,0x90,0xa6,0x51,0x37,0xd3,0x4b,0x34,
+		0xc4,0xda,0x03,0xe1,0x8a,0x6c,0xfb,0x20,
+		0x04,0xb2,0x81,0x05,0xd4,0x87,0xf4,0x0a,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x830107b, {
+		0xb3,0x43,0x13,0x63,0x56,0xc1,0x39,0xad,
+		0x10,0xa6,0x2b,0xcc,0x02,0xe6,0x76,0x2a,
+		0x1e,0x39,0x58,0x3e,0x23,0x6e,0xa4,0x04,
+		0x95,0xea,0xf9,0x6d,0xc2,0x8a,0x13,0x19,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x830107c, {
+		0x21,0x64,0xde,0xfb,0x9f,0x68,0x96,0x47,
+		0x70,0x5c,0xe2,0x8f,0x18,0x52,0x6a,0xac,
+		0xa4,0xd2,0x2e,0xe0,0xde,0x68,0x66,0xc3,
+		0xeb,0x1e,0xd3,0x3f,0xbc,0x51,0x1d,0x38,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x860010d, {
+		0x86,0xb6,0x15,0x83,0xbc,0x3b,0x9c,0xe0,
+		0xb3,0xef,0x1d,0x99,0x84,0x35,0x15,0xf7,
+		0x7c,0x2a,0xc6,0x42,0xdb,0x73,0x07,0x5c,
+		0x7d,0xc3,0x02,0xb5,0x43,0x06,0x5e,0xf8,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8608108, {
+		0x14,0xfe,0x57,0x86,0x49,0xc8,0x68,0xe2,
+		0x11,0xa3,0xcb,0x6e,0xff,0x6e,0xd5,0x38,
+		0xfe,0x89,0x1a,0xe0,0x67,0xbf,0xc4,0xcc,
+		0x1b,0x9f,0x84,0x77,0x2b,0x9f,0xaa,0xbd,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8701034, {
+		0xc3,0x14,0x09,0xa8,0x9c,0x3f,0x8d,0x83,
+		0x9b,0x4c,0xa5,0xb7,0x64,0x8b,0x91,0x5d,
+		0x85,0x6a,0x39,0x26,0x1e,0x14,0x41,0xa8,
+		0x75,0xea,0xa6,0xf9,0xc9,0xd1,0xea,0x2b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8a00008, {
+		0xd7,0x2a,0x93,0xdc,0x05,0x2f,0xa5,0x6e,
+		0x0c,0x61,0x2c,0x07,0x9f,0x38,0xe9,0x8e,
+		0xef,0x7d,0x2a,0x05,0x4d,0x56,0xaf,0x72,
+		0xe7,0x56,0x47,0x6e,0x60,0x27,0xd5,0x8c,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0x8a0000a, {
+		0x73,0x31,0x26,0x22,0xd4,0xf9,0xee,0x3c,
+		0x07,0x06,0xe7,0xb9,0xad,0xd8,0x72,0x44,
+		0x33,0x31,0xaa,0x7d,0xc3,0x67,0x0e,0xdb,
+		0x47,0xb5,0xaa,0xbc,0xf5,0xbb,0xd9,0x20,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00104c, {
+		0x3c,0x8a,0xfe,0x04,0x62,0xd8,0x6d,0xbe,
+		0xa7,0x14,0x28,0x64,0x75,0xc0,0xa3,0x76,
+		0xb7,0x92,0x0b,0x97,0x0a,0x8e,0x9c,0x5b,
+		0x1b,0xc8,0x9d,0x3a,0x1e,0x81,0x3d,0x3b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00104e, {
+		0xc4,0x35,0x82,0x67,0xd2,0x86,0xe5,0xb2,
+		0xfd,0x69,0x12,0x38,0xc8,0x77,0xba,0xe0,
+		0x70,0xf9,0x77,0x89,0x10,0xa6,0x74,0x4e,
+		0x56,0x58,0x13,0xf5,0x84,0x70,0x28,0x0b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001053, {
+		0x92,0x0e,0xf4,0x69,0x10,0x3b,0xf9,0x9d,
+		0x31,0x1b,0xa6,0x99,0x08,0x7d,0xd7,0x25,
+		0x7e,0x1e,0x89,0xba,0x35,0x8d,0xac,0xcb,
+		0x3a,0xb4,0xdf,0x58,0x12,0xcf,0xc0,0xc3,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001058, {
+		0x33,0x7d,0xa9,0xb5,0x4e,0x62,0x13,0x36,
+		0xef,0x66,0xc9,0xbd,0x0a,0xa6,0x3b,0x19,
+		0xcb,0xf5,0xc2,0xc3,0x55,0x47,0x20,0xec,
+		0x1f,0x7b,0xa1,0x44,0x0e,0x8e,0xa4,0xb2,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001075, {
+		0x39,0x02,0x82,0xd0,0x7c,0x26,0x43,0xe9,
+		0x26,0xa3,0xd9,0x96,0xf7,0x30,0x13,0x0a,
+		0x8a,0x0e,0xac,0xe7,0x1d,0xdc,0xe2,0x0f,
+		0xcb,0x9e,0x8d,0xbc,0xd2,0xa2,0x44,0xe0,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001078, {
+		0x2d,0x67,0xc7,0x35,0xca,0xef,0x2f,0x25,
+		0x4c,0x45,0x93,0x3f,0x36,0x01,0x8c,0xce,
+		0xa8,0x5b,0x07,0xd3,0xc1,0x35,0x3c,0x04,
+		0x20,0xa2,0xfc,0xdc,0xe6,0xce,0x26,0x3e,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001079, {
+		0x43,0xe2,0x05,0x9c,0xfd,0xb7,0x5b,0xeb,
+		0x5b,0xe9,0xeb,0x3b,0x96,0xf4,0xe4,0x93,
+		0x73,0x45,0x3e,0xac,0x8d,0x3b,0xe4,0xdb,
+		0x10,0x31,0xc1,0xe4,0xa2,0xd0,0x5a,0x8a,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00107a, {
+		0x5f,0x92,0xca,0xff,0xc3,0x59,0x22,0x5f,
+		0x02,0xa0,0x91,0x3b,0x4a,0x45,0x10,0xfd,
+		0x19,0xe1,0x8a,0x6d,0x9a,0x92,0xc1,0x3f,
+		0x75,0x78,0xac,0x78,0x03,0x1d,0xdb,0x18,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001143, {
+		0x56,0xca,0xf7,0x43,0x8a,0x4c,0x46,0x80,
+		0xec,0xde,0xe5,0x9c,0x50,0x84,0x9a,0x42,
+		0x27,0xe5,0x51,0x84,0x8f,0x19,0xc0,0x8d,
+		0x0c,0x25,0xb4,0xb0,0x8f,0x10,0xf3,0xf8,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001144, {
+		0x42,0xd5,0x9b,0xa7,0xd6,0x15,0x29,0x41,
+		0x61,0xc4,0x72,0x3f,0xf3,0x06,0x78,0x4b,
+		0x65,0xf3,0x0e,0xfa,0x9c,0x87,0xde,0x25,
+		0xbd,0xb3,0x9a,0xf4,0x75,0x13,0x53,0xdc,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00115d, {
+		0xd4,0xc4,0x49,0x36,0x89,0x0b,0x47,0xdd,
+		0xfb,0x2f,0x88,0x3b,0x5f,0xf2,0x8e,0x75,
+		0xc6,0x6c,0x37,0x5a,0x90,0x25,0x94,0x3e,
+		0x36,0x9c,0xae,0x02,0x38,0x6c,0xf5,0x05,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001173, {
+		0x28,0xbb,0x9b,0xd1,0xa0,0xa0,0x7e,0x3a,
+		0x59,0x20,0xc0,0xa9,0xb2,0x5c,0xc3,0x35,
+		0x53,0x89,0xe1,0x4c,0x93,0x2f,0x1d,0xc3,
+		0xe5,0xf7,0xf3,0xc8,0x9b,0x61,0xaa,0x9e,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa0011a8, {
+		0x97,0xc6,0x16,0x65,0x99,0xa4,0x85,0x3b,
+		0xf6,0xce,0xaa,0x49,0x4a,0x3a,0xc5,0xb6,
+		0x78,0x25,0xbc,0x53,0xaf,0x5d,0xcf,0xf4,
+		0x23,0x12,0xbb,0xb1,0xbc,0x8a,0x02,0x2e,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa0011ce, {
+		0xcf,0x1c,0x90,0xa3,0x85,0x0a,0xbf,0x71,
+		0x94,0x0e,0x80,0x86,0x85,0x4f,0xd7,0x86,
+		0xae,0x38,0x23,0x28,0x2b,0x35,0x9b,0x4e,
+		0xfe,0xb8,0xcd,0x3d,0x3d,0x39,0xc9,0x6a,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa0011d1, {
+		0xdf,0x0e,0xca,0xde,0xf6,0xce,0x5c,0x1e,
+		0x4c,0xec,0xd7,0x71,0x83,0xcc,0xa8,0x09,
+		0xc7,0xc5,0xfe,0xb2,0xf7,0x05,0xd2,0xc5,
+		0x12,0xdd,0xe4,0xf3,0x92,0x1c,0x3d,0xb8,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa0011d3, {
+		0x91,0xe6,0x10,0xd7,0x57,0xb0,0x95,0x0b,
+		0x9a,0x24,0xee,0xf7,0xcf,0x56,0xc1,0xa6,
+		0x4a,0x52,0x7d,0x5f,0x9f,0xdf,0xf6,0x00,
+		0x65,0xf7,0xea,0xe8,0x2a,0x88,0xe2,0x26,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa0011d5, {
+		0xed,0x69,0x89,0xf4,0xeb,0x64,0xc2,0x13,
+		0xe0,0x51,0x1f,0x03,0x26,0x52,0x7d,0xb7,
+		0x93,0x5d,0x65,0xca,0xb8,0x12,0x1d,0x62,
+		0x0d,0x5b,0x65,0x34,0x69,0xb2,0x62,0x21,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa0011d7, {
+                0x35,0x07,0xcd,0x40,0x94,0xbc,0x81,0x6b,
+                0xfc,0x61,0x56,0x1a,0xe2,0xdb,0x96,0x12,
+                0x1c,0x1c,0x31,0xb1,0x02,0x6f,0xe5,0xd2,
+                0xfe,0x1b,0x04,0x03,0x2c,0x8f,0x4c,0x36,
+        }
+ },
+ { 0xa001223, {
+		0xfb,0x32,0x5f,0xc6,0x83,0x4f,0x8c,0xb8,
+		0xa4,0x05,0xf9,0x71,0x53,0x01,0x16,0xc4,
+		0x83,0x75,0x94,0xdd,0xeb,0x7e,0xb7,0x15,
+		0x8e,0x3b,0x50,0x29,0x8a,0x9c,0xcc,0x45,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001224, {
+		0x0e,0x0c,0xdf,0xb4,0x89,0xee,0x35,0x25,
+		0xdd,0x9e,0xdb,0xc0,0x69,0x83,0x0a,0xad,
+		0x26,0xa9,0xaa,0x9d,0xfc,0x3c,0xea,0xf9,
+		0x6c,0xdc,0xd5,0x6d,0x8b,0x6e,0x85,0x4a,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001227, {
+		0xab,0xc6,0x00,0x69,0x4b,0x50,0x87,0xad,
+		0x5f,0x0e,0x8b,0xea,0x57,0x38,0xce,0x1d,
+		0x0f,0x75,0x26,0x02,0xf6,0xd6,0x96,0xe9,
+		0x87,0xb9,0xd6,0x20,0x27,0x7c,0xd2,0xe0,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001229, {
+		0x7f,0x49,0x49,0x48,0x46,0xa5,0x50,0xa6,
+		0x28,0x89,0x98,0xe2,0x9e,0xb4,0x7f,0x75,
+		0x33,0xa7,0x04,0x02,0xe4,0x82,0xbf,0xb4,
+		0xa5,0x3a,0xba,0x24,0x8d,0x31,0x10,0x1d,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00122e, {
+		0x56,0x94,0xa9,0x5d,0x06,0x68,0xfe,0xaf,
+		0xdf,0x7a,0xff,0x2d,0xdf,0x74,0x0f,0x15,
+		0x66,0xfb,0x00,0xb5,0x51,0x97,0x9b,0xfa,
+		0xcb,0x79,0x85,0x46,0x25,0xb4,0xd2,0x10,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001231, {
+		0x0b,0x46,0xa5,0xfc,0x18,0x15,0xa0,0x9e,
+		0xa6,0xdc,0xb7,0xff,0x17,0xf7,0x30,0x64,
+		0xd4,0xda,0x9e,0x1b,0xc3,0xfc,0x02,0x3b,
+		0xe2,0xc6,0x0e,0x41,0x54,0xb5,0x18,0xdd,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001234, {
+		0x88,0x8d,0xed,0xab,0xb5,0xbd,0x4e,0xf7,
+		0x7f,0xd4,0x0e,0x95,0x34,0x91,0xff,0xcc,
+		0xfb,0x2a,0xcd,0xf7,0xd5,0xdb,0x4c,0x9b,
+		0xd6,0x2e,0x73,0x50,0x8f,0x83,0x79,0x1a,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001236, {
+		0x3d,0x30,0x00,0xb9,0x71,0xba,0x87,0x78,
+		0xa8,0x43,0x55,0xc4,0x26,0x59,0xcf,0x9d,
+		0x93,0xce,0x64,0x0e,0x8b,0x72,0x11,0x8b,
+		0xa3,0x8f,0x51,0xe9,0xca,0x98,0xaa,0x25,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa001238, {
+		0x72,0xf7,0x4b,0x0c,0x7d,0x58,0x65,0xcc,
+		0x00,0xcc,0x57,0x16,0x68,0x16,0xf8,0x2a,
+		0x1b,0xb3,0x8b,0xe1,0xb6,0x83,0x8c,0x7e,
+		0xc0,0xcd,0x33,0xf2,0x8d,0xf9,0xef,0x59,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00123b, {
+		0xef,0xa1,0x1e,0x71,0xf1,0xc3,0x2c,0xe2,
+		0xc3,0xef,0x69,0x41,0x7a,0x54,0xca,0xc3,
+		0x8f,0x62,0x84,0xee,0xc2,0x39,0xd9,0x28,
+		0x95,0xa7,0x12,0x49,0x1e,0x30,0x71,0x72,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00820c, {
+		0xa8,0x0c,0x81,0xc0,0xa6,0x00,0xe7,0xf3,
+		0x5f,0x65,0xd3,0xb9,0x6f,0xea,0x93,0x63,
+		0xf1,0x8c,0x88,0x45,0xd7,0x82,0x80,0xd1,
+		0xe1,0x3b,0x8d,0xb2,0xf8,0x22,0x03,0xe2,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa00820d, {
+		0xf9,0x2a,0xc0,0xf4,0x9e,0xa4,0x87,0xa4,
+		0x7d,0x87,0x00,0xfd,0xab,0xda,0x19,0xca,
+		0x26,0x51,0x32,0xc1,0x57,0x91,0xdf,0xc1,
+		0x05,0xeb,0x01,0x7c,0x5a,0x95,0x21,0xb7,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa10113e, {
+		0x05,0x3c,0x66,0xd7,0xa9,0x5a,0x33,0x10,
+		0x1b,0xf8,0x9c,0x8f,0xed,0xfc,0xa7,0xa0,
+		0x15,0xe3,0x3f,0x4b,0x1d,0x0d,0x0a,0xd5,
+		0xfa,0x90,0xc4,0xed,0x9d,0x90,0xaf,0x53,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa101144, {
+		0xb3,0x0b,0x26,0x9a,0xf8,0x7c,0x02,0x26,
+		0x35,0x84,0x53,0xa4,0xd3,0x2c,0x7c,0x09,
+		0x68,0x7b,0x96,0xb6,0x93,0xef,0xde,0xbc,
+		0xfd,0x4b,0x15,0xd2,0x81,0xd3,0x51,0x47,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa101148, {
+		0x20,0xd5,0x6f,0x40,0x4a,0xf6,0x48,0x90,
+		0xc2,0x93,0x9a,0xc2,0xfd,0xac,0xef,0x4f,
+		0xfa,0xc0,0x3d,0x92,0x3c,0x6d,0x01,0x08,
+		0xf1,0x5e,0xb0,0xde,0xb4,0x98,0xae,0xc4,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa10114c, {
+		0x9e,0xb6,0xa2,0xd9,0x87,0x38,0xc5,0x64,
+		0xd8,0x88,0xfa,0x78,0x98,0xf9,0x6f,0x74,
+		0x39,0x90,0x1b,0xa5,0xcf,0x5e,0xb4,0x2a,
+		0x02,0xff,0xd4,0x8c,0x71,0x8b,0xe2,0xc0,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa10123e, {
+		0x03,0xb9,0x2c,0x76,0x48,0x93,0xc9,0x18,
+		0xfb,0x56,0xfd,0xf7,0xe2,0x1d,0xca,0x4d,
+		0x1d,0x13,0x53,0x63,0xfe,0x42,0x6f,0xfc,
+		0x19,0x0f,0xf1,0xfc,0xa7,0xdd,0x89,0x1b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa101244, {
+		0x71,0x56,0xb5,0x9f,0x21,0xbf,0xb3,0x3c,
+		0x8c,0xd7,0x36,0xd0,0x34,0x52,0x1b,0xb1,
+		0x46,0x2f,0x04,0xf0,0x37,0xd8,0x1e,0x72,
+		0x24,0xa2,0x80,0x84,0x83,0x65,0x84,0xc0,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa101248, {
+		0xed,0x3b,0x95,0xa6,0x68,0xa7,0x77,0x3e,
+		0xfc,0x17,0x26,0xe2,0x7b,0xd5,0x56,0x22,
+		0x2c,0x1d,0xef,0xeb,0x56,0xdd,0xba,0x6e,
+		0x1b,0x7d,0x64,0x9d,0x4b,0x53,0x13,0x75,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa10124c, {
+		0x29,0xea,0xf1,0x2c,0xb2,0xe4,0xef,0x90,
+		0xa4,0xcd,0x1d,0x86,0x97,0x17,0x61,0x46,
+		0xfc,0x22,0xcb,0x57,0x75,0x19,0xc8,0xcc,
+		0x0c,0xf5,0xbc,0xac,0x81,0x9d,0x9a,0xd2,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa108108, {
+		0xed,0xc2,0xec,0xa1,0x15,0xc6,0x65,0xe9,
+		0xd0,0xef,0x39,0xaa,0x7f,0x55,0x06,0xc6,
+		0xf5,0xd4,0x3f,0x7b,0x14,0xd5,0x60,0x2c,
+		0x28,0x1e,0x9c,0x59,0x69,0x99,0x4d,0x16,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa108109, {
+		0x85,0xb4,0xbd,0x7c,0x49,0xa7,0xbd,0xfa,
+		0x49,0x36,0x80,0x81,0xc5,0xb7,0x39,0x1b,
+		0x9a,0xaa,0x50,0xde,0x9b,0xe9,0x32,0x35,
+		0x42,0x7e,0x51,0x4f,0x52,0x2c,0x28,0x59,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa20102d, {
+		0xf9,0x6e,0xf2,0x32,0xd3,0x0f,0x5f,0x11,
+		0x59,0xa1,0xfe,0xcc,0xcd,0x9b,0x42,0x89,
+		0x8b,0x89,0x2f,0xb5,0xbb,0x82,0xef,0x23,
+		0x8c,0xe9,0x19,0x3e,0xcc,0x3f,0x7b,0xb4,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa20102e, {
+		0xbe,0x1f,0x32,0x04,0x0d,0x3c,0x9c,0xdd,
+		0xe1,0xa4,0xbf,0x76,0x3a,0xec,0xc2,0xf6,
+		0x11,0x00,0xa7,0xaf,0x0f,0xe5,0x02,0xc5,
+		0x54,0x3a,0x1f,0x8c,0x16,0xb5,0xff,0xbe,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa201210, {
+		0xe8,0x6d,0x51,0x6a,0x8e,0x72,0xf3,0xfe,
+		0x6e,0x16,0xbc,0x62,0x59,0x40,0x17,0xe9,
+		0x6d,0x3d,0x0e,0x6b,0xa7,0xac,0xe3,0x68,
+		0xf7,0x55,0xf0,0x13,0xbb,0x22,0xf6,0x41,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa201211, {
+		0x69,0xa1,0x17,0xec,0xd0,0xf6,0x6c,0x95,
+		0xe2,0x1e,0xc5,0x59,0x1a,0x52,0x0a,0x27,
+		0xc4,0xed,0xd5,0x59,0x1f,0xbf,0x00,0xff,
+		0x08,0x88,0xb5,0xe1,0x12,0xb6,0xcc,0x27,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa404107, {
+		0xbb,0x04,0x4e,0x47,0xdd,0x5e,0x26,0x45,
+		0x1a,0xc9,0x56,0x24,0xa4,0x4c,0x82,0xb0,
+		0x8b,0x0d,0x9f,0xf9,0x3a,0xdf,0xc6,0x81,
+		0x13,0xbc,0xc5,0x25,0xe4,0xc5,0xc3,0x99,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa404108, {
+		0x69,0x67,0x43,0x06,0xf8,0x0c,0x62,0xdc,
+		0xa4,0x21,0x30,0x4f,0x0f,0x21,0x2c,0xcb,
+		0xcc,0x37,0xf1,0x1c,0xc3,0xf8,0x2f,0x19,
+		0xdf,0x53,0x53,0x46,0xb1,0x15,0xea,0x00,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa500011, {
+		0x23,0x3d,0x70,0x7d,0x03,0xc3,0xc4,0xf4,
+		0x2b,0x82,0xc6,0x05,0xda,0x80,0x0a,0xf1,
+		0xd7,0x5b,0x65,0x3a,0x7d,0xab,0xdf,0xa2,
+		0x11,0x5e,0x96,0x7e,0x71,0xe9,0xfc,0x74,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa500012, {
+		0xeb,0x74,0x0d,0x47,0xa1,0x8e,0x09,0xe4,
+		0x93,0x4c,0xad,0x03,0x32,0x4c,0x38,0x16,
+		0x10,0x39,0xdd,0x06,0xaa,0xce,0xd6,0x0f,
+		0x62,0x83,0x9d,0x8e,0x64,0x55,0xbe,0x63,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa601209, {
+		0x66,0x48,0xd4,0x09,0x05,0xcb,0x29,0x32,
+		0x66,0xb7,0x9a,0x76,0xcd,0x11,0xf3,0x30,
+		0x15,0x86,0xcc,0x5d,0x97,0x0f,0xc0,0x46,
+		0xe8,0x73,0xe2,0xd6,0xdb,0xd2,0x77,0x1d,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa60120a, {
+		0x0c,0x8b,0x3d,0xfd,0x52,0x52,0x85,0x7d,
+		0x20,0x3a,0xe1,0x7e,0xa4,0x21,0x3b,0x7b,
+		0x17,0x86,0xae,0xac,0x13,0xb8,0x63,0x9d,
+		0x06,0x01,0xd0,0xa0,0x51,0x9a,0x91,0x2c,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa704107, {
+		0xf3,0xc6,0x58,0x26,0xee,0xac,0x3f,0xd6,
+		0xce,0xa1,0x72,0x47,0x3b,0xba,0x2b,0x93,
+		0x2a,0xad,0x8e,0x6b,0xea,0x9b,0xb7,0xc2,
+		0x64,0x39,0x71,0x8c,0xce,0xe7,0x41,0x39,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa704108, {
+		0xd7,0x55,0x15,0x2b,0xfe,0xc4,0xbc,0x93,
+		0xec,0x91,0xa0,0xae,0x45,0xb7,0xc3,0x98,
+		0x4e,0xff,0x61,0x77,0x88,0xc2,0x70,0x49,
+		0xe0,0x3a,0x1d,0x84,0x38,0x52,0xbf,0x5a,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa705206, {
+		0x8d,0xc0,0x76,0xbd,0x58,0x9f,0x8f,0xa4,
+		0x12,0x9d,0x21,0xfb,0x48,0x21,0xbc,0xe7,
+		0x67,0x6f,0x04,0x18,0xae,0x20,0x87,0x4b,
+		0x03,0x35,0xe9,0xbe,0xfb,0x06,0xdf,0xfc,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa705208, {
+		0x30,0x1d,0x55,0x24,0xbc,0x6b,0x5a,0x19,
+		0x0c,0x7d,0x1d,0x74,0xaa,0xd1,0xeb,0xd2,
+		0x16,0x62,0xf7,0x5b,0xe1,0x1f,0x18,0x11,
+		0x5c,0xf0,0x94,0x90,0x26,0xec,0x69,0xff,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa708007, {
+		0x6b,0x76,0xcc,0x78,0xc5,0x8a,0xa3,0xe3,
+		0x32,0x2d,0x79,0xe4,0xc3,0x80,0xdb,0xb2,
+		0x07,0xaa,0x3a,0xe0,0x57,0x13,0x72,0x80,
+		0xdf,0x92,0x73,0x84,0x87,0x3c,0x73,0x93,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa708008, {
+		0x08,0x6e,0xf0,0x22,0x4b,0x8e,0xc4,0x46,
+		0x58,0x34,0xe6,0x47,0xa2,0x28,0xfd,0xab,
+		0x22,0x3d,0xdd,0xd8,0x52,0x9e,0x1d,0x16,
+		0xfa,0x01,0x68,0x14,0x79,0x3e,0xe8,0x6b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa70c005, {
+		0x88,0x5d,0xfb,0x79,0x64,0xd8,0x46,0x3b,
+		0x4a,0x83,0x8e,0x77,0x7e,0xcf,0xb3,0x0f,
+		0x1f,0x1f,0xf1,0x97,0xeb,0xfe,0x56,0x55,
+		0xee,0x49,0xac,0xe1,0x8b,0x13,0xc5,0x13,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xa70c008, {
+		0x0f,0xdb,0x37,0xa1,0x10,0xaf,0xd4,0x21,
+		0x94,0x0d,0xa4,0xa2,0xe9,0x86,0x6c,0x0e,
+		0x85,0x7c,0x36,0x30,0xa3,0x3a,0x78,0x66,
+		0x18,0x10,0x60,0x0d,0x78,0x3d,0x44,0xd0,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xaa00116, {
+		0xe8,0x4c,0x2c,0x88,0xa1,0xac,0x24,0x63,
+		0x65,0xe5,0xaa,0x2d,0x16,0xa9,0xc3,0xf5,
+		0xfe,0x1d,0x5e,0x65,0xc7,0xaa,0x92,0x4d,
+		0x91,0xee,0x76,0xbb,0x4c,0x66,0x78,0xc9,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xaa00212, {
+		0xbd,0x57,0x5d,0x0a,0x0a,0x30,0xc1,0x75,
+		0x95,0x58,0x5e,0x93,0x02,0x28,0x43,0x71,
+		0xed,0x42,0x29,0xc8,0xec,0x34,0x2b,0xb2,
+		0x1a,0x65,0x4b,0xfe,0x07,0x0f,0x34,0xa1,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xaa00213, {
+		0xed,0x58,0xb7,0x76,0x81,0x7f,0xd9,0x3a,
+		0x1a,0xff,0x8b,0x34,0xb8,0x4a,0x99,0x0f,
+		0x28,0x49,0x6c,0x56,0x2b,0xdc,0xb7,0xed,
+		0x96,0xd5,0x9d,0xc1,0x7a,0xd4,0x51,0x9b,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xaa00215, {
+		0x55,0xd3,0x28,0xcb,0x87,0xa9,0x32,0xe9,
+		0x4e,0x85,0x4b,0x7c,0x6b,0xd5,0x7c,0xd4,
+		0x1b,0x51,0x71,0x3a,0x0e,0x0b,0xdc,0x9b,
+		0x68,0x2f,0x46,0xee,0xfe,0xc6,0x6d,0xef,
+	}
+ },
+ { 0xaa00216, {
+		0x79,0xfb,0x5b,0x9f,0xb6,0xe6,0xa8,0xf5,
+		0x4e,0x7c,0x4f,0x8e,0x1d,0xad,0xd0,0x08,
+		0xc2,0x43,0x7c,0x8b,0xe6,0xdb,0xd0,0xd2,
+		0xe8,0x39,0x26,0xc1,0xe5,0x5a,0x48,0xf1,
+	}
+ },
+};

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static struct microcode_ops *microcode_ops;
-bool dis_ucode_ldr = true;
+static bool dis_ucode_ldr = false;
 
 bool force_minrev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_FORCE_MINREV);
 module_param(force_minrev, bool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ static bool amd_check_current_patch_level(void)
 	u32 lvl, dummy, i;
 	u32 *levels;
 
+	if (x86_cpuid_vendor() != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+		return false;
+
 	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, lvl, dummy);
 
 	levels = final_levels;
@@ -95,27 +98,29 @@ static bool amd_check_current_patch_level(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void)
+bool __init microcode_loader_disabled(void)
 {
-	static const char *__dis_opt_str = "dis_ucode_ldr";
-	const char *cmdline = boot_command_line;
-	const char *option  = __dis_opt_str;
+	if (dis_ucode_ldr)
+		return true;
 
 	/*
-	 * CPUID(1).ECX[31]: reserved for hypervisor use. This is still not
-	 * completely accurate as xen pv guests don't see that CPUID bit set but
-	 * that's good enough as they don't land on the BSP path anyway.
+	 * Disable when:
+	 *
+	 * 1) The CPU does not support CPUID.
+	 *
+	 * 2) Bit 31 in CPUID[1]:ECX is clear
+	 *    The bit is reserved for hypervisor use. This is still not
+	 *    completely accurate as XEN PV guests don't see that CPUID bit
+	 *    set, but that's good enough as they don't land on the BSP
+	 *    path anyway.
+	 *
+	 * 3) Certain AMD patch levels are not allowed to be
+	 *    overwritten.
 	 */
-	if (native_cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(31))
-		return true;
-
-	if (x86_cpuid_vendor() == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
-		if (amd_check_current_patch_level())
-			return true;
-	}
-
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option) <= 0)
-		dis_ucode_ldr = false;
+	if (!have_cpuid_p() ||
+	    native_cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(31) ||
+	    amd_check_current_patch_level())
+		dis_ucode_ldr = true;
 
 	return dis_ucode_ldr;
 }
@@ -125,7 +130,10 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void)
 	unsigned int cpuid_1_eax;
 	bool intel = true;
 
-	if (!have_cpuid_p())
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "dis_ucode_ldr") > 0)
+		dis_ucode_ldr = true;
+
+	if (microcode_loader_disabled())
 		return;
 
 	cpuid_1_eax = native_cpuid_eax(1);
@@ -146,9 +154,6 @@ void __init load_ucode_bsp(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (check_loader_disabled_bsp())
-		return;
-
 	if (intel)
 		load_ucode_intel_bsp(&early_data);
 	else
@@ -159,6 +164,11 @@ void load_ucode_ap(void)
 {
 	unsigned int cpuid_1_eax;
 
+	/*
+	 * Can't use microcode_loader_disabled() here - .init section
+	 * hell. It doesn't have to either - the BSP variant must've
+	 * parsed cmdline already anyway.
+	 */
 	if (dis_ucode_ldr)
 		return;
 
@@ -810,7 +820,7 @@ static int __init microcode_init(void)
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
 	int error;
 
-	if (dis_ucode_ldr)
+	if (microcode_loader_disabled())
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c

@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int __init save_builtin_microcode(void)
 	if (xchg(&ucode_patch_va, NULL) != UCODE_BSP_LOADED)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (dis_ucode_ldr || boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+	if (microcode_loader_disabled() || boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
 		return 0;
 
 	uci.mc = get_microcode_blob(&uci, true);

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/internal.h

@@ -94,20 +94,17 @@ static inline unsigned int x86_cpuid_family(void)
 	return x86_family(eax);
 }
 
-extern bool dis_ucode_ldr;
 extern bool force_minrev;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
 void load_ucode_amd_bsp(struct early_load_data *ed, unsigned int family);
 void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family);
-int save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family);
 void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu);
 struct microcode_ops *init_amd_microcode(void);
 void exit_amd_microcode(void);
 #else /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD */
 static inline void load_ucode_amd_bsp(struct early_load_data *ed, unsigned int family) { }
 static inline void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family) { }
-static inline int save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu) { }
 static inline struct microcode_ops *init_amd_microcode(void) { return NULL; }
 static inline void exit_amd_microcode(void) { }

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mkcapflags.sh

@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ dump_array()
 
 		# If the /* comment */ starts with a quote string, grab that.
 		VALUE="$(echo "$i" | sed -n 's@.*/\* *\("[^"]*"\).*\*/@\1@p')"
-		[ -z "$VALUE" ] && VALUE="\"$NAME\""
-		[ "$VALUE" = '""' ] && continue
+		[ ! "$VALUE" ] && continue
 
 		# Name is uppercase, VALUE is all lowercase
 		VALUE="$(echo "$VALUE" | tr A-Z a-z)"

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_MBA,			CPUID_EBX,  6, 0x80000008, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_SMBA,			CPUID_EBX,  2, 0x80000020, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_BMEC,			CPUID_EBX,  3, 0x80000020, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO,		CPUID_ECX,  1, 0x80000021, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO,		CPUID_ECX,  2, 0x80000021, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_WORKLOAD_CLASS,	CPUID_EAX, 22, 0x80000021, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x80000022, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x80000022, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE,	CPUID_EAX,  2, 0x80000022, 0 },

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #define EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE \
 	"EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x) and an EPC page was leaked. SGX may become unusable. " \
-	"Refer to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst for more information."
+	"Refer to Documentation/arch/x86/sgx.rst for more information."
 
 #define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS		8
 #define SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE		256

arch/x86/kernel/head32.c

@@ -144,10 +144,6 @@ void __init __no_stack_protector mk_early_pgtbl_32(void)
 	*ptr = (unsigned long)ptep + PAGE_OFFSET;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_INITRD32
-	/* Running on a hypervisor? */
-	if (native_cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(31))
-		return;
-
 	params = (struct boot_params *)__pa_nodebug(&boot_params);
 	if (!params->hdr.ramdisk_size || !params->hdr.ramdisk_image)
 		return;

arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ void __init pci_iommu_alloc(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * See <Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst> for the iommu kernel
+ * See <Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst> for the iommu kernel
  * parameter documentation.
  */
 static __init int iommu_setup(char *p)

arch/x86/kernel/process.c

@@ -897,19 +897,24 @@ static int prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
  */
 static __cpuidle void mwait_idle(void)
 {
-	if (!current_set_polling_and_test()) {
-		if (this_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR)) {
-			mb(); /* quirk */
-			clflush((void *)&current_thread_info()->flags);
-			mb(); /* quirk */
-		}
+	if (need_resched())
+		return;
+
+	x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+	if (!current_set_polling_and_test()) {
+		const void *addr = &current_thread_info()->flags;
+
+		alternative_input("", "clflush (%[addr])", X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR, [addr] "a" (addr));
+		__monitor(addr, 0, 0);
+		if (need_resched())
+			goto out;
 
-		__monitor((void *)&current_thread_info()->flags, 0, 0);
-		if (!need_resched()) {
 		__sti_mwait(0, 0);
 		raw_local_irq_disable();
 	}
-	}
+
+out:
 	__current_clr_polling();
 }
 

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c

@@ -814,13 +814,16 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX,
 		F(NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) | F(LFENCE_RDTSC) | 0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |
+		0 /* 4:Resv */ | F(VERW_CLEAR) |
 		F(NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE) | F(AUTOIBRS) | 0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ |
-		F(WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS)
+		F(WRMSR_XX_BASE_NS) | F(SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)
 	);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
 	kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
 	kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+	kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
+	kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_8000_0022_EAX,
 		F(PERFMON_V2)
@@ -1378,8 +1381,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 		entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
 		break;
 	case 0x80000021:
-		entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0;
 		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0021_EAX);
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0021_ECX);
 		break;
 	/* AMD Extended Performance Monitoring and Debug */
 	case 0x80000022: {

arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
 	CPUID_8000_0022_EAX,
 	CPUID_7_2_EDX,
 	CPUID_24_0_EBX,
+	CPUID_8000_0021_ECX,
 	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS,
 
 	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
@@ -69,6 +70,10 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
 /* CPUID level 0x80000022 (EAX) */
 #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2	KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0022_EAX, 0)
 
+/* CPUID level 0x80000021 (ECX) */
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO	KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 1)
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO	KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 2)
+
 struct cpuid_reg {
 	u32 function;
 	u32 index;
@@ -99,6 +104,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
 	[CPUID_8000_0022_EAX] = {0x80000022, 0, CPUID_EAX},
 	[CPUID_7_2_EDX]       = {         7, 2, CPUID_EDX},
 	[CPUID_24_0_EBX]      = {      0x24, 0, CPUID_EBX},
+	[CPUID_8000_0021_ECX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_ECX},
 };
 
 /*
@@ -136,6 +142,8 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
 	KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(PERFMON_V2);
 	KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(RRSBA_CTRL);
 	KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(BHI_CTRL);
+	KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_SQ_NO);
+	KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_L1_NO);
 	default:
 		return x86_feature;
 	}

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

@@ -607,6 +607,9 @@ static void svm_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 	kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
 
 	amd_pmu_disable_virt();
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE))
+		msr_clear_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT);
 }
 
 static int svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
@@ -684,6 +687,9 @@ static int svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 		rdmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, sev_es_host_save_area(sd)->tsc_aux, msr_hi);
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE))
+		msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_BIT);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S

@@ -169,6 +169,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 #endif
 	mov VCPU_RDI(%_ASM_DI), %_ASM_DI
 
+	/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+	VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
 	/* Enter guest mode */
 	sti
 
@@ -341,6 +344,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 	mov SVM_current_vmcb(%rdi), %rax
 	mov KVM_VMCB_pa(%rax), %rax
 
+	/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+	VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
 	/* Enter guest mode */
 	sti
 

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

@@ -7292,12 +7292,16 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	 * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still
 	 * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW
 	 * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush.
+	 *
+	 * cpu_buf_vm_clear is used when system is not vulnerable to MDS/TAA,
+	 * and is affected by MMIO Stale Data. In such cases mitigation in only
+	 * needed against an MMIO capable guest.
 	 */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
-	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&cpu_buf_vm_clear) &&
 		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+		x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
 	vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
 

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c

@@ -11129,6 +11129,15 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, 0);
 
+	/*
+	 * Mark this CPU as needing a branch predictor flush before running
+	 * userspace. Must be done before enabling preemption to ensure it gets
+	 * set for the CPU that actually ran the guest, and not the CPU that it
+	 * may migrate to.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER))
+		this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, true);
+
 	/*
 	 * Consume any pending interrupts, including the possible source of
 	 * VM-Exit on SVM and any ticks that occur between VM-Exit and now.

arch/x86/lib/msr.c

@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit)
 {
 	return __flip_bit(msr, bit, true);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(msr_set_bit);
 
 /**
  * msr_clear_bit - Clear @bit in a MSR @msr.
@@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ int msr_clear_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit)
 {
 	return __flip_bit(msr, bit, false);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(msr_clear_bit);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS
 void do_trace_write_msr(unsigned int msr, u64 val, int failed)

arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ within_inclusive(unsigned long addr, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
  * take full advantage of the limited (s32) immediate addressing range (2G)
  * of x86_64.
  *
- * See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for more detail.
+ * See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for more detail.
  */
 
 static inline unsigned long highmap_start_pfn(void)